Yes. The intellectual appetite is distinct from the sensitive because what is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different.
Quia igitur est alterius generis apprehensum per intellectum et apprehensum per sensum, consequens est quod appetitus intellectivus sit alia potentia a sensitivo.
The intellectual appetite, though it tends to individual things which exist outside the soul, yet tends to them as with respect to a certain universal aspect, as when it desires something because it is good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhetoric. ii, 4) that hatred is able to be about something universal; as when "we hate every kind of thief." In the same way by the intellectual appetite we are able to desire immaterial goods, which are not apprehended by sense, such as knowledge, virtue, and suchlike.
Appetitus intellectivus, etsi feratur in res quae sunt extra animam singulares, fertur tamen in eas secundum aliquam rationem universalem, sicut cum appetit aliquid quia est bonum. Unde philosophus dicit in sua rhetorica, quod odium potest esse de aliquo universali; puta cum odio habemus omne latronum genus. Similiter etiam per appetitum intellectivum appetere possumus immaterialia bona, quae sensus non apprehendit; sicut scientiam, virtutes, et alia huiusmodi.
Now things passive and movable are differentiated according to the distinction of the corresponding active and motive principles, because the motive must be proportionate to the movable, and the active to the passive; indeed, the passive power itself has its proper aspect from its relation to its active principle.
Passiva autem et mobilia distinguuntur secundum distinctionem activorum et motivorum, quia oportet motivum esse proportionatum mobili, et activum passivo; et ipsa potentia passiva propriam rationem habet ex ordine ad suum activum.
The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) distinguishes a double appetite, and says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower.
Philosophus, in III de anima, distinguit duplicem appetitum, et dicit quod appetitus superior movet inferiorem.
For the appetitive power is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended, wherefore the apprehended appetible is an activator (a mover which is not moved); while the appetite is a receptor (a mover moved), as the Philosopher says in De Anima iii, 10 and Metaph. xii (Did. xi, 7).
Potentia enim appetitiva est potentia passiva, quae nata est moveri ab apprehenso, unde appetibile apprehensum est movens non motum; appetitus autem movens motum, ut dicitur in III de anima, et XII Metaphys.
It is not accidental to the thing desired to be apprehended by the sense or the intellect, rather this belongs to it intrinsically; for the appetible does not move the appetite except as it is apprehended.
Appetibili non accidit esse apprehensum per sensum vel intellectum, sed per se ei convenit; nam appetibile non movet appetitum nisi inquantum est apprehensum.
Wherefore differences in the thing apprehended are of themselves differences of the appetible. And so the appetitive powers are distinct according to the distinction of the things apprehended, as according to their proper objects.
Unde differentiae apprehensi sunt per se differentiae appetibilis. Unde potentiae appetitivae distinguuntur secundum differentiam apprehensorum, sicut secundum propria obiecta.