Intellectus est subiectum virtutis quia bonum uniuscuiusque est finis eius; et ideo, cum verum sit finis intellectus, cognoscere verum est bonus actus intellectus. Unde habitus perficiens intellectum ad verum cognoscendum, vel in speculativis vel in practicis, dicitur virtus.
The intellect is the subject of virtue because the good of each thing is its end; and therefore, as truth is the end of the intellect, so to know truth is the good act of the intellect. Whence the habit, which perfects the intellect in regard to the knowledge of truth, whether speculative or practical, is a virtue.
Subiectum igitur habitus qui secundum quid dicitur virtus, potest esse intellectus, non solum practicus, sed etiam intellectus speculativus, absque omni ordine ad voluntatem, sic enim philosophus, in VI Ethic., scientiam, sapientiam et intellectum, et etiam artem, ponit esse intellectuales virtutes.
The subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative sense, can be the intellect, and not only the practical intellect, but also the speculative, without any reference to the will: for thus the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) holds that science, wisdom and understanding, and also art, are intellectual virtues.
Virtus est habitus quo quis bene operatur. Dupliciter autem habitus aliquis ordinatur ad bonum actum. Uno modo, inquantum per huiusmodi habitum acquiritur homini facultas ad bonum actum, sicut per habitum grammaticae habet homo facultatem recte loquendi. Non tamen grammatica facit ut homo semper recte loquatur, potest enim grammaticus barbarizare aut soloecismum facere. Et eadem ratio est in aliis scientiis et artibus. Alio modo, aliquis habitus non solum facit facultatem agendi, sed etiam facit quod aliquis recte facultate utatur, sicut iustitia non solum facit quod homo sit promptae voluntatis ad iusta operandum, sed etiam facit ut iuste operetur.
A virtue is a habit by which we work well. Now a habit may be directed to a good act in two ways. First, in so far as by the habit a man acquires an aptness to a good act; for instance, by the habit of grammar man has the aptness to speak correctly. But grammar does not make a man always speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism or make a solecism: and the case is the same with other sciences and arts. Secondly, a habit may confer not only aptness to act, but also the right use of that aptness: for instance, justice not only gives man the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly.
Et quia bonum, sicut et ens, non dicitur simpliciter aliquid secundum id quod est in potentia, sed secundum id quod est in actu; ideo ab huiusmodi habitibus simpliciter dicitur homo bonum operari, et esse bonus, puta quia est iustus vel temperatus; et eadem ratio est de similibus. Et quia virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit, huiusmodi habitus simpliciter dicuntur virtutes, quia reddunt bonum opus in actu, et simpliciter faciunt bonum habentem. Primi vero habitus non simpliciter dicuntur virtutes, quia non reddunt bonum opus nisi in quadam facultate, nec simpliciter faciunt bonum habentem. Non enim dicitur simpliciter aliquis homo bonus, ex hoc quod est sciens vel artifex, sed dicitur bonus solum secundum quid, puta bonus grammaticus, aut bonus faber. Et propter hoc, plerumque scientia et ars contra virtutem dividitur, quandoque autem virtutes dicuntur, ut patet in VI Ethic.
And since good, and, in like manner, being, is said of a thing simply, in respect, not of what it is potentially, but of what it is actually: therefore from having habits of the latter sort, man is said simply to do good, and to be good; for instance, because he is just, or temperate; and in like manner as regards other such virtues. And since virtue is that "which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise," these latter habits are called virtuous simply: because they make the work to be actually good, and the subject good simply. But the first kind of habits are not called virtues simply: because they do not make the work good except in regard to a certain aptness, nor do they make their possessor good simply. For through being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good, not simply, but relatively; for instance, a good grammarian or a good smith. And for this reason science and art are often divided against virtue; while at other times they are called virtues (Ethic. vi, 2).
Subiectum vero habitus qui simpliciter dicitur virtus, non potest esse nisi voluntas; vel aliqua potentia secundum quod est mota a voluntate. Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas movet omnes alias potentias quae aliqualiter sunt rationales, ad suos actus, ut supra habitum est, et ideo quod homo actu bene agat, contingit ex hoc quod homo habet bonam voluntatem. Unde virtus quae facit bene agere in actu, non solum in facultate, oportet quod vel sit in ipsa voluntate; vel in aliqua potentia secundum quod est a voluntate mota.
But the subject of a habit which is called a virtue simply, can only be the will, or some power insofar as it is moved by the will. And the reason of this is, that the will moves to their acts all those other powers that are in some way rational, as we have said above (9, 1; 17, A1,5; I, 82, 4): and therefore if man do well actually, this is because he has a good will. Therefore the virtue which makes a man to do well actually, and not merely to have the aptness to do well, must be either in the will itself; or in some power as moved by the will.
Contingit autem intellectum a voluntate moveri, sicut et alias potentias, considerat enim aliquis aliquid actu, eo quod vult. Et ideo intellectus, secundum quod habet ordinem ad voluntatem, potest esse subiectum virtutis simpliciter dictae. Et hoc modo intellectus speculativus, vel ratio, est subiectum fidei, movetur enim intellectus ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei, ex imperio voluntatis; nullus enim credit nisi volens. Intellectus vero practicus est subiectum prudentiae. Cum enim prudentia sit recta ratio agibilium, requiritur ad prudentiam quod homo se bene habeat ad principia huius rationis agendorum, quae sunt fines; ad quos bene se habet homo per rectitudinem voluntatis, sicut ad principia speculabilium per naturale lumen intellectus agentis. Et ideo sicut subiectum scientiae, quae est ratio recta speculabilium, est intellectus speculativus in ordine ad intellectum agentem; ita subiectum prudentiae est intellectus practicus in ordine ad voluntatem rectam.
Now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will, just as are the other powers: for a man considers something actually, because he wills to do so. And therefore the intellect, in so far as it is subordinate to the will, can be the subject of virtue absolutely so called. And in this way the speculative intellect, or the reason, is the subject of Faith: for the intellect is moved by the command of the will to assent to what is of faith: for "no man believeth, unless he will" [Augustine: Tract. xxvi in Joan.]. But the practical intellect is the subject of prudence. For since prudence is the right reason of things to be done, it is a condition thereof that man be rightly disposed in regard to the principles of this reason of things to be done, that is in regard to their ends, to which man is rightly disposed by the rectitude of the will, just as to the principles of speculative truth he is rightly disposed by the natural light of the active intellect. And therefore as the subject of science, which is the right reason of speculative truths, is the speculative intellect in its relation to the active intellect, so the subject of prudence is the practical intellect in its relation to the right will.
Monday, January 03, 2011
Sunday, January 02, 2011
1a 2ae q56 a2: Whether one virtue can be in several powers? No.
Una virtus non potest esse in pluribus potentiis animae quia idem actus non potest aequaliter, et eodem ordine, pertinere ad diversas potentias, sed secundum diversas rationes, et diverso ordine.
One virtue cannot be in several powers of the soul because one act cannot belong to several powers equally, and in the same degree, but only according to different formal aspects, and in various degrees.
Diversitas potentiarum attenditur secundum generales conditiones obiectorum, diversitas autem habituum secundum speciales; unde ubicumque est diversitas potentiarum, est diversitas habituum, sed non convertitur.
Diversity of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects, while diversity of habits follows the specific conditions thereof; and so wherever there is diversity of powers, there is diversity of habits, but not vice versa.
Una virtus pertinere potest ad plures potentias; ita quod in una sit principaliter, et se extendat ad alias per modum diffusionis, vel per modum dispositionis: secundum quod una potentia movetur ab alia, et secundum quod una potentia accipit ab alia.
One virtue can belong to several powers; so that it is in one chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition: insofar as one power is moved by another, and one power receives from another.
Scire praeexigitur ad virtutem moralem, inquantum virtus moralis operatur secundum rationem rectam. Sed essentialiter in appetendo virtus moralis consistit.
"To know" is a condition required for moral virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works according to the correct assessment of formal aspect (i.e., essence). But moral virtue is essentially in the appetite.
Prudentia realiter est in ratione sicut in subiecto, sed praesupponit rectitudinem voluntatis sicut principium.
Prudence is really subjected to formal aspect, but it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will.
One virtue cannot be in several powers of the soul because one act cannot belong to several powers equally, and in the same degree, but only according to different formal aspects, and in various degrees.
Diversitas potentiarum attenditur secundum generales conditiones obiectorum, diversitas autem habituum secundum speciales; unde ubicumque est diversitas potentiarum, est diversitas habituum, sed non convertitur.
Diversity of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects, while diversity of habits follows the specific conditions thereof; and so wherever there is diversity of powers, there is diversity of habits, but not vice versa.
Una virtus pertinere potest ad plures potentias; ita quod in una sit principaliter, et se extendat ad alias per modum diffusionis, vel per modum dispositionis: secundum quod una potentia movetur ab alia, et secundum quod una potentia accipit ab alia.
One virtue can belong to several powers; so that it is in one chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition: insofar as one power is moved by another, and one power receives from another.
Scire praeexigitur ad virtutem moralem, inquantum virtus moralis operatur secundum rationem rectam. Sed essentialiter in appetendo virtus moralis consistit.
"To know" is a condition required for moral virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works according to the correct assessment of formal aspect (i.e., essence). But moral virtue is essentially in the appetite.
Prudentia realiter est in ratione sicut in subiecto, sed praesupponit rectitudinem voluntatis sicut principium.
Prudence is really subjected to formal aspect, but it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will.
Tuesday, December 28, 2010
1a 2ae q56 a1: Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul? Yes.
Virtus est in potentia animae quia perfectio est in eo cuius est perfectio.
Virtue is in a power of the soul because perfection is in that which it perfects.
Omnis operatio est ab anima per aliquam potentiam.
All operation proceeds from the soul through a power.
Disponit ad optimum: optimum autem est finis, qui vel est operatio rei, vel aliquid consecutum per operationem a potentia egredientem.
Virtue disposes to that which is best: for the best is the end, which is either a thing's operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing's power.
Unde virtus humana est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto.
Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue.
Virtue is in a power of the soul because perfection is in that which it perfects.
Omnis operatio est ab anima per aliquam potentiam.
All operation proceeds from the soul through a power.
Disponit ad optimum: optimum autem est finis, qui vel est operatio rei, vel aliquid consecutum per operationem a potentia egredientem.
Virtue disposes to that which is best: for the best is the end, which is either a thing's operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing's power.
Unde virtus humana est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto.
Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue.
Monday, December 13, 2010
1a 2ae q56: The subject of virtue
- Is the subject of virtue a power of the soul?
- Can one virtue be in several powers?
- Can the intellect be the subject of virtue?
- Can the irascible and concupiscible faculties be the subject of virtue?
- Can the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of virtue?
- Can the will be the subject of virtue?
Sunday, December 12, 2010
1a 2ae q55 a4: Whether virtue is suitably defined? Yes.
"Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur," quia contra est auctoritas Augustini, ex cuius verbis praedicta definitio colligitur, et praecipue in II de libero arbitrio.
"Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us," because we have the authority of Augustine from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, 19.
Ista definitio perfecte complectitur totam rationem virtutis. Perfecta enim ratio uniuscuiusque rei colligitur ex omnibus causis eius. Comprehendit autem praedicta definitio omnes causas virtutis.
This definition comprises perfectly the whole aspect of virtue, because the perfect aspect of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue.
Causa namque formalis virtutis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, accipitur ex eius genere et differentia, cum dicitur qualitas bona, genus enim virtutis qualitas est, differentia autem bonum. Esset tamen convenientior definitio, si loco qualitatis habitus poneretur, qui est genus propinquum.
For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as "a good quality": for "quality" is the genus of virtue, and the difference, "good." But the definition would be more suitable if for "quality" we substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus.
Virtus autem non habet materiam ex qua, sicut nec alia accidentia, sed habet materiam circa quam; et materiam in qua, scilicet subiectum. Materia autem circa quam est obiectum virtutis; quod non potuit in praedicta definitione poni, eo quod per obiectum determinatur virtus ad speciem; hic autem assignatur definitio virtutis in communi. Unde ponitur subiectum loco causae materialis, cum dicitur quod est bona qualitas mentis.
Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter "about which" it is concerned, and matter "in which" it exits, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality "of the mind."
Finis autem virtutis, cum sit habitus operativus, est ipsa operatio. Sed notandum quod habituum operativorum aliqui sunt semper ad malum, sicut habitus vitiosi; aliqui vero quandoque ad bonum, et quandoque ad malum: sicut opinio se habet ad verum et ad falsum; virtus autem est habitus semper se habens ad bonum. Et ideo, ut discernatur virtus ab his quae semper se habent ad malum, dicitur, qua recte vivitur, ut autem discernatur ab his quae se habent quandoque ad bonum, quandoque ad malum, dicitur, qua nullus male utitur.
The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to evil, as vicious habits; others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil: for instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to the untrue, whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good. And so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live righteously", and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, "of which no one makes bad use."
Causa autem efficiens virtutis infusae, de qua definitio datur, Deus est. Propter quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae quidem particula si auferatur, reliquum definitionis erit commune omnibus virtutibus, et acquisitis et infusis.
Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the words "which God works in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or infused.
Id quod primo cadit in intellectu, est ens, unde unicuique apprehenso a nobis attribuimus quod sit ens; et per consequens quod sit unum et bonum, quae convertuntur cum ente.
That which is first seized by the intellect is be-ing: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as be-ing, and consequently as one, and as good, which are convertible with being.
Unde dicimus quod essentia est ens et una et bona; et quod unitas est ens et una et bona; et similiter de bonitate.
Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that oneness is being and one and good: and likewise goodness.
Non autem hoc habet locum in specialibus formis, sicut est albedo et sanitas, non enim omne quod apprehendimus, sub ratione albi et sani apprehendimus. Sed tamen considerandum quod sicut accidentia et formae non subsistentes dicuntur entia, non quia ipsa habeant esse, sed quia eis aliquid est; ita etiam dicuntur bona vel una, non quidem aliqua alia bonitate vel unitate, sed quia eis est aliquid bonum vel unum. Sic igitur et virtus dicitur bona, quia ea aliquid est bonum.
But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the aspect of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had be-ing, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something is good.
Bonum quod ponitur in definitione virtutis, non est bonum commune, quod convertitur cum ente, et est in plus quam qualitas, sed est bonum rationis, secundum quod Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., "quod bonum animae est secundum rationem esse".
Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by formal aspect, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of the soul is to be in accord with formal aspect".
Virtus non potest esse in irrationali parte animae, nisi inquantum participat rationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Et ideo ratio, sive mens, est proprium subiectum virtutis humanae.
Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except insofar as this participates in formal aspect (Ethic. i, 13). And therefore formal aspect, i.e., the mind, is the proper subject of virtue.
Virtus infusa causatur in nobis a Deo sine nobis agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus. Et sic est intelligendum quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae vero per nos aguntur, Deus in nobis causat non sine nobis agentibus, ipse enim operatur in omni voluntate et natura.
Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words, "which God works in us without us." As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.
"Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us," because we have the authority of Augustine from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, 19.
Ista definitio perfecte complectitur totam rationem virtutis. Perfecta enim ratio uniuscuiusque rei colligitur ex omnibus causis eius. Comprehendit autem praedicta definitio omnes causas virtutis.
This definition comprises perfectly the whole aspect of virtue, because the perfect aspect of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue.
Causa namque formalis virtutis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, accipitur ex eius genere et differentia, cum dicitur qualitas bona, genus enim virtutis qualitas est, differentia autem bonum. Esset tamen convenientior definitio, si loco qualitatis habitus poneretur, qui est genus propinquum.
For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as "a good quality": for "quality" is the genus of virtue, and the difference, "good." But the definition would be more suitable if for "quality" we substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus.
Virtus autem non habet materiam ex qua, sicut nec alia accidentia, sed habet materiam circa quam; et materiam in qua, scilicet subiectum. Materia autem circa quam est obiectum virtutis; quod non potuit in praedicta definitione poni, eo quod per obiectum determinatur virtus ad speciem; hic autem assignatur definitio virtutis in communi. Unde ponitur subiectum loco causae materialis, cum dicitur quod est bona qualitas mentis.
Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter "about which" it is concerned, and matter "in which" it exits, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality "of the mind."
Finis autem virtutis, cum sit habitus operativus, est ipsa operatio. Sed notandum quod habituum operativorum aliqui sunt semper ad malum, sicut habitus vitiosi; aliqui vero quandoque ad bonum, et quandoque ad malum: sicut opinio se habet ad verum et ad falsum; virtus autem est habitus semper se habens ad bonum. Et ideo, ut discernatur virtus ab his quae semper se habent ad malum, dicitur, qua recte vivitur, ut autem discernatur ab his quae se habent quandoque ad bonum, quandoque ad malum, dicitur, qua nullus male utitur.
The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to evil, as vicious habits; others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil: for instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to the untrue, whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good. And so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live righteously", and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, "of which no one makes bad use."
Causa autem efficiens virtutis infusae, de qua definitio datur, Deus est. Propter quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae quidem particula si auferatur, reliquum definitionis erit commune omnibus virtutibus, et acquisitis et infusis.
Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the words "which God works in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or infused.
Id quod primo cadit in intellectu, est ens, unde unicuique apprehenso a nobis attribuimus quod sit ens; et per consequens quod sit unum et bonum, quae convertuntur cum ente.
That which is first seized by the intellect is be-ing: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as be-ing, and consequently as one, and as good, which are convertible with being.
Unde dicimus quod essentia est ens et una et bona; et quod unitas est ens et una et bona; et similiter de bonitate.
Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that oneness is being and one and good: and likewise goodness.
Non autem hoc habet locum in specialibus formis, sicut est albedo et sanitas, non enim omne quod apprehendimus, sub ratione albi et sani apprehendimus. Sed tamen considerandum quod sicut accidentia et formae non subsistentes dicuntur entia, non quia ipsa habeant esse, sed quia eis aliquid est; ita etiam dicuntur bona vel una, non quidem aliqua alia bonitate vel unitate, sed quia eis est aliquid bonum vel unum. Sic igitur et virtus dicitur bona, quia ea aliquid est bonum.
But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the aspect of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had be-ing, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something is good.
Bonum quod ponitur in definitione virtutis, non est bonum commune, quod convertitur cum ente, et est in plus quam qualitas, sed est bonum rationis, secundum quod Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., "quod bonum animae est secundum rationem esse".
Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by formal aspect, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of the soul is to be in accord with formal aspect".
Virtus non potest esse in irrationali parte animae, nisi inquantum participat rationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Et ideo ratio, sive mens, est proprium subiectum virtutis humanae.
Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except insofar as this participates in formal aspect (Ethic. i, 13). And therefore formal aspect, i.e., the mind, is the proper subject of virtue.
Virtus infusa causatur in nobis a Deo sine nobis agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus. Et sic est intelligendum quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae vero per nos aguntur, Deus in nobis causat non sine nobis agentibus, ipse enim operatur in omni voluntate et natura.
Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words, "which God works in us without us." As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.
Saturday, December 11, 2010
1a 2ae q55 a3: Whether human virtue is a good habit? Yes.
Virtus humana, quae est habitus operativus, est bonus habitus, et boni operativus, quia virtus importat perfectionem potentiae, unde virtus cuiuslibet rei determinatur ad ultimum in quod res potest.
Human virtue, which is an operative habit, is a good habit, productive of good works, because virtue implies a perfection of power, wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the telos of its power.
Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., "nemo autem dubitaverit quod virtus animam facit optimam".
Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul be at its best".
Et philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod "virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit".
And the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work likewise good".
Human virtue, which is an operative habit, is a good habit, productive of good works, because virtue implies a perfection of power, wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the telos of its power.
Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., "nemo autem dubitaverit quod virtus animam facit optimam".
Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul be at its best".
Et philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod "virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit".
And the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work likewise good".
Sunday, November 21, 2010
1a 2ae q55 a2: Whether human virtue is an operative habit? Yes.
De ratione virtutis humanae est quod sit habitus operativus quia virtus humana, de qua loquimur, non potest pertinere ad corpus; sed pertinet tantum ad id quod est proprium animae. Unde virtus humana non importat ordinem ad esse, sed magis ad agere.
It is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit because human virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act.
Potentia ad esse se tenet ex parte materiae, quae est ens in potentia, potentia autem ad agere se tenet ex parte formae, quae est principium agendi, eo quod unumquodque agit inquantum est actu.
Power in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is potential being, whereas power in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since everything acts insofar as it is in act.
Modus actionis sequitur dispositionem agentis, unumquodque enim quale est, talia operatur. Et ideo, cum virtus sit principium aliqualis operationis, oportet quod in operante praeexistat secundum virtutem aliqua conformis dispositio. Facit autem virtus operationem ordinatam. Et ideo ipsa virtus est quaedam dispositio ordinata in anima, secundum scilicet quod potentiae animae ordinantur aliqualiter ad invicem, et ad id quod est extra.
Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, insofar as, to wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, and to that which is outside.
Virtus quae est ad esse, non est propria hominis, sed solum virtus quae est ad opera rationis, quae sunt propria hominis.
Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man, but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which are proper to man.
Cum Dei substantia sit eius actio, summa assimilatio hominis ad Deum est secundum aliquam operationem. Unde, sicut supra dictum est, felicitas sive beatitudo, per quam homo maxime Deo conformatur, quae est finis humanae vitae, in operatione consistit.
As God's substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have said above (q3 a2), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in an operation.
It is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit because human virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act.
Potentia ad esse se tenet ex parte materiae, quae est ens in potentia, potentia autem ad agere se tenet ex parte formae, quae est principium agendi, eo quod unumquodque agit inquantum est actu.
Power in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is potential being, whereas power in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since everything acts insofar as it is in act.
Modus actionis sequitur dispositionem agentis, unumquodque enim quale est, talia operatur. Et ideo, cum virtus sit principium aliqualis operationis, oportet quod in operante praeexistat secundum virtutem aliqua conformis dispositio. Facit autem virtus operationem ordinatam. Et ideo ipsa virtus est quaedam dispositio ordinata in anima, secundum scilicet quod potentiae animae ordinantur aliqualiter ad invicem, et ad id quod est extra.
Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, insofar as, to wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, and to that which is outside.
Virtus quae est ad esse, non est propria hominis, sed solum virtus quae est ad opera rationis, quae sunt propria hominis.
Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man, but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which are proper to man.
Cum Dei substantia sit eius actio, summa assimilatio hominis ad Deum est secundum aliquam operationem. Unde, sicut supra dictum est, felicitas sive beatitudo, per quam homo maxime Deo conformatur, quae est finis humanae vitae, in operatione consistit.
As God's substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have said above (q3 a2), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in an operation.
Saturday, November 13, 2010
1a 2ae q55 a1: Whether human virtue is a habit? Yes.
Virtutes humanae habitus sunt quia potentia dicitur esse perfecta, secundum quod determinatur ad suum actum.
Human virtues are habits because power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act.
Sunt autem quaedam potentiae quae secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad suos actus; sicut potentiae naturales activae. Et ideo huiusmodi potentiae naturales secundum seipsas dicuntur virtutes.
Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues.
Potentiae autem rationales, quae sunt propriae hominis, non sunt determinatae ad unum, sed se habent indeterminate ad multa, determinantur autem ad actus per habitus.
But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts by means of habits.
Quandoque virtus dicitur id ad quod est virtus, scilicet vel obiectum virtutis, vel actus eius, sicut fides dicitur quandoque id quod creditur, quandoque vero ipsum credere, quandoque autem ipse habitus quo creditur.
Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act: for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe.
Human virtues are habits because power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act.
Sunt autem quaedam potentiae quae secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad suos actus; sicut potentiae naturales activae. Et ideo huiusmodi potentiae naturales secundum seipsas dicuntur virtutes.
Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues.
Potentiae autem rationales, quae sunt propriae hominis, non sunt determinatae ad unum, sed se habent indeterminate ad multa, determinantur autem ad actus per habitus.
But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts by means of habits.
Quandoque virtus dicitur id ad quod est virtus, scilicet vel obiectum virtutis, vel actus eius, sicut fides dicitur quandoque id quod creditur, quandoque vero ipsum credere, quandoque autem ipse habitus quo creditur.
Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act: for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe.
Friday, November 12, 2010
Tuesday, November 09, 2010
1a 2ae q54 a4: Whether one habit is made up of many habits? No.
Si consideremus habitum secundum ea ad quae se extendit, sic inveniemus in eo quandam multiplicitatem, sed quia illa multiplicitas est ordinata ad aliquid unum, ad quod principaliter respicit habitus, inde est quod habitus est qualitas simplex, non constituta ex pluribus habitibus, etiam si ad multa se extendat, quia non unus habitus se extendit ad multa, nisi in ordine ad unum, ex quo habet unitatem.
If we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall find a certain multiplicity therein; but since this multiplicity is directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it is that a habit is a simple quality, not composed from several habits, even though it extend to many things, because a habit does not extend to many things save in relation to one, whence it derives its unity.
Ille qui in aliqua scientia acquirit per demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis unius, habet quidem habitum, sed imperfecte. Cum vero acquirit per aliquam demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis alterius, non aggeneratur in eo alius habitus; sed habitus qui prius inerat fit perfectior, utpote ad plura se extendens; eo quod conclusiones et demonstrationes unius scientiae ordinatae sunt, et una derivatur ex alia.
In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration, scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfectly. And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in him: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, inasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the conclusions and demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one flows from another.
If we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall find a certain multiplicity therein; but since this multiplicity is directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it is that a habit is a simple quality, not composed from several habits, even though it extend to many things, because a habit does not extend to many things save in relation to one, whence it derives its unity.
Ille qui in aliqua scientia acquirit per demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis unius, habet quidem habitum, sed imperfecte. Cum vero acquirit per aliquam demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis alterius, non aggeneratur in eo alius habitus; sed habitus qui prius inerat fit perfectior, utpote ad plura se extendens; eo quod conclusiones et demonstrationes unius scientiae ordinatae sunt, et una derivatur ex alia.
In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration, scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfectly. And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in him: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, inasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the conclusions and demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one flows from another.
Thursday, November 04, 2010
1a 2ae q54 a3: Whether habits are divided into good and bad? Yes.
Distinguuntur specie habitus bonus et malus, quia habitus bonus dicitur qui disponit ad actum convenientem naturae agentis; habitus autem malus dicitur qui disponit ad actum non convenientem naturae.
A good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit because a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature.
Sicut actus virtutum naturae humanae conveniunt, eo quod sunt secundum rationem, actus vero vitiorum, cum sint contra rationem, a natura humana discordant.
Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they are against reason.
Et sic manifestum est quod secundum differentiam boni et mali, habitus specie distinguuntur.
Hence it is clear that habits are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and bad.
A good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit because a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature.
Sicut actus virtutum naturae humanae conveniunt, eo quod sunt secundum rationem, actus vero vitiorum, cum sint contra rationem, a natura humana discordant.
Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they are against reason.
Et sic manifestum est quod secundum differentiam boni et mali, habitus specie distinguuntur.
Hence it is clear that habits are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and bad.
Wednesday, November 03, 2010
1a 2ae q54 a2: Whether habits are distinguished by their objects? Yes.
Habitus distinguuntur secundum diversa obiecta quia habitus importat ordinem ad aliquid; omnia autem quae dicuntur secundum ordinem ad aliquid, distinguuntur secundum distinctionem eorum ad quae dicuntur.
Habits also are distinguished according to the diversity of objects because habits imply order to something; and all things that imply order to something, are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained.
In distinctione potentiarum, vel etiam habituum, non est considerandum ipsum obiectum materialiter, sed ratio obiecti differens specie, vel etiam genere.
In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which may differ in species or even in genus.
Habits also are distinguished according to the diversity of objects because habits imply order to something; and all things that imply order to something, are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained.
In distinctione potentiarum, vel etiam habituum, non est considerandum ipsum obiectum materialiter, sed ratio obiecti differens specie, vel etiam genere.
In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which may differ in species or even in genus.
Monday, November 01, 2010
1a 2ae q54 a1: Whether many habits can be in one power? Yes.
Contingit unius potentiae esse habitus plures quia subiectum habitus est potentia passiva, ut supra dictum est; potentia enim activa tantum non est alicuius habitus subiectum, ut ex supradictis patet.
There may be several habits in one power because the subject of a habit is a passive power, as stated above (q51 a2); for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was clearly shown above (q51 a2).
There may be several habits in one power because the subject of a habit is a passive power, as stated above (q51 a2); for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was clearly shown above (q51 a2).
Tuesday, October 12, 2010
Monday, October 11, 2010
1a 2ae q53 a3: Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act? Yes.
Hoc modo cessatio ab actu causat corruptionem vel diminutionem habituum, inquantum scilicet removetur actus qui prohibebat causas corrumpentes vel diminuentes habitum, quia habitus per se corrumpuntur vel diminuuntur ex contrario agente; unde quorumcumque habituum contraria subcrescunt per temporis tractum, quae oportet subtrahi per actum ab habitu procedentem: huiusmodi habitus diminuuntur, vel etiam tolluntur totaliter, per diuturnam cessationem ab actu, ut patet et in scientia et in virtute.
The destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, insofar, to wit, as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened that habit because habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency; consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue.
Cum igitur homo cessat ab usu intellectualis habitus, insurgunt imaginationes extraneae, et quandoque ad contrarium ducentes; ita quod, nisi per frequentem usum intellectualis habitus, quodammodo succidantur vel comprimantur, redditur homo minus aptus ad recte iudicandum, et quandoque totaliter disponitur ad contrarium. Et sic per cessationem ab actu diminuitur, vel etiam corrumpitur intellectualis habitus.
When man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary. And thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act.
Pars intellectiva animae secundum se est supra tempus, sed pars sensitiva subiacet tempori. Et ideo per temporis cursum, transmutatur quantum ad passiones appetitivae partis et etiam quantum ad vires apprehensivas. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Physic., quod tempus est causa oblivionis.
The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget.
Philosophus, in libro de Longit. et Brevit. vitae, dicit quod corruptio scientiae non solum est deceptio, sed etiam oblivio. Et in VIII Ethic. dicitur quod multas amicitias inappellatio dissolvit.
The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship."
The destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, insofar, to wit, as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened that habit because habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency; consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue.
Cum igitur homo cessat ab usu intellectualis habitus, insurgunt imaginationes extraneae, et quandoque ad contrarium ducentes; ita quod, nisi per frequentem usum intellectualis habitus, quodammodo succidantur vel comprimantur, redditur homo minus aptus ad recte iudicandum, et quandoque totaliter disponitur ad contrarium. Et sic per cessationem ab actu diminuitur, vel etiam corrumpitur intellectualis habitus.
When man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary. And thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act.
Pars intellectiva animae secundum se est supra tempus, sed pars sensitiva subiacet tempori. Et ideo per temporis cursum, transmutatur quantum ad passiones appetitivae partis et etiam quantum ad vires apprehensivas. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Physic., quod tempus est causa oblivionis.
The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget.
Philosophus, in libro de Longit. et Brevit. vitae, dicit quod corruptio scientiae non solum est deceptio, sed etiam oblivio. Et in VIII Ethic. dicitur quod multas amicitias inappellatio dissolvit.
The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship."
Sunday, October 10, 2010
1a 2ae q53 a2: Whether a habit can diminish? Yes.
Habitus diminuuntur, sicut et augentur, quia sicut ex eadem causa augentur ex qua generantur, ita ex eadem causa diminuuntur ex qua corrumpuntur.
Habits diminish, just as they increase, because since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them.
Quaedam diminutio essentiae habitus non habet principium ab habitu, sed a participante.
A certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in its subject.
Habitus secundum se consideratus, est forma simplex, et secundum hoc non accidit ei diminutio, sed secundum diversum modum participandi, qui provenit ex indeterminatione potentiae ipsius participantis, quae scilicet diversimode potest unam formam participare, vel quae potest ad plura vel ad pauciora extendi.
A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease, but according to the different ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through its being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things.
Habits diminish, just as they increase, because since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them.
Quaedam diminutio essentiae habitus non habet principium ab habitu, sed a participante.
A certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in its subject.
Habitus secundum se consideratus, est forma simplex, et secundum hoc non accidit ei diminutio, sed secundum diversum modum participandi, qui provenit ex indeterminatione potentiae ipsius participantis, quae scilicet diversimode potest unam formam participare, vel quae potest ad plura vel ad pauciora extendi.
A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease, but according to the different ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through its being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things.
Wednesday, October 06, 2010
1a 2ae q53 a1: Whether a habit can be corrupted? Yes.
Per iudicium rationis in contrarium moventis quocumque modo, scilicet sive ex ignorantia, sive ex passione, vel etiam ex electione, corrumpitur habitus virtutis vel vitii.
A habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion, or deliberate choice.
Sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., habitus similitudinem habet naturae, deficit tamen ab ipsa. Et ideo, cum natura rei nullo modo removeatur ab ipsa, habitus difficile removetur.
As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty.
Scientia non removetur per motum corporalem quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus, sed solum quantum ad impedimentum actus, inquantum intellectus indiget in suo actu viribus sensitivis, quibus impedimentum affertur per corporalem transmutationem.
Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove an obstacle to the act of science, insofar as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by corporal transmutation.
Sed per intelligibilem motum rationis potest corrumpi habitus scientiae, etiam quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus.
But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the habit.
Et similiter etiam potest corrumpi habitus virtutis. Tamen quod dicitur, virtutes esse permanentiores disciplinis, intelligendum est non ex parte subiecti vel causae, sed ex parte actus: nam virtutum usus est continuus per totam vitam, non autem usus disciplinarum.
In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. Nevertheless when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning" this must be understood in respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does not.
A habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion, or deliberate choice.
Sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., habitus similitudinem habet naturae, deficit tamen ab ipsa. Et ideo, cum natura rei nullo modo removeatur ab ipsa, habitus difficile removetur.
As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty.
Scientia non removetur per motum corporalem quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus, sed solum quantum ad impedimentum actus, inquantum intellectus indiget in suo actu viribus sensitivis, quibus impedimentum affertur per corporalem transmutationem.
Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove an obstacle to the act of science, insofar as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by corporal transmutation.
Sed per intelligibilem motum rationis potest corrumpi habitus scientiae, etiam quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus.
But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the habit.
Et similiter etiam potest corrumpi habitus virtutis. Tamen quod dicitur, virtutes esse permanentiores disciplinis, intelligendum est non ex parte subiecti vel causae, sed ex parte actus: nam virtutum usus est continuus per totam vitam, non autem usus disciplinarum.
In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. Nevertheless when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning" this must be understood in respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does not.
Tuesday, October 05, 2010
1a 2ae q52 a3: Whether every act increases its habit? No.
Non omnis actus habitum auget quia vero usus habituum in voluntate hominis consistit, ut ex supradictis patet: sicut contingit quod aliquis habens habitum non utitur illo, vel etiam agit actum contrarium; ita etiam potest contingere quod utitur habitu secundum actum non respondentem proportionaliter intensioni habitus.
It is not every act that increases a habit because use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above (q50 a5): just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit.
Si igitur intensio actus proportionaliter aequetur intensioni habitus, vel etiam superexcedat, quilibet actus vel auget habitum, vel disponit ad augmentum ipsius (ut loquamur de augmento habituum ad similitudinem augmenti animalis).
Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof (if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal).
Si vero intensio actus proportionaliter deficiat ab intensione habitus, talis actus non disponit ad augmentum habitus, sed magis ad diminutionem ipsius.
If, however, the act falls short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.
"Similes actus similes habitus causant", ut dicitur in II Ethic.
"Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2).
Sed, sicut dicitur in II Ethic., aliqui actus ab habitu procedentes diminuunt ipsum, utpote cum negligenter fiunt.
But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly.
It is not every act that increases a habit because use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above (q50 a5): just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit.
Si igitur intensio actus proportionaliter aequetur intensioni habitus, vel etiam superexcedat, quilibet actus vel auget habitum, vel disponit ad augmentum ipsius (ut loquamur de augmento habituum ad similitudinem augmenti animalis).
Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof (if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal).
Si vero intensio actus proportionaliter deficiat ab intensione habitus, talis actus non disponit ad augmentum habitus, sed magis ad diminutionem ipsius.
If, however, the act falls short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.
"Similes actus similes habitus causant", ut dicitur in II Ethic.
"Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2).
Sed, sicut dicitur in II Ethic., aliqui actus ab habitu procedentes diminuunt ipsum, utpote cum negligenter fiunt.
But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly.
Monday, October 04, 2010
1a 2ae q52 a2: Whether habits increase by addition? No.
Augmentum habituum non fiat per additionem quia augmentum habituum et aliarum formarum, non fit per additionem formae ad formam, sed fit per hoc quod subiectum magis vel minus perfecte participat unam et eandem formam.
The increase of habits is not by way of addition because the increase of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to form, but by the subject participating more or less perfectly, one and the same form.
The increase of habits is not by way of addition because the increase of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to form, but by the subject participating more or less perfectly, one and the same form.
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