1a 2ae q24 a2: Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally? No.

Non passiones dicuntur morbi vel perturbationes animae, nisi cum carent moderatione rationis, quia passiones animae, inquantum sunt praeter ordinem rationis, inclinant ad peccatum; inquantum autem sunt ordinatae a ratione, pertinent ad virtutem.

Passions are not called "diseases" or "disturbances" of the soul, save when they are not controlled by formal aspect, because the passions of the soul, insofar as they are contrary to the order of formal aspect, incline us to sin; but insofar as they are controlled by formal aspect, they pertain to virtue.

Circa hanc quaestionem diversa fuit sententia Stoicorum et Peripateticorum, nam Stoici dixerunt omnes passiones esse malas; Peripatetici vero dixerunt passiones moderatas esse bonas. Quae quidem differentia, licet magna videatur secundum vocem, tamen secundum rem vel nulla est, vel parva, si quis utrorumque intentiones consideret.

On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from that of the Peripatetics, for the Stoics held that all passions are evil; while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are good. This difference, although it appears great in words, is nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider the intent of either school.

1a 2ae q24 a1: Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul? Yes.

Passiones, secundum quod sunt voluntariae, possunt dici bonae vel malae moraliter quia si considerentur secundum quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis, sic est in eis bonum et malum morale.

The passions, insofar as they are voluntary, may be called morally good or evil because if they be considered as subject to the command of the formal aspect and of the will, then moral good and evil are in them.

Dicuntur autem voluntariae vel ex eo quod a voluntate imperantur, vel ex eo quod a voluntate non prohibentur.

And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will.

Istae passiones secundum se consideratae, sunt communes hominibus et aliis animalibus; sed secundum quod a ratione imperantur, sunt propriae hominum.

These passions, considered in themselves, are common to man and other animals; but, as commanded by the formal aspect, they are proper to man.

Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, de passionibus animae loquens "mala sunt ista, si malus est amor; bona, si bonus."

Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good if our love is good."

1a 2ae q24: Good and evil in the passions of the soul

1. Can moral good and evil be found in the passions of the soul?
2. Is every passion of the soul morally evil?
3. Does every passion increase or decrease the goodness or malice of an act?
4. Is any passion good or evil specifically?

1a 2ae q23 a4: Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different, but not contrary to one another? Yes.

Sunt aliquae passiones eiusdem potentiae quae differunt specie, nec sunt contrariae quia passiones differunt secundum activa, quae sunt obiecta passionum animae.

In the same power there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to one another because passions differ in accordance with their active causes, which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects.

Amor et gaudium differunt specie, et sunt in concupiscibili. Nec tamen contrariantur ad invicem; quin potius unum est causa alterius.

Love and joy differ in species, and are in the concupiscible power. And yet they are not contrary to one another; rather, in fact, one causes the other.

In concupiscibili sunt tres coniugationes passionum, scilicet amor et odium, desiderium et fuga, gaudium et tristitia. Similiter in irascibili sunt tres, scilicet spes et desperatio, timor et audacia, et ira, cui nulla passio opponitur.

In the concupiscible faculty there are three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has not contrary passion.

Sunt ergo omnes passiones specie differentes undecim, sex quidem in concupiscibili, et quinque in irascibili; sub quibus omnes animae passiones continentur.

Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.

In motibus autem appetitivae partis, bonum habet quasi virtutem attractivam, malum autem virtutem repulsivam. Bonum ergo primo quidem in potentia appetitiva causat quandam inclinationem, seu aptitudinem, seu connaturalitatem ad bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem amoris. Cui per contrarium respondet odium, ex parte mali.

In the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which is "hatred" in respect of evil.

Secundo, si bonum sit nondum habitum, dat ei motum ad assequendum bonum amatum, et hoc pertinet ad passionem desiderii vel concupiscentiae. Et ex opposito, ex parte mali, est fuga vel abominatio.

Secondly, if the good be not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or "concupiscence": and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion of "aversion" or "dislike."

Tertio, cum adeptum fuerit bonum, dat appetitus quietationem quandam in ipso bono adepto, et hoc pertinet ad delectationem vel gaudium. Cui opponitur ex parte mali dolor vel tristitia.

Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in respect of evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness."

In passionibus autem irascibilis, praesupponitur quidem aptitudo vel inclinatio ad prosequendum bonum vel fugiendum malum, ex concupiscibili, quae absolute respicit bonum vel malum. Et respectu boni nondum adepti, est spes et desperatio.

On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely. And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have "hope" and "despair."

Respectu autem mali nondum iniacentis, est timor et audacia.

In respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and "daring."

Respectu autem boni adepti, non est aliqua passio in irascibili, quia iam non habet rationem ardui, ut supra dictum est. Sed ex malo iam iniacenti, sequitur passio irae.

But in respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: because it no longer has the formal aspect of something arduous, as stated above (q23 a3). But evil already present gives rise to the passion of "anger."

1a 2ae q23 a3: Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety? Yes.

Motus irae non potest habere aliquem motum animae contrarium, quia solummodo opponitur ei cessatio a motu: sicut philosophus dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod mitescere opponitur ei quod est irasci, quod non est oppositum contrarie, sed negative vel privative.

No movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of anger because nothing else than cessation from its movement is contrary thereto: thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or privation.

Singulare est in passione irae, quod non potest habere contrarium, neque secundum accessum et recessum, neque secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. Causatur enim ira ex malo difficili iam iniacente. Ad cuius praesentiam, necesse est quod aut appetitus succumbat, et sic non exit terminos tristitiae, quae est passio concupiscibilis, aut habet motum ad invadendum malum laesivum, quod pertinet ad iram. Motum autem ad fugiendum habere non potest, quia iam malum ponitur praesens vel praeteritum. Et sic motui irae non contrariatur aliqua passio secundum contrarietatem accessus et recessus.

The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by a difficult evil already present: and when such an evil is present, the appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the limits of "sadness," which is a concupiscible passion; or else it has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement is that of "anger." But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil is supposed to be already present or past. Thus no passion is contrary to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal.

Similiter etiam nec secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. Quia malo iam iniacenti opponitur bonum iam adeptum, quod iam non potest habere rationem ardui vel difficilis. Nec post adeptionem boni remanet alius motus, nisi quietatio appetitus in bono adepto, quae pertinet ad gaudium, quod est passio concupiscibilis.

In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained, which can no longer have the formal aspect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor, when once good is obtained, does there remain any other movement, except the appetite's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible faculty.

1a 2ae q23 a2: Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the contrariety of good and evil? No.

Non omnis contrarietas passionum irascibilis est secundum contrarietatem boni et mali quia in passionibus animae duplex contrarietas invenitur: una quidem secundum contrarietatem obiectorum, scilicet boni et mali; alia vero secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino.

Not every contrariety of the irascible passions is that of good and evil because there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul: one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of good and evil; the other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same terminus.

In passionibus quidem concupiscibilis invenitur prima contrarietas tantum: quae scilicet est secundum obiecta; in passionibus autem irascibilis invenitur utraque. Cuius ratio est quia obiectum concupiscibilis, ut supra dictum est, est bonum vel malum sensibile absolute. Bonum autem, inquantum bonum, non potest esse terminus ut a quo, sed solum ut ad quem, quia nihil refugit bonum inquantum bonum; sed omnia appetunt ipsum.

In the concupiscible passions the former contrariety alone is to be found: viz. that which is based on the objects; whereas in the irascible passions, we find both forms of contrariety. The formal aspect of this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (q23 a1), is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good, as such, cannot be a terminus wherefrom, but only [a terminus] whereto, since nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it.

Similiter nihil appetit malum inquantum huiusmodi, sed omnia fugiunt ipsum; et propter hoc, malum non habet rationem termini ad quem, sed solum termini a quo. Sic igitur omnis passio concupiscibilis respectu boni, est ut in ipsum (sicut amor, desiderium et gaudium); omnis vero passio eius respectu mali, est ut ab ipso (sicut odium, fuga seu abominatio, et tristitia). Unde in passionibus concupiscibilis non potest esse contrarietas secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem obiecto.

In like manner, nothing desires evil as such, but all things shun it; wherefore evil cannot have the formal aspect of a terminus whereto, but only of a terminus wherefrom. Accordingly every concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it (as with love, desire and joy); while every concupiscible passion in respect of evil, tends from it (as with hatred, avoidance or dislike, and sorrow). Wherefore, in the concupiscible passions, there can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same object.

Sed obiectum irascibilis est sensibile bonum vel malum, non quidem absolute, sed sub ratione difficultatis vel arduitatis, ut supra dictum est. Bonum autem arduum sive difficile habet rationem ut in ipsum tendatur, inquantum est bonum (quod pertinet ad passionem spei); et ut ab ipso recedatur, inquantum est arduum vel difficile (quod pertinet ad passionem desperationis).

On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the formal aspect of difficulty or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered as good, has the formal aspect which produces in us a tendency to it (which tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"); whereas, considered as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it (and this pertains to the passion of "despair").

Similiter malum arduum habet rationem ut vitetur, inquantum est malum (et hoc pertinet ad passionem timoris); habet etiam rationem ut in ipsum tendatur, sicut in quoddam arduum, per quod scilicet aliquid evadit subiectionem mali (et sic tendit in ipsum audacia).

In like manner the arduous evil, considered as an evil, has the formal aspect of something to be shunned (and this belongs to the passion of "fear"); but it also has the formal aspect for tending to it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to evil (and this tendency is called "daring").

Invenitur ergo in passionibus irascibilis contrarietas secundum contrarietatem boni et mali (sicut inter spem et timorem), et iterum secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino, (sicut inter audaciam et timorem).

Consequently, in the irascible passions we find contrariety according to the contrariety of good and evil (as between hope and fear), and also contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and fear).

1a 2ae q23 a1: Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part? Yes.

Passiones quae sunt in irascibili et in concupiscibili, differunt specie, quia cum diversae potentiae habeant diversa obiecta (ut in primo dictum est), necesse est quod passiones diversarum potentiarum ad diversa obiecta referantur.

The passions of the irascible part differ in species from those of the concupiscible faculty because since different powers have different objects (as stated in I, q77, a3), the passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to different objects.

Bonum inquantum est delectabile, movet concupiscibilem. Sed si bonum habeat quandam difficultatem ad adipiscendum, ex hoc ipso habet aliquid repugnans concupiscibili. Et ideo necessarium fuit esse aliam potentiam quae in id tenderet. Et eadem ratio est de malis. Et haec potentia est irascibilis. Unde ex consequenti passiones concupiscibilis et irascibilis specie differunt.

Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this very fact it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power. And hence the need of another power tending to that good. And the same formal aspect [of a requisite contrariety] applies to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently the concupiscible passions are specifically different from the irascible passions.

1a 2ae q23: How the passions differ from one another

1. Are the passions of the concupiscible part different from those of the irascible part?
2. Is the contrariety of passions in the irascible part based on the contrariety of good and evil?
3. Is there any passion that has no contrary?
4. In the same power, are there any passions, differing in species, but not contrary to one another?

1a 2ae q22 a3: Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will? Yes.

Ratio passionis magis proprie invenitur in actu appetitus sensitivi quam intellectivi, quia in actu appetitus intellectivi non requiritur aliqua transmutatio corporalis (quia huiusmodi appetitus non est virtus alicuius organi).

The formal aspect of passion is found more properly in the act of the sensitive appetite than in that of the intellectual appetite, because there is no need for corporeal transmutation in the act of the intellectual appetite (because this appetite is not exercised by means of a corporeal organ).

Amor et gaudium et alia huiusmodi, cum attribuuntur Deo vel Angelis, aut hominibus secundum appetitum intellectivum, significant simplicem actum voluntatis cum similitudine effectus, absque passione.

When love and joy and the like are ascribed to God or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite, they signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without passion.

Unde dicit Augustinus, IX de Civ. Dei, "sancti Angeli et sine ira puniunt et sine miseriae compassione subveniunt. Et tamen, istarum nomina passionum, consuetudine locutionis humanae, etiam in eos usurpantur, propter quandam operum similitudinem, non propter affectionum infirmitatem."

Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "The holy angels feel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the unhappy; and yet ordinary human speech is wont to ascribe to them also these passions by name, because, although they have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance to ours."

Passio proprie invenitur ubi est transmutatio corporalis. Quae quidem invenitur in actibus appetitus sensitivi, et non solum spiritualis (sicut est in apprehensione sensitiva) sed etiam naturalis.

Passion is properly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal transmutation is found in the act of the sensitive appetite, and is not only spiritual (as in the sensitive apprehension) but also natural.

Dicit Damascenus, in II libro, describens animales passiones, "Passio est motus appetitivae virtutis sensibilis in imaginatione boni vel mali. Et aliter, passio est motus irrationalis animae per suspicionem boni vel mali."

Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while describing the animal passions: "Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite when we imagine good or evil. In other words, passion is a movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil."

1a 2ae q22 a2: Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part? Yes.

Ratio passionis magis invenitur in parte appetitiva quam in parte apprehensiva, quia in nomine passionis importatur quod patiens trahatur ad id quod est agentis.

The formal aspect of passion is found more in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part, because the word "passion" implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent.

Magis autem trahitur anima ad rem per vim appetitivam quam per vim apprehensivam: nam per vim appetitivam anima habet ordinem ad ipsas res, prout in seipsis sunt; unde philosophus dicit, in VI Metaphys., quod "bonum et malum", quae sunt obiecta appetitivae potentiae, "sunt in ipsis rebus".

Now the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power rather than by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through its appetitive power, an order to things as they are in themselves; hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i.e., the objects of the appetitive power, "are in things themselves".

Vis autem apprehensiva non trahitur ad rem, secundum quod in seipsa est, sed cognoscit eam secundum intentionem rei, quam in se habet vel recipit secundum proprium modum. Unde et ibidem dicitur quod "verum et falsum", quae ad cognitionem pertinent, "non sunt in rebus, sed in mente".

On the other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself, but knows it according to an "intention" of the thing, which "intention" it has in itself, or receives according to a specific way. Hence we find it stated (Metaph. vi, 4) that "the true and the false," which pertain to knowledge, "are not in things, but in the mind".

Sicut in primo dictum est, dupliciter organum animae potest transmutari. Uno modo, transmutatione spirituali, secundum quod recipit intentionem rei. Et hoc per se invenitur in actu apprehensivae virtutis sensitivae: sicut oculus immutatur a visibili, non ita quod coloretur, sed ita quod recipiat intentionem coloris.

As stated above (in I, q78, a3), the organs of the soul can be changed in two ways. First, by a [formal] spiritual change, according to which the organ receives an "intention" of the object. And this [kind of change] is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is the eye [formally] "changed" by the object visible, i.e., not by [materially] being colored, but by [formally] receiving an intention of color.

Est autem alia naturalis transmutatio organi, prout organum transmutatur quantum ad suam naturalem dispositionem; puta quod calefit aut infrigidatur, vel alio simili modo transmutatur. Et huiusmodi transmutatio per accidens se habet ad actum apprehensivae virtutis sensitivae: puta cum oculus fatigatur ex forti intuitu, vel dissolvitur ex vehementia visibilis.

But the organs are receptive of another and natural change, which affects their natural disposition; for instance, when they become hot or cold, or undergo some similar [material] change. And this [second] kind of change is incidental to the act of the sensitive apprehension: for instance, if the eye be wearied through gazing intently at something or be overcome by the intensity of the object.

Sed ad actum appetitus sensitivi per se ordinatur huiusmodi transmutatio: unde in definitione motuum appetitivae partis, materialiter ponitur aliqua naturalis transmutatio organi; sicut dicitur quod "ira est accensio sanguinis circa cor". Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis invenitur in actu sensitivae virtutis appetitivae, quam in actu sensitivae virtutis apprehensivae, licet utraque sit actus organi corporalis.

On the other hand, [this second kind of change] is essential to the act of the sensitive appetite: wherefore the material element in the definitions of the movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change of the organ; for instance, "anger is" said to be "a kindling of the blood about the heart". Hence it is evident that the formal aspect of passion is more consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with that of the sensitive apprehension, although both are actions of a corporeal organ.

1a 2ae q22 a1: Whether any passion is in the soul? Yes.

Passiones sunt in anima, quia pati prout importat receptionem solam, non est necessarium quod sit materiae, sed potest esse cuiuscumque existentis in potentia.

There are passions in the soul, because passivity, as implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be in anything that is in potentiality.

Anima autem, etsi non sit composita ex materia et forma, habet tamen aliquid potentialitatis, secundum quam convenit sibi recipere et pati, secundum quod intelligere pati est, ut dicitur in III de anima.

Now, though the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has something of potentiality, in respect of which it is fitting for it to receive or to be passive, according as the act of understanding is a kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii, 4.

Pati et moveri, etsi non conveniat animae per se, convenit tamen ei per accidens (ut in I de anima dicitur): inquantum scilicet compositum patitur; per se autem convenit composito, quod est corruptibile.

Although it is not fitting for the soul in itself to be passive and to be moved, yet it is incidentally fitting for it (as stated in De Anima i, 3): i.e., insofar, to wit, as the "composite" is passive; the composite, which is corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature.

1a 2ae q22: The subject of the soul's passions

1. Is there any passion in the soul?
2. Is passion in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?
3. Is passion in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will?

1a 2ae q21 a4: Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious before God, according as it is good or evil? Yes.

Omnis actus hominis, bonus vel malus, habet rationem meriti vel demeriti apud Deum, quia alioquin sequeretur quod Deus non haberet curam de actibus humanis, sed est debitum ut ad finem ultimum omnes actus referantur.

Every human action, both good and evil, acquires the formal aspect of merit or demerit in God's sight, because else it would follow that human actions are no business of God's, but it is our duty to refer all our actions to the last end.

Unde qui facit actum malum non referibilem in Deum, non servat honorem Dei, qui ultimo fini debetur.

Consequently, whoever does an evil deed, not referable to God, does not give God the honor due to Him as our last end.

Homo non ordinatur ad communitatem politicam secundum se totum, et secundum omnia sua; et ideo non oportet quod quilibet actus eius sit meritorius vel demeritorius per ordinem ad communitatem politicam.

Man is not ordained to the body politic, according to all that he is and has; and so it does not follow that every action of his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body politic.

Sed totum quod homo est, et quod potest et habet, ordinandum est ad Deum; et ideo omnis actus hominis, bonus vel malus, habet rationem meriti vel demeriti apud Deum, quantum est ex ipsa ratione actus.

But all that man is, and can have and does have, must be referred to God; and therefore every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires the formal aspect of merit or demerit in the sight of God, inasmuch as it is [acquired] from the same formal aspect of the action.

Per actum hominis, Deo secundum se nihil potest accrescere vel deperire; sed tamen homo, quantum in se est, aliquid subtrahit Deo, vel ei exhibet, cum servat vel non servat ordinem quem Deus instituit.

God in Himself neither gains nor loses anything by the action of man; but man, for his part, takes something from God, or offers something to Him, when he observes or does not observe the order instituted by God.

1a 2ae q21 a3: Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious in so far as it is good or evil? Yes.

Actus bonus vel malus habet rationem laudabilis vel culpabilis (secundum quod est in potestate voluntatis), rationem vero rectitudinis et peccati (secundum ordinem ad finem), rationem vero meriti et demeriti secundum retributionem iustitiae ad alterum, quia hoc ipsum bonum vel malum quod aliquis sibi facit per suum actum, redundat in communitatem.

A good or evil action has the formal aspect of praiseworthy or blameworthy (insofar as it is in the power of the will), the formal aspect of right or sinful (according as it is ordained to the end), and the formal aspect of merit or demerit according to the recompense for justice or injustice towards another, because this very good or evil, which a man does to himself by his action, redounds to the community.

Homo, qui habet dominium sui actus, ipse etiam, inquantum est alterius, scilicet communitatis, cuius est pars, meretur aliquid vel demeretur, inquantum actus suos bene vel male disponit.

Man is master of his actions; and yet, insofar as he belongs to another, i.e., the community, of which he forms part, he merits or demerits, inasmuch as he disposes his actions well or ill.

Meritum et demeritum dicuntur in ordine ad retributionem quae fit secundum iustitiam. Retributio autem secundum iustitiam fit alicui ex eo quod agit in profectum vel nocumentum alterius.

We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to retribution, rendered according to justice. Now, retribution according to justice is rendered to a man, by reason of his having done something to another's advantage or hurt.

Est autem considerandum quod unusquisque in aliqua societate vivens, est aliquo modo pars et membrum totius societatis. Quicumque ergo agit aliquid in bonum vel malum alicuius in societate existentis, hoc redundat in totam societatem sicut qui laedit manum, per consequens laedit hominem.

It must, moreover, be observed that every individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or evil, done to the member of a society, redounds on the whole society: thus, who hurts the hand, hurts the man.

Cum ergo aliquis agit in bonum vel malum alterius singularis personae, cadit ibi dupliciter ratio meriti vel demeriti. Uno modo, secundum quod debetur ei retributio a singulari persona quam iuvat vel offendit. Alio modo, secundum quod debetur ei retributio a toto collegio.

When, therefore, anyone does good or evil to another individual, there is a twofold formal aspect of merit or demerit in his action: first, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the individual to whom he has done good or harm; secondly, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the whole of society.

Quando vero aliquis ordinat actum suum directe in bonum vel malum totius collegii, debetur ei retributio primo quidem et principaliter a toto collegio, secundario vero, ab omnibus collegii partibus. Cum vero aliquis agit quod in bonum proprium vel malum vergit, etiam debetur ei retributio, inquantum etiam hoc vergit in commune secundum quod ipse est pars collegii, licet non debeatur ei retributio inquantum est bonum vel malum singularis personae, quae est eadem agenti, nisi forte a seipso secundum quandam similitudinem, prout est iustitia hominis ad seipsum.

Now when a man ordains his action directly for the good or evil of the whole society, retribution is owed to him, before and above all, by the whole society; secondarily, by all the parts of society. Whereas when a man does that which conduces to his own benefit or disadvantage, then again is retribution owed to him, insofar as this too affects the community, inasmuch as he is a part of society: although retribution is not due to him, insofar as it conduces to the good or harm of an individual, who is identical with the agent: unless, perchance, he owe retribution to himself, by a sort of resemblance, insofar as man is said to be just to himself.

Dicitur Isaiae III, "dicite iusto quoniam bene; quoniam fructum adinventionum suarum comedet. Vae impio in malum; retributio enim manuum eius fiet ei".

It is written (Isaiah 3:10-11): "Say to the just man that it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Woe to the wicked unto evil; for the reward of his hands shall be given him."

1a 2ae q21 a2: Whether a human action deserves praise or blame, by reason of its being good or evil? Yes.

Actus humanus ex hoc quod est bonus vel malus, habet rationem laudabilis vel culpabilis, quia bonum vel malum in solis actibus voluntariis constituit rationem laudis vel culpae (in quibus idem est malum, peccatum et culpa).

A human action has the formal aspect of praiseworthy or blameworthy through being good or evil because good or evil, only in voluntary actions, has the formal aspect of praiseworthy or blameworthy (and in such like actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing).

Sicut malum est in plus quam peccatum, ita peccatum est in plus quam culpa. Ex hoc enim dicitur aliquis actus culpabilis vel laudabilis, quod imputatur agenti: nihil enim est aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus.

Just as evil is more comprehensive than sin, so is sin more comprehensive than blame. For an action is said to deserve praise or blame, from its being imputed to the agent: since to praise or to blame means nothing else than to impute to someone the malice or goodness of his action.

Tunc autem actus imputatur agenti, quando est in potestate ipsius, ita quod habeat dominium sui actus.

Now an action is imputed to an agent, when it is in his power, so that he has dominion over it: because it is through his will that man has dominion over his actions.

Philosophus dicit, quod "laudabilia sunt virtutum opera; vituperabilia autem, vel culpabilia, opera contraria".

The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i) that "virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed to virtue deserve censure and blame."

In moralibus, ubi attenditur ordo rationis ad finem communem humanae vitae, semper peccatum et malum attenditur per deviationem ab ordine rationis ad finem communem humanae vitae. Et ideo culpatur ex tali peccato homo et inquantum est homo, et inquantum est moralis. Unde philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod "in arte volens peccans est eligibilior; circa prudentiam autem minus, sicut et in virtutibus moralibus", quarum prudentia est directiva.

In moral matters, where we take into consideration the order of formal aspect to the general end of human life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order of formal aspect to the general end of human life. Wherefore man is blamed for such a sin, both as man and as a moral being. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art, he who sins voluntarily is preferable; but in prudence, as in the moral virtues," which prudence directs, "he is the reverse."

Ratio aliter se habet in artificialibus et aliter in moralibus. In artificialibus enim ratio ordinatur ad finem particularem, quod est aliquid per rationem excogitatum. In moralibus autem ordinatur ad finem communem totius humanae vitae. Finis autem particularis ordinatur ad finem communem.

Formal aspect stands in different relations to the productions of art, and to moral actions. In matters of art, formal aspect is directed to a particular end, which is something devised by aspectual apprehension. Whereas in moral matters, it is directed to the general end of all human life. And a particular end is subordinate to the general end.

1a 2ae q21 a1: Whether a human action is right or sinful, insofar as it is good or evil? Yes.

Actus humanus ex hoc quod est bonus vel malus, habeat rationem rectitudinis vel peccati, quia omnis actus voluntarius est malus per hoc quod recedit ab ordine rationis et legis aeternae, et omnis actus bonus concordat rationi et legi aeternae.

A human action has the formal aspect of rectitude or sin from the fact that it is either good or evil, because every voluntary action that turns aside from the order of formal aspect and of the Eternal Law, is evil, and every good action is in accord with formal aspect and the Eternal Law.

Unumquodque ordinatur ad finem per actum suum. Et ideo ratio peccati, quae consistit in deviatione ab ordine ad finem, proprie consistit in actu.

Each thing is ordained to its end by its action. And therefore the formal aspect of sin, which consists in straying from the order to the end, consists properly in an action.

1a 2ae q21: The consequences of human actions by reason of their goodness and badness

1. Is a human action right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil?
2. Does it thereby deserve praise or blame?
3. Is it accordingly meritorious or demeritorious?
4. Is it accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before God?

1a 2ae q20 a6: Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil? No.

Unus actus non potest esse bonus et malus quia si accipiatur unus actus prout est in genere moris, impossibile est quod sit bonus et malus bonitate et malitia morali; si tamen sit unus unitate naturae, et non unitate moris, potest esse bonus et malus.

The same action cannot be both good and evil because if we consider one action in the moral order, it is impossible for it to be morally both good and evil; whereas if it be one as to natural and not moral unity, it can be both good and evil.

Actio et passio pertinent ad genus moris, inquantum habent rationem voluntarii. Et ideo secundum quod diversa voluntate dicuntur voluntaria, secundum hoc sunt duo moraliter, et potest ex una parte inesse bonum, et ex alia malum.

Action and passion belong to the moral order, insofar as they have the formal aspect of being voluntary. And therefore insofar as they are voluntary in respect of wills that differ, they are two distinct things, and good can be in one of them while evil is in the other.

1a 2ae q20 a5: Whether the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or badness? No.

Eventus sequens non addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus quia virtus causae existimatur secundum effectus per se, non autem secundum effectus per accidens.

The consequences of an action doe not increase its goodness or badness because the virtue of a cause is measured by the effect that flows from the nature of the cause, not by that which results by accident.

Manifestum est enim meliorem actum esse ex suo genere, ex quo possunt plura bona sequi; et peiorem, ex quo nata sunt plura mala sequi.

It is evident that an action is generally better, if better results can follow from it; and generally worse, if it is of a nature to produce worse results.

Si vero per accidens, et ut in paucioribus, tunc eventus sequens non addit ad bonitatem vel ad malitiam actus: non enim datur iudicium de re aliqua secundum illud quod est per accidens, sed solum secundum illud quod est per se.

On the other hand, if the consequences follow by accident, and seldom, then they do not increase the goodness or badness of the action: because we do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to it by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of itself.

1a 2ae q20 a4: Whether the external action adds any goodness or badness to that of the interior act? Yes.

Bonitas actus exterioris quam habet ex materia et circumstantiis, est alia a bonitate voluntatis quae est ex fine, non autem alia a bonitate voluntatis quam habet ex ipso actu volito, sed comparatur ad ipsam ut ratio et causa eius, quia si per actum exteriorem nihil additur de bonitate vel malitia, frustra qui habet bonam voluntatem vel malam, facit opus bonum, aut desistit a malo opere—quod est inconveniens.

The goodness which the external action takes from its matter and circumstances, is distinct from that which it derives from the end, but it is not distinct from that which it has from the very act willed, to which it stands in the relation of formal aspect and cause, because if by the external action no further goodness or malice be added, it is to no purpose that he who has a good or an evil will, does a good deed or refrains from an evil deed—which is unreasonable.

1a 2ae q20 a3: Whether the goodness and badness of the external action are the same as those of the interior act?

Est una bonitas actus interioris et exterioris quia actus voluntatis se habet ut formale ad actum exteriorem; ex formali autem et materiali fit unum.

There is but one goodness of the internal and external act because the act of the will is the form, as it were, of the external action; but that which results from the material and formal element is one thing.

1a 2ae q20 a2: Whether the whole goodness and badness of the external action depends on the goodness of the will? No.

Circa utrosque actus potest esse differentia boni et mali quia voluntarium dicitur non solum actus interior voluntatis, sed etiam actus exteriores, prout a voluntate procedunt et ratione.

The difference of good and evil is applicable to both the interior and external act because voluntariness applies not only to the interior act of the will, but also to external actions, inasmuch as they proceed from the will and the formal aspect.

Si igitur voluntas sit bona, et ex obiecto proprio, et ex fine, consequens est actum exteriorem esse bonum.

If therefore the will be good, both from its proper object and from its end, if follows that the external action is good.

Sed non sufficit ad hoc quod actus exterior sit bonus, bonitas voluntatis quae est ex intentione finis.

But if the will be good from [only] its intention of the end, this is not enough to make the external action good.

Sed si voluntas sit mala sive ex intentione finis, sive ex actu volito, consequens est actum exteriorem esse malum.

And if the will be evil either by its intention of the end, or by the act willed, it follows that the external action is evil.

Non solum aliquis voluntate peccat, quando vult malum finem, sed etiam quando vult malum actum.

A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil end, but also when he wills an evil act.

In actu exteriori potest considerari duplex bonitas vel malitia: una secundum debitam materiam et circumstantias; alia secundum ordinem ad finem. Et illa quidem quae est secundum ordinem ad finem, tota dependet ex voluntate. Illa autem quae est ex debita materia vel circumstantiis, dependet ex ratione: et ex hac dependet bonitas voluntatis, secundum quod in ipsam fertur.

We may consider a twofold goodness or badness in the external action: one in respect of due matter and circumstances; the other in respect of the order to the end. And that which is in respect of the order to the end, depends entirely on the will. But that which is in respect of due matter or circumstances, depends on the formal aspect: and on this goodness depends the goodness of the will, insofar as the will tends towards it.

Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium, quod "quaedam sunt quae nullo quasi bono fine, aut bona voluntate, possunt bene fieri".

Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that "there are some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make good."

1a 2ae q20 a1: Whether goodness or badness is first in the action of the will prior to the external action? Yes.

Bonum et malum morale per prius consistit in voluntate quia cum finis sit proprium obiectum voluntatis, manifestum est quod ista ratio (boni vel mali quam habet actus exterior ex ordine ad finem) per prius invenitur in actu voluntatis, et ex eo derivatur ad actum exteriorem.

Moral good and evil are first in the will because since the end is the will's proper object, it is evident that this formal aspect (i.e., of good or evil, which the external action derives from its relation to the end) is to be found first of all in the act of the will, whence it passes to the external action.

Bonitas autem vel malitia quam habet actus exterior secundum se (propter debitam materiam et debitas circumstantias) non derivatur a voluntate, sed magis a ratione.

On the other hand, the goodness or badness which the external action has of itself (i.e., on account of its being about due matter and its being attended by due circumstances) is not derived from the will, but rather from the aspectual apprehension.

Unde si consideretur bonitas exterioris actus secundum quod est in ordinatione et apprehensione rationis, prior est quam bonitas actus voluntatis, sed si consideretur secundum quod est in executione operis, sequitur bonitatem voluntatis, quae est principium eius.

Consequently, if we consider the goodness of the external action, insofar as it comes from the ordination and apprehension of aspect, it is prior to the goodness of the act of the will; but if we consider it insofar as it is in the execution of the action done, it is subsequent to the goodness of the will, which is its principle.

Actus exterior est obiectum voluntatis, inquantum proponitur voluntati a ratione ut quoddam bonum apprehensum et ordinatum per rationem; et sic est prius quam bonum actus voluntatis. Inquantum vero consistit in executione operis, est effectus voluntatis, et sequitur voluntatem.

The exterior action is the object of the will, inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by aspectual apprehension, as a certain good apprehended and ordained by the formal aspect; and thus it is prior to the good in the act of the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the execution of the action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will.

1a 2ae q20: Goodness and badness in external human affairs

1. Is goodness and malice first in the act of the will, or in the external action?
2. Does the whole goodness or malice of the external action depend on the goodness of the will?
3. Are the goodness and malice of the interior act the same as those of the external action?
4. Does the external action add any goodness or malice to that of the interior act?
5. Do the consequences of an external action increase its goodness or malice?
6. Can one and the same external action be both good and evil?

1a 2ae q19 a10: Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed? Yes.

Quicumque non conformat voluntatem suam voluntati divinae in volito, habet malam voluntatem, quia forma voluntatis est ex obiecto sicut et cuiuslibet actus; si ergo tenetur homo conformare voluntatem suam voluntati divinae, sequitur quod teneatur conformare in volito.

Whoever does not conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing willed, has an evil will, because the will takes its form from the object, as does every act; if therefore man is bound to conform his will to the Divine will, it follows that he is bound to conform it, as to the thing willed.

Quod volitum divinum, secundum rationem communem, quale sit, scire possumus. Scimus enim quod Deus quidquid vult, vult sub ratione boni. Et ideo quicumque vult aliquid sub quacumque ratione boni, habet voluntatem conformem voluntati divinae, quantum ad rationem voliti. Sed in particulari nescimus quid Deus velit. Et quantum ad hoc, non tenemur conformare voluntatem nostram divinae voluntati.

We can know by a general formal aspect what God wills. For we know that whatever God wills, He wills it under the formal aspect of good. Consequently whoever wills a thing under any formal aspect of good, has a will conformed to the Divine will, as to the formal aspect of the thing willed. But we know not what God wills in particular. And in this respect we are not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.

In statu tamen gloriae, omnes videbunt in singulis quae volent, ordinem eorum ad id quod Deus circa hoc vult. Et ideo non solum formaliter, sed materialiter in omnibus suam voluntatem Deo conformabunt.

But in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing that he wills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in that particular matter. Consequently he will conform his will to God in all things not only formally, but also materially.

1a 2ae q19 a9: Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine will? Yes.

Bonitas voluntatis dependet ex conformitate ad voluntatem divinam quia sicut dictum est, bonitas voluntatis dependet ex intentione finis; finis autem ultimus voluntatis humanae est summum bonum, quod est Deus, ut supra dictum est.

The goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine will because, as stated above (a7), the goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end; and the last end of the human will is the Sovereign Good, namely, God, as stated above (q1 a8; q3 a1).

Voluntas hominis non potest conformari voluntati divinae per aequiparantiam, sed per imitationem. Et similiter conformatur scientia hominis scientiae divinae, inquantum cognoscit verum. Et actio hominis actioni divinae, inquantum est agenti conveniens. Et hoc per imitationem, non autem per aequiparantiam.

The human will cannot be conformed to the will of God so as to equal it, but only so as to imitate it. In like manner human knowledge is conformed to the Divine knowledge, in so far as it knows truth. And human action is conformed to the Divine, in so far as it is becoming to the agent. And this by way of imitation, not by way of equality.

Requiritur ad bonitatem humanae voluntatis, quod ordinetur ad summum bonum.

The goodness of the human will requires it to be ordained to the Sovereign Good.

Hoc autem bonum primo quidem et per se comparatur ad voluntatem divinam ut obiectum proprium eius. Illud autem quod est primum in quolibet genere, est mensura et ratio omnium quae sunt illius generis.

Now this Good is primarily and essentially referred to the Divine will, as its proper object. Again, that which is first in any class is the measure and formal aspect of all that belongs to that class.

Unumquodque autem rectum et bonum est, inquantum attingit ad propriam mensuram. Ergo ad hoc quod voluntas hominis sit bona, requiritur quod conformetur voluntati divinae.

Moreover, everything attains to rectitude and goodness, insofar as it is in accord with its proper measure. Therefore, in order that man's will be good it needs to be conformed to the Divine will.

1a 2ae q19 a8: Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention? No.

Si vero consideretur quantitas intentionis et actus, secundum intensionem utriusque, sic intensio intentionis redundat in actum interiorem et exteriorem voluntatis, quia ipsa intentio quodammodo se habet formaliter ad utrumque, ut ex supra dictis patet.

If we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act, according to their respective intensity, then the intensity of the intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the will, because the intention stands in relation to them as a kind of form, as is clear from what has been said above (q12 a4; q18 a6).

Licet materialiter, intentione existente intensa, possit esse actus interior vel exterior non ita intensus, materialiter loquendo: puta cum aliquis non ita intense vult medicinam sumere, sicut vult sanitatem. Tamen hoc ipsum quod est intense intendere sanitatem, redundat formaliter in hoc quod est intense velle medicinam.

And yet considered materially, while the intention is intense, the interior or exterior act may be not so intense, materially speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as much intensity to take medicine as he wills to regain health. Nevertheless the very fact of intending health intensely, redounds, as a formal principle, upon the intense volition of medicine.

Sed quia etiam ipsa intentio quodammodo pertinet ad actum voluntatis, inquantum scilicet est ratio eius; propter hoc redundat quantitas bonae intentionis in voluntatem, inquantum scilicet voluntas vult aliquod bonum magnum ut finem, licet illud per quod vult consequi tantum bonum, non sit dignum illo bono.

Yet because the intention also belongs, in a way, to the act of the will, inasmuch, to wit, as it is the formal aspect thereof; it comes to pass that the quantity of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act of the will; that is to say, insofar as the will wills some great good for an end, although that by which it wills to gain so great a good, is not proportionate to that good.

1a 2ae q19 a7: Whether the goodness of the will, as regards the means, depends on the intention of the end? Yes.

Bonitas voluntatis ex intentione finis dependet quia bonitas voluntatis dependeat a bonitate voliti.

The goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end because the goodness of the will depends on the goodness of the thing willed.

Quando intentio est causa volendi, ordo ad finem accipitur ut quaedam ratio bonitatis in obiecto.

When the intention is the cause of [the act of] willing, the order to the end is considered as a certain formal aspect of the goodness of the object.

Intentio dupliciter se potest habere ad voluntatem: uno modo, ut praecedens; alio modo, ut concomitans.

The intention may stand in a twofold relation to the act of the will: first, as preceding it; secondly, as accompanying it.

Praecedit quidem causaliter intentio voluntatem, quando aliquid volumus propter intentionem alicuius finis. Et tunc ordo ad finem consideratur ut ratio quaedam bonitatis ipsius voliti: puta, cum aliquis vult ieiunare propter Deum; habet enim ieiunium rationem boni ex hoc ipso quod fit propter Deum.

The intention precedes the act of the will causally, when we will something because we intend a certain end. And then the order to the end is considered as a certain formal aspect of the goodness of the thing willed: for instance, when a man wills to fast for God's sake; because the act of fasting has the formal aspect of good from the very fact that it is done for God's sake.

Consequitur autem intentio voluntatem, quando accedit voluntati praeexistenti: puta si aliquis velit aliquid facere, et postea referat illud in Deum. Et tunc primae voluntatis bonitas non dependet ex intentione sequenti, nisi quatenus reiteratur actus voluntatis cum sequenti intentione.

On the other hand, intention accompanies the act of the will, when it is added to a preceding act of the will: for instance, a man may will to do something, and may afterwards refer it to God. And then the goodness of the previous act of the will does not depend on the subsequent intention, except insofar as that act of the will is repeated with the subsequent intention.

Voluntas non potest dici bona, si sit intentio mala causa volendi. Qui enim vult dare eleemosynam propter inanem gloriam consequendam, vult id quod de se est bonum, sub ratione mali; et ideo, prout est volitum ab ipso, est malum. Unde voluntas eius est mala. Sed si intentio sit consequens, tunc voluntas potuit esse bona; et per intentionem sequentem non depravatur ille actus voluntatis qui praecessit, sed actus voluntatis qui iteratur.

The [act of the] will cannot be said to be good, if an evil intention is the cause of [the act of] willing. For when a man wills to give an alms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which is good in itself, under a formal aspect of evil; and therefore, as willed by him, it is evil. Wherefore his [act of] will is evil. If, however, the intention is subsequent to the [act of the] will, then the [act of the] will may be good; and the subsequent intention does not spoil that act of the will which preceded, but that act of the will which is repeated.

Sicut iam dictum est, "malum contingit ex singularibus defectibus, bonum vero ex tota et integra causa". Unde sive voluntas sit eius quod est secundum se malum, etiam sub ratione boni; sive sit boni sub ratione mali: semper voluntas erit mala. Sed ad hoc quod sit voluntas bona, requiritur quod sit boni sub ratione boni; idest quod velit bonum, et propter bonum.

As we have already stated (a6 ad 1), "evil results from each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire cause". Hence, whether the will tend to what is evil in itself, even under the formal aspect of good; or to the good under the formal aspect of evil: it will be evil in either case. But in order for the will to be good, it must tend to the good under the formal aspect of good; in other words, it must will the good, and for the sake of the good.

1a 2ae q19 a6: Whether the will is good when it abides by erring reason? No.

Voluntas concordans rationi erranti, potest esse mala, quia si ratio vel conscientia erret errore voluntario, vel directe, vel propter negligentiam, quia est error circa id quod quis scire tenetur: tunc talis error rationis vel conscientiae non excusat quin voluntas concordans rationi vel conscientiae sic erranti, sit mala.

The will can be evil when it abides by erring aspectual apprehension because if aspectual apprehension or conscience err with an error that is voluntary, either directly, or through negligence, so that one errs about what one ought to know: then such an error of aspectual apprehension or conscience does not excuse the will that abides by that erring aspectual apprehension or conscience, from being evil.

Si autem sit error qui causet involuntarium, proveniens ex ignorantia alicuius circumstantiae absque omni negligentia: tunc talis error rationis vel conscientiae excusat, ut voluntas concordans rationi erranti non sit mala.

But if the error arise from ignorance of some circumstance, and without any negligence, so that it cause the act to be involuntary: then that error of aspectual apprehension or conscience excuses the will, that abides by that erring aspectual apprehension, from being evil.

Puta, si ratio errans dicat quod homo teneatur ad uxorem alterius accedere, voluntas concordans huic rationi erranti est mala (eo quod error iste provenit ex ignorantia legis Dei, quam scire tenetur). Si autem ratio erret in hoc, quod credat aliquam mulierem submissam, esse suam uxorem, et, ea petente debitum, velit eam cognoscere, excusatur voluntas eius, ut non sit mala (quia error iste ex ignorantia circumstantiae provenit, quae excusat, et involuntarium causat).

For instance, if erring aspectual apprehension tells a man that he should go to another man's wife, the will that abides by that erring aspectual apprehension is evil (since this error arises from ignorance of the Divine Law, which he is bound to know). But if a man's aspectual apprehension, errs in mistaking another for his wife, and if he wish to give her her right when she asks for it, his will is excused from being evil (because this error arises from ignorance of a circumstance, which ignorance excuses, and causes the act to be involuntary).

Sicut Dionysius dicit in IV cap. de Div. Nom., "bonum causatur ex integra causa, malum autem ex singularibus defectibus". Et ideo ad hoc quod dicatur malum id in quod fertur voluntas, sufficit sive quod secundum suam naturam sit malum, sive quod apprehendatur ut malum. Sed ad hoc quod sit bonum, requiritur quod utroque modo sit bonum.

As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good is caused by the entire cause, but evil from each particular defect". Consequently in order that the thing to which the will tends be called evil, it suffices, either that it be evil in itself, or that it be apprehended as evil. But in order for it to be good, it must be good in both ways.

Sicut praemissa quaestio eadem est cum quaestione qua quaeritur utrum conscientia erronea liget, ita ista quaestio eadem est cum illa qua quaeritur utrum conscientia erronea excuset.

Whereas the previous question is the same as inquiring "whether an erring conscience binds", so this question is the same as inquiring "whether an erring conscience excuses".

1a 2ae q19 a5: Whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason? Yes.

Voluntas discordans a ratione errante, est mala, quia voluntas discordans a ratione errante, est contra conscientiam.

The will is evil when it is at variance with erring aspectual apprehension because when the will is at variance with erring aspectual apprehension, it is against conscience.

Iudicium rationis errantis licet non derivetur a Deo, tamen ratio errans iudicium suum proponit ut verum, et per consequens ut a Deo derivatum, a quo est omnis veritas.

Although the judgment of an erring aspectual apprehension is not derived from God, yet the erring aspectual apprehension puts forward its judgment as being true, and consequently as being derived from God, from Whom is all truth.

Voluntas erit mala, quia vult malum, non quidem id quod est malum per se, sed id quod est malum per accidens, propter apprehensionem rationis.

The will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that which is evil in itself, but that which is evil accidentally, through being apprehended as such by the formal aspect.

Et ideo philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod, "per se loquendo, incontinens est qui non sequitur rationem rectam; per accidens autem, qui non sequitur etiam rationem falsam". Unde dicendum est simpliciter quod omnis voluntas discordans a ratione, sive recta sive errante, semper est mala.

Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 9) that "properly speaking, the incontinent man is one who does not follow correct aspectual apprehension; but accidentally, he is also one who does not follow incorrect aspectual apprehension." We must therefore conclude that, absolutely speaking, every will at variance with aspectual apprehension, whether correct or erring, is always evil.

1a 2ae q19 a4: Whether the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law? Yes.

Multo magis dependet bonitas voluntatis humanae a lege aeterna, quam a ratione humana, et ubi deficit humana ratio, oportet ad rationem aeternam recurrere, quia in omnibus causis ordinatis, effectus plus dependet a causa prima quam a causa secunda, quia causa secunda non agit nisi in virtute primae causae.

The goodness of the human will depends on the eternal law much more than on human aspectual apprehension, and when human aspectual apprehension fails, we must have recourse to the Eternal Formal Aspect, because wherever a number of causes are subordinate to one another, the effect depends more on the first than on the second cause, since the second cause acts only in virtue of the first.

Quod autem ratio humana sit regula voluntatis humanae, ex qua eius bonitas mensuretur, habet ex lege aeterna, quae est ratio divina.

Now it is from the eternal law, which is the Divine Formal Aspect, that human aspectual apprehension is the rule of the human will: the rule from which the will's goodness is measured.

Unde in Psalmo IV, dicitur, "multi dicunt, quis ostendit nobis bona? signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine", quasi diceret, "lumen rationis quod in nobis est, intantum potest nobis ostendere bona, et nostram voluntatem regulare, inquantum est lumen vultus tui, idest a vultu tuo derivatum.

Hence it is written (Psalm 4:6-7): "Many say: Who showeth us good things? The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": as though to say: "The light of the formal aspect, which is in us [as our aspectual apprehension], is able to show us good things, and guide our will, insofar as it is the light of Thy countenance, i.e., derived from Thy countenance".

Lex aeterna sit nobis ignota secundum quod est in mente divina, innotescit tamen nobis aliqualiter, vel per rationem naturalem, quae ab ea derivatur ut propria eius imago, vel per aliqualem revelationem superadditam.

Although the eternal law is unknown to us according as it is in the Divine Mind, nevertheless it becomes known to us somewhat, either by natural aspectual apprehension, which is derived from the divine mind as its proper image, or by some sort of additional revelation.

1a 2ae q19 a3: Whether the goodness of the will depends on formal aspect? Yes.

Bonitas voluntatis dependet ex hoc quod sit subiecta rationi quia bonitas voluntatis proprie ex obiecto dependet, et obiectum voluntatis proponitur ei per rationem.

The goodness of the will depends on its being subject to the formal aspect because the goodness of the will depends properly on the object, and the will's object is proposed to it through the formal aspect.

Bonum sub ratione boni (idest appetibilis) per prius pertinet ad voluntatem quam ad rationem.

The good, considered under the formal aspect of being good (i.e., as desirable), pertains to the will before pertaining to aspectual apprehension.

Sed tamen per prius pertinet ad rationem sub ratione veri, quam ad voluntatem sub ratione appetibilis, quia appetitus voluntatis non potest esse de bono, nisi prius a ratione apprehendatur.

But considered under the formal aspect of being true, it pertains to aspectual apprehension before pertaining to the will under the aspect of being desirable [in its goodness], because the will cannot desire a good that is not previously apprehended in [the truth of] its formal aspect.

In his autem quae sunt ad finem, rectitudo rationis consistit in conformitate ad appetitum finis debiti. Sed tamen et ipse appetitus finis debiti praesupponit rectam apprehensionem de fine, quae est per rationem.

In regard to the means, the correctness of aspectual apprehension depends on its conformity with the desire of a due end. Nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes a correct apprehension of the end, which [correctness of apprehension] occurs through [the apprehension of] the formal aspect.

Voluntas quodam modo movet rationem; et ratio alio modo movet voluntatem: ex parte scilicet obiecti, ut supra dictum est.

The will moves aspectual apprehension in one way; the formal aspect moves the will in another: viz., on the part of the object, as stated above (q9 a1).

Nam bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis proportionatum ei. Bonum autem sensibile, vel imaginarium, non est proportionatum voluntati, sed appetitui sensitivo, quia voluntas potest tendere in bonum universale, quod ratio apprehendit, appetitus autem sensitivus non tendit nisi in bonum particulare, quod apprehendit vis sensitiva. Et ideo bonitas voluntatis dependet a ratione, eo modo quo dependet ab obiecto.

For the good understood is the proportionate object of the will. But a good apprehended by sense, or a good apprehended in perception, is proportionate, not to the will, but to the sensory appetite, because the will is able to tend to the universal good that the formal aspect apprehends, whereas the sensory appetite tends only to a particular good that is apprehended by the sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on the apprehension of the formal aspect in the same way as [the goodness of the will] depends on the object.

1a 2ae q19 a2: Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone? Yes.

Bonitas et malitia voluntatis non dependet ex circumstantiis, sed ex solo obiecto, quia bonitas voluntatis ex solo uno illo dependet, quod per se facit bonitatem in actu; scilicet ex obiecto, et non ex circumstantiis (quae sunt quaedam accidentia actus).

The goodness and badness of the will depend, not on the circumstances, but on the object alone, because the goodness of the will's act depends on that one thing alone, which essentially causes goodness in the act; and that one thing is the object, and not the circumstances (which are accidents, as it were, of the act).

Illud autem unum quod est principium in quolibet genere, non est per accidens, sed per se, quia omne quod est per accidens, reducitur ad id quod est per se, sicut ad principium.

That one thing which is the principle in each genus, is not something accidental to that genus, but something essential thereto, because whatever is accidental is reduced to something essential, as to its principle.

Principium autem bonitatis et malitiae humanorum actuum est ex actu voluntatis.

Now the principle of the goodness and malice of human actions is taken from the act of the will.

Finis est obiectum voluntatis, non autem aliarum virium. Unde quantum ad actum voluntatis, non differt bonitas quae est ex obiecto, a bonitate quae est ex fine, sicut in actibus aliarum virium; nisi forte per accidens, prout finis dependet ex fine, et voluntas ex voluntate.

The end is the object of the will, but not of the other powers. Hence, in regard to the act of the will, the goodness derived from the object, does not differ from that which is derived from the end, as they differ in the acts of the other powers; except perhaps accidentally, insofar as one end depends on another, and one act of the will on another.

Supposito quod voluntas sit boni, nulla circumstantia potest eam facere malam.

Given that the act of the will is fixed on some good, no circumstances can make that act bad.

1a 2ae q19 a1: Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object? Yes.

Bonum et malum in actibus voluntatis proprie attenditur secundum obiecta, quia differentia speciei in actibus est secundum obiecta, ut dictum est.

Good and evil in the acts of the will is derived properly from the objects, because the specific difference in acts is according to objects, as stated above (q18 a5).

Ergo bonitas voluntatis est ex hoc quod aliquis vult bonum.

Therefore the goodness of the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is good.

Voluntas non semper est veri boni, sed quandoque est apparentis boni, quod quidem habet aliquam rationem boni, non tamen simpliciter convenientis ad appetendum. Et propter hoc actus voluntatis non est bonus semper, sed aliquando malus.

The will is not always directed to what is truly good, but sometimes to the apparent good, which has indeed some formal aspect of good, but not of a good that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence it is that the act of the will is not always good, but sometimes evil.

Bonum per rationem repraesentatur voluntati ut obiectum; et inquantum cadit sub ordine rationis, pertinet ad genus moris, et causat bonitatem moralem in actu voluntatis. Ratio enim principium est humanorum et moralium actuum, ut supra dictum est.

Good, according to its formal aspect, is presented to the will as its object; and insofar as an object falls under the order of formal aspect, it enters the moral order, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will, since formal aspect is the principle of human and moral acts, as stated above (q18 a5).

1a 2ae q19: The goodness and badness of the interior act of the will

1. Does the goodness of the will depend on the object?
2. Does it depend on the object alone?
3. Does it depend on reason?
4. Does it depend on the eternal law?
5. Does erring reason bind?
6. Is the will evil if it follows the erring reason against the law of God?
7. Does the goodness of the will in regard to the means, depend on the intention of the end?
8. Does the degree of goodness or badness in the will depend on the degree of good or evil in the intention?
9. Does the goodness of the will depend on its conformity to the Divine will?
10. Is it necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed?

1a 2ae q18 a11: Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places a moral action in a species of good or evil? No.

Non omnis circumstantia addens in bonitate vel malitia, variat speciem moralis actus, quia circumstantia dat speciem boni vel mali actui morali, inquantum respicit specialem ordinem rationis.

Not every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, changes its species, because a circumstance gives the species of good or evil to a moral action only insofar as it regards a special aspectual relation.

Contingit autem quandoque quod circumstantia non respicit ordinem rationis in bono vel malo, nisi praesupposita alia circumstantia, a qua actus moralis habet speciem boni vel mali.

Now it happens sometimes that a circumstance does not regard an aspectual relation in respect of good or evil, except on the supposition of another previous circumstance, from which the moral action takes its species of good or evil.

Sicut tollere aliquid in magna quantitate vel parva, non respicit ordinem rationis in bono vel malo, nisi praesupposita aliqua alia conditione, per quam actus habeat malitiam vel bonitatem.

Thus to take something in a large or small quantity, does not regard the aspectual relation in respect of good or evil, unless a certain other condition be presupposed from which the action takes its malice or goodness.

Puta hoc quod est esse alienum, quod repugnat rationi. Unde tollere alienum in magna vel parva quantitate, non diversificat speciem peccati. Tamen potest aggravare vel diminuere peccatum. Et similiter est in aliis malis vel bonis. Unde non omnis circumstantia addens in bonitate vel malitia, variat speciem moralis actus.

For instance, if what is taken belongs to another, which makes the action to be discordant in the formal aspect. Wherefore to take what belongs to another in a large or small quantity, does not change the species of the sin. Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin. The same applies to other evil or good actions.

1a 2ae q18 a10: Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil? Yes.

Circumstantia constituit actum moralem in aliqua specie boni vel mali quia circumstantia secundum quod dat speciem actui, consideratur ut quaedam conditio obiecti, et quasi quaedam specifica differentia eius.

A circumstance makes a moral action to be specifically good or bad because a circumstance, insofar as it specifies an action, is considered as a condition of the object, and as being, as it were, a specific difference thereof.

Circumstantia manens in ratione circumstantiae, cum habeat rationem accidentis, non dat speciem; sed inquantum mutatur in principalem conditionem obiecti, secundum hoc dat speciem.

A circumstance, so long as it remains in the formal aspect of circumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it has the formal aspect of accident; but when it becomes a principal condition of the object, then it does specify the action.

Non omnis circumstantia constituit actum moralem in aliqua specie boni vel mali, cum non quaelibet circumstantia importet aliquam consonantiam vel dissonantiam ad rationem. Unde non oportet, licet sint multae circumstantiae unius actus, quod unus actus sit in pluribus speciebus. Licet etiam non sit inconveniens quod unus actus moralis sit in pluribus speciebus moris etiam disparatis.

It is not every circumstance that places the moral action in the species of good or evil, since not every circumstance implies accord or disaccord with the formal aspect. Consequently, although one action may have many circumstances, it does not follow that it is in many species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one action should not be in several, even disparate, moral species.

Sicut species rerum naturalium constituuntur ex naturalibus formis, ita species moralium actuum constituuntur ex formis prout sunt a ratione conceptae, sicut ex supradictis patet.

Just as the species of natural things are constituted by their natural forms, so the species of moral actions are constituted by forms taken together under a formal aspect, as is evident from what was said above (a5).

Quia vero natura determinata est ad unum, nec potest esse processus naturae in infinitum, necesse est pervenire ad aliquam ultimam formam, ex qua sumatur differentia specifica, post quam alia differentia specifica esse non possit. Et inde est quod in rebus naturalibus, id quod est accidens alicui rei, non potest accipi ut differentia constituens speciem.

But since nature is determinate to one thing, nor can a process of nature go on to infinity, there must needs be some ultimate form, giving a specific difference, after which no further specific difference is possible. Hence it is that in natural things, that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference constituting the species.

Sed processus rationis non est determinatus ad aliquid unum, sed quolibet dato, potest ulterius procedere. Et ideo quod in uno actu accipitur ut circumstantia superaddita obiecto quod determinat speciem actus, potest iterum accipi a ratione ordinante ut principalis conditio obiecti determinantis speciem actus.

But the process of aspectual apprehension is not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further. And consequently that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance added to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by the directing aspect, as the principal condition of the object that determines the action's species.

Sicut tollere alienum habet speciem ex ratione alieni, ex hoc enim constituitur in specie furti; et si consideretur super hoc ratio loci vel temporis, se habebit in ratione circumstantiae. Sed quia ratio etiam de loco vel de tempore, et aliis huiusmodi, ordinare potest, contingit conditionem loci circa obiectum accipi ut contrariam ordini rationis.

Thus to appropriate another's property is specified by the aspect of the property being "another's," and in this respect it is placed in the species of theft; and if we consider that action also in its formal aspect of place or time, then this will be an additional aspect of circumstance. But since the aspect can direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that the condition as to place, in relation to the object, is considered as being in disaccord with the formal aspect.

Puta quod ratio ordinat non esse iniuriam faciendam loco sacro. Unde tollere aliquid alienum de loco sacro addit specialem repugnantiam ad ordinem rationis.

For instance, the formal aspect forbids damage to be done to a holy place. Consequently to steal from a holy place has an additional repugnance to the order of reason.

Et ideo locus, qui prius considerabatur ut circumstantia, nunc consideratur ut principalis conditio obiecti rationi repugnans. Et per hunc modum, quandocumque aliqua circumstantia respicit specialem ordinem rationis vel pro vel contra, oportet quod circumstantia det speciem actui morali vel bono vel malo.

And thus place, which was first of all considered as a circumstance, is considered here as the principal condition of the object, and as itself repugnant to formal aspect. And in this way, whenever some circumstance has a special relation to formal aspect, either for or against, the circumstance must needs specify the moral action whether good or bad.