Non omnis contrarietas passionum irascibilis est secundum contrarietatem boni et mali quia in passionibus animae duplex contrarietas invenitur: una quidem secundum contrarietatem obiectorum, scilicet boni et mali; alia vero secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino.
Not every contrariety of the irascible passions is that of good and evil because there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul: one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of good and evil; the other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same terminus.
In passionibus quidem concupiscibilis invenitur prima contrarietas tantum: quae scilicet est secundum obiecta; in passionibus autem irascibilis invenitur utraque. Cuius ratio est quia obiectum concupiscibilis, ut supra dictum est, est bonum vel malum sensibile absolute. Bonum autem, inquantum bonum, non potest esse terminus ut a quo, sed solum ut ad quem, quia nihil refugit bonum inquantum bonum; sed omnia appetunt ipsum.
In the concupiscible passions the former contrariety alone is to be found: viz. that which is based on the objects; whereas in the irascible passions, we find both forms of contrariety. The formal aspect of this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (q23 a1), is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good, as such, cannot be a terminus wherefrom, but only [a terminus] whereto, since nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it.
Similiter nihil appetit malum inquantum huiusmodi, sed omnia fugiunt ipsum; et propter hoc, malum non habet rationem termini ad quem, sed solum termini a quo. Sic igitur omnis passio concupiscibilis respectu boni, est ut in ipsum (sicut amor, desiderium et gaudium); omnis vero passio eius respectu mali, est ut ab ipso (sicut odium, fuga seu abominatio, et tristitia). Unde in passionibus concupiscibilis non potest esse contrarietas secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem obiecto.
In like manner, nothing desires evil as such, but all things shun it; wherefore evil cannot have the formal aspect of a terminus whereto, but only of a terminus wherefrom. Accordingly every concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it (as with love, desire and joy); while every concupiscible passion in respect of evil, tends from it (as with hatred, avoidance or dislike, and sorrow). Wherefore, in the concupiscible passions, there can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same object.
Sed obiectum irascibilis est sensibile bonum vel malum, non quidem absolute, sed sub ratione difficultatis vel arduitatis, ut supra dictum est. Bonum autem arduum sive difficile habet rationem ut in ipsum tendatur, inquantum est bonum (quod pertinet ad passionem spei); et ut ab ipso recedatur, inquantum est arduum vel difficile (quod pertinet ad passionem desperationis).
On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the formal aspect of difficulty or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered as good, has the formal aspect which produces in us a tendency to it (which tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"); whereas, considered as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it (and this pertains to the passion of "despair").
Similiter malum arduum habet rationem ut vitetur, inquantum est malum (et hoc pertinet ad passionem timoris); habet etiam rationem ut in ipsum tendatur, sicut in quoddam arduum, per quod scilicet aliquid evadit subiectionem mali (et sic tendit in ipsum audacia).
In like manner the arduous evil, considered as an evil, has the formal aspect of something to be shunned (and this belongs to the passion of "fear"); but it also has the formal aspect for tending to it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to evil (and this tendency is called "daring").
Invenitur ergo in passionibus irascibilis contrarietas secundum contrarietatem boni et mali (sicut inter spem et timorem), et iterum secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino, (sicut inter audaciam et timorem).
Consequently, in the irascible passions we find contrariety according to the contrariety of good and evil (as between hope and fear), and also contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and fear).