Eventus sequens non addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus quia virtus causae existimatur secundum effectus per se, non autem secundum effectus per accidens.
The consequences of an action doe not increase its goodness or badness because the virtue of a cause is measured by the effect that flows from the nature of the cause, not by that which results by accident.
Manifestum est enim meliorem actum esse ex suo genere, ex quo possunt plura bona sequi; et peiorem, ex quo nata sunt plura mala sequi.
It is evident that an action is generally better, if better results can follow from it; and generally worse, if it is of a nature to produce worse results.
Si vero per accidens, et ut in paucioribus, tunc eventus sequens non addit ad bonitatem vel ad malitiam actus: non enim datur iudicium de re aliqua secundum illud quod est per accidens, sed solum secundum illud quod est per se.
On the other hand, if the consequences follow by accident, and seldom, then they do not increase the goodness or badness of the action: because we do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to it by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of itself.