Tuesday, March 23, 2010

1a 2ae q20 a2: Whether the whole goodness and badness of the external action depends on the goodness of the will? No.

Circa utrosque actus potest esse differentia boni et mali quia voluntarium dicitur non solum actus interior voluntatis, sed etiam actus exteriores, prout a voluntate procedunt et ratione.

The difference of good and evil is applicable to both the interior and external act because voluntariness applies not only to the interior act of the will, but also to external actions, inasmuch as they proceed from the will and the formal aspect.

Si igitur voluntas sit bona, et ex obiecto proprio, et ex fine, consequens est actum exteriorem esse bonum.

If therefore the will be good, both from its proper object and from its end, if follows that the external action is good.

Sed non sufficit ad hoc quod actus exterior sit bonus, bonitas voluntatis quae est ex intentione finis.

But if the will be good from [only] its intention of the end, this is not enough to make the external action good.

Sed si voluntas sit mala sive ex intentione finis, sive ex actu volito, consequens est actum exteriorem esse malum.

And if the will be evil either by its intention of the end, or by the act willed, it follows that the external action is evil.

Non solum aliquis voluntate peccat, quando vult malum finem, sed etiam quando vult malum actum.

A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil end, but also when he wills an evil act.

In actu exteriori potest considerari duplex bonitas vel malitia: una secundum debitam materiam et circumstantias; alia secundum ordinem ad finem. Et illa quidem quae est secundum ordinem ad finem, tota dependet ex voluntate. Illa autem quae est ex debita materia vel circumstantiis, dependet ex ratione: et ex hac dependet bonitas voluntatis, secundum quod in ipsam fertur.

We may consider a twofold goodness or badness in the external action: one in respect of due matter and circumstances; the other in respect of the order to the end. And that which is in respect of the order to the end, depends entirely on the will. But that which is in respect of due matter or circumstances, depends on the formal aspect: and on this goodness depends the goodness of the will, insofar as the will tends towards it.

Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium, quod "quaedam sunt quae nullo quasi bono fine, aut bona voluntate, possunt bene fieri".

Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that "there are some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make good."