Non omnis circumstantia addens in bonitate vel malitia, variat speciem moralis actus, quia circumstantia dat speciem boni vel mali actui morali, inquantum respicit specialem ordinem rationis.
Not every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, changes its species, because a circumstance gives the species of good or evil to a moral action only insofar as it regards a special aspectual relation.
Contingit autem quandoque quod circumstantia non respicit ordinem rationis in bono vel malo, nisi praesupposita alia circumstantia, a qua actus moralis habet speciem boni vel mali.
Now it happens sometimes that a circumstance does not regard an aspectual relation in respect of good or evil, except on the supposition of another previous circumstance, from which the moral action takes its species of good or evil.
Sicut tollere aliquid in magna quantitate vel parva, non respicit ordinem rationis in bono vel malo, nisi praesupposita aliqua alia conditione, per quam actus habeat malitiam vel bonitatem.
Thus to take something in a large or small quantity, does not regard the aspectual relation in respect of good or evil, unless a certain other condition be presupposed from which the action takes its malice or goodness.
Puta hoc quod est esse alienum, quod repugnat rationi. Unde tollere alienum in magna vel parva quantitate, non diversificat speciem peccati. Tamen potest aggravare vel diminuere peccatum. Et similiter est in aliis malis vel bonis. Unde non omnis circumstantia addens in bonitate vel malitia, variat speciem moralis actus.
For instance, if what is taken belongs to another, which makes the action to be discordant in the formal aspect. Wherefore to take what belongs to another in a large or small quantity, does not change the species of the sin. Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin. The same applies to other evil or good actions.