1a 2ae q28 a1: Whether union is an effect of love? Yes.

Amor quilibet est virtus unitiva quia amor vero et in absentia et in praesentia.

Every love is a unitive love because love remains whether the beloved be absent or present.

Unio tripliciter se habet ad amorem. Quaedam enim unio est causa amoris. Et haec quidem est unio substantialis, quantum ad amorem quo quis amat seipsum, quantum vero ad amorem quo quis amat alia, est unio similitudinis, ut dictum est.

Union has a threefold relation to love. There is union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above (q27 a3).

Quaedam vero unio est essentialiter ipse amor. Et haec est unio secundum coaptationem affectus. Quae quidem assimilatur unioni substantiali, inquantum amans se habet ad amatum, in amore quidem amicitiae, ut ad seipsum; in amore autem concupiscentiae, ut ad aliquid sui.

There is also a union which is essentially love itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened to substantial union, inasmuch as the lover stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something belonging to himself, if it be love of concupiscence.

Quaedam vero unio est effectus amoris. Et haec est unio realis, quam amans quaerit de re amata. Et haec quidem unio est secundum convenientiam amoris, ut enim philosophus refert, II Politic., "Aristophanes dixit quod amantes desiderarent ex ambobus fieri unum, sed quia ex hoc accideret aut ambos aut alterum corrumpi", quaerunt unionem quae convenit et decet; ut scilicet simul conversentur, et simul colloquantur, et in aliis huiusmodi coniungantur.

Again there is a union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover seeks with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. ii, 1), "Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into one," but since "this would result in either one or both being destroyed," they seek a suitable and becoming union--to live together, speak together, and be united together in other like things.

Duplex est unio amantis ad amatum. Una quidem secundum rem, puta cum amatum praesentialiter adest amanti. Alia vero secundum affectum. Quae quidem unio consideranda est ex apprehensione praecedente, nam motus appetitivus sequitur apprehensionem.

The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the appetite follows apprehension.

Cum autem sit duplex amor, scilicet concupiscentiae et amicitiae, uterque procedit ex quadam apprehensione unitatis amati ad amantem. Cum enim aliquis amat aliquid quasi concupiscens illud, apprehendit illud quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse.

Now love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being.

Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum sicut et sibi vult bonum, unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi.

In like manner when a man loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, insofar, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself.

Et inde est quod amicus dicitur esse alter ipse, et Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., "bene quidam dixit de amico suo, dimidium animae suae".

Hence a friend is called a man's "other self" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul."

Primam ergo unionem amor facit effective, quia movet ad desiderandum et quaerendum praesentiam amati, quasi sibi convenientis et ad se pertinentis.

The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to him.

Secundam autem unionem facit formaliter, quia ipse amor est talis unio vel nexus. Unde Augustinus dicit, in VIII de Trin., quod "amor est quasi vita quaedam duo aliqua copulans, vel copulare appetens, amantem scilicet et quod amatur". Quod enim dicit copulans, refertur ad unionem affectus, sine qua non est amor, quod vero dicit copulare intendens, pertinet ad unionem realem.

The second union is caused "formally" by love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved." For in describing it as "uniting" he refers to the union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that "it seeks to unite," he refers to real union.

1a 2ae q28: The effects of love

1. Is union an effect of love?
2. Is mutual indwelling an effect of love?
3. Is ecstasy an effect of love?
4. Is zeal an effect of love?
5. Is love a passion that is hurtful to the lover?
6. Is love cause of all that the lover does?

1a 2ae q27 a4: Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love? No.

Nulla alia passio animae est quae non praesupponat aliquem amorem, quia omnis alia passio animae vel importat motum ad aliquid, vel quietem in aliquo; omnis autem motus in aliquid, vel quies in aliquo, ex aliqua connaturalitate vel coaptatione procedit, quae pertinet ad rationem amoris.

There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose love of some kind, because every other passion of the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in something; but every movement towards something, or rest in something, arises from some connaturality or fitting aptness, which pertains to love's formal aspect.

Unde impossibile est quod aliqua alia passio animae sit causa universaliter omnis amoris. Contingit tamen aliquam aliam passionem esse causam amoris alicuius, sicut etiam unum bonum est causa alterius.

Therefore it is not possible for any other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular love, just as one good is the cause of another.

Cum aliquis amat aliquid propter delectationem, amor quidem ille causatur ex delectatione, sed delectatio illa iterum causatur ex alio amore praecedente; nullus enim delectatur, nisi in re aliquo modo amata.

When someone loves something for the pleasure it affords, love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure is caused, in its turn, by another preceding love; for nobody takes pleasure, save in that which is loved in some way.

1a 2ae q27 a3: Whether likeness is a cause of love? Yes.

Similitudo, proprie loquendo, est causa amoris quia in amore concupiscentiae amans proprie amat seipsum, cum vult illud bonum quod concupiscit.

Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love, because in the love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing the good that he desires.

Magis autem unusquisque seipsum amat quam alium, quia sibi unus est in substantia, alteri vero in similitudine alicuius formae. Et ideo si ex eo quod est sibi similis in participatione formae, impediatur ipsemet a consecutione boni quod amat, efficitur ei odiosus, non inquantum est similis, sed inquantum est proprii boni impeditivus.

But a man loves himself more than another, because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only in the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders him from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good.

Et propter hoc figuli corrixantur ad invicem, quia se invicem impediunt in proprio lucro, et inter superbos sunt iurgia, quia se invicem impediunt in propria excellentia, quam concupiscunt.

This is why "potters quarrel among themselves," because they hinder one another's gain, and why "there are contentions among the proud," because they hinder one another in attaining the position they covet.

Ille qui amat hoc quo indiget, habet similitudinem ad id quod amat sicut quod est potentia ad actum.

He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to that which he loves, as what is in potency [bears a likeness] to its act.

1a 2ae q27 a2: Whether knowledge is a cause of love? Yes.

Amor requirit aliquam apprehensionem boni quod amatur quia bonum est causa amoris per modum obiecti, sed bonum non est obiectum appetitus, nisi prout est apprehensum.

Love demands some apprehension of the good that is loved because good is the cause of love, as being its object, but good is not the object of the appetite, except as apprehended.

Augustinus probat, in X de Trin., quod "nullus potest amare aliquid incognitum."

Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that "none can love what he does not know."

Aliquid requiritur ad perfectionem cognitionis, quod non requiritur ad perfectionem amoris. Cognitio enim ad rationem pertinet, cuius est distinguere inter ea quae secundum rem sunt coniuncta, et componere (quodammodo) ea quae sunt diversa, unum alteri comparando. Et ideo ad perfectionem cognitionis requiritur quod homo cognoscat singillatim quidquid est in re (sicut partes et virtutes et proprietates).

Something is required for the perfection of cognition, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For cognition is oriented towards formal aspect, whose [function] it is to distinguish between aspects which in the thing are united, and to unite together (in some sort of way) aspects that are distinct, by comparing one [aspect] with another. Consequently the perfection of cognition requires that a man should cognize one by one whatever is in a thing (such as its parts, powers, and properties).

Sed amor est in vi appetitiva, quae respicit rem secundum quod in se est. Unde ad perfectionem amoris sufficit quod res prout in se apprehenditur, ametur. Ob hoc ergo contingit quod aliquid plus amatur quam cognoscatur, quia potest perfecte amari, etiam si non perfecte cognoscatur.

On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing according to what it is in itself. Wherefore it suffices, for the perfection of love, that a thing be loved as far as it is known in itself. Hence it is, therefore, that something is loved more than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known.

1a 2ae q27 a1: Whether good is the only cause of love? Yes.

Bonum est propria causa amoris quia amoris proprium obiectum est bonum; quia, ut dictum est, amor importat quandam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad amatum; unicuique autem est bonum id quod est sibi connaturale et proportionatum.

Good is the proper cause of love because the proper object of love is the good; since, as stated above (q26, a1,a2), love implies a certain connaturalness, or fitting pleasure, of the lover for the thing beloved; and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and [fittingly] proportionate to it.

Amor ad appetitivam potentiam pertinet, quae est vis passiva. Unde obiectum eius comparatur ad ipsam sicut causa motus vel actus ipsius. Oportet igitur ut illud sit proprie causa amoris quod est amoris obiectum.

Love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's object.

Malum nunquam amatur nisi sub ratione boni, scilicet inquantum est secundum quid bonum, et apprehenditur ut simpliciter bonum. Et sic aliquis amor est malus, inquantum tendit in id quod non est simpliciter verum bonum.

Evil is never loved except under the formal aspect of good, that is to say, insofar as it is good in some respect, but is [instead] considered as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, insofar as it tends to that which is not simply a true good.

Pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens. Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus; sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus.

The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in formal aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the formal aspect of good is that which calms the appetite; while the formal aspect of the beautiful is that which calms the appetite by its [merely] being seen or known.

Unde et illi sensus praecipue respiciunt pulchrum, qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt: scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes.

Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive: viz. sight and hearing, as [the senses that are foremost in] attaining the formal aspect.

Dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. In sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum, non utimur nomine pulchritudinis, non enim dicimus pulchros sapores aut odores.

For we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the other formal objects of (i.e., the other specific things sensed by) the other senses, we do not [customarily] use the expression "beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful odors.

Et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum, quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam: ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet.

Thus it is evident that beauty adds, on top of goodness, a certain ordination towards cognitive power: thus results the [customary] fact that "good" is spoken of that which simply pleases the appetite; while "beautiful" is spoken of that about which [merely] the apprehension itself is pleasing.

1a 2ae q27: The cause of love

1. Is good the only cause of love?
2. Is knowledge a cause of love?
3. Is likeness a cause of love?
4. Is any other passion of the soul a cause of love?

1a 2ae q26 a4: Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence? Yes.

Alius est amor concupiscentiae, et alius est amor amicitiae, quia ad illud bonum quod quis vult alteri, habetur amor concupiscentiae, ad illud autem cui aliquis vult bonum, habetur amor amicitiae.

Love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship because man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes good.

Amor non dividitur per amicitiam et concupiscentiam, sed per amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Nam ille proprie dicitur amicus, cui aliquod bonum volumus, illud autem dicimur concupiscere, quod volumus nobis.

Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence. For a friend is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good, while we are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves.

Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. Nam id quod amatur amore amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amatur, quod autem amatur amore concupiscentiae, non simpliciter et secundum se amatur, sed amatur alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio; ita bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum habet bonitatem; quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum quid. Et per consequens amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum, est amor simpliciter, amor autem quo amatur aliquid ut sit bonum alterius, est amor secundum quid.

Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary: since that which is loved with the love of friendship is loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for something else. For just as that which has existence, is a being simply, while that which exists in another is a relative being; so, because good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good simply; but that which is another's good, is a relative good. Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that it may have some good, is love simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved, that it may be another's good, is relative love.

In amicitia utilis et delectabilis, vult quidem aliquis aliquod bonum amico, et quantum ad hoc salvatur ibi ratio amicitiae. Sed quia illud bonum refert ulterius ad suam delectationem vel utilitatem, inde est quod amicitia utilis et delectabilis, inquantum trahitur ad amorem concupiscentiae, deficit a ratione verae amicitiae.

When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good, and in this respect the formal aspect of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the useful or pleasant, insofar as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the formal aspect of true friendship.

1a 2ae q26 a3: Whether love is the same as dilection? No.

Obiectum amoris est communius quam obiectum dilectionis, quia ad plura se extendit amor quam dilectio.

The object of love is more general than the object of dilection because love extends to more than dilection does.

Nam amor communius est inter ea, omnis enim dilectio vel caritas est amor, sed non e converso. Addit enim dilectio, supra amorem, electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Unde dilectio non est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola rationali natura. Caritas autem addit, supra amorem, perfectionem quandam amoris, inquantum id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur, ut ipsum nomen designat.

For love has a wider signification among these words, since every dilection or charity is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand, as the very word denotes. And therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the will, and only in the formally aspectual nature. Charity denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, insofar as that which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [Referring to the Latin "carus" (dear)].

Ideo aliqui posuerunt, etiam in ipsa voluntate, nomen amoris esse divinius nomine dilectionis, quia amor importat quandam passionem, praecipue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo; dilectio autem praesupponit iudicium rationis. Magis autem homo in Deum tendere potest per amorem, passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, quam ad hoc eum propria ratio ducere possit, quod pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est. Et propter hoc, divinius est amor quam dilectio.

Thus some held that, even when applied to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more Godlike than "dilection," because love denotes a kind of passion, especially insofar as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection presupposes the judgment of formal aspect. But it is more possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his aspectual apprehension, which pertains to the formal aspect of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike than dilection.

1a 2ae q26 a2: Whether love is a passion? Yes.

Amor et passio (proprie quidem, secundum quod est in concupiscibili; communiter autem, et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in voluntate) quia amor consistat in quadam immutatione appetitus ab appetibili.

Love is a passion (properly so called, according as it is in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will) because love consists in a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object.

Passio est effectus agentis in patiente. Agens autem naturale duplicem effectum inducit in patiens, nam primo quidem dat formam, secundo autem dat motum consequentem formam.

Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient, for in the first place it gives it the form, and secondly it gives it the movement that results from the form.

Sic etiam ipsum appetibile dat appetitui, primo quidem, quandam coaptationem ad ipsum, quae est complacentia appetibilis; ex qua sequitur motus ad appetibile.

In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object.

Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium; et ultimo quies, quae est gaudium.

The first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this movement is "desire"; and lastly, there is rest which is "joy."

Philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod amor est passio.

The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love is a passion."

Unio pertinet ad amorem, inquantum per complacentiam appetitus, amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum, vel ad aliquid sui. Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis, sed unio est consequens amorem. Unde et Dionysius dicit quod "amor est virtus unitiva", et philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod unio est opus amoris.

Union belongs to love insofar as by the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that which he loves, as though it were himself, or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but that union is a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that "love is a unitive force" (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 1) that union is the work of love.

1a 2ae q26 a1: Whether love is in the concupiscible power? Yes.

Amor pertinet ad concupiscibilem, quia dicitur per respectum ad bonum absolute, non per respectum ad arduum, quod est obiectum irascibilis.

Love belongs to the concupiscible power, because it regards good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible faculty.

Amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. In appetitu autem naturali, principium huiusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest amor naturalis.

The name "love" is given to the principle of movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite, the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may be called "natural love".

Et similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi, vel voluntatis, ad aliquod bonum, idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel intellectivus seu rationalis. Amor igitur sensitivus est in appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in appetitu intellectivo.

In like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite, or of the will, to some good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is called "sensitive love," or "intellectual" or "rational love." So that sensitive love is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite.

Philosophus dicit, in II Topic., quod "amor est in concupiscibili".

The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is in the concupiscible power".

1a 2ae q26: The passions of the soul in particular: and first, of love

1. Is love in the concupiscible power?
2. Is love a passion?
3. Is love the same as dilection?
4. Is love properly divided into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence?

1a 2ae q25 a4: Whether these are the four principal passions: joy, sadness, hope and fear? Yes.

Hae quatuor passiones communiter principales esse dicuntur quia
de bono praesenti est gaudium;
de malo praesenti est tristitia;
de bono vero futuro est spes;
de malo futuro est timor.

These four are commonly called the principal passions because
joy relates to present good,
sadness relates to present evil;
hope regards future good, and
fear, future evil.

Quarum duae, scilicet gaudium et tristitia, principales dicuntur, quia sunt completivae et finales simpliciter respectu omnium passionum, unde ad omnes passiones consequuntur.

Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because in them all the other passions have their completion and end.

Desperatio importat recessum a bono, quod est quasi per accidens; et audacia importat accessum ad malum, quod etiam est per accidens. Et ideo hae passiones non possunt esse principales, quia quod est per accidens, non potest dici principale. Et sic etiam nec ira potest dici passio principalis, quae consequitur audaciam.

Despair implies movement away from good, and this is, as it were, accidental; and daring implies movement towards evil, and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal passions, because that which is accidental cannot be said to be principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring.

Augustinus ponit desiderium vel cupiditatem loco spei, inquantum ad idem pertinere videntur, scilicet ad bonum futurum.

Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, insofar as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future good.

1a 2ae q25 a3: Whether hope is the first of the irascible passions? Yes.

Spes est prior inter omnes passiones irascibilis quia spes est motus in bonum secundum rationem boni quod de sua ratione est attractivum, et ideo est motus in bonum per se; desperatio autem est recessus a bono, qui non competit bono secundum quod est bonum, sed secundum aliquid aliud, unde est quasi per accidens.

Hope is the first of the passions in the irascible faculty because hope is a movement towards a good according to the formal aspect of the good, which is attractive [simply] by its own formal aspect, so that hope tends to the good in itself; whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were.

Et eadem ratione, timor, cum sit recessus a malo, est prior quam audacia. Quod autem spes et desperatio sint naturaliter priores quam timor et audacia, ex hoc manifestum est, quod, sicut appetitus boni est ratio quare vitetur malum, ita etiam spes et desperatio sunt ratio timoris et audaciae, nam audacia consequitur spem victoriae, et timor consequitur desperationem vincendi. Ira autem consequitur audaciam, nullus enim irascitur vindictam appetens, nisi audeat vindicare (secundum quod Avicenna dicit, in sexto de naturalibus).

And by the same formal aspect, fear, since it is a movement from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this--that as the appetite for the good is the aspectual apprehension by which evil is avoided, so hope and despair are aspectually apprehended by fear and daring, because daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring, for no one is angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself (as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics).

Quia ira causatur ex aliis passionibus sicut effectus a causis praecedentibus, ideo ab ea, tanquam a manifestiori, denominatur potentia.

Because anger arises from the other passions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being more manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name.

Et quidem ex praesentia boni non causatur aliqua passio in irascibili, ut dictum est, sed ex praesentia mali causatur passio irae.

The presence of good produces no passion in the irascible, as stated above (q23, a3,a4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger.

Quia igitur in via generationis seu consecutionis, proportio vel aptitudo ad finem praecedit consecutionem finis; inde est quod ira, inter omnes passiones irascibilis, est ultima, ordine generationis. Inter alias autem passiones irascibilis, quae important motum consequentem amorem vel odium boni vel mali, oportet quod passiones quarum obiectum est bonum, scilicet spes et desperatio, sint naturaliter priores passionibus quarum obiectum est malum, scilicet audacia et timore. Ita tamen quod spes est prior desperatione.

Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation. And among the other passions of the irascible faculty, which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope precedes despair.

Et si ordinem omnium passionum secundum viam generationis, scire velimus,
primo occurrunt amor et odium;
secundo, desiderium et fuga;
tertio, spes et desperatio;
quarto, timor et audacia;
quinto, ira;
sexto et ultimo, gaudium et tristitia,
quae consequuntur ad omnes passiones, ut dicitur in II Ethic.

And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation,
love and hatred are first;
desire and aversion, second;
hope and despair, third;
fear and daring, fourth;
anger, fifth;
sixth and last, joy and sadness,
which follow from all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5.

Ita tamen quod
amor est prior odio,
et desiderium fuga,
et spes desperatione,
et timor audacia,
et gaudium quam tristitia,
ut ex praedictis colligi potest.

Yet so that
love precedes hatred;
desire precedes aversion;
hope precedes despair;
fear precedes daring; and
joy precedes sadness,
as may be gathered from what has been stated above.

1a 2ae q25 a2: Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions? Yes.

Amor est prima passionum concupiscibilis quia omne quod tendit ad finem aliquem, primo quidem habet aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem, nihil enim tendit in finem non proportionatum; secundo, movetur ad finem; tertio, quiescit in fine post eius consecutionem. Ipsa autem aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni; motus autem ad bonum est desiderium vel concupiscentia; quies autem in bono est gaudium vel delectatio.

Love is the first of the concupiscible passions because whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure.

Et ideo secundum hunc ordinem, amor praecedit desiderium, et desiderium praecedit delectationem. Sed secundum ordinem intentionis, est e converso, nam delectatio intenta causat desiderium et amorem. Delectatio enim est fruitio boni, quae quodammodo est finis sicut et ipsum bonum, ut supra dictum est.

Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse, because the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated above (q11, a3, ad 3).

Hoc modo nominatur aliquid, secundum quod nobis innotescit, voces enim sunt signa intellectuum, secundum philosophum. Nos autem, ut plurimum, per effectum cognoscimus causam. Effectus autem amoris, quando quidem habetur ipsum amatum, est delectatio; quando vero non habetur, est desiderium vel concupiscentia. Ut autem Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., amor magis sentitur, cum eum prodit indigentia. Unde inter omnes passiones concupiscibilis, magis sensibilis est concupiscentia. Et propter hoc, ab ea denominatur potentia.

We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now, in most cases, we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure; when it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence. And, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most. And for this reason the power is named after it.

Obiectum concupiscibilis sunt bonum et malum. Naturaliter autem est prius bonum malo, eo quod malum est privatio boni. Unde et omnes passiones, quarum obiectum est bonum, naturaliter sunt priores passionibus quarum obiectum est malum, unaquaeque scilicet sua opposita: quia enim bonum quaeritur, ideo refutatur oppositum malum.

Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil, since evil is privation of good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object of which is evil--that is to say, each precedes its contrary passion: for because a good is sought, therefore an opposite evil is shunned.

Bonum autem habet rationem finis, qui quidem est prior in intentione, sed est posterior in consecutione. Potest ergo ordo passionum concupiscibilis attendi vel secundum intentionem, vel secundum consecutionem. Secundum quidem consecutionem, illud est prius quod primo fit in eo quod tendit ad finem.

Now good has the formal aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the end.

Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod omnes passiones ex amore causantur, "amor enim inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; id autem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia est".

Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy."

1a 2ae q25 a1: Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions? No.

Passiones concupiscibilis sunt priores passionibus irascibilis quia bonum simpliciter est prius quam bonum contractum.

The concupiscible passions precede the irascible because the absolute good precedes the restricted good.

Passiones concupiscibilis respiciunt bonum absolutum, passiones autem irascibilis respiciunt bonum contractum, scilicet arduum.

The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult, good.

Passiones irascibilis mediae sunt inter passiones concupiscibilis quae important motum in bonum vel in malum, et inter passiones concupiscibilis quae important quietem in bono vel in malo.

The passions of the irascible faculty stand between those concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and between those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil.

Id in quo iam quiescitur, non habet rationem difficilis seu ardui, quod est obiectum irascibilis.

When we find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as having the formal aspect of the difficult or arduous, whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty.

De ratione obiecti irascibilis est quod sit arduum. Sed quia obiectum concupiscibilis est bonum absolute, prius naturaliter est quam obiectum irascibilis, sicut commune proprio.

The formal aspect of the object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common precedes the proper.

1a 2ae q25: The order of the passions to one another

1. The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible passions
2. The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another
3. The relation of the irascible passions to one another
4. The four principal passions

1a 2ae q24 a4: Whether any passion is good or evil in its species? Yes.

Aliquae passiones sunt bonae vel malae secundum suam speciem quia secundum quod appetitus sensitivus obedit rationi, iam bonum et malum rationis non est in passionibus eius per accidens, sed per se.

Some passions are good or evil according to their species because insofar as the sensitive appetite obeys formal aspect, good and evil in their formal aspects are no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite, but essentially.

In brutis animalibus, appetitus sensitivus non obedit rationi. Et tamen inquantum ducitur quadam aestimativa naturali, quae subiicitur rationi superiori (scilicet divinae), est in eis quaedam similitudo moralis boni, quantum ad animae passiones.

In irrational animals, the sensitive appetite does not obey formal aspect. Nevertheless, insofar as they are led by a kind of estimative apprehension (+, 0, -) of the natures of things, which [estimative power] is governed by a higher aspectual apprehension (i.e., that of the Divine mind [ratio]), there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the soul's passions.

Species actus vel passionis dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est in genere naturae; et sic bonum vel malum morale non pertinet ad speciem actus vel passionis.

The species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion.

Alio modo, secundum quod pertinent ad genus moris, prout scilicet participant aliquid de voluntario et de iudicio rationis. Et hoc modo bonum et malum morale possunt pertinere ad speciem passionis, secundum quod accipitur ut obiectum passionis aliquid de se conveniens rationi, vel dissonum a ratione: sicut patet de verecundia, quae est timor turpis; et de invidia, quae est tristitia de bono alterius. Sic enim pertinent ad speciem exterioris actus.

Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary and proceeds from a judgment about formal aspect. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, insofar as the object to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with [that object's] formal aspect: as is clear in the case of "shame", which is base fear; and of "envy", which is sorrow for another's good. For thus passions belong to the same species as the external act.

Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei, quod "misericordia pertinet ad virtutem". Philosophus etiam dicit, in II Ethic., quod verecundia est passio laudabilis.

Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty is a praiseworthy passion.

1a 2ae q24 a3: Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act? No.

Passio animae non diminuit bonum moris quia ad perfectionem moralis sive humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones animae sint regulatae per rationem.

A passion of the soul does not lessen moral good because it belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that the passions themselves should be regulated by formal aspect.

In Deo et in Angelis non est appetitus sensitivus, neque etiam membra corporea; et ideo bonum in eis non attenditur secundum ordinationem passionum aut corporeorum actuum, sicut in nobis.

In God and the angels there is no sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members; and so in them good does not depend on the right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us.

Stoici, sicut ponebant omnem passionem animae esse malam, ita ponebant consequenter omnem passionem animae diminuere actus bonitatem; omne enim bonum ex permixtione mali vel totaliter tollitur, vel fit minus bonum. Et hoc quidem verum est, si dicamus passiones animae solum inordinatos motus sensitivi appetitus, prout sunt perturbationes seu aegritudines. Sed si passiones simpliciter nominemus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic ad perfectionem humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones sint moderatae per rationem.

As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens the goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true indeed, if by passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his passions be moderated by formal aspect.

1a 2ae q24 a2: Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally? No.

Non passiones dicuntur morbi vel perturbationes animae, nisi cum carent moderatione rationis, quia passiones animae, inquantum sunt praeter ordinem rationis, inclinant ad peccatum; inquantum autem sunt ordinatae a ratione, pertinent ad virtutem.

Passions are not called "diseases" or "disturbances" of the soul, save when they are not controlled by formal aspect, because the passions of the soul, insofar as they are contrary to the order of formal aspect, incline us to sin; but insofar as they are controlled by formal aspect, they pertain to virtue.

Circa hanc quaestionem diversa fuit sententia Stoicorum et Peripateticorum, nam Stoici dixerunt omnes passiones esse malas; Peripatetici vero dixerunt passiones moderatas esse bonas. Quae quidem differentia, licet magna videatur secundum vocem, tamen secundum rem vel nulla est, vel parva, si quis utrorumque intentiones consideret.

On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from that of the Peripatetics, for the Stoics held that all passions are evil; while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are good. This difference, although it appears great in words, is nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider the intent of either school.

1a 2ae q24 a1: Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul? Yes.

Passiones, secundum quod sunt voluntariae, possunt dici bonae vel malae moraliter quia si considerentur secundum quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis, sic est in eis bonum et malum morale.

The passions, insofar as they are voluntary, may be called morally good or evil because if they be considered as subject to the command of the formal aspect and of the will, then moral good and evil are in them.

Dicuntur autem voluntariae vel ex eo quod a voluntate imperantur, vel ex eo quod a voluntate non prohibentur.

And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will.

Istae passiones secundum se consideratae, sunt communes hominibus et aliis animalibus; sed secundum quod a ratione imperantur, sunt propriae hominum.

These passions, considered in themselves, are common to man and other animals; but, as commanded by the formal aspect, they are proper to man.

Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, de passionibus animae loquens "mala sunt ista, si malus est amor; bona, si bonus."

Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good if our love is good."

1a 2ae q24: Good and evil in the passions of the soul

1. Can moral good and evil be found in the passions of the soul?
2. Is every passion of the soul morally evil?
3. Does every passion increase or decrease the goodness or malice of an act?
4. Is any passion good or evil specifically?

1a 2ae q23 a4: Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different, but not contrary to one another? Yes.

Sunt aliquae passiones eiusdem potentiae quae differunt specie, nec sunt contrariae quia passiones differunt secundum activa, quae sunt obiecta passionum animae.

In the same power there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to one another because passions differ in accordance with their active causes, which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects.

Amor et gaudium differunt specie, et sunt in concupiscibili. Nec tamen contrariantur ad invicem; quin potius unum est causa alterius.

Love and joy differ in species, and are in the concupiscible power. And yet they are not contrary to one another; rather, in fact, one causes the other.

In concupiscibili sunt tres coniugationes passionum, scilicet amor et odium, desiderium et fuga, gaudium et tristitia. Similiter in irascibili sunt tres, scilicet spes et desperatio, timor et audacia, et ira, cui nulla passio opponitur.

In the concupiscible faculty there are three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has not contrary passion.

Sunt ergo omnes passiones specie differentes undecim, sex quidem in concupiscibili, et quinque in irascibili; sub quibus omnes animae passiones continentur.

Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.

In motibus autem appetitivae partis, bonum habet quasi virtutem attractivam, malum autem virtutem repulsivam. Bonum ergo primo quidem in potentia appetitiva causat quandam inclinationem, seu aptitudinem, seu connaturalitatem ad bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem amoris. Cui per contrarium respondet odium, ex parte mali.

In the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which is "hatred" in respect of evil.

Secundo, si bonum sit nondum habitum, dat ei motum ad assequendum bonum amatum, et hoc pertinet ad passionem desiderii vel concupiscentiae. Et ex opposito, ex parte mali, est fuga vel abominatio.

Secondly, if the good be not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or "concupiscence": and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion of "aversion" or "dislike."

Tertio, cum adeptum fuerit bonum, dat appetitus quietationem quandam in ipso bono adepto, et hoc pertinet ad delectationem vel gaudium. Cui opponitur ex parte mali dolor vel tristitia.

Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in respect of evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness."

In passionibus autem irascibilis, praesupponitur quidem aptitudo vel inclinatio ad prosequendum bonum vel fugiendum malum, ex concupiscibili, quae absolute respicit bonum vel malum. Et respectu boni nondum adepti, est spes et desperatio.

On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely. And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have "hope" and "despair."

Respectu autem mali nondum iniacentis, est timor et audacia.

In respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and "daring."

Respectu autem boni adepti, non est aliqua passio in irascibili, quia iam non habet rationem ardui, ut supra dictum est. Sed ex malo iam iniacenti, sequitur passio irae.

But in respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: because it no longer has the formal aspect of something arduous, as stated above (q23 a3). But evil already present gives rise to the passion of "anger."

1a 2ae q23 a3: Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety? Yes.

Motus irae non potest habere aliquem motum animae contrarium, quia solummodo opponitur ei cessatio a motu: sicut philosophus dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod mitescere opponitur ei quod est irasci, quod non est oppositum contrarie, sed negative vel privative.

No movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of anger because nothing else than cessation from its movement is contrary thereto: thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or privation.

Singulare est in passione irae, quod non potest habere contrarium, neque secundum accessum et recessum, neque secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. Causatur enim ira ex malo difficili iam iniacente. Ad cuius praesentiam, necesse est quod aut appetitus succumbat, et sic non exit terminos tristitiae, quae est passio concupiscibilis, aut habet motum ad invadendum malum laesivum, quod pertinet ad iram. Motum autem ad fugiendum habere non potest, quia iam malum ponitur praesens vel praeteritum. Et sic motui irae non contrariatur aliqua passio secundum contrarietatem accessus et recessus.

The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by a difficult evil already present: and when such an evil is present, the appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the limits of "sadness," which is a concupiscible passion; or else it has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement is that of "anger." But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil is supposed to be already present or past. Thus no passion is contrary to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal.

Similiter etiam nec secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. Quia malo iam iniacenti opponitur bonum iam adeptum, quod iam non potest habere rationem ardui vel difficilis. Nec post adeptionem boni remanet alius motus, nisi quietatio appetitus in bono adepto, quae pertinet ad gaudium, quod est passio concupiscibilis.

In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained, which can no longer have the formal aspect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor, when once good is obtained, does there remain any other movement, except the appetite's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible faculty.

1a 2ae q23 a2: Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the contrariety of good and evil? No.

Non omnis contrarietas passionum irascibilis est secundum contrarietatem boni et mali quia in passionibus animae duplex contrarietas invenitur: una quidem secundum contrarietatem obiectorum, scilicet boni et mali; alia vero secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino.

Not every contrariety of the irascible passions is that of good and evil because there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul: one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of good and evil; the other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same terminus.

In passionibus quidem concupiscibilis invenitur prima contrarietas tantum: quae scilicet est secundum obiecta; in passionibus autem irascibilis invenitur utraque. Cuius ratio est quia obiectum concupiscibilis, ut supra dictum est, est bonum vel malum sensibile absolute. Bonum autem, inquantum bonum, non potest esse terminus ut a quo, sed solum ut ad quem, quia nihil refugit bonum inquantum bonum; sed omnia appetunt ipsum.

In the concupiscible passions the former contrariety alone is to be found: viz. that which is based on the objects; whereas in the irascible passions, we find both forms of contrariety. The formal aspect of this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (q23 a1), is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good, as such, cannot be a terminus wherefrom, but only [a terminus] whereto, since nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it.

Similiter nihil appetit malum inquantum huiusmodi, sed omnia fugiunt ipsum; et propter hoc, malum non habet rationem termini ad quem, sed solum termini a quo. Sic igitur omnis passio concupiscibilis respectu boni, est ut in ipsum (sicut amor, desiderium et gaudium); omnis vero passio eius respectu mali, est ut ab ipso (sicut odium, fuga seu abominatio, et tristitia). Unde in passionibus concupiscibilis non potest esse contrarietas secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem obiecto.

In like manner, nothing desires evil as such, but all things shun it; wherefore evil cannot have the formal aspect of a terminus whereto, but only of a terminus wherefrom. Accordingly every concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it (as with love, desire and joy); while every concupiscible passion in respect of evil, tends from it (as with hatred, avoidance or dislike, and sorrow). Wherefore, in the concupiscible passions, there can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same object.

Sed obiectum irascibilis est sensibile bonum vel malum, non quidem absolute, sed sub ratione difficultatis vel arduitatis, ut supra dictum est. Bonum autem arduum sive difficile habet rationem ut in ipsum tendatur, inquantum est bonum (quod pertinet ad passionem spei); et ut ab ipso recedatur, inquantum est arduum vel difficile (quod pertinet ad passionem desperationis).

On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the formal aspect of difficulty or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered as good, has the formal aspect which produces in us a tendency to it (which tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"); whereas, considered as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it (and this pertains to the passion of "despair").

Similiter malum arduum habet rationem ut vitetur, inquantum est malum (et hoc pertinet ad passionem timoris); habet etiam rationem ut in ipsum tendatur, sicut in quoddam arduum, per quod scilicet aliquid evadit subiectionem mali (et sic tendit in ipsum audacia).

In like manner the arduous evil, considered as an evil, has the formal aspect of something to be shunned (and this belongs to the passion of "fear"); but it also has the formal aspect for tending to it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to evil (and this tendency is called "daring").

Invenitur ergo in passionibus irascibilis contrarietas secundum contrarietatem boni et mali (sicut inter spem et timorem), et iterum secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino, (sicut inter audaciam et timorem).

Consequently, in the irascible passions we find contrariety according to the contrariety of good and evil (as between hope and fear), and also contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and fear).

1a 2ae q23 a1: Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part? Yes.

Passiones quae sunt in irascibili et in concupiscibili, differunt specie, quia cum diversae potentiae habeant diversa obiecta (ut in primo dictum est), necesse est quod passiones diversarum potentiarum ad diversa obiecta referantur.

The passions of the irascible part differ in species from those of the concupiscible faculty because since different powers have different objects (as stated in I, q77, a3), the passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to different objects.

Bonum inquantum est delectabile, movet concupiscibilem. Sed si bonum habeat quandam difficultatem ad adipiscendum, ex hoc ipso habet aliquid repugnans concupiscibili. Et ideo necessarium fuit esse aliam potentiam quae in id tenderet. Et eadem ratio est de malis. Et haec potentia est irascibilis. Unde ex consequenti passiones concupiscibilis et irascibilis specie differunt.

Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this very fact it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power. And hence the need of another power tending to that good. And the same formal aspect [of a requisite contrariety] applies to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently the concupiscible passions are specifically different from the irascible passions.

1a 2ae q23: How the passions differ from one another

1. Are the passions of the concupiscible part different from those of the irascible part?
2. Is the contrariety of passions in the irascible part based on the contrariety of good and evil?
3. Is there any passion that has no contrary?
4. In the same power, are there any passions, differing in species, but not contrary to one another?

1a 2ae q22 a3: Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will? Yes.

Ratio passionis magis proprie invenitur in actu appetitus sensitivi quam intellectivi, quia in actu appetitus intellectivi non requiritur aliqua transmutatio corporalis (quia huiusmodi appetitus non est virtus alicuius organi).

The formal aspect of passion is found more properly in the act of the sensitive appetite than in that of the intellectual appetite, because there is no need for corporeal transmutation in the act of the intellectual appetite (because this appetite is not exercised by means of a corporeal organ).

Amor et gaudium et alia huiusmodi, cum attribuuntur Deo vel Angelis, aut hominibus secundum appetitum intellectivum, significant simplicem actum voluntatis cum similitudine effectus, absque passione.

When love and joy and the like are ascribed to God or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite, they signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without passion.

Unde dicit Augustinus, IX de Civ. Dei, "sancti Angeli et sine ira puniunt et sine miseriae compassione subveniunt. Et tamen, istarum nomina passionum, consuetudine locutionis humanae, etiam in eos usurpantur, propter quandam operum similitudinem, non propter affectionum infirmitatem."

Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "The holy angels feel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the unhappy; and yet ordinary human speech is wont to ascribe to them also these passions by name, because, although they have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance to ours."

Passio proprie invenitur ubi est transmutatio corporalis. Quae quidem invenitur in actibus appetitus sensitivi, et non solum spiritualis (sicut est in apprehensione sensitiva) sed etiam naturalis.

Passion is properly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal transmutation is found in the act of the sensitive appetite, and is not only spiritual (as in the sensitive apprehension) but also natural.

Dicit Damascenus, in II libro, describens animales passiones, "Passio est motus appetitivae virtutis sensibilis in imaginatione boni vel mali. Et aliter, passio est motus irrationalis animae per suspicionem boni vel mali."

Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while describing the animal passions: "Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite when we imagine good or evil. In other words, passion is a movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil."

1a 2ae q22 a2: Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part? Yes.

Ratio passionis magis invenitur in parte appetitiva quam in parte apprehensiva, quia in nomine passionis importatur quod patiens trahatur ad id quod est agentis.

The formal aspect of passion is found more in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part, because the word "passion" implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent.

Magis autem trahitur anima ad rem per vim appetitivam quam per vim apprehensivam: nam per vim appetitivam anima habet ordinem ad ipsas res, prout in seipsis sunt; unde philosophus dicit, in VI Metaphys., quod "bonum et malum", quae sunt obiecta appetitivae potentiae, "sunt in ipsis rebus".

Now the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power rather than by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through its appetitive power, an order to things as they are in themselves; hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i.e., the objects of the appetitive power, "are in things themselves".

Vis autem apprehensiva non trahitur ad rem, secundum quod in seipsa est, sed cognoscit eam secundum intentionem rei, quam in se habet vel recipit secundum proprium modum. Unde et ibidem dicitur quod "verum et falsum", quae ad cognitionem pertinent, "non sunt in rebus, sed in mente".

On the other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself, but knows it according to an "intention" of the thing, which "intention" it has in itself, or receives according to a specific way. Hence we find it stated (Metaph. vi, 4) that "the true and the false," which pertain to knowledge, "are not in things, but in the mind".

Sicut in primo dictum est, dupliciter organum animae potest transmutari. Uno modo, transmutatione spirituali, secundum quod recipit intentionem rei. Et hoc per se invenitur in actu apprehensivae virtutis sensitivae: sicut oculus immutatur a visibili, non ita quod coloretur, sed ita quod recipiat intentionem coloris.

As stated above (in I, q78, a3), the organs of the soul can be changed in two ways. First, by a [formal] spiritual change, according to which the organ receives an "intention" of the object. And this [kind of change] is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is the eye [formally] "changed" by the object visible, i.e., not by [materially] being colored, but by [formally] receiving an intention of color.

Est autem alia naturalis transmutatio organi, prout organum transmutatur quantum ad suam naturalem dispositionem; puta quod calefit aut infrigidatur, vel alio simili modo transmutatur. Et huiusmodi transmutatio per accidens se habet ad actum apprehensivae virtutis sensitivae: puta cum oculus fatigatur ex forti intuitu, vel dissolvitur ex vehementia visibilis.

But the organs are receptive of another and natural change, which affects their natural disposition; for instance, when they become hot or cold, or undergo some similar [material] change. And this [second] kind of change is incidental to the act of the sensitive apprehension: for instance, if the eye be wearied through gazing intently at something or be overcome by the intensity of the object.

Sed ad actum appetitus sensitivi per se ordinatur huiusmodi transmutatio: unde in definitione motuum appetitivae partis, materialiter ponitur aliqua naturalis transmutatio organi; sicut dicitur quod "ira est accensio sanguinis circa cor". Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis invenitur in actu sensitivae virtutis appetitivae, quam in actu sensitivae virtutis apprehensivae, licet utraque sit actus organi corporalis.

On the other hand, [this second kind of change] is essential to the act of the sensitive appetite: wherefore the material element in the definitions of the movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change of the organ; for instance, "anger is" said to be "a kindling of the blood about the heart". Hence it is evident that the formal aspect of passion is more consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with that of the sensitive apprehension, although both are actions of a corporeal organ.

1a 2ae q22 a1: Whether any passion is in the soul? Yes.

Passiones sunt in anima, quia pati prout importat receptionem solam, non est necessarium quod sit materiae, sed potest esse cuiuscumque existentis in potentia.

There are passions in the soul, because passivity, as implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be in anything that is in potentiality.

Anima autem, etsi non sit composita ex materia et forma, habet tamen aliquid potentialitatis, secundum quam convenit sibi recipere et pati, secundum quod intelligere pati est, ut dicitur in III de anima.

Now, though the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has something of potentiality, in respect of which it is fitting for it to receive or to be passive, according as the act of understanding is a kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii, 4.

Pati et moveri, etsi non conveniat animae per se, convenit tamen ei per accidens (ut in I de anima dicitur): inquantum scilicet compositum patitur; per se autem convenit composito, quod est corruptibile.

Although it is not fitting for the soul in itself to be passive and to be moved, yet it is incidentally fitting for it (as stated in De Anima i, 3): i.e., insofar, to wit, as the "composite" is passive; the composite, which is corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature.

1a 2ae q22: The subject of the soul's passions

1. Is there any passion in the soul?
2. Is passion in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?
3. Is passion in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will?

1a 2ae q21 a4: Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious before God, according as it is good or evil? Yes.

Omnis actus hominis, bonus vel malus, habet rationem meriti vel demeriti apud Deum, quia alioquin sequeretur quod Deus non haberet curam de actibus humanis, sed est debitum ut ad finem ultimum omnes actus referantur.

Every human action, both good and evil, acquires the formal aspect of merit or demerit in God's sight, because else it would follow that human actions are no business of God's, but it is our duty to refer all our actions to the last end.

Unde qui facit actum malum non referibilem in Deum, non servat honorem Dei, qui ultimo fini debetur.

Consequently, whoever does an evil deed, not referable to God, does not give God the honor due to Him as our last end.

Homo non ordinatur ad communitatem politicam secundum se totum, et secundum omnia sua; et ideo non oportet quod quilibet actus eius sit meritorius vel demeritorius per ordinem ad communitatem politicam.

Man is not ordained to the body politic, according to all that he is and has; and so it does not follow that every action of his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body politic.

Sed totum quod homo est, et quod potest et habet, ordinandum est ad Deum; et ideo omnis actus hominis, bonus vel malus, habet rationem meriti vel demeriti apud Deum, quantum est ex ipsa ratione actus.

But all that man is, and can have and does have, must be referred to God; and therefore every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires the formal aspect of merit or demerit in the sight of God, inasmuch as it is [acquired] from the same formal aspect of the action.

Per actum hominis, Deo secundum se nihil potest accrescere vel deperire; sed tamen homo, quantum in se est, aliquid subtrahit Deo, vel ei exhibet, cum servat vel non servat ordinem quem Deus instituit.

God in Himself neither gains nor loses anything by the action of man; but man, for his part, takes something from God, or offers something to Him, when he observes or does not observe the order instituted by God.

1a 2ae q21 a3: Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious in so far as it is good or evil? Yes.

Actus bonus vel malus habet rationem laudabilis vel culpabilis (secundum quod est in potestate voluntatis), rationem vero rectitudinis et peccati (secundum ordinem ad finem), rationem vero meriti et demeriti secundum retributionem iustitiae ad alterum, quia hoc ipsum bonum vel malum quod aliquis sibi facit per suum actum, redundat in communitatem.

A good or evil action has the formal aspect of praiseworthy or blameworthy (insofar as it is in the power of the will), the formal aspect of right or sinful (according as it is ordained to the end), and the formal aspect of merit or demerit according to the recompense for justice or injustice towards another, because this very good or evil, which a man does to himself by his action, redounds to the community.

Homo, qui habet dominium sui actus, ipse etiam, inquantum est alterius, scilicet communitatis, cuius est pars, meretur aliquid vel demeretur, inquantum actus suos bene vel male disponit.

Man is master of his actions; and yet, insofar as he belongs to another, i.e., the community, of which he forms part, he merits or demerits, inasmuch as he disposes his actions well or ill.

Meritum et demeritum dicuntur in ordine ad retributionem quae fit secundum iustitiam. Retributio autem secundum iustitiam fit alicui ex eo quod agit in profectum vel nocumentum alterius.

We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to retribution, rendered according to justice. Now, retribution according to justice is rendered to a man, by reason of his having done something to another's advantage or hurt.

Est autem considerandum quod unusquisque in aliqua societate vivens, est aliquo modo pars et membrum totius societatis. Quicumque ergo agit aliquid in bonum vel malum alicuius in societate existentis, hoc redundat in totam societatem sicut qui laedit manum, per consequens laedit hominem.

It must, moreover, be observed that every individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or evil, done to the member of a society, redounds on the whole society: thus, who hurts the hand, hurts the man.

Cum ergo aliquis agit in bonum vel malum alterius singularis personae, cadit ibi dupliciter ratio meriti vel demeriti. Uno modo, secundum quod debetur ei retributio a singulari persona quam iuvat vel offendit. Alio modo, secundum quod debetur ei retributio a toto collegio.

When, therefore, anyone does good or evil to another individual, there is a twofold formal aspect of merit or demerit in his action: first, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the individual to whom he has done good or harm; secondly, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the whole of society.

Quando vero aliquis ordinat actum suum directe in bonum vel malum totius collegii, debetur ei retributio primo quidem et principaliter a toto collegio, secundario vero, ab omnibus collegii partibus. Cum vero aliquis agit quod in bonum proprium vel malum vergit, etiam debetur ei retributio, inquantum etiam hoc vergit in commune secundum quod ipse est pars collegii, licet non debeatur ei retributio inquantum est bonum vel malum singularis personae, quae est eadem agenti, nisi forte a seipso secundum quandam similitudinem, prout est iustitia hominis ad seipsum.

Now when a man ordains his action directly for the good or evil of the whole society, retribution is owed to him, before and above all, by the whole society; secondarily, by all the parts of society. Whereas when a man does that which conduces to his own benefit or disadvantage, then again is retribution owed to him, insofar as this too affects the community, inasmuch as he is a part of society: although retribution is not due to him, insofar as it conduces to the good or harm of an individual, who is identical with the agent: unless, perchance, he owe retribution to himself, by a sort of resemblance, insofar as man is said to be just to himself.

Dicitur Isaiae III, "dicite iusto quoniam bene; quoniam fructum adinventionum suarum comedet. Vae impio in malum; retributio enim manuum eius fiet ei".

It is written (Isaiah 3:10-11): "Say to the just man that it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Woe to the wicked unto evil; for the reward of his hands shall be given him."