1a 2ae q21 a2: Whether a human action deserves praise or blame, by reason of its being good or evil? Yes.

Actus humanus ex hoc quod est bonus vel malus, habet rationem laudabilis vel culpabilis, quia bonum vel malum in solis actibus voluntariis constituit rationem laudis vel culpae (in quibus idem est malum, peccatum et culpa).

A human action has the formal aspect of praiseworthy or blameworthy through being good or evil because good or evil, only in voluntary actions, has the formal aspect of praiseworthy or blameworthy (and in such like actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing).

Sicut malum est in plus quam peccatum, ita peccatum est in plus quam culpa. Ex hoc enim dicitur aliquis actus culpabilis vel laudabilis, quod imputatur agenti: nihil enim est aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus.

Just as evil is more comprehensive than sin, so is sin more comprehensive than blame. For an action is said to deserve praise or blame, from its being imputed to the agent: since to praise or to blame means nothing else than to impute to someone the malice or goodness of his action.

Tunc autem actus imputatur agenti, quando est in potestate ipsius, ita quod habeat dominium sui actus.

Now an action is imputed to an agent, when it is in his power, so that he has dominion over it: because it is through his will that man has dominion over his actions.

Philosophus dicit, quod "laudabilia sunt virtutum opera; vituperabilia autem, vel culpabilia, opera contraria".

The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i) that "virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed to virtue deserve censure and blame."

In moralibus, ubi attenditur ordo rationis ad finem communem humanae vitae, semper peccatum et malum attenditur per deviationem ab ordine rationis ad finem communem humanae vitae. Et ideo culpatur ex tali peccato homo et inquantum est homo, et inquantum est moralis. Unde philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod "in arte volens peccans est eligibilior; circa prudentiam autem minus, sicut et in virtutibus moralibus", quarum prudentia est directiva.

In moral matters, where we take into consideration the order of formal aspect to the general end of human life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order of formal aspect to the general end of human life. Wherefore man is blamed for such a sin, both as man and as a moral being. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art, he who sins voluntarily is preferable; but in prudence, as in the moral virtues," which prudence directs, "he is the reverse."

Ratio aliter se habet in artificialibus et aliter in moralibus. In artificialibus enim ratio ordinatur ad finem particularem, quod est aliquid per rationem excogitatum. In moralibus autem ordinatur ad finem communem totius humanae vitae. Finis autem particularis ordinatur ad finem communem.

Formal aspect stands in different relations to the productions of art, and to moral actions. In matters of art, formal aspect is directed to a particular end, which is something devised by aspectual apprehension. Whereas in moral matters, it is directed to the general end of all human life. And a particular end is subordinate to the general end.

1a 2ae q21 a1: Whether a human action is right or sinful, insofar as it is good or evil? Yes.

Actus humanus ex hoc quod est bonus vel malus, habeat rationem rectitudinis vel peccati, quia omnis actus voluntarius est malus per hoc quod recedit ab ordine rationis et legis aeternae, et omnis actus bonus concordat rationi et legi aeternae.

A human action has the formal aspect of rectitude or sin from the fact that it is either good or evil, because every voluntary action that turns aside from the order of formal aspect and of the Eternal Law, is evil, and every good action is in accord with formal aspect and the Eternal Law.

Unumquodque ordinatur ad finem per actum suum. Et ideo ratio peccati, quae consistit in deviatione ab ordine ad finem, proprie consistit in actu.

Each thing is ordained to its end by its action. And therefore the formal aspect of sin, which consists in straying from the order to the end, consists properly in an action.

1a 2ae q21: The consequences of human actions by reason of their goodness and badness

1. Is a human action right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil?
2. Does it thereby deserve praise or blame?
3. Is it accordingly meritorious or demeritorious?
4. Is it accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before God?

1a 2ae q20 a6: Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil? No.

Unus actus non potest esse bonus et malus quia si accipiatur unus actus prout est in genere moris, impossibile est quod sit bonus et malus bonitate et malitia morali; si tamen sit unus unitate naturae, et non unitate moris, potest esse bonus et malus.

The same action cannot be both good and evil because if we consider one action in the moral order, it is impossible for it to be morally both good and evil; whereas if it be one as to natural and not moral unity, it can be both good and evil.

Actio et passio pertinent ad genus moris, inquantum habent rationem voluntarii. Et ideo secundum quod diversa voluntate dicuntur voluntaria, secundum hoc sunt duo moraliter, et potest ex una parte inesse bonum, et ex alia malum.

Action and passion belong to the moral order, insofar as they have the formal aspect of being voluntary. And therefore insofar as they are voluntary in respect of wills that differ, they are two distinct things, and good can be in one of them while evil is in the other.

1a 2ae q20 a5: Whether the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or badness? No.

Eventus sequens non addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus quia virtus causae existimatur secundum effectus per se, non autem secundum effectus per accidens.

The consequences of an action doe not increase its goodness or badness because the virtue of a cause is measured by the effect that flows from the nature of the cause, not by that which results by accident.

Manifestum est enim meliorem actum esse ex suo genere, ex quo possunt plura bona sequi; et peiorem, ex quo nata sunt plura mala sequi.

It is evident that an action is generally better, if better results can follow from it; and generally worse, if it is of a nature to produce worse results.

Si vero per accidens, et ut in paucioribus, tunc eventus sequens non addit ad bonitatem vel ad malitiam actus: non enim datur iudicium de re aliqua secundum illud quod est per accidens, sed solum secundum illud quod est per se.

On the other hand, if the consequences follow by accident, and seldom, then they do not increase the goodness or badness of the action: because we do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to it by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of itself.

1a 2ae q20 a4: Whether the external action adds any goodness or badness to that of the interior act? Yes.

Bonitas actus exterioris quam habet ex materia et circumstantiis, est alia a bonitate voluntatis quae est ex fine, non autem alia a bonitate voluntatis quam habet ex ipso actu volito, sed comparatur ad ipsam ut ratio et causa eius, quia si per actum exteriorem nihil additur de bonitate vel malitia, frustra qui habet bonam voluntatem vel malam, facit opus bonum, aut desistit a malo opere—quod est inconveniens.

The goodness which the external action takes from its matter and circumstances, is distinct from that which it derives from the end, but it is not distinct from that which it has from the very act willed, to which it stands in the relation of formal aspect and cause, because if by the external action no further goodness or malice be added, it is to no purpose that he who has a good or an evil will, does a good deed or refrains from an evil deed—which is unreasonable.

1a 2ae q20 a3: Whether the goodness and badness of the external action are the same as those of the interior act?

Est una bonitas actus interioris et exterioris quia actus voluntatis se habet ut formale ad actum exteriorem; ex formali autem et materiali fit unum.

There is but one goodness of the internal and external act because the act of the will is the form, as it were, of the external action; but that which results from the material and formal element is one thing.

1a 2ae q20 a2: Whether the whole goodness and badness of the external action depends on the goodness of the will? No.

Circa utrosque actus potest esse differentia boni et mali quia voluntarium dicitur non solum actus interior voluntatis, sed etiam actus exteriores, prout a voluntate procedunt et ratione.

The difference of good and evil is applicable to both the interior and external act because voluntariness applies not only to the interior act of the will, but also to external actions, inasmuch as they proceed from the will and the formal aspect.

Si igitur voluntas sit bona, et ex obiecto proprio, et ex fine, consequens est actum exteriorem esse bonum.

If therefore the will be good, both from its proper object and from its end, if follows that the external action is good.

Sed non sufficit ad hoc quod actus exterior sit bonus, bonitas voluntatis quae est ex intentione finis.

But if the will be good from [only] its intention of the end, this is not enough to make the external action good.

Sed si voluntas sit mala sive ex intentione finis, sive ex actu volito, consequens est actum exteriorem esse malum.

And if the will be evil either by its intention of the end, or by the act willed, it follows that the external action is evil.

Non solum aliquis voluntate peccat, quando vult malum finem, sed etiam quando vult malum actum.

A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil end, but also when he wills an evil act.

In actu exteriori potest considerari duplex bonitas vel malitia: una secundum debitam materiam et circumstantias; alia secundum ordinem ad finem. Et illa quidem quae est secundum ordinem ad finem, tota dependet ex voluntate. Illa autem quae est ex debita materia vel circumstantiis, dependet ex ratione: et ex hac dependet bonitas voluntatis, secundum quod in ipsam fertur.

We may consider a twofold goodness or badness in the external action: one in respect of due matter and circumstances; the other in respect of the order to the end. And that which is in respect of the order to the end, depends entirely on the will. But that which is in respect of due matter or circumstances, depends on the formal aspect: and on this goodness depends the goodness of the will, insofar as the will tends towards it.

Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium, quod "quaedam sunt quae nullo quasi bono fine, aut bona voluntate, possunt bene fieri".

Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that "there are some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make good."

1a 2ae q20 a1: Whether goodness or badness is first in the action of the will prior to the external action? Yes.

Bonum et malum morale per prius consistit in voluntate quia cum finis sit proprium obiectum voluntatis, manifestum est quod ista ratio (boni vel mali quam habet actus exterior ex ordine ad finem) per prius invenitur in actu voluntatis, et ex eo derivatur ad actum exteriorem.

Moral good and evil are first in the will because since the end is the will's proper object, it is evident that this formal aspect (i.e., of good or evil, which the external action derives from its relation to the end) is to be found first of all in the act of the will, whence it passes to the external action.

Bonitas autem vel malitia quam habet actus exterior secundum se (propter debitam materiam et debitas circumstantias) non derivatur a voluntate, sed magis a ratione.

On the other hand, the goodness or badness which the external action has of itself (i.e., on account of its being about due matter and its being attended by due circumstances) is not derived from the will, but rather from the aspectual apprehension.

Unde si consideretur bonitas exterioris actus secundum quod est in ordinatione et apprehensione rationis, prior est quam bonitas actus voluntatis, sed si consideretur secundum quod est in executione operis, sequitur bonitatem voluntatis, quae est principium eius.

Consequently, if we consider the goodness of the external action, insofar as it comes from the ordination and apprehension of aspect, it is prior to the goodness of the act of the will; but if we consider it insofar as it is in the execution of the action done, it is subsequent to the goodness of the will, which is its principle.

Actus exterior est obiectum voluntatis, inquantum proponitur voluntati a ratione ut quoddam bonum apprehensum et ordinatum per rationem; et sic est prius quam bonum actus voluntatis. Inquantum vero consistit in executione operis, est effectus voluntatis, et sequitur voluntatem.

The exterior action is the object of the will, inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by aspectual apprehension, as a certain good apprehended and ordained by the formal aspect; and thus it is prior to the good in the act of the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the execution of the action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will.

1a 2ae q20: Goodness and badness in external human affairs

1. Is goodness and malice first in the act of the will, or in the external action?
2. Does the whole goodness or malice of the external action depend on the goodness of the will?
3. Are the goodness and malice of the interior act the same as those of the external action?
4. Does the external action add any goodness or malice to that of the interior act?
5. Do the consequences of an external action increase its goodness or malice?
6. Can one and the same external action be both good and evil?

1a 2ae q19 a10: Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed? Yes.

Quicumque non conformat voluntatem suam voluntati divinae in volito, habet malam voluntatem, quia forma voluntatis est ex obiecto sicut et cuiuslibet actus; si ergo tenetur homo conformare voluntatem suam voluntati divinae, sequitur quod teneatur conformare in volito.

Whoever does not conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing willed, has an evil will, because the will takes its form from the object, as does every act; if therefore man is bound to conform his will to the Divine will, it follows that he is bound to conform it, as to the thing willed.

Quod volitum divinum, secundum rationem communem, quale sit, scire possumus. Scimus enim quod Deus quidquid vult, vult sub ratione boni. Et ideo quicumque vult aliquid sub quacumque ratione boni, habet voluntatem conformem voluntati divinae, quantum ad rationem voliti. Sed in particulari nescimus quid Deus velit. Et quantum ad hoc, non tenemur conformare voluntatem nostram divinae voluntati.

We can know by a general formal aspect what God wills. For we know that whatever God wills, He wills it under the formal aspect of good. Consequently whoever wills a thing under any formal aspect of good, has a will conformed to the Divine will, as to the formal aspect of the thing willed. But we know not what God wills in particular. And in this respect we are not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.

In statu tamen gloriae, omnes videbunt in singulis quae volent, ordinem eorum ad id quod Deus circa hoc vult. Et ideo non solum formaliter, sed materialiter in omnibus suam voluntatem Deo conformabunt.

But in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing that he wills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in that particular matter. Consequently he will conform his will to God in all things not only formally, but also materially.

1a 2ae q19 a9: Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine will? Yes.

Bonitas voluntatis dependet ex conformitate ad voluntatem divinam quia sicut dictum est, bonitas voluntatis dependet ex intentione finis; finis autem ultimus voluntatis humanae est summum bonum, quod est Deus, ut supra dictum est.

The goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine will because, as stated above (a7), the goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end; and the last end of the human will is the Sovereign Good, namely, God, as stated above (q1 a8; q3 a1).

Voluntas hominis non potest conformari voluntati divinae per aequiparantiam, sed per imitationem. Et similiter conformatur scientia hominis scientiae divinae, inquantum cognoscit verum. Et actio hominis actioni divinae, inquantum est agenti conveniens. Et hoc per imitationem, non autem per aequiparantiam.

The human will cannot be conformed to the will of God so as to equal it, but only so as to imitate it. In like manner human knowledge is conformed to the Divine knowledge, in so far as it knows truth. And human action is conformed to the Divine, in so far as it is becoming to the agent. And this by way of imitation, not by way of equality.

Requiritur ad bonitatem humanae voluntatis, quod ordinetur ad summum bonum.

The goodness of the human will requires it to be ordained to the Sovereign Good.

Hoc autem bonum primo quidem et per se comparatur ad voluntatem divinam ut obiectum proprium eius. Illud autem quod est primum in quolibet genere, est mensura et ratio omnium quae sunt illius generis.

Now this Good is primarily and essentially referred to the Divine will, as its proper object. Again, that which is first in any class is the measure and formal aspect of all that belongs to that class.

Unumquodque autem rectum et bonum est, inquantum attingit ad propriam mensuram. Ergo ad hoc quod voluntas hominis sit bona, requiritur quod conformetur voluntati divinae.

Moreover, everything attains to rectitude and goodness, insofar as it is in accord with its proper measure. Therefore, in order that man's will be good it needs to be conformed to the Divine will.

1a 2ae q19 a8: Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention? No.

Si vero consideretur quantitas intentionis et actus, secundum intensionem utriusque, sic intensio intentionis redundat in actum interiorem et exteriorem voluntatis, quia ipsa intentio quodammodo se habet formaliter ad utrumque, ut ex supra dictis patet.

If we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act, according to their respective intensity, then the intensity of the intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the will, because the intention stands in relation to them as a kind of form, as is clear from what has been said above (q12 a4; q18 a6).

Licet materialiter, intentione existente intensa, possit esse actus interior vel exterior non ita intensus, materialiter loquendo: puta cum aliquis non ita intense vult medicinam sumere, sicut vult sanitatem. Tamen hoc ipsum quod est intense intendere sanitatem, redundat formaliter in hoc quod est intense velle medicinam.

And yet considered materially, while the intention is intense, the interior or exterior act may be not so intense, materially speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as much intensity to take medicine as he wills to regain health. Nevertheless the very fact of intending health intensely, redounds, as a formal principle, upon the intense volition of medicine.

Sed quia etiam ipsa intentio quodammodo pertinet ad actum voluntatis, inquantum scilicet est ratio eius; propter hoc redundat quantitas bonae intentionis in voluntatem, inquantum scilicet voluntas vult aliquod bonum magnum ut finem, licet illud per quod vult consequi tantum bonum, non sit dignum illo bono.

Yet because the intention also belongs, in a way, to the act of the will, inasmuch, to wit, as it is the formal aspect thereof; it comes to pass that the quantity of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act of the will; that is to say, insofar as the will wills some great good for an end, although that by which it wills to gain so great a good, is not proportionate to that good.

1a 2ae q19 a7: Whether the goodness of the will, as regards the means, depends on the intention of the end? Yes.

Bonitas voluntatis ex intentione finis dependet quia bonitas voluntatis dependeat a bonitate voliti.

The goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end because the goodness of the will depends on the goodness of the thing willed.

Quando intentio est causa volendi, ordo ad finem accipitur ut quaedam ratio bonitatis in obiecto.

When the intention is the cause of [the act of] willing, the order to the end is considered as a certain formal aspect of the goodness of the object.

Intentio dupliciter se potest habere ad voluntatem: uno modo, ut praecedens; alio modo, ut concomitans.

The intention may stand in a twofold relation to the act of the will: first, as preceding it; secondly, as accompanying it.

Praecedit quidem causaliter intentio voluntatem, quando aliquid volumus propter intentionem alicuius finis. Et tunc ordo ad finem consideratur ut ratio quaedam bonitatis ipsius voliti: puta, cum aliquis vult ieiunare propter Deum; habet enim ieiunium rationem boni ex hoc ipso quod fit propter Deum.

The intention precedes the act of the will causally, when we will something because we intend a certain end. And then the order to the end is considered as a certain formal aspect of the goodness of the thing willed: for instance, when a man wills to fast for God's sake; because the act of fasting has the formal aspect of good from the very fact that it is done for God's sake.

Consequitur autem intentio voluntatem, quando accedit voluntati praeexistenti: puta si aliquis velit aliquid facere, et postea referat illud in Deum. Et tunc primae voluntatis bonitas non dependet ex intentione sequenti, nisi quatenus reiteratur actus voluntatis cum sequenti intentione.

On the other hand, intention accompanies the act of the will, when it is added to a preceding act of the will: for instance, a man may will to do something, and may afterwards refer it to God. And then the goodness of the previous act of the will does not depend on the subsequent intention, except insofar as that act of the will is repeated with the subsequent intention.

Voluntas non potest dici bona, si sit intentio mala causa volendi. Qui enim vult dare eleemosynam propter inanem gloriam consequendam, vult id quod de se est bonum, sub ratione mali; et ideo, prout est volitum ab ipso, est malum. Unde voluntas eius est mala. Sed si intentio sit consequens, tunc voluntas potuit esse bona; et per intentionem sequentem non depravatur ille actus voluntatis qui praecessit, sed actus voluntatis qui iteratur.

The [act of the] will cannot be said to be good, if an evil intention is the cause of [the act of] willing. For when a man wills to give an alms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which is good in itself, under a formal aspect of evil; and therefore, as willed by him, it is evil. Wherefore his [act of] will is evil. If, however, the intention is subsequent to the [act of the] will, then the [act of the] will may be good; and the subsequent intention does not spoil that act of the will which preceded, but that act of the will which is repeated.

Sicut iam dictum est, "malum contingit ex singularibus defectibus, bonum vero ex tota et integra causa". Unde sive voluntas sit eius quod est secundum se malum, etiam sub ratione boni; sive sit boni sub ratione mali: semper voluntas erit mala. Sed ad hoc quod sit voluntas bona, requiritur quod sit boni sub ratione boni; idest quod velit bonum, et propter bonum.

As we have already stated (a6 ad 1), "evil results from each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire cause". Hence, whether the will tend to what is evil in itself, even under the formal aspect of good; or to the good under the formal aspect of evil: it will be evil in either case. But in order for the will to be good, it must tend to the good under the formal aspect of good; in other words, it must will the good, and for the sake of the good.

1a 2ae q19 a6: Whether the will is good when it abides by erring reason? No.

Voluntas concordans rationi erranti, potest esse mala, quia si ratio vel conscientia erret errore voluntario, vel directe, vel propter negligentiam, quia est error circa id quod quis scire tenetur: tunc talis error rationis vel conscientiae non excusat quin voluntas concordans rationi vel conscientiae sic erranti, sit mala.

The will can be evil when it abides by erring aspectual apprehension because if aspectual apprehension or conscience err with an error that is voluntary, either directly, or through negligence, so that one errs about what one ought to know: then such an error of aspectual apprehension or conscience does not excuse the will that abides by that erring aspectual apprehension or conscience, from being evil.

Si autem sit error qui causet involuntarium, proveniens ex ignorantia alicuius circumstantiae absque omni negligentia: tunc talis error rationis vel conscientiae excusat, ut voluntas concordans rationi erranti non sit mala.

But if the error arise from ignorance of some circumstance, and without any negligence, so that it cause the act to be involuntary: then that error of aspectual apprehension or conscience excuses the will, that abides by that erring aspectual apprehension, from being evil.

Puta, si ratio errans dicat quod homo teneatur ad uxorem alterius accedere, voluntas concordans huic rationi erranti est mala (eo quod error iste provenit ex ignorantia legis Dei, quam scire tenetur). Si autem ratio erret in hoc, quod credat aliquam mulierem submissam, esse suam uxorem, et, ea petente debitum, velit eam cognoscere, excusatur voluntas eius, ut non sit mala (quia error iste ex ignorantia circumstantiae provenit, quae excusat, et involuntarium causat).

For instance, if erring aspectual apprehension tells a man that he should go to another man's wife, the will that abides by that erring aspectual apprehension is evil (since this error arises from ignorance of the Divine Law, which he is bound to know). But if a man's aspectual apprehension, errs in mistaking another for his wife, and if he wish to give her her right when she asks for it, his will is excused from being evil (because this error arises from ignorance of a circumstance, which ignorance excuses, and causes the act to be involuntary).

Sicut Dionysius dicit in IV cap. de Div. Nom., "bonum causatur ex integra causa, malum autem ex singularibus defectibus". Et ideo ad hoc quod dicatur malum id in quod fertur voluntas, sufficit sive quod secundum suam naturam sit malum, sive quod apprehendatur ut malum. Sed ad hoc quod sit bonum, requiritur quod utroque modo sit bonum.

As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good is caused by the entire cause, but evil from each particular defect". Consequently in order that the thing to which the will tends be called evil, it suffices, either that it be evil in itself, or that it be apprehended as evil. But in order for it to be good, it must be good in both ways.

Sicut praemissa quaestio eadem est cum quaestione qua quaeritur utrum conscientia erronea liget, ita ista quaestio eadem est cum illa qua quaeritur utrum conscientia erronea excuset.

Whereas the previous question is the same as inquiring "whether an erring conscience binds", so this question is the same as inquiring "whether an erring conscience excuses".

1a 2ae q19 a5: Whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason? Yes.

Voluntas discordans a ratione errante, est mala, quia voluntas discordans a ratione errante, est contra conscientiam.

The will is evil when it is at variance with erring aspectual apprehension because when the will is at variance with erring aspectual apprehension, it is against conscience.

Iudicium rationis errantis licet non derivetur a Deo, tamen ratio errans iudicium suum proponit ut verum, et per consequens ut a Deo derivatum, a quo est omnis veritas.

Although the judgment of an erring aspectual apprehension is not derived from God, yet the erring aspectual apprehension puts forward its judgment as being true, and consequently as being derived from God, from Whom is all truth.

Voluntas erit mala, quia vult malum, non quidem id quod est malum per se, sed id quod est malum per accidens, propter apprehensionem rationis.

The will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that which is evil in itself, but that which is evil accidentally, through being apprehended as such by the formal aspect.

Et ideo philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod, "per se loquendo, incontinens est qui non sequitur rationem rectam; per accidens autem, qui non sequitur etiam rationem falsam". Unde dicendum est simpliciter quod omnis voluntas discordans a ratione, sive recta sive errante, semper est mala.

Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 9) that "properly speaking, the incontinent man is one who does not follow correct aspectual apprehension; but accidentally, he is also one who does not follow incorrect aspectual apprehension." We must therefore conclude that, absolutely speaking, every will at variance with aspectual apprehension, whether correct or erring, is always evil.

1a 2ae q19 a4: Whether the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law? Yes.

Multo magis dependet bonitas voluntatis humanae a lege aeterna, quam a ratione humana, et ubi deficit humana ratio, oportet ad rationem aeternam recurrere, quia in omnibus causis ordinatis, effectus plus dependet a causa prima quam a causa secunda, quia causa secunda non agit nisi in virtute primae causae.

The goodness of the human will depends on the eternal law much more than on human aspectual apprehension, and when human aspectual apprehension fails, we must have recourse to the Eternal Formal Aspect, because wherever a number of causes are subordinate to one another, the effect depends more on the first than on the second cause, since the second cause acts only in virtue of the first.

Quod autem ratio humana sit regula voluntatis humanae, ex qua eius bonitas mensuretur, habet ex lege aeterna, quae est ratio divina.

Now it is from the eternal law, which is the Divine Formal Aspect, that human aspectual apprehension is the rule of the human will: the rule from which the will's goodness is measured.

Unde in Psalmo IV, dicitur, "multi dicunt, quis ostendit nobis bona? signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine", quasi diceret, "lumen rationis quod in nobis est, intantum potest nobis ostendere bona, et nostram voluntatem regulare, inquantum est lumen vultus tui, idest a vultu tuo derivatum.

Hence it is written (Psalm 4:6-7): "Many say: Who showeth us good things? The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": as though to say: "The light of the formal aspect, which is in us [as our aspectual apprehension], is able to show us good things, and guide our will, insofar as it is the light of Thy countenance, i.e., derived from Thy countenance".

Lex aeterna sit nobis ignota secundum quod est in mente divina, innotescit tamen nobis aliqualiter, vel per rationem naturalem, quae ab ea derivatur ut propria eius imago, vel per aliqualem revelationem superadditam.

Although the eternal law is unknown to us according as it is in the Divine Mind, nevertheless it becomes known to us somewhat, either by natural aspectual apprehension, which is derived from the divine mind as its proper image, or by some sort of additional revelation.

1a 2ae q19 a3: Whether the goodness of the will depends on formal aspect? Yes.

Bonitas voluntatis dependet ex hoc quod sit subiecta rationi quia bonitas voluntatis proprie ex obiecto dependet, et obiectum voluntatis proponitur ei per rationem.

The goodness of the will depends on its being subject to the formal aspect because the goodness of the will depends properly on the object, and the will's object is proposed to it through the formal aspect.

Bonum sub ratione boni (idest appetibilis) per prius pertinet ad voluntatem quam ad rationem.

The good, considered under the formal aspect of being good (i.e., as desirable), pertains to the will before pertaining to aspectual apprehension.

Sed tamen per prius pertinet ad rationem sub ratione veri, quam ad voluntatem sub ratione appetibilis, quia appetitus voluntatis non potest esse de bono, nisi prius a ratione apprehendatur.

But considered under the formal aspect of being true, it pertains to aspectual apprehension before pertaining to the will under the aspect of being desirable [in its goodness], because the will cannot desire a good that is not previously apprehended in [the truth of] its formal aspect.

In his autem quae sunt ad finem, rectitudo rationis consistit in conformitate ad appetitum finis debiti. Sed tamen et ipse appetitus finis debiti praesupponit rectam apprehensionem de fine, quae est per rationem.

In regard to the means, the correctness of aspectual apprehension depends on its conformity with the desire of a due end. Nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes a correct apprehension of the end, which [correctness of apprehension] occurs through [the apprehension of] the formal aspect.

Voluntas quodam modo movet rationem; et ratio alio modo movet voluntatem: ex parte scilicet obiecti, ut supra dictum est.

The will moves aspectual apprehension in one way; the formal aspect moves the will in another: viz., on the part of the object, as stated above (q9 a1).

Nam bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis proportionatum ei. Bonum autem sensibile, vel imaginarium, non est proportionatum voluntati, sed appetitui sensitivo, quia voluntas potest tendere in bonum universale, quod ratio apprehendit, appetitus autem sensitivus non tendit nisi in bonum particulare, quod apprehendit vis sensitiva. Et ideo bonitas voluntatis dependet a ratione, eo modo quo dependet ab obiecto.

For the good understood is the proportionate object of the will. But a good apprehended by sense, or a good apprehended in perception, is proportionate, not to the will, but to the sensory appetite, because the will is able to tend to the universal good that the formal aspect apprehends, whereas the sensory appetite tends only to a particular good that is apprehended by the sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on the apprehension of the formal aspect in the same way as [the goodness of the will] depends on the object.

1a 2ae q19 a2: Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone? Yes.

Bonitas et malitia voluntatis non dependet ex circumstantiis, sed ex solo obiecto, quia bonitas voluntatis ex solo uno illo dependet, quod per se facit bonitatem in actu; scilicet ex obiecto, et non ex circumstantiis (quae sunt quaedam accidentia actus).

The goodness and badness of the will depend, not on the circumstances, but on the object alone, because the goodness of the will's act depends on that one thing alone, which essentially causes goodness in the act; and that one thing is the object, and not the circumstances (which are accidents, as it were, of the act).

Illud autem unum quod est principium in quolibet genere, non est per accidens, sed per se, quia omne quod est per accidens, reducitur ad id quod est per se, sicut ad principium.

That one thing which is the principle in each genus, is not something accidental to that genus, but something essential thereto, because whatever is accidental is reduced to something essential, as to its principle.

Principium autem bonitatis et malitiae humanorum actuum est ex actu voluntatis.

Now the principle of the goodness and malice of human actions is taken from the act of the will.

Finis est obiectum voluntatis, non autem aliarum virium. Unde quantum ad actum voluntatis, non differt bonitas quae est ex obiecto, a bonitate quae est ex fine, sicut in actibus aliarum virium; nisi forte per accidens, prout finis dependet ex fine, et voluntas ex voluntate.

The end is the object of the will, but not of the other powers. Hence, in regard to the act of the will, the goodness derived from the object, does not differ from that which is derived from the end, as they differ in the acts of the other powers; except perhaps accidentally, insofar as one end depends on another, and one act of the will on another.

Supposito quod voluntas sit boni, nulla circumstantia potest eam facere malam.

Given that the act of the will is fixed on some good, no circumstances can make that act bad.

1a 2ae q19 a1: Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object? Yes.

Bonum et malum in actibus voluntatis proprie attenditur secundum obiecta, quia differentia speciei in actibus est secundum obiecta, ut dictum est.

Good and evil in the acts of the will is derived properly from the objects, because the specific difference in acts is according to objects, as stated above (q18 a5).

Ergo bonitas voluntatis est ex hoc quod aliquis vult bonum.

Therefore the goodness of the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is good.

Voluntas non semper est veri boni, sed quandoque est apparentis boni, quod quidem habet aliquam rationem boni, non tamen simpliciter convenientis ad appetendum. Et propter hoc actus voluntatis non est bonus semper, sed aliquando malus.

The will is not always directed to what is truly good, but sometimes to the apparent good, which has indeed some formal aspect of good, but not of a good that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence it is that the act of the will is not always good, but sometimes evil.

Bonum per rationem repraesentatur voluntati ut obiectum; et inquantum cadit sub ordine rationis, pertinet ad genus moris, et causat bonitatem moralem in actu voluntatis. Ratio enim principium est humanorum et moralium actuum, ut supra dictum est.

Good, according to its formal aspect, is presented to the will as its object; and insofar as an object falls under the order of formal aspect, it enters the moral order, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will, since formal aspect is the principle of human and moral acts, as stated above (q18 a5).

1a 2ae q19: The goodness and badness of the interior act of the will

1. Does the goodness of the will depend on the object?
2. Does it depend on the object alone?
3. Does it depend on reason?
4. Does it depend on the eternal law?
5. Does erring reason bind?
6. Is the will evil if it follows the erring reason against the law of God?
7. Does the goodness of the will in regard to the means, depend on the intention of the end?
8. Does the degree of goodness or badness in the will depend on the degree of good or evil in the intention?
9. Does the goodness of the will depend on its conformity to the Divine will?
10. Is it necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed?

1a 2ae q18 a11: Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places a moral action in a species of good or evil? No.

Non omnis circumstantia addens in bonitate vel malitia, variat speciem moralis actus, quia circumstantia dat speciem boni vel mali actui morali, inquantum respicit specialem ordinem rationis.

Not every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, changes its species, because a circumstance gives the species of good or evil to a moral action only insofar as it regards a special aspectual relation.

Contingit autem quandoque quod circumstantia non respicit ordinem rationis in bono vel malo, nisi praesupposita alia circumstantia, a qua actus moralis habet speciem boni vel mali.

Now it happens sometimes that a circumstance does not regard an aspectual relation in respect of good or evil, except on the supposition of another previous circumstance, from which the moral action takes its species of good or evil.

Sicut tollere aliquid in magna quantitate vel parva, non respicit ordinem rationis in bono vel malo, nisi praesupposita aliqua alia conditione, per quam actus habeat malitiam vel bonitatem.

Thus to take something in a large or small quantity, does not regard the aspectual relation in respect of good or evil, unless a certain other condition be presupposed from which the action takes its malice or goodness.

Puta hoc quod est esse alienum, quod repugnat rationi. Unde tollere alienum in magna vel parva quantitate, non diversificat speciem peccati. Tamen potest aggravare vel diminuere peccatum. Et similiter est in aliis malis vel bonis. Unde non omnis circumstantia addens in bonitate vel malitia, variat speciem moralis actus.

For instance, if what is taken belongs to another, which makes the action to be discordant in the formal aspect. Wherefore to take what belongs to another in a large or small quantity, does not change the species of the sin. Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin. The same applies to other evil or good actions.

1a 2ae q18 a10: Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil? Yes.

Circumstantia constituit actum moralem in aliqua specie boni vel mali quia circumstantia secundum quod dat speciem actui, consideratur ut quaedam conditio obiecti, et quasi quaedam specifica differentia eius.

A circumstance makes a moral action to be specifically good or bad because a circumstance, insofar as it specifies an action, is considered as a condition of the object, and as being, as it were, a specific difference thereof.

Circumstantia manens in ratione circumstantiae, cum habeat rationem accidentis, non dat speciem; sed inquantum mutatur in principalem conditionem obiecti, secundum hoc dat speciem.

A circumstance, so long as it remains in the formal aspect of circumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it has the formal aspect of accident; but when it becomes a principal condition of the object, then it does specify the action.

Non omnis circumstantia constituit actum moralem in aliqua specie boni vel mali, cum non quaelibet circumstantia importet aliquam consonantiam vel dissonantiam ad rationem. Unde non oportet, licet sint multae circumstantiae unius actus, quod unus actus sit in pluribus speciebus. Licet etiam non sit inconveniens quod unus actus moralis sit in pluribus speciebus moris etiam disparatis.

It is not every circumstance that places the moral action in the species of good or evil, since not every circumstance implies accord or disaccord with the formal aspect. Consequently, although one action may have many circumstances, it does not follow that it is in many species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one action should not be in several, even disparate, moral species.

Sicut species rerum naturalium constituuntur ex naturalibus formis, ita species moralium actuum constituuntur ex formis prout sunt a ratione conceptae, sicut ex supradictis patet.

Just as the species of natural things are constituted by their natural forms, so the species of moral actions are constituted by forms taken together under a formal aspect, as is evident from what was said above (a5).

Quia vero natura determinata est ad unum, nec potest esse processus naturae in infinitum, necesse est pervenire ad aliquam ultimam formam, ex qua sumatur differentia specifica, post quam alia differentia specifica esse non possit. Et inde est quod in rebus naturalibus, id quod est accidens alicui rei, non potest accipi ut differentia constituens speciem.

But since nature is determinate to one thing, nor can a process of nature go on to infinity, there must needs be some ultimate form, giving a specific difference, after which no further specific difference is possible. Hence it is that in natural things, that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference constituting the species.

Sed processus rationis non est determinatus ad aliquid unum, sed quolibet dato, potest ulterius procedere. Et ideo quod in uno actu accipitur ut circumstantia superaddita obiecto quod determinat speciem actus, potest iterum accipi a ratione ordinante ut principalis conditio obiecti determinantis speciem actus.

But the process of aspectual apprehension is not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further. And consequently that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance added to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by the directing aspect, as the principal condition of the object that determines the action's species.

Sicut tollere alienum habet speciem ex ratione alieni, ex hoc enim constituitur in specie furti; et si consideretur super hoc ratio loci vel temporis, se habebit in ratione circumstantiae. Sed quia ratio etiam de loco vel de tempore, et aliis huiusmodi, ordinare potest, contingit conditionem loci circa obiectum accipi ut contrariam ordini rationis.

Thus to appropriate another's property is specified by the aspect of the property being "another's," and in this respect it is placed in the species of theft; and if we consider that action also in its formal aspect of place or time, then this will be an additional aspect of circumstance. But since the aspect can direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that the condition as to place, in relation to the object, is considered as being in disaccord with the formal aspect.

Puta quod ratio ordinat non esse iniuriam faciendam loco sacro. Unde tollere aliquid alienum de loco sacro addit specialem repugnantiam ad ordinem rationis.

For instance, the formal aspect forbids damage to be done to a holy place. Consequently to steal from a holy place has an additional repugnance to the order of reason.

Et ideo locus, qui prius considerabatur ut circumstantia, nunc consideratur ut principalis conditio obiecti rationi repugnans. Et per hunc modum, quandocumque aliqua circumstantia respicit specialem ordinem rationis vel pro vel contra, oportet quod circumstantia det speciem actui morali vel bono vel malo.

And thus place, which was first of all considered as a circumstance, is considered here as the principal condition of the object, and as itself repugnant to formal aspect. And in this way, whenever some circumstance has a special relation to formal aspect, either for or against, the circumstance must needs specify the moral action whether good or bad.

1a 2ae q18 a9: Whether an individual action can be indifferent? No.

Contingit quandoque aliquem actum esse indifferentem secundum speciem, qui tamen est bonus vel malus in individuo consideratus, quia malum communiter omne quod est rationi rectae repugnans, et secundum hoc, omnis individualis actus est bonus vel malus.

It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil, because evil, in general, is all that is repugnant to the right aspect, and in this sense every individual action is either good or bad.

Actus moralis, sicut dictum est, non solum habet bonitatem ex obiecto (a quo habet speciem), sed etiam ex circumstantiis (quae sunt quasi quaedam accidentia), sicut aliquid convenit individuo hominis secundum accidentia individualia, quod non convenit homini secundum rationem speciei. Et oportet quod quilibet individualis actus habeat aliquam circumstantiam per quam trahatur ad bonum vel malum, ad minus ex parte intentionis finis.

A moral action, as stated above (a3), derives its goodness not only from its object (whence it takes its species), but also from the circumstances (which are its accidents, as it were), just as something belongs to a man according to his individual accidents, which does not belong to him according to the formal aspect of his species. And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end.

Cum enim rationis sit ordinare, actus a ratione deliberativa procedens, si non sit ad debitum finem ordinatus, ex hoc ipso repugnat rationi, et habet rationem mali. Si vero ordinetur ad debitum finem, convenit cum ordine rationis, unde habet rationem boni.

For, since it belongs to aspect to direct, if an action that proceeds from deliberate aspect be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to the aspect, and has the formal aspect of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with the aspect, wherefore it has the formal aspect of good.

Necesse est autem quod vel ordinetur, vel non ordinetur ad debitum finem. Unde necesse est omnem actum hominis a deliberativa ratione procedentem, in individuo consideratum, bonum esse vel malum.

Now it must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate aspect, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.

Si autem non procedit a ratione deliberativa, sed ex quadam imaginatione (sicut cum aliquis fricat barbam, vel movet manum aut pedem), talis actus non est, proprie loquendo, moralis vel humanus (cum hoc habeat actus a ratione). Et sic erit indifferens, quasi extra genus moralium actuum existens.

If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate aspect, but from some act of the imagination (as when a man strokes his beard, or moves his hand or foot), such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or human (since this depends on the formal aspect). Hence it will be indifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions.

1a 2ae q18 a8: Whether any action is indifferent in its species? Yes.

Sunt aliqui actus secundum speciem suam indifferentes quia contingit quod obiectum actus non includit aliquid pertinens ad ordinem rationis; sicut levare festucam de terra, ire ad campum, et huiusmodi: et tales actus secundum speciem suam sunt indifferentes.

Some actions are indifferent according to their species because it may happen that the object of an action does not include something pertaining to the order of formal aspect; for instance, to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields, and the like: and such actions are indifferent according to their species.

Actus omnis habet speciem ab obiecto; et actus humanus, qui dicitur moralis, habet speciem ab obiecto relato ad principium actuum humanorum, quod est ratio.

Every action takes its species from its object; while the human action, which is called moral, takes its species from the object as related to the principle of human actions, which is the formal aspect.

Unde si obiectum actus includat aliquid quod conveniat ordini rationis, erit actus bonus secundum suam speciem; sicut dare eleemosynam indigenti.

Wherefore if the object of an action includes something befitting the order of the formal aspect, it will be a good action according to its species; for instance, to give alms to a person in want.

Si autem includat aliquid quod repugnet ordini rationis, erit malus actus secundum speciem; sicut furari, quod est tollere aliena.

On the other hand, if it includes something repugnant to the order of the formal aspect, it will be an evil act according to its species; for instance, to steal, which is to take things belonging to another.

Omne obiectum vel finis habet aliquam bonitatem vel malitiam, saltem naturalem; non tamen semper importat bonitatem vel malitiam moralem, quae consideratur per comparationem ad rationem.

Every object or end has some goodness or malice, at least natural to it; but this does not imply moral goodness or malice, which is considered in relation to the formal aspect.

1a 2ae q18 a7: Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus? No.

Species quae est ex fine, non continetur sub specie quae est ex obiecto, sicut sub genere, quia cuiuslibet generis sunt determinatae differentiae; sed actus eiusdem speciei ex parte obiecti, potest ad infinitos fines ordinari: puta furtum ad infinita bona vel mala.

The species derived from the end is not contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus, because each genus has its determinate differences; but an action of one same species on the part of its object, can be ordained to an infinite number of ends: for instance, theft can be ordained to an infinite number of good and bad ends.

1a 2ae q18 a6: Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end? Yes.

Bonum et malum quod accipitur secundum finem, diversificat speciem actuum, quia actus humani habent speciem a fine.

Good and evil in respect of the end diversify the species of action because human actions derive their species from the end (q1 a3).

Aliqui actus dicuntur humani, inquantum sunt voluntarii, sicut supra dictum est. In actu autem voluntario invenitur duplex actus: scilicet actus interior voluntatis, et actus exterior; et uterque horum actuum habet suum obiectum.

Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary, as stated above (q1 a1). Now, in a voluntary action, there is a twofold action: viz. (1) the interior action of the will, and (2) the external action; and each of these actions has its object.

Finis autem proprie est obiectum interioris actus voluntarii, id autem circa quod est actio exterior, est obiectum eius. Sicut igitur actus exterior accipit speciem ab obiecto circa quod est, ita actus interior voluntatis accipit speciem a fine, sicut a proprio obiecto.

The end is properly the object of the interior act of the will, while the object of the external action, is that on which the action is brought to bear. Therefore just as the external action takes its species from the object on which it bears, so the interior act of the will takes its species from the end, as from its own proper object.

Ita autem quod est ex parte voluntatis, se habet ut formale ad id quod est ex parte exterioris actus, quia voluntas utitur membris ad agendum, sicut instrumentis, neque actus exteriores habent rationem moralitatis, nisi inquantum sunt voluntarii.

Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that which is on the part of the external action, because the will uses the limbs to act as instruments, nor do external actions have a formal aspect of morality, save in so far as they are voluntary.

Et ideo actus humani species formaliter consideratur secundum finem, materialiter autem secundum obiectum exterioris actus. Unde philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod "ille qui furatur ut committat adulterium, est, per se loquendo, magis adulter quam fur".

Consequently the species of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end, but materially with regard to the object of the external action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who steals that he may commit adultery, is strictly speaking, more adulterer than thief".

Quando multi actus, specie differentes, ordinantur ad unum finem, est quidem diversitas speciei ex parte exteriorum actuum, sed unitas speciei ex parte actus interioris.

When many actions, differing in species, are ordained to the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on the part of the external actions, but unity of species on the part of the internal action.

Ordinari ad talem finem, etsi accidat exteriori actui, non tamen accidit actui interiori voluntatis, qui comparatur ad exteriorem sicut formale ad materiale.

Although it is accidental to the external action to be ordained to some particular end, it is not accidental to the interior act of the will, which act is compared to the external act as the formal is to the material.

1a 2ae q18 a5: Whether a human action is good or evil in its species? Yes.

Bonum et malum diversificant speciem in actibus moralibus quia differentiae per se diversificant speciem.

Good and evil diversify the species in human actions because essential differences diversify species.

Etiam in rebus naturalibus, bonum et malum, quod est secundum naturam et contra naturam, diversificant speciem naturae: corpus enim mortuum et corpus vivum non sunt eiusdem speciei. Et similiter bonum, inquantum est secundum rationem, et malum, inquantum est praeter rationem, diversificant speciem moris.

Even in natural things, good and evil, inasmuch as something is according to nature, and something against nature, diversify the natural species: for a dead body and a living body are not of the same species. In like manner, good, inasmuch as it is in accord with a formal aspect, and evil, inasmuch as it is against a formal aspect, diversify the moral species.

In actibus autem humanis bonum et malum dicitur per comparationem ad rationem, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., "bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse, malum autem quod est praeter rationem".

In human actions, good and evil are predicated in reference to a formal aspect; because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "the good of man is to be in accordance with a formal aspect," and evil is "to be against a formal aspect."

Unicuique enim rei est bonum quod convenit ei secundum suam formam; et malum quod est ei praeter ordinem suae formae.

For that is good for a thing which befits it in regard to its form; and evil, that which is against the order of its form.

Patet ergo quod differentia boni et mali, circa obiectum considerata, comparatur per se ad rationem, scilicet secundum quod obiectum est ei conveniens vel non conveniens.

It is therefore evident that the difference of good and evil, considered in reference to the object, is an essential difference in relation to its formal aspect; that is to say, according as the object is befitting or unbecoming to its formal aspect.

Dicuntur autem aliqui actus humani, vel morales, secundum quod sunt a ratione.

Now certain actions are called human, or moral, inasmuch as they are from the formal aspect.

Malum importat privationem non absolutam, sed consequentem talem potentiam. Dicitur enim malus actus secundum suam speciem, non ex eo quod nullum habeat obiectum, sed quia habet obiectum non conveniens rationi, sicut tollere aliena. Unde inquantum obiectum est aliquid positive, potest constituere speciem mali actus.

Evil implies privation, not absolute [privation], but affecting some potentiality. For an action is said to be evil according to its species, not because it has no object at all, but because it has an object not befitting the formal aspect, for instance, to appropriate another's property. Wherefore insofar as the object is something positive, it can constitute the species of an evil act.

1a 2ae q18 a4: Whether a human action is good or evil from its end? Yes.

Actiones humanae (et alia quorum bonitas dependet ab alio) habent rationem bonitatis ex fine a quo dependent, praeter bonitatem absolutam quae in eis existit, quia oportet quod [actio] consideretur per considerationem ad causam a qua dependet.

Human actions (and other things, the goodness of which depends on something else) have a formal aspect of goodness from the end on which they depend, besides that goodness which is in them absolutely, because in their regard we must consider their being in its relation to the cause on which it depends.

Sic igitur in actione humana bonitas quadruplex considerari potest.

Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action.

Una quidem secundum genus, prout scilicet est actio, quia quantum habet de actione et entitate, tantum habet de bonitate.

(1) First, that which, as an action, it derives from its genus; because as much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness.

Alia vero secundum speciem, quae accipitur secundum obiectum conveniens.

(2) Secondly, it has goodness according to its species; which is derived with respect to its fitting object.

Tertia secundum circumstantias, quasi secundum accidentia quaedam.

(3) Thirdly, it has goodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its accidents.

Quarta autem secundum finem, quasi secundum habitudinem ad causam bonitatis.

(4) Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, with respect to its proportion to the cause of its goodness.

Nihil prohibet actioni habenti unam praedictarum bonitatum, deesse aliam. Et secundum hoc, contingit actionem quae est bona secundum speciem suam vel secundum circumstantias, ordinari ad finem malum, et e converso.

Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the way mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus it may happen that an action which is good in its species or in its circumstances is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa.

Non tamen est actio bona simpliciter, nisi omnes bonitates concurrant, quia "quilibet singularis defectus causat malum, bonum autem causatur ex integra causa", ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom.

However, an action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways, since "any single defect causes evil, but good is caused from an integral cause," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

Bonum ad quod aliquis respiciens operatur, non semper est verum bonum: sed quandoque verum bonum, et quandoque apparens. Et secundum hoc, ex fine sequitur actio mala.

The good in view of which one acts is not always a true good: sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good. And in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in view.