1a 2ae q19 a1: Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object? Yes.

Bonum et malum in actibus voluntatis proprie attenditur secundum obiecta, quia differentia speciei in actibus est secundum obiecta, ut dictum est.

Good and evil in the acts of the will is derived properly from the objects, because the specific difference in acts is according to objects, as stated above (q18 a5).

Ergo bonitas voluntatis est ex hoc quod aliquis vult bonum.

Therefore the goodness of the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is good.

Voluntas non semper est veri boni, sed quandoque est apparentis boni, quod quidem habet aliquam rationem boni, non tamen simpliciter convenientis ad appetendum. Et propter hoc actus voluntatis non est bonus semper, sed aliquando malus.

The will is not always directed to what is truly good, but sometimes to the apparent good, which has indeed some formal aspect of good, but not of a good that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence it is that the act of the will is not always good, but sometimes evil.

Bonum per rationem repraesentatur voluntati ut obiectum; et inquantum cadit sub ordine rationis, pertinet ad genus moris, et causat bonitatem moralem in actu voluntatis. Ratio enim principium est humanorum et moralium actuum, ut supra dictum est.

Good, according to its formal aspect, is presented to the will as its object; and insofar as an object falls under the order of formal aspect, it enters the moral order, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will, since formal aspect is the principle of human and moral acts, as stated above (q18 a5).

1a 2ae q19: The goodness and badness of the interior act of the will

1. Does the goodness of the will depend on the object?
2. Does it depend on the object alone?
3. Does it depend on reason?
4. Does it depend on the eternal law?
5. Does erring reason bind?
6. Is the will evil if it follows the erring reason against the law of God?
7. Does the goodness of the will in regard to the means, depend on the intention of the end?
8. Does the degree of goodness or badness in the will depend on the degree of good or evil in the intention?
9. Does the goodness of the will depend on its conformity to the Divine will?
10. Is it necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed?

1a 2ae q18 a11: Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places a moral action in a species of good or evil? No.

Non omnis circumstantia addens in bonitate vel malitia, variat speciem moralis actus, quia circumstantia dat speciem boni vel mali actui morali, inquantum respicit specialem ordinem rationis.

Not every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, changes its species, because a circumstance gives the species of good or evil to a moral action only insofar as it regards a special aspectual relation.

Contingit autem quandoque quod circumstantia non respicit ordinem rationis in bono vel malo, nisi praesupposita alia circumstantia, a qua actus moralis habet speciem boni vel mali.

Now it happens sometimes that a circumstance does not regard an aspectual relation in respect of good or evil, except on the supposition of another previous circumstance, from which the moral action takes its species of good or evil.

Sicut tollere aliquid in magna quantitate vel parva, non respicit ordinem rationis in bono vel malo, nisi praesupposita aliqua alia conditione, per quam actus habeat malitiam vel bonitatem.

Thus to take something in a large or small quantity, does not regard the aspectual relation in respect of good or evil, unless a certain other condition be presupposed from which the action takes its malice or goodness.

Puta hoc quod est esse alienum, quod repugnat rationi. Unde tollere alienum in magna vel parva quantitate, non diversificat speciem peccati. Tamen potest aggravare vel diminuere peccatum. Et similiter est in aliis malis vel bonis. Unde non omnis circumstantia addens in bonitate vel malitia, variat speciem moralis actus.

For instance, if what is taken belongs to another, which makes the action to be discordant in the formal aspect. Wherefore to take what belongs to another in a large or small quantity, does not change the species of the sin. Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin. The same applies to other evil or good actions.

1a 2ae q18 a10: Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil? Yes.

Circumstantia constituit actum moralem in aliqua specie boni vel mali quia circumstantia secundum quod dat speciem actui, consideratur ut quaedam conditio obiecti, et quasi quaedam specifica differentia eius.

A circumstance makes a moral action to be specifically good or bad because a circumstance, insofar as it specifies an action, is considered as a condition of the object, and as being, as it were, a specific difference thereof.

Circumstantia manens in ratione circumstantiae, cum habeat rationem accidentis, non dat speciem; sed inquantum mutatur in principalem conditionem obiecti, secundum hoc dat speciem.

A circumstance, so long as it remains in the formal aspect of circumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it has the formal aspect of accident; but when it becomes a principal condition of the object, then it does specify the action.

Non omnis circumstantia constituit actum moralem in aliqua specie boni vel mali, cum non quaelibet circumstantia importet aliquam consonantiam vel dissonantiam ad rationem. Unde non oportet, licet sint multae circumstantiae unius actus, quod unus actus sit in pluribus speciebus. Licet etiam non sit inconveniens quod unus actus moralis sit in pluribus speciebus moris etiam disparatis.

It is not every circumstance that places the moral action in the species of good or evil, since not every circumstance implies accord or disaccord with the formal aspect. Consequently, although one action may have many circumstances, it does not follow that it is in many species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one action should not be in several, even disparate, moral species.

Sicut species rerum naturalium constituuntur ex naturalibus formis, ita species moralium actuum constituuntur ex formis prout sunt a ratione conceptae, sicut ex supradictis patet.

Just as the species of natural things are constituted by their natural forms, so the species of moral actions are constituted by forms taken together under a formal aspect, as is evident from what was said above (a5).

Quia vero natura determinata est ad unum, nec potest esse processus naturae in infinitum, necesse est pervenire ad aliquam ultimam formam, ex qua sumatur differentia specifica, post quam alia differentia specifica esse non possit. Et inde est quod in rebus naturalibus, id quod est accidens alicui rei, non potest accipi ut differentia constituens speciem.

But since nature is determinate to one thing, nor can a process of nature go on to infinity, there must needs be some ultimate form, giving a specific difference, after which no further specific difference is possible. Hence it is that in natural things, that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference constituting the species.

Sed processus rationis non est determinatus ad aliquid unum, sed quolibet dato, potest ulterius procedere. Et ideo quod in uno actu accipitur ut circumstantia superaddita obiecto quod determinat speciem actus, potest iterum accipi a ratione ordinante ut principalis conditio obiecti determinantis speciem actus.

But the process of aspectual apprehension is not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further. And consequently that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance added to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by the directing aspect, as the principal condition of the object that determines the action's species.

Sicut tollere alienum habet speciem ex ratione alieni, ex hoc enim constituitur in specie furti; et si consideretur super hoc ratio loci vel temporis, se habebit in ratione circumstantiae. Sed quia ratio etiam de loco vel de tempore, et aliis huiusmodi, ordinare potest, contingit conditionem loci circa obiectum accipi ut contrariam ordini rationis.

Thus to appropriate another's property is specified by the aspect of the property being "another's," and in this respect it is placed in the species of theft; and if we consider that action also in its formal aspect of place or time, then this will be an additional aspect of circumstance. But since the aspect can direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that the condition as to place, in relation to the object, is considered as being in disaccord with the formal aspect.

Puta quod ratio ordinat non esse iniuriam faciendam loco sacro. Unde tollere aliquid alienum de loco sacro addit specialem repugnantiam ad ordinem rationis.

For instance, the formal aspect forbids damage to be done to a holy place. Consequently to steal from a holy place has an additional repugnance to the order of reason.

Et ideo locus, qui prius considerabatur ut circumstantia, nunc consideratur ut principalis conditio obiecti rationi repugnans. Et per hunc modum, quandocumque aliqua circumstantia respicit specialem ordinem rationis vel pro vel contra, oportet quod circumstantia det speciem actui morali vel bono vel malo.

And thus place, which was first of all considered as a circumstance, is considered here as the principal condition of the object, and as itself repugnant to formal aspect. And in this way, whenever some circumstance has a special relation to formal aspect, either for or against, the circumstance must needs specify the moral action whether good or bad.

1a 2ae q18 a9: Whether an individual action can be indifferent? No.

Contingit quandoque aliquem actum esse indifferentem secundum speciem, qui tamen est bonus vel malus in individuo consideratus, quia malum communiter omne quod est rationi rectae repugnans, et secundum hoc, omnis individualis actus est bonus vel malus.

It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil, because evil, in general, is all that is repugnant to the right aspect, and in this sense every individual action is either good or bad.

Actus moralis, sicut dictum est, non solum habet bonitatem ex obiecto (a quo habet speciem), sed etiam ex circumstantiis (quae sunt quasi quaedam accidentia), sicut aliquid convenit individuo hominis secundum accidentia individualia, quod non convenit homini secundum rationem speciei. Et oportet quod quilibet individualis actus habeat aliquam circumstantiam per quam trahatur ad bonum vel malum, ad minus ex parte intentionis finis.

A moral action, as stated above (a3), derives its goodness not only from its object (whence it takes its species), but also from the circumstances (which are its accidents, as it were), just as something belongs to a man according to his individual accidents, which does not belong to him according to the formal aspect of his species. And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end.

Cum enim rationis sit ordinare, actus a ratione deliberativa procedens, si non sit ad debitum finem ordinatus, ex hoc ipso repugnat rationi, et habet rationem mali. Si vero ordinetur ad debitum finem, convenit cum ordine rationis, unde habet rationem boni.

For, since it belongs to aspect to direct, if an action that proceeds from deliberate aspect be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to the aspect, and has the formal aspect of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with the aspect, wherefore it has the formal aspect of good.

Necesse est autem quod vel ordinetur, vel non ordinetur ad debitum finem. Unde necesse est omnem actum hominis a deliberativa ratione procedentem, in individuo consideratum, bonum esse vel malum.

Now it must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate aspect, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.

Si autem non procedit a ratione deliberativa, sed ex quadam imaginatione (sicut cum aliquis fricat barbam, vel movet manum aut pedem), talis actus non est, proprie loquendo, moralis vel humanus (cum hoc habeat actus a ratione). Et sic erit indifferens, quasi extra genus moralium actuum existens.

If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate aspect, but from some act of the imagination (as when a man strokes his beard, or moves his hand or foot), such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or human (since this depends on the formal aspect). Hence it will be indifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions.

1a 2ae q18 a8: Whether any action is indifferent in its species? Yes.

Sunt aliqui actus secundum speciem suam indifferentes quia contingit quod obiectum actus non includit aliquid pertinens ad ordinem rationis; sicut levare festucam de terra, ire ad campum, et huiusmodi: et tales actus secundum speciem suam sunt indifferentes.

Some actions are indifferent according to their species because it may happen that the object of an action does not include something pertaining to the order of formal aspect; for instance, to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields, and the like: and such actions are indifferent according to their species.

Actus omnis habet speciem ab obiecto; et actus humanus, qui dicitur moralis, habet speciem ab obiecto relato ad principium actuum humanorum, quod est ratio.

Every action takes its species from its object; while the human action, which is called moral, takes its species from the object as related to the principle of human actions, which is the formal aspect.

Unde si obiectum actus includat aliquid quod conveniat ordini rationis, erit actus bonus secundum suam speciem; sicut dare eleemosynam indigenti.

Wherefore if the object of an action includes something befitting the order of the formal aspect, it will be a good action according to its species; for instance, to give alms to a person in want.

Si autem includat aliquid quod repugnet ordini rationis, erit malus actus secundum speciem; sicut furari, quod est tollere aliena.

On the other hand, if it includes something repugnant to the order of the formal aspect, it will be an evil act according to its species; for instance, to steal, which is to take things belonging to another.

Omne obiectum vel finis habet aliquam bonitatem vel malitiam, saltem naturalem; non tamen semper importat bonitatem vel malitiam moralem, quae consideratur per comparationem ad rationem.

Every object or end has some goodness or malice, at least natural to it; but this does not imply moral goodness or malice, which is considered in relation to the formal aspect.

1a 2ae q18 a7: Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus? No.

Species quae est ex fine, non continetur sub specie quae est ex obiecto, sicut sub genere, quia cuiuslibet generis sunt determinatae differentiae; sed actus eiusdem speciei ex parte obiecti, potest ad infinitos fines ordinari: puta furtum ad infinita bona vel mala.

The species derived from the end is not contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus, because each genus has its determinate differences; but an action of one same species on the part of its object, can be ordained to an infinite number of ends: for instance, theft can be ordained to an infinite number of good and bad ends.

1a 2ae q18 a6: Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end? Yes.

Bonum et malum quod accipitur secundum finem, diversificat speciem actuum, quia actus humani habent speciem a fine.

Good and evil in respect of the end diversify the species of action because human actions derive their species from the end (q1 a3).

Aliqui actus dicuntur humani, inquantum sunt voluntarii, sicut supra dictum est. In actu autem voluntario invenitur duplex actus: scilicet actus interior voluntatis, et actus exterior; et uterque horum actuum habet suum obiectum.

Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary, as stated above (q1 a1). Now, in a voluntary action, there is a twofold action: viz. (1) the interior action of the will, and (2) the external action; and each of these actions has its object.

Finis autem proprie est obiectum interioris actus voluntarii, id autem circa quod est actio exterior, est obiectum eius. Sicut igitur actus exterior accipit speciem ab obiecto circa quod est, ita actus interior voluntatis accipit speciem a fine, sicut a proprio obiecto.

The end is properly the object of the interior act of the will, while the object of the external action, is that on which the action is brought to bear. Therefore just as the external action takes its species from the object on which it bears, so the interior act of the will takes its species from the end, as from its own proper object.

Ita autem quod est ex parte voluntatis, se habet ut formale ad id quod est ex parte exterioris actus, quia voluntas utitur membris ad agendum, sicut instrumentis, neque actus exteriores habent rationem moralitatis, nisi inquantum sunt voluntarii.

Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that which is on the part of the external action, because the will uses the limbs to act as instruments, nor do external actions have a formal aspect of morality, save in so far as they are voluntary.

Et ideo actus humani species formaliter consideratur secundum finem, materialiter autem secundum obiectum exterioris actus. Unde philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod "ille qui furatur ut committat adulterium, est, per se loquendo, magis adulter quam fur".

Consequently the species of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end, but materially with regard to the object of the external action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who steals that he may commit adultery, is strictly speaking, more adulterer than thief".

Quando multi actus, specie differentes, ordinantur ad unum finem, est quidem diversitas speciei ex parte exteriorum actuum, sed unitas speciei ex parte actus interioris.

When many actions, differing in species, are ordained to the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on the part of the external actions, but unity of species on the part of the internal action.

Ordinari ad talem finem, etsi accidat exteriori actui, non tamen accidit actui interiori voluntatis, qui comparatur ad exteriorem sicut formale ad materiale.

Although it is accidental to the external action to be ordained to some particular end, it is not accidental to the interior act of the will, which act is compared to the external act as the formal is to the material.

1a 2ae q18 a5: Whether a human action is good or evil in its species? Yes.

Bonum et malum diversificant speciem in actibus moralibus quia differentiae per se diversificant speciem.

Good and evil diversify the species in human actions because essential differences diversify species.

Etiam in rebus naturalibus, bonum et malum, quod est secundum naturam et contra naturam, diversificant speciem naturae: corpus enim mortuum et corpus vivum non sunt eiusdem speciei. Et similiter bonum, inquantum est secundum rationem, et malum, inquantum est praeter rationem, diversificant speciem moris.

Even in natural things, good and evil, inasmuch as something is according to nature, and something against nature, diversify the natural species: for a dead body and a living body are not of the same species. In like manner, good, inasmuch as it is in accord with a formal aspect, and evil, inasmuch as it is against a formal aspect, diversify the moral species.

In actibus autem humanis bonum et malum dicitur per comparationem ad rationem, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., "bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse, malum autem quod est praeter rationem".

In human actions, good and evil are predicated in reference to a formal aspect; because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "the good of man is to be in accordance with a formal aspect," and evil is "to be against a formal aspect."

Unicuique enim rei est bonum quod convenit ei secundum suam formam; et malum quod est ei praeter ordinem suae formae.

For that is good for a thing which befits it in regard to its form; and evil, that which is against the order of its form.

Patet ergo quod differentia boni et mali, circa obiectum considerata, comparatur per se ad rationem, scilicet secundum quod obiectum est ei conveniens vel non conveniens.

It is therefore evident that the difference of good and evil, considered in reference to the object, is an essential difference in relation to its formal aspect; that is to say, according as the object is befitting or unbecoming to its formal aspect.

Dicuntur autem aliqui actus humani, vel morales, secundum quod sunt a ratione.

Now certain actions are called human, or moral, inasmuch as they are from the formal aspect.

Malum importat privationem non absolutam, sed consequentem talem potentiam. Dicitur enim malus actus secundum suam speciem, non ex eo quod nullum habeat obiectum, sed quia habet obiectum non conveniens rationi, sicut tollere aliena. Unde inquantum obiectum est aliquid positive, potest constituere speciem mali actus.

Evil implies privation, not absolute [privation], but affecting some potentiality. For an action is said to be evil according to its species, not because it has no object at all, but because it has an object not befitting the formal aspect, for instance, to appropriate another's property. Wherefore insofar as the object is something positive, it can constitute the species of an evil act.

1a 2ae q18 a4: Whether a human action is good or evil from its end? Yes.

Actiones humanae (et alia quorum bonitas dependet ab alio) habent rationem bonitatis ex fine a quo dependent, praeter bonitatem absolutam quae in eis existit, quia oportet quod [actio] consideretur per considerationem ad causam a qua dependet.

Human actions (and other things, the goodness of which depends on something else) have a formal aspect of goodness from the end on which they depend, besides that goodness which is in them absolutely, because in their regard we must consider their being in its relation to the cause on which it depends.

Sic igitur in actione humana bonitas quadruplex considerari potest.

Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action.

Una quidem secundum genus, prout scilicet est actio, quia quantum habet de actione et entitate, tantum habet de bonitate.

(1) First, that which, as an action, it derives from its genus; because as much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness.

Alia vero secundum speciem, quae accipitur secundum obiectum conveniens.

(2) Secondly, it has goodness according to its species; which is derived with respect to its fitting object.

Tertia secundum circumstantias, quasi secundum accidentia quaedam.

(3) Thirdly, it has goodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its accidents.

Quarta autem secundum finem, quasi secundum habitudinem ad causam bonitatis.

(4) Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, with respect to its proportion to the cause of its goodness.

Nihil prohibet actioni habenti unam praedictarum bonitatum, deesse aliam. Et secundum hoc, contingit actionem quae est bona secundum speciem suam vel secundum circumstantias, ordinari ad finem malum, et e converso.

Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the way mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus it may happen that an action which is good in its species or in its circumstances is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa.

Non tamen est actio bona simpliciter, nisi omnes bonitates concurrant, quia "quilibet singularis defectus causat malum, bonum autem causatur ex integra causa", ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom.

However, an action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways, since "any single defect causes evil, but good is caused from an integral cause," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

Bonum ad quod aliquis respiciens operatur, non semper est verum bonum: sed quandoque verum bonum, et quandoque apparens. Et secundum hoc, ex fine sequitur actio mala.

The good in view of which one acts is not always a true good: sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good. And in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in view.

1a 2ae q18 a3: Whether man's action is good or evil from a circumstance? Yes.

Actiones humanae secundum circumstantias sunt bonae vel malae quia si aliquid desit quod requiratur ad debitas circumstantias, erit actio mala.

Human actions are good or evil according to circumstances because if something be wanting that is requisite as a due circumstance, the action will be evil.

Circumstantiae sunt extra actionem, inquantum non sunt de essentia actionis; sunt tamen in ipsa actione velut quaedam accidentia eius. Sicut et accidentia quae sunt in substantiis naturalibus, sunt extra essentias earum.

Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as they are not part of its essence; but they are in an action as certain accidents thereof. Thus, too, accidents in natural substances are outside their essences.

Non omnia accidentia per accidens se habent ad sua subiecta; sed quaedam sunt per se accidentia; quae in unaquaque arte considerantur. Et per hunc modum considerantur circumstantiae actuum in doctrina morali.

Every accident is not accidentally in its subject; for some are proper accidents; and of these every art takes notice. And thus it is that the circumstances of actions are considered in the doctrine of morals.

In rebus naturalibus non invenitur tota plenitudo perfectionis quae debetur rei, ex forma substantiali, quae dat speciem; sed multum superadditur ex supervenientibus accidentibus, sicut in homine ex figura, ex colore, et huiusmodi; quorum si aliquod desit ad decentem habitudinem, consequitur malum.

In natural things, it is to be noted that the whole fullness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the mere substantial form, that gives it its species; since a thing derives much from supervening accidents, as man does from shape, color, and the like; and if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the result.

Ita etiam est in actione. Nam plenitudo bonitatis eius non tota consistit in sua specie, sed aliquid additur ex his quae adveniunt tanquam accidentia quaedam. Et huiusmodi sunt circumstantiae debitae.

So it is with action. For the plenitude of its goodness does not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain additions which accrue to it by reason of certain accidents: and such are its due circumstances.

1a 2ae q18 a2: Whether the good or evil of a man's action is derived from its object? Yes.

Sicut prima bonitas rei naturalis attenditur ex sua forma, quae dat speciem ei, ita et prima bonitas actus moralis attenditur ex obiecto convenienti, quia sicut res naturalis habet speciem ex sua forma, ita actio habet speciem ex obiecto, sicut et motus ex termino.

Just as the primary goodness of a natural thing is derived from its form, which gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral action is derived from the befitting object, because just as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has its species from its object, as movement from its term.

Bonum et malum actionis, sicut et ceterarum rerum, attenditur ex plenitudine essendi vel defectu ipsius. Primum autem quod ad plenitudinem essendi pertinere videtur, est id quod dat rei speciem.

The good or evil of an action, as of other things, depends on its fullness of subsisting or its lack of that fullness. Now the first thing that belongs to the fullness of subsisting seems to be that which gives a thing its species.

Ex hoc autem quod obiectum est aliquo modo effectus potentiae activae, sequitur quod sit terminus actionis eius, et per consequens quod det ei formam et speciem, motus enim habet speciem a terminis.

Now since the object is in some way the effect of the active power, it follows that it is the term of its action, and consequently that it gives it its form and species, since movement derives its species from its term.

Et quamvis etiam bonitas actionis non causetur ex bonitate effectus, tamen ex hoc dicitur actio bona, quod bonum effectum inducere potest. Et ita ipsa proportio actionis ad effectum, est ratio bonitatis ipsius.

Moreover, although the goodness of an action is not caused by the goodness of its effect, yet an action is said to be good from the fact that it can produce a good effect. Consequently the very proportion of an action to its effect is the formal aspect of its goodness.

1a 2ae q18 a1: Whether every human action is good? No.

Est aliqua actio hominis mala quia omnis actio, inquantum habet aliquid de esse, intantum habet de bonitate; inquantum vero deficit ei aliquid de plenitudine essendi quae debetur actioni humanae, intantum deficit a bonitate; et sic dicitur mala.

Some actions of man are evil because every action has goodness, insofar as it has be-ing; whereas it is lacking in goodness, insofar as it is lacking in something that is required by the fullness of subsisting that would befit human action; and thus it is said to be evil.

Malum agit in virtute boni deficientis. Si enim nihil esset ibi de bono, neque esset ens, neque agere posset. Si autem non esset deficiens, non esset malum. Unde et actio causata est quoddam bonum deficiens, quod secundum quid est bonum, simpliciter autem malum.

Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness. For it there were nothing of good there, there would be neither being nor possibility of action. On the other hand if good were not deficient, there would be no evil. Consequently the action done is a deficient good, which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil.

Nihil prohibet aliquid esse secundum quid in actu, unde agere possit; et secundum aliud privari actu, unde causet deficientem actionem. Sicut homo caecus actu habet virtutem gressivam, per quam ambulare potest, sed inquantum caret visu, qui dirigit in ambulando, patitur defectum in ambulando, dum ambulat cespitando.

Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a certain respect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect deficient in act, so as to cause a deficient act. Thus a blind man has in act the power of walking, whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch as he is deprived of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he walks.

Actio mala potest habere aliquem effectum per se, secundum id quod habet de bonitate et entitate. Sicut adulterium est causa generationis humanae, inquantum habet commixtionem maris et feminae, non autem inquantum caret ordine rationis.

An evil action can have a proper effect, according to the goodness and beingness that it has. Thus adultery is the cause of human generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and female, but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of the formal aspect [of the fullness of being and goodness].

De bono et malo in actionibus oportet loqui sicut de bono et malo in rebus: eo quod unaquaeque res talem actionem producit, qualis est ipsa. In rebus autem unumquodque tantum habet de bono, quantum habet de esse, bonum enim et ens convertuntur, ut in primo dictum est. Solus autem Deus habet totam plenitudinem sui esse secundum aliquid unum et simplex, unaquaeque vero res alia habet plenitudinem essendi sibi convenientem secundum diversa.

We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and evil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act that it produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has be-ing: since good and being are convertible, as was stated in the I, q5, aa1,3. But God alone has the whole plenitude of His Be-ing in a certain unity, and simply, whereas every other thing has the fullness of subsisting that would befit its essence in a certain multiplicity.

Unde in aliquibus contingit quod quantum ad aliquid habent esse, et tamen eis aliquid deficit ad plenitudinem essendi eis debitam. Sicut ad plenitudinem esse humani requiritur quod sit quoddam compositum ex anima et corpore, habens omnes potentias et instrumenta cognitionis et motus; unde si aliquid horum deficiat alicui homini deficit ei aliquid de plenitudine sui esse. Quantum igitur habet de esse, tantum habet de bonitate.

Wherefore it happens with some things, that they have be-ing in some respect, and yet they are lacking in the fullness of subsisting due to them. Thus the fullness of human be-ing requires a compound of soul and body, having all the powers and instruments of knowledge and movement; wherefore if any man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something due to the fullness of his be-ing. So that as much as he has of be-ing, so much has he of goodness.

1a 2ae q18: The good and evil of human acts, in general

1. Is every human action good, or are there evil actions?
2. Is the good or evil of a human action derived from its object?
3. Is it derived from a circumstance?
4. Is it derived from the end?
5. Is a human action good or evil in its species?
6. Does an action have the species of good or evil from its end?
7. Is the species derived from the end, contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?
8. Is any action indifferent in its species?
9. Can an individual action be indifferent?
10. Does a circumstance place a moral action in the species of good or evil?
11. Does every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, place the moral action in the species of good or evil?

1a 2ae q17 a9: Whether the acts of the external members are commanded? Yes.

Eo modo quo potentiae animae se habent ad hoc quod obediant rationi, hoc modo se habent etiam corporis membra, quia membra corporis sunt organa quaedam potentiarum animae.

In the same way that the powers of the soul stand in respect of obedience to formal aspect, so do the members of the body stand in respect thereof, because the members of the body are organs of the soul's powers.

Quia igitur vires sensitivae subduntur imperio rationis, non autem vires naturales; ideo omnes motus membrorum quae moventur a potentiis sensitivis, subduntur imperio rationis; motus autem membrorum qui consequuntur vires naturales, non subduntur imperio rationis.

Since then the sensitive powers are subject to the command of formal aspect, whereas the natural powers are not; therefore all movements of members, that are moved by the sensitive powers, are subject to the command of formal aspect; whereas those movements of members, that arise from the natural powers, are not subject to the command of formal aspect.

Augustinus dicit, VIII Confess., "imperat animus ut moveatur manus, et tanta est facilitas, ut vix a servitio discernatur imperium".

Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands a movement of the hand, and so ready is the hand to obey, that scarcely can one discern obedience from command."

Membra non movent seipsa, sed moventur per potentias animae; quarum quaedam sunt rationi viciniores quam vires animae vegetabilis.

The members do not move themselves, but are moved through the powers of the soul; of which powers, some are in closer contact with the formal aspect than are the powers of the vegetal soul.

Sicut Augustinus dicit in XIV de Civ. Dei, hoc quod motus genitalium membrorum rationi non obedit, est ex poena peccati, ut scilicet anima suae inobedientiae ad Deum in illo praecipue membro poenam inobedientiae patiatur, per quod peccatum originale ad posteros traducitur.

As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 17,20) it is in punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey formal aspect in this sense, that the soul is punished for its rebellion against God, by the insubmission of that member whereby original sin is transmitted to posterity.

Sed quia per peccatum primi parentis, ut infra dicetur, natura est sibi relicta, subtracto supernaturali dono quod homini divinitus erat collatum; ideo consideranda est ratio naturalis quare motus huiusmodi membrorum specialiter rationi non obedit.

But because, as we shall state later on, the effect of the sin of our first parent was that his nature was left to itself, through the withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God had bestowed on man, we must consider the natural aspect of this particular member's insubmission to formal aspect.

Cuius causam assignat Aristoteles in libro de causis motus animalium, dicens involuntarios esse motus cordis et membri pudendi, quia scilicet ex aliqua apprehensione huiusmodi membra commoventur: inquantum scilicet intellectus et phantasia repraesentant aliqua ex quibus consequuntur passiones animae, ad quas consequitur motus horum membrorum. Non tamen moventur secundum iussum rationis aut intellectus, quia scilicet ad motum horum membrorum requiritur aliqua alteratio naturalis (scilicet caliditatis et frigiditatis), quae quidem alteratio non subiacet imperio rationis.

This is stated by Aristotle (De Causis Mot. Animal.) who says that "the movements of the heart and of the organs of generation are involuntary," because these members are stirred at the occasion of some apprehension: insofar as the intellect and imagination represent such things as arouse the passions of the soul, of which passions the movements of these members are a consequence. But they are not moved at the command of formal aspect or intellect, because these movements are conditioned by a certain natural change (e.g., of heat and cold), which change is not subject to the command of formal aspect.

Specialiter autem hoc accidit in his duobus membris, quia utrumque istorum membrorum est quasi quoddam animal separatum, inquantum est principium vitae; principium autem est virtute totum. Cor enim principium est sensuum, et ex membro genitali virtus exit seminalis, quae est virtute totum animal. Et ideo habent proprios motus naturaliter: quia principia oportet esse naturalia.

This is the case with these two organs in particular, because each is as it were a separate animal being, insofar as it is a principle of life; and the principle is virtually the whole. For the heart is the principle of the senses; and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal virtue, which is virtually the entire animal. Consequently they have their proper movements naturally: because principles must needs be natural.

In his quae ad intellectum et voluntatem pertinent, primum invenitur id quod est secundum naturam, ex quo alia derivantur: ut a cognitione principiorum naturaliter notorum, cognitio conclusionum; et a voluntate finis naturaliter desiderati, derivatur electio eorum quae sunt ad finem. Ita etiam in corporalibus motibus principium est secundum naturam.

In things pertaining to intellect and will, that which is according to nature stands first, whence all other things are derived: thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally known, is derived knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition of the end naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means. So also in bodily movements the principle is according to nature.

1a 2ae q17 a8: Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded? No.

Actus vegetabilis animae non subduntur imperio rationis quia ratio imperat per modum apprehensivae virtutis.

The acts of the vegetal soul are not subject to the command of formal aspect because formal aspect commands by way of apprehensive power.

Et ideo actus illi qui procedunt ab appetitu intellectivo vel animali, possunt a ratione imperari, non autem actus illi qui procedunt ex appetitu naturali.

Wherefore those acts that proceed from the intellective or the animal appetite, can be commanded by formal aspect, but not those acts that proceed from the natural appetite.

Huiusmodi autem sunt actus vegetabilis animae; unde Gregorius Nyssenus dicit quod vocatur naturale quod generativum et nutritivum.

And such are the acts of the vegetal soul; wherefore Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says "that generation and nutrition belong to what are called natural powers."

Quanto aliquis actus est immaterialior, tanto est nobilior, et magis subditus imperio rationis. Unde ex hoc ipso quod vires animae vegetabilis non obediunt rationi, apparet has vires infimas esse.

The more immaterial an act is, the more noble it is, and the more is it subject to the command of formal aspect. Hence the very fact that the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey formal aspect, shows that these powers rank lowest.

Sicut Deus movet mundum, ita anima movet corpus. Non enim anima creavit corpus ex nihilo, sicut Deus mundum; propter quod totaliter subditur eius imperio.

As God moves the world, so the soul moves the body. But the soul did not create the body out of nothing, as God created the world; accordingly, the world is wholly subject to His command.

1a 2ae q17 a7: Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded? Yes.

Actus appetitus sensitivi subiacet imperio rationis quia apprehensio imaginationis, cum sit particularis, regulatur ab apprehensione rationis, quae est universalis, sicut virtus activa particularis a virtute activa universali.

The act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of formal aspect because the apprehension of the imagination, being a particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of formal aspect, which is universal; just as a particular active power is regulated by a universal active power.

Qualitas autem et dispositio corporis non subiacet imperio rationis. Et ideo ex hac parte, impeditur quin motus sensitivi appetitus totaliter subdatur imperio rationis.

On the other hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the command of formal aspect; and consequently in this respect, the movement of the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the command of formal aspect.

Contingit etiam quandoque quod motus appetitus sensitivi subito concitatur ad apprehensionem imaginationis vel sensus. Et tunc ille motus est praeter imperium rationis, quamvis potuisset impediri a ratione, si praevidisset. Unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod ratio praeest irascibili et concupiscibili non principatu despotico, qui est domini ad servum; sed principatu politico aut regali, qui est ad liberos, qui non totaliter subduntur imperio.

Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the imagination or of sense. And then such movement occurs without the command of formal aspect—although formal aspect could have prevented it, had it foreseen. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that formal aspect governs the irascible and concupiscible not by a "despotic supremacy," which is that of a master over his slave; but by a "politic and royal supremacy," whereby the free are governed, who are not wholly subject to command.

Hoc quod homo vult non concupiscere, et tamen concupiscit, contingit ex dispositione corporis, per quam impeditur appetitus sensitivus ne totaliter sequatur imperium rationis. Unde et apostolus ibidem subdit, video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae. Hoc etiam contingit propter subitum motum concupiscentiae, ut dictum est.

That man lusts, although he wills not to lust, is due to a disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive appetite is hindered from perfect compliance with the command of formal aspect. Hence the Apostle adds (Romans 7:15): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind." This may also happen through a sudden movement of concupiscence, as stated above.

1a 2ae q17 a6: Whether the act of the reason is commanded? Yes.

Actus rationis possunt esse imperati quia ratio supra seipsam reflectitur (sicut ordinat de actibus aliarum potentiarum, ita etiam potest ordinare de actu suo).

Formally aspectual acts can be commanded because aspectual apprehension is turned back on itself (just as it directs the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own act).

Ratio hoc modo imperat sibi ipsi, sicut et voluntas movet seipsam, ut supra dictum est, inquantum scilicet utraque potentia reflectitur supra suum actum, et ex uno in aliud tendit.

Aspectual apprehension commands itself, just as the will moves itself, as stated above (q9 a3), that is to say, insofar as each power is turned back on its own acts, and from one thing tends to another.

Sed attendendum est quod actus rationis potest considerari dupliciter.

But we must take note that a formally aspectual act may be considered in two ways.

Uno modo, quantum ad exercitium actus. Et sic actus rationis semper imperari potest (sicut cum indicitur alicui quod attendat, et ratione utatur).

(1) First, as to the exercise of the act. And considered thus, a formally aspectual act can always be commanded (as when one is told to be attentive, and to use one's reason).

Alio modo, quantum ad obiectum, respectu cuius, duo actus rationis attenduntur.

(2) Secondly, as to the object; in respect of which two formally aspectual acts have to be noticed.

Primo quidem, ut veritatem circa aliquid apprehendat. Et hoc non est in potestate nostra; hoc enim contingit per virtutem alicuius luminis, vel naturalis vel supernaturalis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc, actus rationis non est in potestate nostra, nec imperari potest.

(2a) One is the act whereby it apprehends the truth about something. This act is not in our power; because it happens in virtue of a natural or supernatural light. Consequently in this respect, the formally aspectual act is not in our power, and cannot be commanded.

Alius autem actus rationis est, dum his quae apprehendit assentit. Si igitur fuerint talia apprehensa, quibus naturaliter intellectus assentiat, sicut prima principia, assensus talium vel dissensus non est in potestate nostra; sed in ordine naturae, et ideo, proprie loquendo, nec imperio subiacet.

(2b) The other formally aspectual act is that whereby it assents to what it apprehends. If, therefore, that which the intellect apprehends is such that it naturally assents thereto, e.g., the first principles, it is not in our power to assent or dissent to the like; assent follows naturally, and consequently, properly speaking, is not subject to our command.

Sunt autem quaedam apprehensa, quae non adeo convincunt intellectum, quin possit assentire vel dissentire, vel saltem assensum vel dissensum suspendere, propter aliquam causam; et in talibus assensus ipse vel dissensus in potestate nostra est, et sub imperio cadit.

(1) But some things which are apprehended do not convince the intellect to such an extent as not to leave it free to assent or dissent, or at least suspend its assent or dissent, on account of some cause or other; and in such things assent or dissent is in our power, and is subject to our command.

1a 2ae q17 a5: Whether the act of the will is commanded? Yes.

Ratio potest ordinare de actu voluntatis, quia sicut potest iudicare quod bonum sit aliquid velle, ita potest ordinare imperando quod homo velit.

Formal aspect can direct the act of the will, because just as it can judge what good it is to will something, so it can direct, by commanding, what a man wills.

Imperium nihil aliud est quam actus rationis ordinantis, cum quadam motione, aliquid ad agendum.

Command is nothing else than the act of aspectual apprehension that directs, with a certain motion, something to be actualized.

Sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, animus, quando perfecte imperat sibi ut velit, tunc iam vult; sed quod aliquando imperet et non velit, hoc contingit ex hoc quod non perfecte imperat.

As Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9) when the mind commands itself perfectly to will, then already it wills; but that sometimes it commands and wills not, is due to the fact that it commands imperfectly.

Imperfectum autem imperium contingit ex hoc, quod ratio ex diversis partibus movetur ad imperandum vel non imperandum: unde fluctuat inter duo, et non perfecte imperat.

Now imperfect command arises from the fact that aspectual apprehension is moved by opposite motives to command or not to command: wherefore it fluctuates between the two, and fails to command perfectly.

Sicut in membris corporalibus quodlibet membrum operatur non sibi soli, sed toti corpori (ut oculus videt toti corpori), ita etiam est in potentiis animae. Nam intellectus intelligit non solum sibi, sed omnibus potentiis; et voluntas vult non solum sibi, sed omnibus potentiis. Et ideo homo imperat sibi ipsi actum voluntatis, inquantum est intelligens et volens.

Just as each of the members of the body works not for itself alone but for the whole body (thus it is for the whole body that the eye sees), so is it with the powers of the soul. For the intellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all the powers; and the will wills not only for itself, but for all the powers too. Wherefore man, insofar as he is endowed with intellect and will, commands the act of the will for himself.

Cum imperium sit actus rationis, ille actus imperatur, qui rationi subditur. Primus autem voluntatis actus non est ex rationis ordinatione, sed ex instinctu naturae, aut superioris causae, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non oportet quod in infinitum procedatur.

Since command is an act of aspectual apprehension, that act is commanded which is subject to formal aspect. Now the first act of the will is not due to the direction of formal aspect, but due to biological imperatives, or due to a higher cause, as stated above (q9 a4). Therefore there is no need to proceed to infinity.

1a 2ae q17 a4: Whether command and the commanded act are one act? Yes.

Imperium et actus imperatus sunt unus actus humanus (sicut quoddam totum est unum, sed est secundum partes multa), quia actus imperatus non est nisi propter imperium.

Command and the commanded act are one human act (just as a whole is one, yet in its parts, many), because there is no commanded act unless according to the command.

Si essent potentiae diversae ad invicem non ordinatae, actus earum essent simpliciter diversi. Sed quando una potentia est movens alteram, tunc actus earum sunt quodammodo unus; nam "idem est actus moventis et moti", ut dicitur in III Physic.

If the distinct powers are not ordained to one another, their acts are diverse simply. But when one power is the mover of the other, then their acts are, in a way, one; since "the act of the mover and the act of the thing moved are one act" (Phys. iii, 3).

In actibus humanis, actus inferioris potentiae materialiter se habet ad actum superioris, inquantum inferior potentia agit in virtute superioris moventis ipsam.

In human acts, the act of a lower power is in the position of matter in regard to the act of a higher power, insofar as the lower power acts in virtue of the higher power moving it.

Ens autem simpliciter est substantia, sed ens secundum quid est accidens (vel etiam ens rationis).

A substance is a being simply, whereas an accident (or even aspectual being) is a being only in a certain respect.

Esse unum genere vel specie, est esse unum secundum rationem.

To be one in genus or species is to be one according to the consideration of the aspect.

1a 2ae q17 a3: Whether use precedes command? No.

Imperium praecedit usum quia impetus ad operationem praecedit usum, sed impetus ad operationem fit per imperium.

Command precedes use because impulse to action precedes use, but impulse to operation is given by command.

Non omnis actus voluntatis praecedit hunc actum rationis qui est imperium, sed aliquis praecedit, scilicet electio; et aliquis sequitur, scilicet usus.

Not every act of the will precedes this act of formal aspect which is command; but an act of the will precedes, viz. choice; and an act of the will follows, viz. use.

Quia post determinationem consilii, quae est iudicium rationis, voluntas eligit; et post electionem, ratio imperat ei per quod agendum est quod eligitur; et tunc demum voluntas alicuius incipit uti, exequendo imperium rationis (quandoque quidem voluntas alterius, cum aliquis imperat alteri; quandoque autem voluntas ipsius imperantis, cum aliquis imperat sibi ipsi).

Because after counsel's decision, which is a judgment of formal aspect, the will chooses; and after choice, aspectual apprehension commands that power which has to do what was chosen; and then, last of all, someone's will begins to use, by executing the command of formal aspect (sometimes it is another's will, when one commands another; sometimes the will of the one that commands, when he commands himself to do something).

Usus eius quod est ad finem, secundum quod est in ratione referente ipsum in finem, praecedit electionem, ut supra dictum est. Unde multo magis praecedit imperium.

Use of that which is directed to the end, insofar as it is in the formal aspect referring this to the end, precedes choice, as stated above (I-II q16 a4). Wherefore still more does it precede command.

Sed usus eius quod est ad finem, secundum quod subditur potentiae executivae, sequitur imperium, eo quod usus utentis coniunctus est cum actu eius quo quis utitur; non enim utitur aliquis baculo, antequam aliquo modo per baculum operetur.

On the other hand, use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as it is subject to the executive power, follows command; because use in the user is united to the act of the thing used; for one does not use a stick before doing something with the stick.

Imperium autem non est simul cum actu eius cui imperatur, sed naturaliter prius est imperium quam imperio obediatur, et aliquando etiam est prius tempore.

But command is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to which the command is given, for it naturally precedes its fulfilment, sometimes, indeed, by priority of time.

1a 2ae q17 a2: Whether command belongs to irrational animals? No.

Impossibile est quod in brutis animalibus, sit aliquo modo imperium, quia in quibus non est ratio; sed ordinare est proprius actus rationis.

It is impossible that brute animals should command in any way, because they are devoid of formal aspect; but to direct is the proper act of aspectual apprehension.

Aliter invenitur impetus ad opus in brutis animalibus, et aliter in hominibus. Homines enim faciunt impetum ad opus per ordinationem rationis, unde habet in eis impetus rationem imperii.

Impulse to action is in brute animals otherwise than in man. For the impulse of man to action arises from the direction of formal aspect; wherefore his impulse has the formal aspect of command.

In brutis autem fit impetus ad opus per instinctum naturae, quia scilicet appetitus eorum statim apprehenso convenienti vel inconvenienti, naturaliter movetur ad prosecutionem vel fugam. Unde ordinantur ab alio ad agendum, non autem ipsa seipsa ordinant ad actionem. Et ideo in eis est impetus, sed non imperium.

On the other hand, the impulse of the brute animal arises from anatomical imperatives; because as soon as they apprehend the fitting or the unfitting, their appetite is moved naturally to pursue (+) or to avoid (-). Wherefore they are directed by another to act; and they themselves do not direct themselves to act. Consequently in them is impulse but not command.

In brutis animalibus corpus quidem habet unde obediat, sed anima non habet unde imperet, quia non habet unde ordinet. Et ideo non est ibi ratio imperantis et imperati; sed solum moventis et moti.

The body of the brute animal is competent to obey; but its soul is not competent to command, because it is not competent to direct. Consequently there is no formal aspect there of commander and commanded; but only of mover and moved.

1a 2ae q17 a1: Whether command is an act of the reason? Yes.

Imperare est actus rationis, praesupposito tamen actu voluntatis, quia radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subiectum; sed sicut causa, est ratio.

Command is an act of aspectual apprehension, presupposing, however, an act of the will because the root of liberty is the will, as the subject thereof; but formal aspect is as its cause.

Ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere diversas conceptiones boni. Et ideo philosophi definiunt liberum arbitrium quod est liberum de ratione iudicium, quasi ratio sit causa libertatis.

For the will can tend freely towards various objects, precisely because aspectual apprehension can have various conceptions of the good. Hence philosophers define free choice as that which is "a free judgment, arising from formal aspect" implying that aspectual apprehension is the cause of liberty.

Hoc ipsum quod ratio movet imperando, sit ei ex virtute voluntatis.

The very fact that formal aspect moves by commanding, is due to the power of the will.

Unde relinquitur quod imperare sit actus rationis, praesupposito actu voluntatis, in cuius virtute ratio movet per imperium ad exercitium actus.

Consequently it follows that command is an act of aspectual apprehension, presupposing an act of the will, in the power of which formal aspect, by its command, moves to the execution of the act.

1a 2ae q17: The acts commanded by the will

1. Is command an act of the will or of the reason?
2. Does command belong to irrational animals?
3. The order between command and use
4. Are command and the commanded act one act or distinct?
5. Is the act of the will commanded?
6. Is the act of the reason commanded?
7. Is the act of the sensitive appetite commanded?
8. Is the act of the vegetal soul commanded?
9. Are the acts of the external members commanded?

1a 2ae q16 a4: Whether use precedes choice? No.

Usus sequitur electionem, si tamen accipiatur usus, secundum quod voluntas utitur executiva potentia movendo ipsam, quia ipsam executionem operis praecedit motio qua voluntas movet ad exequendum, sequitur autem electionem; et sic, cum usus pertineat ad praedictam motionem voluntatis, medium est inter electionem et executionem.

Use follows choice, provided that by use we mean the will's use of the executive power in moving it, because the motion of the will to the execution of the work precedes execution, but follows choice; and so, since use belongs to that very motion of the will, it stands between choice and execution.

Sed quia voluntas etiam quodammodo rationem movet, et utitur ea, potest intelligi usus eius quod est ad finem, secundum quod est in consideratione rationis referentis ipsum in finem. Et hoc modo usus praecedit electionem.

But since the will, in a way, also moves aspectual apprehension, and uses it, we may take the use of the means, as consisting in the consideration of the formal aspect whereby it refers the means to the end. In this sense use precedes choice.

1a 2ae q16 a3: Whether use regards also the last end? No.

Ultimo fine non est utendum quia uti importat applicationem alicuius ad aliquid; quod autem applicatur ad aliud, se habet in ratione eius quod est ad finem, et ideo uti semper est eius quod est ad finem.

We cannot use the last end because use implies the application of one thing to another; and that which is applied to another has its formal aspect as a means to an end, and consequently use always regards the means.

Finis assumitur in facultatem voluntatis, ut voluntas in illo quiescat. Unde ipsa requies in fine, quae fruitio est, dicitur hoc modo usus finis. Sed id quod est ad finem, assumitur in facultatem voluntatis, non solum in ordine ad usum eius quod est ad finem, sed in ordine ad aliam rem, in qua voluntas quiescit.

The end is applied to the purpose of the will, that the will may find rest in it. Consequently this rest in the end, which is the enjoyment thereof, is in this sense called use of the end. But the means are applied to the will's purpose, not only in being related for use as means, but as ordained to something else in which the will finds rest.

Dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., "Deo nullus recte utitur, sed fruitur".

Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "No one rightly uses God, but one enjoys Him."

1a 2ae q16 a2: Whether use is to be found in irrational animals? No.

Solum animal rationale et consentit et utitur, quia applicare aliquid ad alterum non est nisi eius quod habet arbitrium super illud, quod non est nisi eius qui scit referre aliquid in alterum, quod ad rationem pertinet.

None but a relationally aspectual animal consents and uses, because only he who has choice of a thing can apply something to something else, and this belongs only to him who knows how to refer something to something else, which pertains to aspectual apprehension.

Frui importat absolutum motum appetitus in appetibile, sed uti importat motum appetitus ad aliquid in ordine ad alterum. Si ergo comparentur uti et frui quantum ad obiecta, sic frui est nobilius quam uti, quia id quod est absolute appetibile, est melius quam id quod est appetibile solum in ordine ad aliud.

To enjoy implies the absolute movement of the appetite to the appetible, whereas to use implies a movement of the appetite to something as directed to something else. If therefore we compare use and enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment is better than use, because that which is appetible absolutely is better than that which is appetible only as directed to something else.

Sed si comparentur quantum ad vim apprehensivam praecedentem, maior nobilitas requiritur ex parte usus, quia ordinare aliquid in alterum est rationis, absolute autem aliquid apprehendere potest etiam sensus.

But if we compare them in respect of the apprehensive power that precedes them, greater excellence is required on the part of use, because to direct one thing to another is an apprehension of formal aspect, whereas to apprehend something absolutely is within the competency even of sense.

Animalia per sua membra aliquid agunt instinctu naturae, non per hoc quod cognoscant ordinem membrorum ad illas operationes. Unde non dicuntur proprie applicare membra ad agendum, nec uti membris.

Animals by means of their body parts do something from the anatomical imperatives of their biological heritage, not through knowing the relation of their body parts to these operations. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not apply their body parts to what must be enacted, nor do they use them.

Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., "uti aliqua re non potest nisi animal quod rationis est particeps".

Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "None but the animal who shares in aspectual apprehension can make use of a thing."

1a 2ae q16 a1: Whether use is an act of the will? Yes.

Uti proprie est actus voluntatis, quia voluntas est quae movet potentias animae ad suos actus, et hoc est applicare eas ad operationem.

Use is, properly speaking, an act of the will, because it is the will which moves the soul's powers to their acts, and this is to apply them to operation.

Ratio quidem in aliud refert, sed voluntas tendit in id quod est in aliud relatum per rationem. Et secundum hoc dicitur quod uti est referre aliquid in alterum.

Reason does indeed refer one thing to another, but the will tends to that which is referred by the reason to something else. And in this sense to use is to refer one thing to another.

Uti primo et principaliter est voluntatis, tanquam primi moventis; rationis autem tanquam dirigentis; sed aliarum potentiarum tanquam exequentium, quae comparantur ad voluntatem, a qua applicantur ad agendum, sicut instrumenta ad principale agens.

First and principally, use belongs to the will as first mover; to the reason, as directing; and to the other powers as executing the operation, which powers are compared to the will which applies them to act, as the instruments are compared to the principal agent.

Actio autem proprie non attribuitur instrumento, sed principali agenti, sicut aedificatio aedificatori, non autem instrumentis.

Now action is properly ascribed, not to the instrument, but to the principal agent, as building is ascribed to the builder, not to his tools.

Etiam ipsa ratio speculativa applicatur ad opus intelligendi vel iudicandi, a voluntate. Et ideo intellectus speculativus uti dicitur tanquam a voluntate motus, sicut aliae executivae potentiae.

Even the speculative reason is applied by the will to the act of understanding or judging. Consequently the speculative reason is said to use, insofar as it is moved by the will, in the same way as the other executing powers.

1a 2ae q16: Use, which is an act of the will in regard to the means

1. Is use an act of the will?
2. Is it to be found in irrational animals?
3. Does it regard the means only, or the end also?
4. The relation of use to choice

1a 2ae q15 a4: Whether consent to the act belongs only to the higher part of the soul? Yes.

Ratio superior dicitur consentire, non solum quia secundum rationes aeternas semper moveat ad agendum, sed etiam quia secundum rationes aeternas non dissentit.

The higher mode of aspectual apprehension is said to consent not only because it always moves to act according to eternal aspectual principles, but also because it fails to dissent according to eternal aspectual principles.

Manifestum est autem quod superior ratio est quae habet de omnibus iudicare, quia de sensibilibus per rationem iudicamus; de his vero quae ad rationes humanas pertinent, iudicamus secundum rationes divinas, quae pertinent ad rationem superiorem.

Now it is evident that it belongs to the higher mode of aspectual apprehension to judge of all, since it is by the aspectual principle that we judge of sensible things; and of things pertaining to human aspectual principles we judge according to Divine aspectual principles, which is the function of the higher aspectual apprehension.

Et ideo quandiu incertum est an secundum rationes divinas resistatur vel non, nullum iudicium rationis habet rationem finalis sententiae.

Wherefore as long as a man is uncertain whether he resists or not, according to Divine aspectual principles, no judgment of aspect can be considered to have the formal aspect of a final decision.

Finalis autem sententia de agendis est consensus in actum. Et ideo consensus in actum pertinet ad rationem superiorem, secundum tamen quod in ratione voluntas includitur.

Now the final decision of what is to be done is consent to the act. Therefore consent to the act belongs to the higher mode of aspectual apprehension, but in that sense in which aspectual apprehension includes the will.

Consensus in delectationem operis pertinet ad superiorem rationem, sicut et consensus in opus, sed consensus in delectationem cogitationis, pertinet ad rationem inferiorem, sicut ad ipsam pertinet cogitare.

Consent to delight in the work done belongs to the higher mode of aspectual apprehension, as also does consent to the work; but consent to delight in thought belongs to the lower mode of aspectual apprehension, just as to the lower aspect it belongs to think.

Et tamen de hoc ipso quod est cogitare vel non cogitare, inquantum consideratur ut actio quaedam, habet iudicium superior ratio, et similiter de delectatione consequente.

Nevertheless the higher mode of aspectual apprehension exercises judgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an action, and in like manner on the delight that results.

Sed inquantum accipitur ut ad actionem aliam ordinatum, sic pertinet ad inferiorem rationem.

But in so far as the act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further act, it belongs to the lower mode of aspectual apprehension.

Quod enim ad aliud ordinatur, ad inferiorem artem vel potentiam pertinet quam finis ad quem ordinatur; unde ars quae est de fine, architectonica (seu principalis) vocatur.

For that which is ordained to something else, belongs to a lower art or power than does the end to which it is ordained; hence the art which is concerned with the end is called the architectonic (or principal) art.

1a 2ae q15 a3: Whether consent is directed to the end? No.

Applicatio appetitivi motus ad determinationem consilii, proprie est consensus, quia appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem, praesupponit determinationem consilii.

The application of the appetitive movement to counsel's decision is consent properly speaking, because the desire of the means presupposes the decision of counsel.

Sicut conclusiones scimus per principia, horum tamen non est scientia, sed quod maius est, scilicet intellectus; ita consentimus his quae sunt ad finem propter finem, cuius tamen non est consensus, sed quod maius est, scilicet voluntas.

Just as the knowledge of conclusions through the principles is science, whereas the knowledge of the principles is not science, but something higher, namely, understanding; so do we consent to the means on account of the end, in respect of which our act is not consent but something greater, namely, volition.

Consensus nominat applicationem appetitivi motus ad aliquid praeexistens in potestate applicantis in ordine autem agibilium.

Consent is the application of the appetitive movement to something that is already in the power of him who causes the application.

Primo quidem oportet sumere apprehensionem finis; deinde appetitum finis; deinde consilium de his quae sunt ad finem; deinde appetitum eorum quae sunt ad finem.

Now the order of action is this: First there is the apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel about the means; then the desire of the means.

Unde, cum consilium non sit nisi de his quae sunt ad finem, consensus, proprie loquendo, non est nisi de his quae sunt ad finem.

Consequently, since counsel is only about the means, consent, properly speaking, is of nothing else but the means.

Electio addit supra consensum quandam relationem respectu eius cui aliquid praeeligitur, et ideo post consensum, adhuc remanet electio. Potest enim contingere quod per consilium inveniantur plura ducentia ad finem, quorum dum quodlibet placet, in quodlibet eorum consentitur, sed ex multis quae placent, praeaccipimus unum eligendo.

Choice includes something that consent has not, namely, a certain relation to something to which something else is preferred: and therefore after consent there still remains a choice. For it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have been found conducive to the end, and through each of these meeting with approval, consent has been given to each: but after approving of many, we have given our preference to one by choosing it.

Sed si inveniatur unum solum quod placeat, non differunt re consensus et electio, sed ratione tantum, ut consensus dicatur secundum quod placet ad agendum; electio autem, secundum quod praefertur his quae non placent.

But if only one meets with approval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only in our way of looking at them; so that we call it consent, according as we approve of doing that thing; but choice according as we prefer it to those that do not meet with our approval.

1a 2ae q15 a2: Whether consent is to be found in irrational animals? No.

Consensus, proprie loquendo, non est in brutis animalibus, quia proprie dicitur consentire solum rationalis natura, quae habet in potestate sua appetitivum motum, et potest ipsum applicare vel non applicare ad hoc vel ad illud.

Consent, properly speaking, is not in irrational animals, because this is proper to the rational nature, which has the command of the appetitive movement, and is able to apply or not to apply it to this or that thing.

In brutis animalibus invenitur determinatio appetitus ad aliquid passive tantum. Consensus vero importat determinationem appetitus non solum passivam, sed magis activam.

In irrational animals the determination of the appetite to a particular thing is merely passive, whereas consent implies a determination of the appetite, which is active rather than merely passive.

1a 2ae q15 a1: Whether consent is an act of the appetitive power? Yes.

Consentire est actus appetitivae virtutis quia consentire importat applicationem sensus ad aliquid.

Consent is an act of the appetitive power because consent implies application of sense to something.

Sentire proprie dictum ad apprehensivam potentiam pertinet, sed secundum similitudinem cuiusdam experientiae, pertinet ad appetitivam.

Sense, properly speaking, belongs to the apprehensive faculty; but by way of similitude, insofar as it implies seeking acquaintance, it belongs to the appetitive power.

Quia actus appetitivae virtutis est quaedam inclinatio ad rem ipsam, secundum quandam similitudinem ipsa applicatio appetitivae virtutis ad rem, secundum quod ei inhaeret, accipit nomen sensus, quasi experientiam quandam sumens de re cui inhaeret, inquantum complacet sibi in ea.

Since the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing itself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, insofar as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude, the name of sense, since, as it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing to which it cleaves, insofar as it takes complacency in it.

1a 2ae q15: Consent, which is an act of the will in regard to the means

1. Is consent an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power?
2. Is it to be found in irrational animals?
3. Is it directed to the end or to the means?
4. Does consent to an act belong to the higher part of the soul only?