Consentire est actus appetitivae virtutis quia consentire importat applicationem sensus ad aliquid.
Consent is an act of the appetitive power because consent implies application of sense to something.
Sentire proprie dictum ad apprehensivam potentiam pertinet, sed secundum similitudinem cuiusdam experientiae, pertinet ad appetitivam.
Sense, properly speaking, belongs to the apprehensive faculty; but by way of similitude, insofar as it implies seeking acquaintance, it belongs to the appetitive power.
Quia actus appetitivae virtutis est quaedam inclinatio ad rem ipsam, secundum quandam similitudinem ipsa applicatio appetitivae virtutis ad rem, secundum quod ei inhaeret, accipit nomen sensus, quasi experientiam quandam sumens de re cui inhaeret, inquantum complacet sibi in ea.
Since the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing itself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, insofar as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude, the name of sense, since, as it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing to which it cleaves, insofar as it takes complacency in it.