Q76 A6: Whether the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions?

No. It is impossible for any accidental disposition to come between the body and the soul, or between any substantial form whatever and its matter because since matter is in potentiality to all manner of acts in a certain order, what is absolutely first among the acts must be understood as being first in matter.

Impossibile est quod aliqua dispositio accidentalis cadat media inter corpus et animam, vel inter quamcumque formam substantialem et materiam suam. Et huius ratio est quia, cum materia sit in potentia ad omnes actus ordine quodam, oportet quod id quod est primum simpliciter in actibus, primo in materia intelligatur.

Now the first among all acts is existence. Therefore, it is impossible for matter to be apprehended as hot, or as having quantity, before it is actual.

Primum autem inter omnes actus est esse. Impossibile est ergo intelligere materiam prius esse calidam vel quantam, quam esse in actu.

But matter has actual existence by the substantial form, which makes it to exist absolutely, as we have said above (Q76 A4). Wherefore it is impossible for any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter before the substantial form, and consequently before the soul.

Esse autem in actu habet per formam substantialem, quae facit esse simpliciter, ut iam dictum est. Unde impossibile est quod quaecumque dispositiones accidentales praeexistant in materia ante formam substantialem; et per consequens neque ante animam.

A spiritual substance which is united to a body as its motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. But the intellectual soul is united by its very being to the body as a form; and yet it guides and moves the body by its power and virtue.

Substantia spiritualis quae unitur corpori solum ut motor, unitur ei per potentiam vel virtutem. Sed anima intellectiva corpori unitur ut forma per suum esse. Administrat tamen ipsum et movet per suam potentiam et virtutem.

As appears from what has been already said (Q76 A4), the more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms; therefore while remaining one and the same, it perfects matter according to the various degrees of perfection. For the same essential form makes man an actual being, a body, a living being, an animal, and a man.

Sicut ex praedictis patet, forma perfectior virtute continet quidquid est inferiorum formarum. Et ideo una et eadem existens, perficit materiam secundum diversos perfectionis gradus. Una enim et eadem forma est per essentiam, per quam homo est ens actu, et per quam est corpus, et per quam est vivum, et per quam est animal, et per quam est homo.

Now it is clear that to every "genus" follow its own proper accidents. Therefore as matter is apprehended as perfected in its existence (before it is understood as corporeal, and so on), so those accidents which belong to existence are understood to exist before corporeity. And thus dispositions are understood in matter before the form, not as regards all its effects, but as regards the subsequent effect.

Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque genus consequuntur propria accidentia. Sicut ergo materia praeintelligitur perfecta secundum esse (ante intellectum corporeitatis, et sic de aliis), ita praeintelliguntur accidentia quae sunt propria entis, ante corporeitatem. Et sic praeintelliguntur dispositiones in materia ante formam, non quantum ad omnem eius effectum, sed quantum ad posteriorem.

Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the corporeity which belongs to the whole matter. Wherefore matter, once understood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as distinct in its various parts, and as receptive of different forms according to the further degrees of perfection.

Dimensiones quantitativae sunt accidentia consequentia corporeitatem, quae toti materiae convenit. Unde materia iam intellecta sub corporeitate et dimensionibus, potest intelligi ut distincta in diversas partes, ut sic accipiat diversas formas secundum ulteriores perfectionis gradus.

For although it is essentially the same form which gives matter the various degrees of perfection, as we have said (RO1), yet it is considered as different when brought under the observation of reason.

Quamvis enim eadem forma sit secundum essentiam quae diversos perfectionis gradus materiae attribuit, ut dictum est; tamen secundum considerationem rationis differt.

Accident is posterior to substance, both in the order of time and in the order of reason, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 1).

Accidens est posterius substantia et tempore et ratione, ut dicitur in VII Metaphys.

Q76 A5: Whether the intellectual soul is properly united to such a body?

Yes. It behooved the intellectual soul to be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense because the action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument.

Oportuit animam intellectivam tali corpori uniri, quod possit esse conveniens organum sensus quia actio sensus non fit sine corporeo instrumento.

Now the intellectual soul, as we have seen above (Q55, A2) in the order of nature, holds the lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels are; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the senses, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii).

Anima autem intellectiva, sicut supra habitum est, secundum naturae ordinem, infimum gradum in substantiis intellectualibus tenet; intantum quod non habet naturaliter sibi inditam notitiam veritatis, sicut Angeli, sed oportet quod eam colligat ex rebus divisibilibus per viam sensus, ut Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom.

But nature never fails in necessary things; therefore the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power of understanding, but also with the power of feeling.

Natura autem nulli deest in necessariis; unde oportuit quod anima intellectiva non solum haberet virtutem intelligendi, sed etiam virtutem sentiendi.

A body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by reason of its intellectual operation considered as such; but on account of the sensitive power, which requires an organ of equable temperament. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to such a body, and not to a simple element, or to a mixed body, in which fire was in excess; because otherwise there could not be an equability of temperament. And this body of an equable temperament has a dignity of its own by reason of its being remote from contraries, thereby resembling in a way a heavenly body.

Animae intellectivae non debetur corpus propter ipsam intellectualem operationem secundum se; sed propter sensitivam virtutem, quae requirit organum aequaliter complexionatum. Et ideo oportuit animam intellectivam tali corpori uniri, et non simplici elemento, vel corpori mixto in quo excederet ignis secundum quantitatem, quia non posset esse aequalitas complexionis, propter excedentem ignis activam virtutem. Habet autem hoc corpus aequaliter complexionatum quandam dignitatem, per hoc quod est remotum a contrariis; in quo quodammodo assimilatur corpori caelesti.

Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. Therefore the more the organ of touch is reduced to an equable complexion, the more sensitive will be the touch.

Omnes autem alii sensus fundantur supra tactum. ... Unde quanto organum tactus fuerit magis reductum ad aequalitatem complexionis, tanto perceptibilior erit tactus.

Therefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be a mixed body, above others reduced to the most equable complexion.

Unde oportuit corpus cui unitur anima intellectiva, esse corpus mixtum, inter omnia alia magis reductum ad aequalitatem complexionis.

The intellectual soul as comprehending universals, has a power extending to the infinite; therefore it cannot be limited by nature to certain fixed natural notions, or even to certain fixed means whether of defence or of clothing, as is the case with other animals, the souls of which are endowed with knowledge and power in regard to fixed particular things.

Anima intellectiva, quia est universalium comprehensiva, habet virtutem ad infinita. Et ideo non potuerunt sibi determinari a natura vel determinatae existimationes naturales, vel etiam determinata auxilia vel defensionum vel tegumentorum, sicut aliis animalibus, quorum animae habent apprehensionem et virtutem ad aliqua particularia determinata.

Instead of all these, man has by nature his reason and his hands, which are "the organs of organs" (De Anima iii), since by their means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety, and for any number of purposes.

Sed loco horum omnium, homo habet naturaliter rationem, et manus, quae sunt "organa organorum", quia per eas homo potest sibi praeparare instrumenta infinitorum modorum, et ad infinitos effectus.

Before sin the human body was immortal not by nature, but by a gift of Divine grace; otherwise its immortality would not be forfeited through sin, as neither was the immortality of the devil.

Corpus hominis ante peccatum immortale fuit non per naturam, sed per gratiae divinae donum; alioquin immortalitas eius per peccatum sublata non esset, sicut nec immortalitas Daemonis.

So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable complexion, which, however, is corruptible by force of its matter. If, however, it be said that God could avoid this [necessity], we answer that in the formation of natural things we do not consider what God might do; but what is suitable to the nature of things, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 1). God, however, provided in this case by applying a remedy against death in the gift of grace.

Sic igitur et animae intellectivae debetur corpus quod sit aequalis complexionis, ex hoc autem de necessitate materiae sequitur quod sit corruptibile. Si quis vero dicat quod Deus potuit hanc necessitatem vitare, dicendum est quod in constitutione rerum naturalium non consideratur quid Deus facere possit, sed quid naturae rerum conveniat, ut Augustinus dicit, II super Gen. ad Litt. Providit tamen Deus adhibendo remedium contra mortem per gratiae donum.

Q76 A4: Whether in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul?

No. It is impossible for there to be in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul because of one thing there is but one substantial being. But the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one thing there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form of man.

Impossibile est quod in homine sit aliqua alia forma substantialis quam anima intellectiva quia unius rei est unum esse substantiale. Sed forma substantialis dat esse substantiale. Ergo unius rei est una tantum forma substantialis. Anima autem est forma substantialis hominis.

The substantial being of each thing consists in something indivisible, and every addition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as stated in Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3); and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form to receive "more" or "less." Nor is it less impossible for anything to be a medium between substance and accident.

Nam esse substantiale cuiuslibet rei in indivisibili consistit; et omnis additio et subtractio variat speciem, sicut in numeris, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. Unde impossibile est quod forma substantialis quaecumque recipiat magis et minus. Nec minus est impossibile aliquid esse medium inter substantiam et accidens.

Therefore we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 10), that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, not actually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the elements remain, though modified; and in them is the power of the elementary forms. This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the substantial form of the mixed body; for instance, the form of a stone, or of any sort of soul.

Et ideo dicendum est, secundum philosophum in I de Generat., quod formae elementorum manent in mixto non actu, sed virtute. Manent enim qualitates propriae elementorum, licet remissae, in quibus est virtus formarum elementarium. Et huiusmodi qualitas mixtionis est propria dispositio ad formam substantialem corporis mixti; puta formam lapidis, vel animae cuiuscumque.

We observe in matter various degrees of perfection, as existence, living, sensing, and understanding. Now what is added is always more perfect. Therefore that form which gives matter only the first degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while that form which gives the first, second, and third degree, and so on, is the most perfect: and yet it inheres to matter immediately.

In materia considerantur diversi gradus perfectionis, sicut esse, vivere, sentire et intelligere. Semper autem secundum superveniens priori, perfectius est. Forma ergo quae dat solum primum gradum perfectionis materiae, est imperfectissima, sed forma quae dat primum et secundum, et tertium, et sic deinceps, est perfectissima; et tamen materiae immediata.

Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in man besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants, and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect.

Unde dicendum est quod nulla alia forma substantialis est in homine, nisi sola anima intellectiva; et quod ipsa, sicut virtute continet animam sensitivam et nutritivam, ita virtute continet omnes inferiores formas, et facit ipsa sola quidquid imperfectiores formae in aliis faciunt. Et similiter est dicendum de anima sensitiva in brutis, et de nutritiva in plantis, et universaliter de omnibus formis perfectioribus respectu imperfectiorum.

The soul does not move the body by its essence, as the form of the body, but by the motive power, the act of which presupposes the body to be already actualized by the soul: so that the soul by its motive power is the part which moves; and the animate body is the part moved.

Anima non movet corpus per esse suum, secundum quod unitur corpori ut forma; sed per potentiam motivam, cuius actus praesupponit iam corpus effectum in actu per animam; ut sic anima secundum vim motivam sit pars movens, et corpus animatum sit pars mota.

Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of a body only, but "the act of a physical organic body which has life potentially"; and that this potentiality "does not reject the soul." Whence it is clear that in that of which the soul is called the act, the soul itself is included.

Aristoteles non dicit animam esse actum corporis tantum, sed "actum corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis," et quod talis potentia "non abiicit animam." Unde manifestum est quod in eo cuius anima dicitur actus, etiam anima includitur.

The soul is said to be the "act of a body," etc., because by the soul it is a body, and is organic, and has life potentially. Yet the first act is said to be in potentiality to the second act, which is operation; for such a potentiality "does not reject"--that is, does not exclude--the soul.

Et similiter dicitur quod anima est "actus corporis" etc., quia per animam et est corpus, et est organicum, et est potentia vitam habens. Sed actus primus dicitur in potentia respectu actus secundi, qui est operatio. Talis enim potentia "est non abiiciens," idest non excludens, animam.

In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental form does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be "such."

Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod forma substantialis in hoc a forma accidentali differt quia forma accidentalis non dat esse simpliciter, sed esse tale.

Therefore by the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a thing is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively.

Et ideo cum advenit forma accidentalis, non dicitur aliquid fieri vel generari simpliciter, sed fieri tale aut aliquo modo se habens, et similiter cum recedit forma accidentalis, non dicitur aliquid corrumpi simpliciter, sed secundum quid.

Now the substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming a thing is said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted simply.

Forma autem substantialis dat esse simpliciter, et ideo per eius adventum dicitur aliquid simpliciter generari, et per eius recessum simpliciter corrumpi.

For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who held that primary matter was some actual being -- for instance, fire or air, or something of that sort -- maintained that nothing is generated simply, or corrupted simply; and stated that "every becoming is nothing but an alteration," as we read, Phys. i, 4.

Et propter hoc antiqui naturales, qui posuerunt materiam primam esse aliquod ens actu -- puta ignem aut aerem aut aliquid huiusmodi -- dixerunt quod nihil generatur aut corrumpitur simpliciter, sed "omne fieri statuerunt alterari," ut dicitur in I Physic.

Therefore, if besides the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form by which the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would follow that the soul does not give being simply; and consequently that it is not the substantial form.

Si igitur ita esset, quod praeter animam intellectivam praeexisteret quaecumque alia forma substantialis in materia, per quam subiectum animae esset ens actu; sequeretur quod anima non daret esse simpliciter; et per consequens quod non esset forma substantialis.

If, however, the intellectual soul be united to the body as its substantial form, as we have said above (Q76, A1), it is impossible for another substantial form besides the intellectual soul to be found in man.

Sed si anima intellectiva unitur corpori ut forma substantialis, sicut supra iam diximus, impossibile est quod aliqua alia forma substantialis praeter eam inveniatur in homine.

Q76 A3: Whether besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another?

No. It is one and the same soul in man, that both gives life to the body by being united to it, and orders itself by its own reasoning because the intellectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive souls of plants.

Dicimus unam et eandem esse animam in homine, quae et corpus sua societate vivificat, et semetipsam sua ratione disponit quia anima intellectiva continet in sua virtute quidquid habet anima sensitiva brutorum, et nutritiva plantarum.

We must not consider the diversity of natural things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions, which flow from our manner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one and the same thing in various ways. Therefore since, as we have said, the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to the sensitive soul, and something more, reason can consider separately what belongs to the power of the sensitive soul, as something imperfect and material. And because it observes that this is something common to man and to other animals, it forms thence the notion of the "genus"; while that wherein the intellectual soul exceeds the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting; thence it gathers the "difference" of man.

Non oportet secundum diversas rationes vel intentiones logicas, quae consequuntur modum intelligendi, diversitatem in rebus naturalibus accipere, quia ratio unum et idem secundum diversos modos apprehendere potest. Quia igitur, ut dictum est, anima intellectiva virtute continet id quod sensitiva habet, et adhuc amplius; potest seorsum ratio considerare quod pertinet ad virtutem sensitivae, quasi quoddam imperfectum et materiale. Et quia hoc invenit commune homini et aliis animalibus, ex hoc rationem generis format. Id vero in quo anima intellectiva sensitiva excedit, accipit quasi formale et completivum, et ex eo format differentiam hominis.

We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul. This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of species and forms. For we observe that the species and forms of things differ from one another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in the order of things, the animate are more perfect than the inanimate, and animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute animals; and in each of these genera there are various degrees.

Sic ergo dicendum quod eadem numero est anima in homine sensitiva et intellectiva et nutritiva. Quomodo autem hoc contingat, de facili considerari potest, si quis differentias specierum et formarum attendat. Inveniuntur enim rerum species et formae differre ab invicem secundum perfectius et minus perfectum, sicut in rerum ordine animata perfectiora sunt inanimatis, et animalia plantis, et homines animalibus brutis, et in singulis horum generum sunt gradus diversi.

For this reason Aristotle, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3), compares the species of things to numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of unity. And (De Anima ii, 3) he compares the various souls to the species of figures, one of which contains another; as a pentagon contains and exceeds a tetragon. Therefore, as a surface which is of a pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by another--since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained in the pentagonal--so neither is Socrates a man by one soul, and animal by another; but by one and the same soul he is both animal and man.

Et ideo Aristoteles, in VIII Metaphys., assimilat species rerum numeris, qui differunt specie secundum additionem vel subtractionem unitatis. Et in II de anima, comparat diversas animas speciebus figurarum, quarum una continet aliam; sicut pentagonum continet tetragonum, et excedit. ... Sicut ergo superficies quae habet figuram pentagonam, non per aliam figuram est tetragona, et per aliam pentagona; quia superflueret figura tetragona, ex quo in pentagona continetur; ita nec per aliam animam Socrates est homo, et per aliam animal, sed per unam et eandem.

The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by reason of its being sensitive, but by reason of its being intellectual. When, therefore, a soul is sensitive only, it is corruptible; but when with sensibility it has also intellectuality, it is incorruptible. For although sensibility does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility.

Anima sensitiva non habet incorruptibilitatem ex hoc quod est sensitiva, sed ex hoc quod est intellectiva, ei incorruptibilitas debetur. Quando ergo anima est sensitiva tantum, corruptibilis est, quando vero cum sensitivo intellectivum habet, est incorruptibilis. Licet enim sensitivum incorruptionem non det, tamen incorruptionem intellectivo auferre non potest.

The embryo has first of all a soul which is merely sensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted by a more perfect soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual: as will be shown further on (Q118, A2, RO2).

Prius embryo habet animam quae est sensitiva tantum; qua abiecta, advenit perfectior anima, quae est simul sensitiva et intellectiva; ut infra plenius ostendetur.

It is quite impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body.

Omnino impossibile videtur plures animas per essentiam differentes in uno corpore esse.

In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which there were several souls. For nothing is absolutely one except by one form, by which a thing has existence: because a thing has from the same source both existence and unity; and therefore things which are denominated by various forms are not absolutely one.

Primo quidem, quia animal non esset simpliciter unum, cuius essent animae plures. Nihil enim est simpliciter unum nisi per formam unam, per quam habet res esse, ab eodem enim habet res quod sit ens et quod sit una; et ideo ea quae denominantur a diversis formis, non sunt unum simpliciter.

Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the manner in which one thing is predicated of another. Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal and man; otherwise man would not really be the thing which is an animal, so that animal can be essentially predicated of man.

Secundo, hoc apparet impossibile ex modo praedicationis. ... Ergo oportet eandem formam esse per quam aliquid est animal, et per quam aliquid est homo, alioquin homo non vere esset id quod est animal, ut sic animal per se de homine praedicetur.

Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which could never be the case unless the principle of action were essentially one.

Tertio, apparet hoc esse impossibile per hoc, quod una operatio animae, cum fuerit intensa, impedit aliam. Quod nullo modo contingeret, nisi principium actionum esset per essentiam unum.

Plato held that there were several souls in one body, distinct even as to organs, to which souls he referred the different vital actions, saying that the nutritive power is in the liver, the concupiscible in the heart, and the power of knowledge in the brain. Which opinion is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), with regard to those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs; for this reason, that in those animals which continue to live when they have been divided in each part are observed the operations of the soul, as sense and appetite. Now this would not be the case if the various principles of the soul's operations were essentially different, and distributed in the various parts of the body.

Plato posuit diversas animas esse in corpore uno, etiam secundum organa distinctas, quibus diversa opera vitae attribuebat; dicens vim nutritivam esse in hepate, concupiscibilem in corde, cognoscitivam in cerebro. Quam quidem opinionem Aristoteles reprobat, in libro de anima, quantum ad illas animae partes quae corporeis organis in suis operibus utuntur; ex hoc quod in animalibus quae decisa vivunt, in qualibet parte inveniuntur diversae operationes animae, sicut sensus et appetitus. Hoc autem non esset, si diversa principia operationum animae, tanquam per essentiam diversae, diversis partibus corporis distributa essent.

But with regard to the intellectual part, he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be "only logically" distinct from the other parts of the soul, "or also locally."

Sed de intellectiva sub dubio videtur relinquere utrum sit separata ab aliis partibus animae solum ratione, an etiam loco.

Q76 A2: Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied according to the number of bodies?

Yes. It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to belong to all men because it is impossible for many distinct individuals to have one form, as it is impossible for them to have one existence, for the form is the principle of existence.

Intellectum esse unum omnium hominum, omnino est impossibile quia impossibile est enim plurium numero diversorum esse unam formam, sicut impossibile est quod eorum sit unum esse, nam forma est essendi principium.

It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to the opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed that the intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man.

Similiter etiam patet hoc esse impossibile, si, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, intellectus ponatur pars, seu potentia, animae quae est hominis forma.

Although the intellectual soul, like an angel, has no matter from which it is produced, yet it is the form of a certain matter; in which it is unlike an angel. Therefore, according to the division of matter, there are many souls of one species; while it is quite impossible for many angels to be of one species.

Licet anima intellectiva non habeat materiam ex qua sit, sicut nec Angelus, tamen est forma materiae alicuius; quod Angelo non convenit. Et ideo secundum divisionem materiae sunt multae animae unius speciei, multi autem Angeli unius speciei omnino esse non possunt.

And if to this we add that to understand, which is the act of the intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the intellect itself; it will further follow that there is but one agent and one action: that is to say that all men are but one "understander," and have but one act of understanding, in regard, that is, of one intelligible object.

Et si addamus quod ipsum intelligere, quod est actio intellectus, non fit per aliquod aliud organum, nisi per ipsum intellectum; sequetur ulterius quod sit et agens unum et actio una; idest quod omnes homines sint unus intelligens, et unum intelligere; dico autem respectu eiusdem intelligibilis.

But the phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that is a form. Now in one intellect, from different phantasms of the same species, only one intelligible species is abstracted; as appears in one man, in whom there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet from all of them only one intelligible species of a stone is abstracted; by which the intellect of that one man, by one operation, understands the nature of a stone, notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if there were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phantasms which are in this one and that one would not cause a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that man. It follows, therefore, that it is altogether impossible and unreasonable to maintain that there exists one intellect for all men.

Sed ipsum phantasma non est forma intellectus possibilis, sed species intelligibilis quae a phantasmatibus abstrahitur. In uno autem intellectu a phantasmatibus diversis eiusdem speciei non abstrahitur nisi una species intelligibilis. Sicut in uno homine apparet, in quo possunt esse diversa phantasmata lapidis, et tamen ab omnibus eis abstrahitur una species intelligibilis lapidis, per quam intellectus unius hominis operatione una intelligit naturam lapidis, non obstante diversitate phantasmatum. Si ergo unus intellectus esset omnium hominum, diversitas phantasmatum quae sunt in hoc et in illo, non posset causare diversitatem intellectualis operationis huius et illius hominis, ut Commentator fingit in III de anima. Relinquitur ergo quod omnino impossibile et inconveniens est ponere unum intellectum omnium hominum.

Whether the intellect be one or many, what is understood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not according to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for "the stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is," as is said, De Anima iii, 8. Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the likeness of the stone, except by a reflection of the intellect on itself; otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but only intelligible species.

Sive intellectus sit unus sive plures, id quod intelligitur est unum. Id enim quod intelligitur non est in intellectu secundum se, sed secundum suam similitudinem, "lapis enim non est in anima, sed species lapidis," ut dicitur in III de anima. Et tamen lapis est id quod intelligitur, non autem species lapidis, nisi per reflexionem intellectus supra seipsum, alioquin scientiae non essent de rebus, sed de speciebus intelligibilibus.

Now it happens that different things, according to different forms, are likened to the same thing. And since knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of the knower to the thing known, it follows that the same thing may happen to be known by several knowers, as is apparent in regard to the senses; for several see the same color, according to different likenesses. In the same way several intellects understand one object understood.

Contingit autem eidem rei diversa secundum diversas formas assimilari. Et quia cognitio fit secundum assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, sequitur quod idem a diversis cognoscentibus cognosci contingit, ut patet in sensu, nam plures vident eundem colorem, secundum diversas similitudines. Et similiter plures intellectus intelligunt unam rem intellectam.

But there is this difference, according to the opinion of Aristotle, between the sense and the intelligence--that a thing is perceived by the sense according to the disposition which it has outside the soul --that is, in its individuality; whereas the nature of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul, but the mode according to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which it is understood. For the common nature is understood as apart from the individuating principles; whereas such is not its mode of existence outside the soul.

Sed hoc tantum interest inter sensum et intellectum, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, quod res sentitur secundum illam dispositionem quam extra animam habet, in sua particularitate, natura autem rei quae intelligitur, est quidem extra animam, sed non habet illum modum essendi extra animam, secundum quem intelligitur. Intelligitur enim natura communis seclusis principiis individuantibus; non autem hunc modum essendi habet extra animam.

But, according to the opinion of Plato, the thing understood exists outside the soul in the same condition as those under which it is understood; for he supposed that the natures of things exist separate from matter.

Sed secundum sententiam Platonis, res intellecta eo modo est extra animam quo intelligitur, posuit enim naturas rerum a materia separatas.

Augustine (De Quant. Animae xxxii) says: "If I were to say that there are many human souls, I should laugh at myself." But there Augustine only denies a plurality of souls that would involve a plurality of species.

Augustinus dicit, in libro de quantitate animae, "si plures tantum animas humanas dixerim, ipse me ridebo." Augustinus intelligit animas non esse plures tantum, quin uniantur in una ratione speciei.

Q76 A1: Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form?

Yes. The intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body because that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed. Now the proper operation of man as man is to understand; because he thereby surpasses all other animals.

Intellectus, qui est intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani corporis forma. Illud enim quo primo aliquid operatur, est forma eius cui operatio attribuitur. Propria autem operatio hominis, inquantum est homo, est intelligere, per hanc enim omnia animalia transcendit.

Whence Aristotle concludes (Ethic. x, 7) that the ultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as properly belonging to him. Man must therefore derive his species from that which is the principle of this operation. But the species of anything is derived from its form. It follows therefore that the intellectual principle is the proper form of man.

Unde et Aristoteles, in libro Ethic., in hac operatione, sicut in propria hominis, ultimam felicitatem constituit. Oportet ergo quod homo secundum illud speciem sortiatur, quod est huius operationis principium. Sortitur autem unumquodque speciem per propriam formam. Relinquitur ergo quod intellectivum principium sit propria hominis forma.

According to the Philosopher, Metaph. viii (Did. vii 2), difference is derived from the form. But the difference which constitutes man is "rational," which is applied to man on account of his intellectual principle. Therefore the intellectual principle is the form of man.

Secundum philosophum, in VIII Metaphys., differentia sumitur a forma rei. Sed differentia constitutiva hominis est rationale; quod dicitur de homine ratione intellectivi principii. Intellectivum ergo principium est forma hominis.

The reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is in act; wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local movement; and likewise of our understanding. Therefore this principle by which we primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body. This is the demonstration used by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2).

Et huius ratio est, quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu, unde quo aliquid est actu, eo agit. Manifestum est autem quod primum quo corpus vivit, est anima. Et cum vita manifestetur secundum diversas operationes in diversis gradibus viventium, id quo primo operamur unumquodque horum operum vitae, est anima, anima enim est primum quo nutrimur, et sentimus, et movemur secundum locum; et similiter quo primo intelligimus. Hoc ergo principium quo primo intelligimus, sive dicatur intellectus sive anima intellectiva, est forma corporis. Et haec est demonstratio Aristotelis in II de anima.

It is one and the same man who is conscious both that he understands, and that he senses. But one cannot sense without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man.

Ipse idem homo est qui percipit se et intelligere et sentire, sentire autem non est sine corpore, unde oportet corpus aliquam esse hominis partem.

Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the body as its motor; and hence that the intellect and body form one thing so that the act of the intellect could be attributed to the whole. This is, however, absurd for many reasons.

Quidam autem dicere voluerunt quod intellectus unitur corpori ut motor; et sic ex intellectu et corpore fit unum, ut actio intellectus toti attribui possit. Sed hoc est multipliciter vanum.

If, however, Socrates be a whole composed of a union of the intellect with whatever else belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect be united to those other things only as a motor, it follows that Socrates is not one absolutely, and consequently neither a being absolutely, for a thing is a being according as it is one. This is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher, who holds that understanding is not possible through a corporeal instrument (De Anima iii, 4).

Si vero Socrates est totum quod componitur ex unione intellectus ad reliqua quae sunt Socratis, et tamen intellectus non unitur aliis quae sunt Socratis nisi sicut motor; sequitur quod Socrates non sit unum simpliciter, et per consequens nec ens simpliciter; sic enim aliquid est ens, quomodo et unum. Quod est contra philosophum, qui vult quod intelligere non sit per instrumentum corporeum.

There remains, therefore, no other explanation than that given by Aristotle--namely, that this particular man understands, because the intellectual principle is his form. Thus from the very operation of the intellect it is made clear that the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form.

Relinquitur ergo solus modus quem Aristoteles ponit, quod hic homo intelligit, quia principium intellectivum est forma ipsius. Sic ergo ex ipsa operatione intellectus apparet quod intellectivum principium unitur corpori ut forma.

Now the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever. This power is called the intellect.

Anima autem humana est ultima in nobilitate formarum. Unde intantum sua virtute excedit materiam corporalem, quod habet aliquam operationem et virtutem in qua nullo modo communicat materia corporalis. Et haec virtus dicitur intellectus.

It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of matter and form, it would follow that in no way could the soul be the form of the body. For since the form is an act, and matter is only in potentiality, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of another by virtue of itself as a whole.

Est autem attendendum quod, si quis poneret animam componi ex materia et forma, nullo modo posset dicere animam esse formam corporis. Cum enim forma sit actus, materia vero sit ens in potentia tantum; nullo modo id quod est ex materia et forma compositum, potest esse alterius forma secundum se totum.

The soul communicates that existence in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual soul there results unity of existence; so that the existence of the whole composite is also the existence of the soul. This is not the case with other non-subsistent forms. For this reason the human soul retains its own existence after the dissolution of the body; whereas it is not so with other forms.

Anima illud esse in quo ipsa subsistit, communicat materiae corporali, ex qua et anima intellectiva fit unum, ita quod illud esse quod est totius compositi, est etiam ipsius animae. Quod non accidit in aliis formis, quae non sunt subsistentes. Et propter hoc anima humana remanet in suo esse, destructo corpore, non autem aliae formae.

The human soul retains its proper existence when separated from the body, having an aptitude and a natural inclination to be united to the body.

Ita anima humana manet in suo esse cum fuerit a corpore separata, habens aptitudinem et inclinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem.

Q76: The union of body and soul

1. Is the intellectual principle united to the body as its form?
2. Is the intellectual principle multiplied numerically according to the number of bodies or is there one intelligence for all men?
3. In the body, the form of which is an intellectual principle, is there some other soul?
4. In the body is there any other substantial form?
5. What are the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual principle is the form?
6. Is it united to such a body by means of another body?
7. By means of an accident?
8. Is the soul wholly in each part of the body?

Q75 A7: Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?

No. The soul and an angel are not of the same species because a separate form cannot be understood otherwise than as one of a single species.

Anima igitur et Angelus non sunt unius speciei. Non enim potest intelligi quod aliqua forma separata sit nisi una unius speciei.

In incorporeal substances there cannot be diversity of number without diversity of species and inequality of nature; because, as they are not composed of matter and form, but are subsistent forms, it is clear that there is necessarily among them a diversity of species.

In substantiis incorporeis non potest esse diversitas secundum numerum absque diversitate secundum speciem, et absque naturali inaequalitate. Quia si non sint compositae ex materia et forma, sed sint formae subsistentes, manifestum est quod necesse erit in eis esse diversitatem in specie.

One matter cannot be distinct from another, except by a distinction of quantity, which has no place in these incorporeal substances, such as an angel and the soul. So that it is not possible for the angel and the soul to be of the same species.

Nec poterit dici materia haec alia ab illa, nisi secundum divisionem quantitativam, quae non habet locum in substantiis incorporeis, cuiusmodi sunt Angelus et anima. Unde non potest esse quod Angelus et anima sint unius speciei.

How it is that there can be many souls of one species will be explained later (Q76, A2, RO1).

Quomodo autem sint plures animae unius speciei infra ostendetur.

The body is not of the essence of the soul; but the soul by the nature of its essence can be united to the body, so that, properly speaking, not the soul alone, but the "composite," is the species.

Corpus non est de essentia animae, sed anima ex natura suae essentiae habet quod sit corpori unibilis. Unde nec proprie anima est in specie; sed compositum.

And the very fact that the soul in a certain way requires the body for its operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a grade of intellectuality inferior to that of an angel, who is not united to a body.

Et hoc ipsum quod anima quodammodo indiget corpore ad suam operationem, ostendit quod anima tenet inferiorem gradum intellectualitatis quam Angelus, qui corpori non unitur.

Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), "Angelic minds have simple and blessed intelligence, not gathering their knowledge of Divine things from visible things."

Dicit Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., "mentes angelicae simplices et beatos intellectus habent, non de visibilibus congregantes divinam cognitionem".

Q75 A6: Whether the human soul is corruptible?

No. We must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible because it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist.

Necesse est dicere animam humanam, quam dicimus intellectivum principium, esse incorruptibilem quia impossibile est quod forma subsistens desinat esse.

This, indeed, is impossible, not only as regards the human soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that is a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it.

Quod quidem omnino est impossibile non solum de ipsa, sed de quolibet subsistente quod est forma tantum. Manifestum est enim quod id quod secundum se convenit alicui, est inseparabile ab ipso.

But existence belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires actual existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself.

Esse autem per se convenit formae, quae est actus. Unde materia secundum hoc acquirit esse in actu, quod acquirit formam, secundum hoc autem accidit in ea corruptio, quod separatur forma ab ea. Impossibile est autem quod forma separetur a seipsa.

For a thing may be corrupted in two ways--"per se," and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the generation or corruption of something else. For generation and corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to it, which is acquired by generation and lost by corruption.

Dupliciter enim aliquid corrumpitur, uno modo, per se; alio modo, per accidens. Impossibile est autem aliquid subsistens generari aut corrumpi per accidens, idest aliquo generato vel corrupto. Sic enim competit alicui generari et corrumpi, sicut et esse, quod per generationem acquiritur et per corruptionem amittitur.

Therefore, whatever has existence "per se" cannot be generated or corrupted except 'per se'; while things which do not subsist, such as accidents and material forms, acquire existence or lost it through the generation or corruption of composite things.

Unde quod per se habet esse, non potest generari vel corrumpi nisi per se, quae vero non subsistunt, ut accidentia et formae materiales, dicuntur fieri et corrumpi per generationem et corruptionem compositorum.

Now it was shown above (Q75 A2, Q75 A3) that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their bodies are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it were corrupted "per se."

Ostensum est autem supra quod animae brutorum non sunt per se subsistentes, sed sola anima humana. Unde animae brutorum corrumpuntur, corruptis corporibus, anima autem humana non posset corrumpi, nisi per se corrumperetur.

For the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body; whereas the human soul is produced by God.

Nam anima brutorum producitur ex virtute aliqua corporea, anima vero humana a Deo.

Now there can be no contrariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to the manner of its existence, and those things which it receives are without contrariety; for the notions even of contraries are not themselves contrary, since contraries belong to the same knowledge. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be corruptible.

In anima autem intellectiva non potest esse aliqua contrarietas. Recipit enim secundum modum sui esse, ea vero quae in ipsa recipiuntur, sunt absque contrarietate; quia etiam rationes contrariorum in intellectu non sunt contrariae, sed est una scientia contrariorum. Impossibile est ergo quod anima intellectiva sit corruptibilis.

Moreover we may take a sign of this from the fact that everything naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now, in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The senses indeed do not know existence, except under the conditions of "here" and "now," whereas the intellect apprehends existence absolutely, and for all time; so that everything that has an intellect naturally desires always to exist.

Potest etiam huius rei accipi signum ex hoc, quod unumquodque naturaliter suo modo esse desiderat. Desiderium autem in rebus cognoscentibus sequitur cognitionem. Sensus autem non cognoscit esse nisi sub hic et nunc, sed intellectus apprehendit esse absolute, et secundum omne tempus. Unde omne habens intellectum naturaliter desiderat esse semper.

But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible.

Naturale autem desiderium non potest esse inane. Omnis igitur intellectualis substantia est incorruptibilis.

Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe to Divine goodness that they are "intellectual," and that they have "an incorruptible substantial life."

Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod animae humanae habent ex bonitate divina quod sint intellectuales et quod habeant substantialem vitam inconsumptibilem.

Q75 A5: Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?

No. The intellectual soul itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form, because the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely.

Anima igitur intellectiva est forma absoluta, non autem aliquid compositum ex materia et forma. Anima autem intellectiva cognoscit rem aliquam in sua natura absolute.

For it is clear that whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower.

Manifestum est enim quod omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis. Sic autem cognoscitur unumquodque, sicut forma eius est in cognoscente.

For instance, [the intellectual soul] knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the intellectual soul.

Puta lapidem inquantum est lapis absolute. Est igitur forma lapidis absolute, secundum propriam rationem formalem, in anima intellectiva.

For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so it would only know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since matter is the principle by which forms are individualized.

Si enim anima intellectiva esset composita ex materia et forma, formae rerum reciperentur in ea ut individuales, et sic non cognosceret nisi singulare, sicut accidit in potentiis sensitivis, quae recipiunt formas rerum in organo corporali, materia enim est principium individuationis formarum.

It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form.

Relinquitur ergo quod anima intellectiva, et omnis intellectualis substantia cognoscens formas absolute, caret compositione formae et materiae.

To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the potentiality of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary matter another, so in each is there a different reason of subjection and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in potentiality with regard to the intelligible species.

Subiici et transmutari convenit materiae secundum quod est in potentia. Sicut ergo est alia potentia intellectus, et alia potentia materiae primae, ita est alia ratio subiiciendi et transmutandi. Secundum hoc enim intellectus subiicitur scientiae, et transmutatur de ignorantia ad scientiam, secundum quod est in potentia ad species intelligibiles.

The soul in general has no matter because it belongs to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body.

In communi anima non habet materiam. Est enim de ratione animae, quod sit forma alicuius corporis.

Now, either it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of itself.

Aut igitur est forma secundum se totam; aut secundum aliquam partem sui.

If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we understand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act; and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto.

Si secundum se totam, impossibile est quod pars eius sit materia, si dicatur materia aliquod ens in potentia tantum, quia forma, inquantum forma, est actus; id autem quod est in potentia tantum, non potest esse pars actus, cum potentia repugnet actui, utpote contra actum divisa.

If, however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the "primary animate."

Si autem sit forma secundum aliquam partem sui, illam partem, dicemus esse animam, et illam materiam cuius primo est actus, dicemus esse primum animatum.

Now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the things received by each. For primary matter receives individual forms; whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms. Hence the existence of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and form.

Est autem alia potentia receptiva in anima intellectiva, a potentia receptiva materiae primae, ut patet ex diversitate receptorum, nam materia prima recipit formas individuales, intellectus autem recipit formas absolutas. Unde talis potentia in anima intellectiva existens, non ostendit quod anima sit composita ex materia et forma.

The First Act is the universal principle of all acts; because It is infinite, virtually "precontaining all things," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things participate of It not as a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. But the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and are participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which all participated acts are derived; for then the receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the First Act.

Primus actus est universale principium omnium actuum, quia est infinitum, virtualiter in se omnia praehabens, ut dicit Dionysius. Unde participatur a rebus, non sicut pars, sed secundum diffusionem processionis ipsius. Potentia autem, cum sit receptiva actus, oportet quod actui proportionetur. Actus vero recepti, qui procedunt a primo actu infinito et sunt quaedam participationes eius, sunt diversi. Unde non potest esse potentia una quae recipiat omnes actus, sicut est unus actus influens omnes actus participatos, alioquin potentia receptiva adaequaret potentiam activam primi actus.

Everything participated is compared to the participator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist "per se," must have existence by participation; for "even life," or anything of that sort, "is a participator of existence," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).

Omne participatum comparatur ad participans ut actus eius. Quaecumque autem forma creata per se subsistens ponatur, oportet quod participet esse, quia etiam ipsa vita, vel quidquid sic diceretur, participat ipsum esse, ut dicit Dionysius, V cap. de Div. Nom.

Now participated existence is limited by the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who is His own existence, is pure act and infinite.

Esse autem participatum finitur ad capacitatem participantis. Unde solus Deus, qui est ipsum suum esse, est actus purus et infinitus.

But in intellectual substances there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form and participated existence. Wherefore some say that they are composed of that "whereby they are" and that "which they are"; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.

In substantiis vero intellectualibus est compositio ex actu et potentia; non quidem ex materia et forma, sed ex forma et esse participato. Unde a quibusdam dicuntur componi ex quo est et quod est, ipsum enim esse est quo aliquid est.

The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however, does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause transmuting it from potentiality to act.

Forma est causa essendi materiae, et agens, unde agens, inquantum reducit materiam in actum formae transmutando, est ei causa essendi. Si quid autem est forma subsistens, non habet esse per aliquod formale principium, nec habet causam transmutantem de potentia in actum.

Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter.

Augustinus probat, in VII super Gen. ad Litt., quod anima non est facta nec ex materia corporali, nec ex materia spirituali.

Q75 A4: Whether the soul is man?

No. Since, then, sensation is an operation of man, but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not a soul only, but something composed of soul and body.

Cum igitur sentire sit quaedam operatio hominis, licet non propria, manifestum est quod homo non est anima tantum, sed est aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore.

Plato, through supposing that sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man to be a soul making use of the body.

Plato vero, ponens sentire esse proprium animae, ponere potuit quod homo esset anima utens corpore.

This could be held if it were supposed that the operation of the sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in that case all the operations which are attributed to man would belong to the soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, is that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations of a man is man. But it has been shown above (Q75 A3) that sensation is not the operation of the soul only.

Et hoc quidem sustineri posset, si poneretur quod animae sensitivae operatio esset eius propria sine corpore, quia omnes operationes quae attribuuntur homini, convenirent soli animae; illud autem est unaquaeque res, quod operatur operationes illius rei. Unde illud est homo, quod operatur operationes hominis. Ostensum est autem quod sentire non est operatio animae tantum.

Some held that the form alone belongs to the species; while matter is part of the individual, and not the species. This cannot be true; for to the nature of the species belongs what the definition signifies; and in natural things the definition does not signify the form only, but the form and the matter.

Quod ideo dico, quia quidam posuerunt solam formam esse de ratione speciei, materiam vero esse partem individui, et non speciei. Quod quidem non potest esse verum. Nam ad naturam speciei pertinet id quod significat definitio. Definitio autem in rebus naturalibus non significat formam tantum, sed formam et materiam.

Hence in natural things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter, which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter.

Unde materia est pars speciei in rebus naturalibus, non quidem materia signata, quae est principium individuationis; sed materia communis.

For as it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a given species, must belong to the substance of the species.

Sicut enim de ratione huius hominis est quod sit ex hac anima et his carnibus et his ossibus; ita de ratione hominis est quod sit ex anima et carnibus et ossibus. Oportet enim de substantia speciei esse quidquid est communiter de substantia omnium individuorum sub specie contentorum.

Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) commends Varro as holding "that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but both soul and body."

Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, commendat Varronem, "qui hominem nec animam solam, nec solum corpus, sed animam simul et corpus esse arbitrabatur."

Q75 A3: Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?

No. Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul, whereas the souls of animals are not subsistent because the souls of brute animals have no "per se" operations. For the operation of anything follows the mode of its being.

Solum hominem credimus habere animam substantivam; animalium vero animae non sunt substantivae quod cum animae brutorum animalium per se non operentur, non sint subsistentes, similiter enim unumquodque habet esse et operationem.

Sensation and the consequent operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with change in the body.

Sentire vero, et consequentes operationes animae sensitivae, manifeste accidunt cum aliqua corporis immutatione.

Hence it is clear that the sensitive soul has no "per se" operation of its own, and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to the composite.

Et sic manifestum est quod anima sensitiva non habet aliquam operationem propriam per seipsam, sed omnis operatio sensitivae animae est coniuncti.

The relation of the sensitive faculty to the sensible object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual faculty to the intelligible object, in so far as each is in potentiality to its object. But in another way their relations differ, inasmuch as the impression of the object on the sense is accompanied with change in the body; so that excessive strength of the sensible corrupts sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect. For an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects is more able afterwards to understand those that are lower.

Sensitivum quodammodo se habet ad sensibilia sicut intellectivum ad intelligibilia, inquantum scilicet utrumque est in potentia ad sua obiecta. Sed quodammodo dissimiliter se habent, inquantum sensitivum patitur a sensibili cum corporis immutatione, unde excellentia sensibilium corrumpit sensum. Quod in intellectu non contingit, nam intellectus intelligens maxima intelligibilium, magis potest postmodum intelligere minora.

If, however, in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect requires the operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms.

Si vero in intelligendo fatigetur corpus, hoc est per accidens, in quantum intellectus indiget operatione virium sensitivarum, per quas ei phantasmata praeparantur.

The ancient philosophers made no distinction between sense and intellect, and referred both a corporeal principle, as has been said (Q75 A1). Plato, however, drew a distinction between intellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal principle, maintaining that sensing, just as understanding, belongs to the soul as such. From this it follows that even the souls of brute animals are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the operations of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a corporeal organ.

Antiqui philosophi nullam distinctionem ponebant inter sensum et intellectum, et utrumque corporeo principio attribuebant, ut dictum est. Plato autem distinxit inter intellectum et sensum; utrumque tamen attribuit principio incorporeo, ponens quod, sicut intelligere, ita et sentire convenit animae secundum seipsam. Et ex hoc sequebatur quod etiam animae brutorum animalium sint subsistentes. Sed Aristoteles posuit quod solum intelligere, inter opera animae, sine organo corporeo exercetur.

Q75 A2: Whether the human soul is something subsistent?

Yes. The nature of the human intellect is not only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that is, something subsistent because if the intellectual principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies.

Natura mentis humanae non solum est incorporea, sed etiam substantia, scilicet aliquid subsistens quod si igitur principium intellectuale haberet in se naturam alicuius corporis, non posset omnia corpora cognoscere.

Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies.

Omne autem corpus habet aliquam naturam determinatam. Impossibile est igitur quod principium intellectuale sit corpus. Et similiter impossibile est quod intelligat per organum corporeum, quia etiam natura determinata illius organi corporei prohiberet cognitionem omnium corporum.

Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation "per se" apart from the body. Now only that which subsists can have an operation "per se." For nothing can operate but what is actual.

Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium, quod dicitur mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se, cui non communicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari, nisi quod per se subsistit. Non enim est operari nisi entis in actu, unde eo modo aliquid operatur, quo est.

The body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as its origin of action, but on the part of the object; for the phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight. Neither does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to be non-subsistent; otherwise it would follow that an animal is non-subsistent, since it requires external objects of the senses in order to perform its act of perception.

Corpus requiritur ad actionem intellectus, non sicut organum quo talis actio exerceatur, sed ratione obiecti, phantasma enim comparatur ad intellectum sicut color ad visum. Sic autem indigere corpore non removet intellectum esse subsistentem, alioquin animal non esset aliquid subsistens, cum indigeat exterioribus sensibilibus ad sentiendum.

We must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent.

Relinquitur igitur animam humanam, quae dicitur intellectus vel mens, esse aliquid incorporeum et subsistens.

Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7): "Who understands that the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a body, will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are led astray through associating with the soul those things without which they are unable to think of any nature--i.e. imaginary pictures of corporeal things."

Augustinus dicit, X de Trin. "Quisquis videt mentis naturam et esse substantiam, et non esse corpoream, videt eos qui opinantur eam esse corpoream, ob hoc errare, quod adiungunt ei ea sine quibus nullam possunt cogitare naturam, scilicet corporum phantasias."

Q75 A1: Whether the soul is a body?

No. The soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body because a body is competent to be a living thing or even a principle of life, as "such" a body. Now that it is actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act.

Anima igitur, quae est primum principium vitae, non est corpus, sed corporis actus, quod convenit igitur alicui corpori quod sit vivens, vel etiam principium vitae, per hoc quod est tale corpus. Quod autem est actu tale, habet hoc ab aliquo principio quod dicitur actus eius.

It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision; and the same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but it is the "first" principle of life, which we call the soul.

Manifestum est enim quod non quodcumque vitalis operationis principium est anima, sic enim oculus esset anima, cum sit quoddam principium visionis; et idem esset dicendum de aliis animae instrumentis. Sed primum principium vitae dicimus esse animam.

Now, though a body may be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart is a principle of life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life. For it is clear that to be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such; since, if that were the case, every body would be a living thing, or a principle of life.

Quamvis autem aliquod corpus possit esse quoddam principium vitae, sicut cor est principium vitae in animali; tamen non potest esse primum principium vitae aliquod corpus. Manifestum est enim quod esse principium vitae, vel vivens, non convenit corpori ex hoc quod est corpus, alioquin omne corpus esset vivens, aut principium vitae.

The soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things which live: for we call living things "animate," [i.e. having a soul], and those things which have no life, "inanimate." Now life is shown principally by two actions, knowledge and movement.

Anima dicitur esse primum principium vitae in his quae apud nos vivunt animata enim viventia dicimus, res vero inanimatas vita carentes. Vita autem maxime manifestatur duplici opere, scilicet cognitionis et motus.

The philosophers of old, not being able to rise above their imagination, supposed that the principle of these actions was something corporeal: for they asserted that only bodies were real things; and that what is not corporeal is nothing: hence they maintained that the soul is something corporeal.

Horum autem principium antiqui philosophi, imaginationem transcendere non valentes, aliquod corpus ponebant; sola corpora res esse dicentes, et quod non est corpus, nihil esse. Et secundum hoc, animam aliquod corpus esse dicebant.

But, as is shown in Phys. viii, 6, there is a mover which is altogether immovable, and not moved either essentially, or accidentally; and such a mover can cause an invariable movement. There is, however, another kind of mover, which, though not moved essentially, is moved accidentally; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable movement; such a mover, is the soul.

Sed sicut ostenditur in VIII Physic., est quoddam movens penitus immobile, quod nec per se nec per accidens movetur, et tale movens potest movere motum semper uniformem. Est autem aliud movens, quod non movetur per se, sed movetur per accidens, et propter hoc non movet motum semper uniformem. Et tale movens est anima.

There is, again, another mover, which is moved essentially--namely, the body. And because the philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and is a body.

Est autem aliud movens, quod per se movetur, scilicet corpus. Et quia antiqui naturales nihil esse credebant nisi corpora, posuerunt quod omne movens movetur, et quod anima per se movetur, et est corpus.

But the ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of a body; and that it must be composed of the principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies.

Sed quia antiqui naturales nesciebant distinguere inter actum et potentiam, ponebant animam esse corpus, ad hoc quod cognosceret corpus; et ad hoc quod cognosceret omnia corpora, quod esset composita ex principiis omnium corporum.

Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that the soul "is simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy space by its bulk."

Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod "anima simplex dicitur respectu corporis, quia mole non diffunditur per spatium loci."

Q75: The nature of the soul in itself

Question 75. Man who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal substance: and in the first place, concerning what belongs to the essence of the soul

1. Is the soul a body?
2. Is the human soul a subsistence?
3. Are the souls of brute animals subsistent?
4. Is the soul man, or is man composed of soul and body?
5. Is the soul composed of matter and form?
6. Is the soul incorruptible?
7. Is the soul of the same species as an angel?

Q74 A3: Whether Scripture uses suitable words to express the work of the six days?

Yes. Scripture does use suitable words to express the works of the six days because according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 4), the person of the Son is mentioned both in the first creation of the world, and in its distinction and adornment, but differently in either place.

Scriptura utatur convenientibus verbis ad exprimendum opera sex dierum quod secundum Augustinum, persona filii commemoratur tam in prima rerum creatione, quam in rerum distinctione et ornatu; aliter tamen et aliter.

For distinction and adornment belong to the work by which the world receives its form. But as the giving form to a work of art is by means of the form of the art in the mind of the artist, which may be called his intelligible word, so the giving form to every creature is by the word of God; and for this reason in the works of distinction and adornment the Word is mentioned.

Distinctio enim et ornatus pertinet ad rerum formationem. Sicut autem formatio artificiatorum est per formam artis quae est in mente artificis, quae potest dici intelligibile verbum ipsius; ita formatio totius creaturae est per verbum Dei. Et ideo in opere distinctionis et ornatus fit mentio de verbo.

But in creation the Son is mentioned as the beginning, by the words, "In the beginning God created," since by creation is understood the production of formless matter.

In creatione autem commemoratur filius ut principium, cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus, quia per creationem intelligitur productio informis materiae.

But according to those who hold that the elements were created from the first under their proper forms, another explanation must be given; and therefore Basil says (Hom. ii, iii in Hexaem.) that the words, "God said," signify a Divine command. Such a command, however, could not have been given before creatures had been produced that could obey it.

Secundum vero alios, qui ponunt primo creata elementa sub propriis formis, oportet aliter dici. Basilius enim dicit quod per hoc quod dicitur, dixit Deus, importatur divinum imperium. Prius autem oportuit produci creaturam quae obediret, quam fieri mentionem de divino imperio.

According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 33), by the heaven is understood the formless spiritual nature, and by the earth, the formless matter of all corporeal things, and thus no creature is omitted.

Secundum Augustinum, per caelum intelligitur spiritualis natura informis; per terram autem materia informis omnium corporum. Et sic nulla creatura est praetermissa.

In either work, of creation and of formation, the Trinity of Persons is implied. In creation the Person of the Father is indicated by God the Creator, the Person of the Son by the beginning, in which He created, and the Person of the Holy Ghost by the Spirit that moved over the waters.

Et sic in utroque opere creationis et formationis, Trinitas personarum insinuatur. In creatione quidem, persona patris per Deum creantem; persona filii, per principium in quo creavit; spiritus sancti, qui superfertur aquis.

But in the formation, the Person of the Father is indicated by God that speaks, and the Person of the Son by the Word in which He speaks, and the Person of the Holy Spirit by the satisfaction with which God saw that what was made was good.

In formatione vero, persona patris in Deo dicente; persona vero filii, in verbo quo dicitur; persona spiritus sancti, in complacentia qua vidit Deus esse bonum quod factum erat.

But according to the holy writers, the Spirit of the Lord signifies the Holy Ghost, Who is said to "move over the water" -- that is to say, over what Augustine holds to mean formless matter, "lest it should be supposed that God loved of necessity the works He was to produce, as though He stood in need of them. For love of that kind is subject to, not superior to, the object of love. Moreover, it is fittingly implied that the Spirit moved over that which was incomplete and unfinished, since that movement is not one of place, but of pre-eminent power," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 7).

Sed secundum sanctos, per spiritum domini intelligitur spiritus sanctus. Qui dicitur superferri aquae, idest materiae informi secundum Augustinum, "ne facienda opera sua propter indigentiae necessitatem putaretur Deus amare, indigentiae enim amor rebus quas diligit subiicitur. Commode, autem factum est, ut prius insinuaretur aliquid inchoatum, cui superferri diceretur, non enim superfertur loco, sed praeexcellente potentia," ut Augustinus dicit I super Gen. ad Litt.

According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8), these three phrases denote the threefold being of creatures; first, their being in the Word, denoted by the command "Let . . . be made"; secondly, their being in the angelic mind, signified by the words, "It was . . . done"; thirdly, their being in their proper nature, by the words, "He made."

Secundum Augustinum, per illa tria designatur triplex esse rerum, primo quidem esse rerum in verbo, per hoc quod dixit, fiat; secundo, esse rerum in mente angelica per hoc quod dixit, factum est; tertio, esse rerum in propria natura, per hoc quod dixit, fecit.

According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,30), by the "evening" and the "morning" are understood the evening and the morning knowledge of the angels, which has been explained (Q58 A6, Q58 A7).

Secundum Augustinum, per vespere et mane intelligitur vespertina et matutina cognitio in Angelis, de quibus dictum est supra.

The words "one day" are used when day is first instituted, to denote that one day is made up of twenty-four hours. Hence, by mentioning "one," the measure of a natural day is fixed.

Dicitur unus dies in prima diei institutione, ad designandum quod viginti quatuor horarum spatia pertinent ad unum diem. Unde per hoc quod dicitur unus, praefigitur mensura diei naturalis.

Q74 A2: Whether all these days are one day?

No. There was not only one day because God created all things together so far as regards their substance in some measure formless, but He did not create all things together, so far as regards that formation of things which lies in distinction and adornment. (Hence the word "creation" is significant in (Sirach 18:1): "He that liveth for ever, created all things together.")

Non fuit unus dies tantum quod Deus creavit omnia simul, quantum ad rerum substantiam quodammodo informem. Sed quantum ad formationem quae facta est per distinctionem et ornatum, non simul. (Unde signanter utitur verbo "creationis": Eccli. XVIII, dicitur, "qui vivit in aeternum, creavit omnia simul.")

All things were not distinguished and adorned together, not from a want of power on God's part, as requiring time in which to work, but that due order might be observed in the instituting of the world. Hence it was fitting that different days should be assigned to the different states of the world, as each succeeding work added to the world a fresh state of perfection.

Non est ex impotentia Dei, quasi indigentis tempore ad operandum, quod omnia non sunt simul distincta et ornata, sed ut ordo servaretur in rerum institutione. Et ideo oportuit ut diversis statibus mundi diversi dies deservirent. Semper autem per sequens opus novus perfectionis status mundo est additus.

According to Augustine, the order of days refers to the natural order of the works attributed to the days.

Secundum Augustinum, ille ordo dierum referendus est ad naturalem ordinem operum quae diebus attribuuntur.

On this question Augustine differs from other expositors. His opinion is that all the days that are called seven, are one day represented in a sevenfold aspect (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22; De Civ. Dei xi, 9; Ad Orosium xxvi); while others consider there were seven distinct days, not one only. Now, these two opinions, taken as explaining the literal text of Genesis, are certainly widely different.

In hac quaestione Augustinus ab aliis expositoribus dissentit. Augustinus enim vult, et super Gen. ad Litt., et XI de Civ. Dei, et ad Orosium, quod omnes qui dicuntur septem dies, sunt unus dies septempliciter rebus praesentatus. Alii vero expositores sentiunt quod fuerunt septem dies diversi, et non unus tantum. Hae autem duae opiniones, si referantur ad expositionem litterae Genesis, magnam diversitatem habent.

For Augustine understands by the word "day," the knowledge in the mind of the angels, and hence, according to him, the first day denotes their knowledge of the first of the Divine works, the second day their knowledge of the second work, and similarly with the rest. Thus, then, each work is said to have been wrought in some one of these days, inasmuch as God wrought in some one of these days, inasmuch as God wrought nothing in the universe without impressing the knowledge thereof on the angelic mind; which can know many things at the same time, especially in the Word, in Whom all angelic knowledge is perfected and terminated.

Nam secundum Augustinum, per "diem" intelligitur cognitio mentis angelicae; ut sic primus dies sit cognito primi divini operis, secundus dies cognitio secundi operis, et sic de aliis. Et dicitur unumquodque opus esse factum in aliqua die, quia nihil Deus produxit in rerum natura, quod non impresserit menti angelicae. Quae quidem multa simul potest cognoscere, praecipue in verbo, in quo omnis Angelorum cognitio perficitur et terminatur.

So the distinction of days denotes the natural order of the things known, and not a succession in the knowledge acquired, or in the things produced.

Et sic distinguitur dies secundum naturalem ordinem rerum cognitarum, non secundum successionem cognitionis, aut secundum successionem productionis rerum.

Moreover, angelic knowledge is appropriately called "day," since light, the cause of day, is to be found in spiritual things, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28). In the opinion of the others, however, the days signify a succession both in time, and in the things produced.

Cognitio autem angelica proprie et vere "dies" nominari potest, cum lux, quae est causa diei, proprie in spiritualibus, secundum Augustinum, inveniatur. Secundum vero alios, per istos dies et successio dierum temporalium ostenditur, et successio productionis rerum.

If, however, these two explanations are looked at as referring to the mode of production, they will be found not greatly to differ, if the diversity of opinion existing on two points, as already shown (Q67, A1; Q69, A1), between Augustine and other writers is taken into account.

Sed si istae duae opiniones referantur ad modum productionis rerum, non invenitur magna differentia. Et hoc propter duo in quibus, exponendo, diversificatur Augustinus ab aliis, ut ex supra dictis patet.

First, because Augustine takes the earth and the water as first created, to signify matter totally without form; but the making of the firmament, the gathering of the waters, and the appearing of dry land, to denote the impression of forms upon corporeal matter.

Primo quidem, quia Augustinus per terram et aquam prius creatam, intelligit materiam corporalem totaliter informem; per factionem autem firmamenti, et congregationem aquarum, et apparitionem aridae, intelligit impressionem formarum in materiam corporalem.

But other holy writers take the earth and the water, as first created, to signify the elements of the universe themselves existing under the proper forms, and the works that follow to mean some sort of distinction in bodies previously existing, as also has been shown (Q67, A1; Q67, A4; Q69, A1).

Alii vero sancti per terram et aquam primo creatas, intelligunt ipsa elementa mundi, sub propriis formis existentia, per sequentia autem opera, aliquam distinctionem in corporibus prius existentibus, ut supra dictum est.

Secondly, some writers hold that plants and animals were produced actually in the work of the six days; Augustine, that they were produced potentially.

Secundo autem differunt quantum ad productionem plantarum et animalium, quae alii ponunt in opere sex dierum esse producta in actu; Augustinus vero potentialiter tantum.

On the day on which God created the heaven and the earth, He created also every plant of the field, not, indeed, actually, but "before it sprung up in the earth," that is, potentially. And this work Augustine ascribes to the third day, but other writers to the first instituting of the world.

In die in quo creavit Deus caelum et terram, creavit etiam omne virgultum agri, non in actu, sed "antequam oriretur super terram," idest potentialiter. Quod Augustinus adscribit tertiae diei, alii vero primae rerum institutioni.

Now the opinion of Augustine, that the works of the six days were simultaneous, is consistent with either view of the mode of production. For the other writers agree with him that in the first production of things matter existed under the substantial form of the elements, and agree with him also that in the first instituting of the world animals and plants did not exist actually.

In hoc ergo quod Augustinus ponit opera sex dierum esse simul facta, sequitur idem modus productionis rerum. Nam secundum utrosque, in prima rerum productione materia erat sub formis substantialibus elementorum, et secundum utrosque, in prima rerum institutione non fuerunt animalia et plantae in actu.

There remains, however, a difference as to four points; since, according to the latter, there was a time, after the production of creatures, in which
(1) light did not exist,
(2) the firmament had not been formed,
(3) and the earth was still covered by the waters,
(4) nor had the heavenly bodies been formed,
which is the fourth difference; which are not consistent with Augustine's explanation. "Therefore, in order not to do prejudice to either of these opinions, we must reply to the arguments for both sides."

Sed remanet differentia quantum ad quatuor. Quia secundum alios sanctos, post primam productionem creaturae, fuit aliquod tempus
in quo non erat lux;
item in quo non erat firmamentum formatum;
item in quo non erat terra discooperta aquis;
et in quo non erant formata caeli luminaria,
quod est quartum. Quae non oportet ponere secundum expositionem Augustini. Ut igitur neutri sententiae praeiudicetur, utriusque rationibus respondendum est.

On the seventh day God ceased from making new things, but not from providing for their increase, and to this latter work it belongs that the first day is succeeded by other days.

In die septimo cessavit Deus a novis operibus condendis, non autem a propagandis quibusdam ex aliis, ad quam propagationem pertinet quod post primum diem alii succedunt.