Wednesday, January 28, 2009

Q75 A3: Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?

No. Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul, whereas the souls of animals are not subsistent because the souls of brute animals have no "per se" operations. For the operation of anything follows the mode of its being.

Solum hominem credimus habere animam substantivam; animalium vero animae non sunt substantivae quod cum animae brutorum animalium per se non operentur, non sint subsistentes, similiter enim unumquodque habet esse et operationem.

Sensation and the consequent operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with change in the body.

Sentire vero, et consequentes operationes animae sensitivae, manifeste accidunt cum aliqua corporis immutatione.

Hence it is clear that the sensitive soul has no "per se" operation of its own, and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to the composite.

Et sic manifestum est quod anima sensitiva non habet aliquam operationem propriam per seipsam, sed omnis operatio sensitivae animae est coniuncti.

The relation of the sensitive faculty to the sensible object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual faculty to the intelligible object, in so far as each is in potentiality to its object. But in another way their relations differ, inasmuch as the impression of the object on the sense is accompanied with change in the body; so that excessive strength of the sensible corrupts sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect. For an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects is more able afterwards to understand those that are lower.

Sensitivum quodammodo se habet ad sensibilia sicut intellectivum ad intelligibilia, inquantum scilicet utrumque est in potentia ad sua obiecta. Sed quodammodo dissimiliter se habent, inquantum sensitivum patitur a sensibili cum corporis immutatione, unde excellentia sensibilium corrumpit sensum. Quod in intellectu non contingit, nam intellectus intelligens maxima intelligibilium, magis potest postmodum intelligere minora.

If, however, in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect requires the operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms.

Si vero in intelligendo fatigetur corpus, hoc est per accidens, in quantum intellectus indiget operatione virium sensitivarum, per quas ei phantasmata praeparantur.

The ancient philosophers made no distinction between sense and intellect, and referred both a corporeal principle, as has been said (Q75 A1). Plato, however, drew a distinction between intellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal principle, maintaining that sensing, just as understanding, belongs to the soul as such. From this it follows that even the souls of brute animals are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the operations of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a corporeal organ.

Antiqui philosophi nullam distinctionem ponebant inter sensum et intellectum, et utrumque corporeo principio attribuebant, ut dictum est. Plato autem distinxit inter intellectum et sensum; utrumque tamen attribuit principio incorporeo, ponens quod, sicut intelligere, ita et sentire convenit animae secundum seipsam. Et ex hoc sequebatur quod etiam animae brutorum animalium sint subsistentes. Sed Aristoteles posuit quod solum intelligere, inter opera animae, sine organo corporeo exercetur.