No. Since, then, sensation is an operation of man, but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not a soul only, but something composed of soul and body.
Cum igitur sentire sit quaedam operatio hominis, licet non propria, manifestum est quod homo non est anima tantum, sed est aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore.
Plato, through supposing that sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man to be a soul making use of the body.
Plato vero, ponens sentire esse proprium animae, ponere potuit quod homo esset anima utens corpore.
This could be held if it were supposed that the operation of the sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in that case all the operations which are attributed to man would belong to the soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, is that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations of a man is man. But it has been shown above (Q75 A3) that sensation is not the operation of the soul only.
Et hoc quidem sustineri posset, si poneretur quod animae sensitivae operatio esset eius propria sine corpore, quia omnes operationes quae attribuuntur homini, convenirent soli animae; illud autem est unaquaeque res, quod operatur operationes illius rei. Unde illud est homo, quod operatur operationes hominis. Ostensum est autem quod sentire non est operatio animae tantum.
Some held that the form alone belongs to the species; while matter is part of the individual, and not the species. This cannot be true; for to the nature of the species belongs what the definition signifies; and in natural things the definition does not signify the form only, but the form and the matter.
Quod ideo dico, quia quidam posuerunt solam formam esse de ratione speciei, materiam vero esse partem individui, et non speciei. Quod quidem non potest esse verum. Nam ad naturam speciei pertinet id quod significat definitio. Definitio autem in rebus naturalibus non significat formam tantum, sed formam et materiam.
Hence in natural things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter, which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter.
Unde materia est pars speciei in rebus naturalibus, non quidem materia signata, quae est principium individuationis; sed materia communis.
For as it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a given species, must belong to the substance of the species.
Sicut enim de ratione huius hominis est quod sit ex hac anima et his carnibus et his ossibus; ita de ratione hominis est quod sit ex anima et carnibus et ossibus. Oportet enim de substantia speciei esse quidquid est communiter de substantia omnium individuorum sub specie contentorum.
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) commends Varro as holding "that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but both soul and body."
Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, commendat Varronem, "qui hominem nec animam solam, nec solum corpus, sed animam simul et corpus esse arbitrabatur."