Has quatuor virtutes sunt diversi habitus, secundum diversitatem obiectorum distincti quia determinantur ad materias speciales; unaquaeque quidem illarum ad unam materiam, in qua principaliter laudatur illa generalis conditio a qua nomen virtutis accipitur, ut supra dictum est:
These four [cardinal] virtues are distinct habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects because they have their special determinate matter; indeed, each of these [virtues] is determined to its [own] one [special] matter, in which special commendation is given to that general condition from which the virtue's name is taken, as stated above (I-II, 61, 3; cf. II-II, 141, 2):
"istae virtutes denominantur ab eo quod est praecipuum in unaquaque materia. Et sic sunt speciales virtutes, contra alias divisae. Dicuntur tamen principales respectu aliarum, propter principalitatem materiae: puta quod prudentia dicatur quae praeceptiva est; iustitia, quae est circa actiones debitas inter aequales; temperantia, quae reprimit concupiscentias delectationum tactus; fortitudo, quae firmat contra pericula mortis."
"they may be considered in point of their being denominated, each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter. And thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called principal [i.e., cardinal] in comparison with the other virtues, on account of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death."