Prudentia est simpliciter principalior omnibus; sed aliae ponuntur principales unaquaeque in suo genere, quia quadruplex invenitur subiectum huius virtutis de qua nunc loquimur, scilicet rationale per essentiam, quod prudentia perficit; et rationale per participationem, quod dividitur in tria; idest in voluntatem, quae est subiectum iustitiae; et in concupiscibilem, quae est subiectum temperantiae; et in irascibilem, quae est subiectum fortitudinis.
Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply; the others are principal, each in its own genus, because there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by "Prudence"; and that which is rational by participation, and is threefold: the will, subject of "Justice"; the concupiscible faculty, subject of "Temperance"; and the irascible faculty, subject of "Fortitude".
Numerus aliquorum accipi potest aut secundum principia formalia, aut secundum subiecta, et utroque modo inveniuntur quatuor cardinales virtutes.
Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are, and either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.
Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., "in quatuor virtutibus tota boni operis structura consurgit".
Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of a good work is built on four virtues".