1a 2ae q6 a2: Whether there is anything voluntary in irrational animals? Yes.

Soli rationali naturae competit voluntarium secundum rationem perfectam, sed secundum rationem imperfectam, competit etiam brutis animalibus, quia imperfectam cognitionem finis sequitur voluntarium secundum rationem imperfectam, prout scilicet apprehendens finem non deliberat, sed subito movetur in ipsum.

The voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature, whereas the imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even irrational animals because imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the imperfect voluntary, inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once.

Voluntas nominat rationalem appetitum, et ideo non potest esse in his quae ratione carent. Voluntarium autem denominative dicitur a voluntate, et potest trahi ad ea in quibus est aliqua participatio voluntatis, secundum aliquam convenientiam ad voluntatem. Et hoc modo voluntarium attribuitur animalibus brutis, inquantum scilicet per cognitionem aliquam moventur in finem.

The will is the name of the rational appetite; and consequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason. But the word "voluntary" is derived from "voluntas" [will], and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will, by way of likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, through some kind of knowledge.

Perfecta quidem finis cognitio est quando non solum apprehenditur res quae est finis sed etiam cognoscitur ratio finis, et proportio eius quod ordinatur in finem ad ipsum. Et talis cognitio finis competit soli rationali naturae.

Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that end. And such knowledge belongs to none but the rational nature.

Imperfecta autem cognitio finis est quae in sola finis apprehensione consistit, sine hoc quod cognoscatur ratio finis, et proportio actus ad finem. Et talis cognitio finis invenitur in brutis animalibus, per sensum et aestimationem naturalem.

But imperfect knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the end. Such knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational animals, through their senses and their natural estimative power.

1a 2ae q6 a1: Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts? Yes.

Oportet in actibus humanis voluntarium esse quia quodcumque agit vel movetur a principio intrinseco, quod habet aliquam notitiam finis, habet in seipso principium sui actus non solum ut agat, sed etiam ut agat propter finem.

There must needs be something voluntary in human acts because whatever acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has some knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end.

Hoc enim importat nomen voluntarii, quod motus et actus sit a propria inclinatione. Et inde est quod voluntarium dicitur esse, secundum definitionem Aristotelis et Gregorii Nysseni et Damasceni, non solum cuius principium est intra, sed cum additione scientiae. Unde, cum homo maxime cognoscat finem sui operis et moveat seipsum, in eius actibus maxime voluntarium invenitur.

The word "voluntary" implies that their movements and acts are from their own inclination. Hence it is that, according to the definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene, the voluntary is defined not only as having "a principle within" the agent, but also as implying "knowledge." Therefore, since man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found.

Deus movet hominem ad agendum non solum sicut proponens sensui appetibile, vel sicut immutans corpus, sed etiam sicut movens ipsam voluntatem; quia omnis motus tam voluntatis quam naturae, ab eo procedit sicut a primo movente. Et sicut non est contra rationem naturae quod motus naturae sit a Deo sicut a primo movente (inquantum natura est quoddam instrumentum Dei moventis), ita non est contra rationem actus voluntarii quod sit a Deo (inquantum voluntas a Deo movetur). Est tamen communiter de ratione naturalis et voluntarii motus, quod sint a principio intrinseco.

God moves man to act, not only by proposing the appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also by moving the will itself; because every movement either of the will or of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as it is not incompatible with the formal aspect of nature that the natural movement be from God as the First Mover (inasmuch as nature is an instrument of God moving it), so it is not contrary to the formal aspect of a voluntary act, that it proceed from God (inasmuch as the will is moved by God). Nevertheless both natural and voluntary movements have this formal aspect in common, that they should proceed from a principle within the agent.

Damascenus, in II libro, quod "voluntarium est actus qui est operatio rationalis".

Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the voluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation."

1a 2ae q6: The voluntary and the involuntary

1. Is there anything voluntary in human acts?
2. In irrational animals?
3. Can there be voluntariness without any action?
4. Can violence be done to the will?
5. Does violence cause involuntariness?
6. Does fear cause involuntariness?
7. Does concupiscence cause involuntariness?
8. Does ignorance cause involuntariness?

1a 2ae q5 a8: Whether every man desires happiness? Yes.

Quilibet vult esse beatus quia appetere beatitudinem nihil aliud est quam appetere ut voluntas satietur.

Everyone desires to be happy because to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire that one's will be satisfied, and this everyone desires.

Ratio autem beatitudinis communis est ut sit bonum perfectum, sicut dictum est. Cum autem bonum sit obiectum voluntatis, perfectum bonum est alicuius, quod totaliter eius voluntati satisfacit.

For the general formal aspect of happiness consists in its being the perfect good, as has been said above. But since good is the object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely satisfies his will.

1a 2ae q5 a7: Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from God? Yes.

Per actionem ad beatitudinem pervenitur quia operatio hominis non praeexigitur ad consecutionem beatitudinis propter insufficientiam divinae virtutis beatificantis, sed ut servetur ordo in rebus.

Happiness is obtained through works because works are necessary to man in order to gain Happiness, not on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power which bestows Happiness, but that the order in things be observed.

Ut enim dicitur in II de caelo, "eorum quae nata sunt habere bonum perfectum, aliquid habet ipsum sine motu, aliquid uno motu, aliquid pluribus". Habere autem perfectum bonum sine motu, convenit ei quod naturaliter habet illud. Habere autem beatitudinem naturaliter est solius Dei. Unde solius Dei proprium est quod ad beatitudinem non moveatur per aliquam operationem praecedentem.

For as is stated in De Coel. ii, 12, "of those things that have a natural capacity for the perfect good, one has it without movement, some by one movement, some by several." Now to possess the perfect good without movement, belongs to that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs to God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not to be moved towards Happiness by any previous operation.

Cum autem beatitudo excedat omnem naturam creatam, nulla pura creatura convenienter beatitudinem consequitur absque motu operationis, per quam tendit in ipsam. Sed Angelus, qui est superior ordine naturae quam homo, consecutus est eam, ex ordine divinae sapientiae, uno motu operationis meritoriae, ut in primo expositum est. Homines autem consequuntur ipsam multis motibus operationum, qui merita dicuntur. Unde etiam, secundum philosophum, beatitudo est praemium virtuosarum operationum.

Now since Happiness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature can becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the angel, who is above man in the natural order, obtained it, according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement of a meritorious work, as was explained in Ia q62 a5; whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called merits. Wherefore also according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward of works of virtue.

Apostolus dicit, Rom. IV, beatitudinem hominis esse cui Deus confert iustitiam sine operibus.

The Apostle says (Romans 4:6) that Happiness is of the man "to whom God reputeth justice without works."

Apostolus loquitur de beatitudine spei, quae habetur per gratiam iustificantem, quae quidem non datur propter opera praecedentia. Non enim habet rationem termini motus, ut beatitudo, sed magis est principium motus quo ad beatitudinem tenditur.

The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope, which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on account of previous works. For grace does not have the formal aspect of a term of movement, as Happiness does; rather, it is the principle of the movement that tends towards Happiness.

1a 2ae q5 a6: Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature? No.

Non per actionem superioris creaturae, scilicet Angeli, in hominem, homo beatus efficitur, quia beatitudo est quoddam bonum excedens naturam creatam; unde impossibile est quod per actionem alicuius creaturae conferatur, sed homo beatus fit solo Deo agente, si loquamur de beatitudine perfecta.

Man is not made happy through a higher creature, viz. an angel, acting on him, because Happiness is a good surpassing created nature; therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of any creature, but by God alone is man made happy, if we speak of perfect Happiness.

Et ideo si quid fieri oporteat quod sit supra naturam, hoc fit immediate a Deo; sicut suscitatio mortui, illuminatio caeci, et cetera huiusmodi.

Consequently if anything need to be done that is above nature, it is done by God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring sight to the blind, and such like.

Plerumque contingit in potentiis activis ordinatis, quod perducere ad ultimum finem pertinet ad supremam potentiam, inferiores vero potentiae coadiuvant ad consecutionem illius ultimi finis disponendo, sicut ad artem gubernativam, quae praeest navifactivae, pertinet usus navis, propter quem navis ipsa fit.

It often happens in the case of active powers ordained to one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach the last end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of that last end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to the art of sailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a ship for the end for which it was made.

Sic igitur et in ordine universi, homo quidem adiuvatur ab Angelis ad consequendum ultimum finem, secundum aliqua praecedentia, quibus disponitur ad eius consecutionem; sed ipsum ultimum finem consequitur per ipsum primum agentem, qui est Deus.

Thus, too, in the order of the universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the attainment of his last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto; whereas he attains the last end itself through the First Agent, which is God.

Lumen autem gloriae, per quod Deus videtur, in Deo quidem est perfecte secundum esse naturale, in qualibet autem creatura est imperfecte, et secundum esse similitudinarium vel participatum. Unde nulla creatura beata potest communicare suam beatitudinem alteri.

The light of glory, whereby God is seen, exists in God perfectly, and naturally; whereas in any creature, it exists imperfectly, and by likeness or participation. Consequently no creature can communicate its Happiness to another.

Angelus beatus illuminat intellectum hominis, vel etiam inferioris Angeli, quantum ad aliquas rationes divinorum operum, non autem quantum ad visionem divinae essentiae (ut in primo dictum est). Ad eam enim videndam, omnes immediate illuminantur a Deo.

The happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man, or of a lower angel, as to certain formal aspects of the Divine works, but not as to the vision of the Divine Essence (as was stated in Ia q106 a1), since in order to see this, all are immediately enlightened by God.

1a 2ae q5 a5: Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers? No.

Homo per sua naturalia non potest beatitudinem consequi, quia homo est principium naturaliter actuum suorum per intellectum et voluntatem, sed ultima beatitudo sanctis praeparata excedit intellectum hominis et voluntatem.

Man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers because, by his intellect and will, man is naturally the principle of his action, but final Happiness prepared for the saints surpasses the intellect and will of man.

Sicut natura non deficit homini in necessariis, quamvis non dederit sibi arma et tegumenta sicut aliis animalibus quia dedit ei rationem et manus, quibus possit haec sibi conquirere; ita nec deficit homini in necessariis, quamvis non daret sibi aliquod principium quo posset beatitudinem consequi, hoc enim erat impossibile. Sed dedit ei liberum arbitrium, quo possit converti ad Deum, qui eum faceret beatum. "Quae enim per amicos possumus, per nos aliqualiter possumus", ut dicitur in III Ethic.

Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries, although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it provided other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did it fail man in things necessary, although it did not give him a definite principle by which he would attain Happiness, since this is impossible [because of what Happiness, by its nature, is]. But it did give him free choice, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him happy [by God's friendship with him]: "For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3).

Naturalis enim cognitio cuiuslibet creaturae est secundum modum substantiae eius; sicut de intelligentia dicitur in libro de causis, quod "cognoscit ea quae sunt supra se, et ea quae sunt infra se, secundum modum substantiae suae". Omnis autem cognitio quae est secundum modum substantiae creatae, deficit a visione divinae essentiae, quae in infinitum excedit omnem substantiam creatam. Unde nec homo, nec aliqua creatura, potest consequi beatitudinem ultimam per sua naturalia.

The natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his substance; thus it is said of the intelligence (De Causis; Prop. viii) that "it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it, according to the mode of its substance." But every cognition that is according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of the Divine Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain final Happiness by its natural powers.

Non enim quidquid potest causare dispositionem materiae, potest ultimam perfectionem conferre. Imperfecta autem operatio, quae subiacet naturali hominis potestati, non est eiusdem speciei cum operatione illa perfecta quae est hominis beatitudo, cum operationis species dependeat ex obiecto.

For not everything, that can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection. Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power, is not of the same species as that perfect operation which is man's happiness, since operation takes its species from its object.

Nobilioris conditionis est natura quae potest consequi perfectum bonum, licet indigeat exteriori auxilio ad hoc consequendum, quam natura quae non potest consequi perfectum bonum, sed consequitur quoddam bonum imperfectum, licet ad consecutionem eius non indigeat exteriori auxilio, ut philosophus dicit in II de caelo.

The nature that can attain perfect good, although it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble condition than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in order to attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12).

Sicut melius est dispositus ad sanitatem qui potest consequi perfectam sanitatem, licet hoc sit per auxilium medicinae, quam qui solum potest consequi quandam imperfectam sanitatem, sine medicinae auxilio. Et ideo creatura rationalis, quae potest consequi perfectum beatitudinis bonum, indigens ad hoc divino auxilio, est perfectior quam creatura irrationalis, quae huiusmodi boni non est capax, sed quoddam imperfectum bonum consequitur virtute suae naturae.

Thus he is better disposed to health who can attain perfect health, albeit by means of medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health, without the help of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the perfect good of happiness, but needs the Divine assistance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not capable of attaining this good, but attains some imperfect good by its natural powers.

Beatitudo imperfecta quae in hac vita haberi potest, potest ab homine acquiri per sua naturalia, eo modo quo et virtus, in cuius operatione consistit, de quo infra dicetur.

Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in whose operation it consists; on this point we shall speak further on (q63).

1a 2ae q5 a4: Whether happiness once had can be lost? No.

Beatitudo non potest amitti quia requiritur ad veram beatitudinem quod homo certam habeat opinionem bonum quod habet, nunquam se amissurum, cum enim ipsa beatitudo sit perfectum bonum et sufficiens, oportet quod desiderium hominis quietet, et omne malum excludat.

Happiness cannot be lost because it is necessary for true Happiness that man have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses, for since happiness is the "perfect and sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude every evil.

Et quia beatitudo huius vitae amitti potest, quod videtur esse contra rationem beatitudinis; ideo philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., aliquos esse in hac vita beatos, non simpliciter, sed sicut homines quorum natura mutationi subiecta est.

Since the happiness of this life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be contrary to the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state (Ethic. i, 10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but "as men," whose nature is subject to change.

Perfecta beatitudo hominis in visione divinae essentiae consistit. Est autem impossibile quod aliquis videns divinam essentiam, velit eam non videre. Quia omne bonum habitum quo quis carere vult, aut est insufficiens, et quaeritur aliquid sufficientius loco eius, aut habet aliquod incommodum annexum, propter quod in fastidium venit. Visio autem divinae essentiae replet animam omnibus bonis, cum coniungat fonti totius bonitatis.

Man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to see It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without, is either insufficient, something more sufficing being desired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience attached to it, by reason of which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all good things, since it unites it to the source of all goodness.

Beatitudo est perfectio consummata, quae omnem defectum excludit a beato. Et ideo absque mutabilitate advenit eam habenti, faciente hoc virtute divina, quae hominem sublevat in participationem aeternitatis transcendentis omnem mutationem.

Happiness is consummate perfection, which excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has happiness has it altogether unchangeably; this is done by the Divine power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which transcends all change.

1a 2ae q5 a3: Whether one can be happy in this life? No.

Aliqualis beatitudinis participatio in hac vita haberi potest, perfecta autem et vera beatitudo non potest haberi in hac vita, quia beatitudo, cum sit "perfectum et sufficiens bonum", omne malum excludit, et omne desiderium implet, sed in hac vita non potest omne malum excludi.

A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this life, but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life, because since happiness is a "perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil, and fulfils every desire, but in this life every evil cannot be excluded.

Beati dicuntur aliqui in hac vita, vel propter spem beatitudinis adipiscendae in futura vita, secundum illud Rom. VIII, "spe salvi facti sumus".

Some are said to be happy in this life, either on account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come, according to Romans 8:24: "We are saved by hope".

Beatitudo consistit in visione divinae essentiae, quae non potest homini provenire in hac vita, ut in primo ostensum est.

Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot obtain in this life, as was shown in Ia q12 a11.

1a 2ae q5 a2: Whether one man can be happier than another? Yes.

Sunt diversi gradus beatitudinis, et non omnium est aequalis beatitudo, quia contingit aliquem perfectius frui Deo quam alium, ex eo quod est melius dispositus vel ordinatus ad eius fruitionem, et secundum hoc potest aliquis alio beatior esse.

There are diverse degrees of Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all, because that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him, and in this sense one man can be happier than another.

Quantum igitur ad ipsum bonum quod est beatitudinis obiectum et causa, non potest esse una beatitudo alia maior, quia non est nisi unum summum bonum, scilicet Deus, cuius fruitione homines sunt beati. Sed quantum ad adeptionem huiusmodi boni vel fruitionem, potest aliquis alio esse beatior, quia quanto magis hoc bono fruitur, tanto beatior est.

As to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one Happiness cannot be greater than another, since there is but one Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But as to the attainment or enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier than another, because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is.

1a 2ae q5 a1: Whether man can attain happiness? Yes.

Quod autem homo perfecti boni sit capax, ex hoc apparet, quia et eius intellectus apprehendere potest universale et perfectum bonum, et eius voluntas appetere illud. Et ideo homo potest beatitudinem adipisci.

That man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect good, and because his will can desire it. And therefore man can attain happiness.

Apparet etiam idem ex hoc quod homo est capax visionis divinae essentiae, sicut in primo habitum est, in qua quidem visione perfectam hominis beatitudinem consistere diximus.

This can be proved again from the fact that man is capable of seeing God, as stated in Ia q12 a1, in which vision, as we stated above (q3 a8) man's perfect Happiness consists.

Et ideo ad id quod intellectus apprehendit, ratio per quendam motum pertingit. Unde rationalis natura consequi potest beatitudinem, quae est perfectio intellectualis naturae, tamen alio modo quam Angeli. Nam Angeli consecuti sunt eam statim post principium suae conditionis, homines autem per tempus ad ipsam perveniunt. Sed natura sensitiva ad hunc finem nullo modo pertingere potest.

Reason arrives by a kind of movement at that which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can attain Happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature, but otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained it forthwith after the beginning of their creation, whereas man attains it after a time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end.

1a 2ae q5: The attainment of happiness

1. Can man attain happiness?
2. Can one man be happier than another?
3. Can any man be happy in this life?
4. Once had, can happiness be lost?
5. Can man attain happiness by means of his natural powers?
6. Does man attain happiness through the action of some higher creature?
7. Are any actions of man necessary in order that man may obtain happiness of God?
8. Does every man desire happiness?

1a 2ae q4 a8: Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for happiness? No.

Si loquamur de perfecta beatitudine quae erit in patria, non requiritur societas amicorum de necessitate ad beatitudinem, quia homo habet totam plenitudinem suae perfectionis in Deo, quia omnis boni sufficientiam habet homo in Deo.

If we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential to Happiness because man has the entire fullness of his perfection in God, since man possesses in God a sufficiency of every good.

Sed ad bene esse beatitudinis facit societas amicorum. Unde Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod "creatura spiritualis, ad hoc quod beata sit, non nisi intrinsecus adiuvatur aeternitate, veritate, caritate creatoris. Extrinsecus vero, si adiuvari dicenda est, fortasse hoc solo adiuvatur, quod invicem vident, et de sua societate gaudent in Deo."

But the fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being of Happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that "the spiritual creatures receive no other interior aid to happiness than the eternity, truth, and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and rejoice in God, at their fellowship."

Perfectio caritatis est essentialis beatitudini quantum ad dilectionem Dei, non autem quantum ad dilectionem proximi. Unde si esset una sola anima fruens Deo, beata esset, non habens proximum quem diligeret. Sed supposito proximo, sequitur dilectio eius ex perfecta dilectione Dei. Unde quasi concomitanter se habet amicitia ad beatitudinem perfectam.

Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness, as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore if there were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy, though having no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor to be there, love of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently, friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect Happiness.

Si loquamur de felicitate praesentis vitae, sicut philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., felix indiget amicis, non quidem propter utilitatem, cum sit sibi sufficiens; nec propter delectationem, quia habet in seipso delectationem perfectam in operatione virtutis; sed propter bonam operationem, ut scilicet eis benefaciat, et ut eos inspiciens benefacere delectetur; et ut etiam ab eis in benefaciendo adiuvetur. Indiget enim homo ad bene operandum auxilio amicorum, tam in operibus vitae activae, quam in operibus vitae contemplativae.

If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do good; and again that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order that man may do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends.

1a 2ae q4 a7: Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness? No.

Nullo modo huiusmodi exteriora bona requiruntur ad beatitudinem perfectam, quae in visione Dei consistit, cum ordinentur ad vitam animalem; illa autem perfecta beatitudo quae in visione Dei consistit, vel erit in anima sine corpore, vel erit in anima corpori unita non iam animali, sed spirituali.

These external goods are nowise necessary for perfect Happiness, which consists in seeing God, because they are ordained to the animal life, whereas that perfect Happiness which consists in seeing God, will be either in the soul separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then no longer animal but spiritual.

Bona ista deservientia animali vitae, non competunt vitae spirituali in qua beatitudo perfecta consistit. Et tamen erit in illa beatitudine omnium bonorum congregatio, quia quidquid boni invenitur in istis, totum habebitur in summo fonte bonorum.

These goods that serve for the animal life, are incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness consists. Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate of all good things, because whatever good there be in these things, we shall possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness.

Ad beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in hac vita potest haberi, requiruntur exteriora bona, non quasi de essentia beatitudinis existentia, sed quasi instrumentaliter deservientia beatitudini, quae consistit in operatione virtutis, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Indiget enim homo in hac vita necessariis corporis tam ad operationem virtutis contemplativae quam etiam ad operationem virtutis activae, ad quam etiam plura alia requiruntur, quibus exerceat opera activae virtutis.

For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. For man needs in this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of contemplative virtue, and for the operation of active virtue, for which latter he needs also many other things by means of which to perform its operations.

Secundum Augustinum in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, merces sanctorum non dicitur esse in corporeis caelis, sed per caelos intelligitur altitudo spiritualium bonorum. Nihilominus tamen locus corporeus, scilicet caelum Empyreum, aderit beatis, non propter necessitatem beatitudinis, sed secundum quandam congruentiam et decorem.

According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 5), it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of the saints, but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods. Nevertheless a bodily place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be appointed to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment.

Omnes illae corporales promissiones quae in sacra Scriptura continentur, sunt metaphorice intelligendae, secundum quod in Scripturis solent spiritualia per corporalia designari, ut ex his quae novimus, ad desiderandum incognita consurgamus, sicut Gregorius dicit in quadam homilia. Sicut per cibum et potum intelligitur delectatio beatitudinis; per divitias, sufficientia qua homini sufficiet Deus; per regnum, exaltatio hominis usque ad coniunctionem cum Deo.

All those material promises contained in Holy Scripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture is wont to express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal, in order "that from things we know, we may rise to the desire of things unknown," as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang.). Thus food and drink signify the delight of Happiness; wealth, the sufficiency of God for man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to union of God.

1a 2ae q4 a6: Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness? Yes.

Bona dispositio corporis requiritur ad beatitudinem quia cum naturale sit animae corpori uniri, non potest esse quod perfectio animae naturalem eius perfectionem excludat.

Good disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness because since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it is not possible for the perfection of the soul to exclude its natural perfection.

Ad perfectam operationem intellectus requiritur quidem abstractio ab hoc corruptibili corpore, quod aggravat animam, non autem a corpore spirituali, quod erit totaliter spiritui subiectum.

The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which weighs upon the soul, but not from the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject to the spirit.

Etsi corpus nihil conferat ad illam operationem intellectus qua Dei essentia videtur, tamen posset ab hac impedire. Et ideo requiritur perfectio corporis, ut non impediat elevationem mentis.

Although the body has not part in that operation of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up.

In corporali bono non consistit beatitudo sicut in obiecto beatitudinis, sed corporale bonum potest facere ad aliquem beatitudinis decorem vel perfectionem.

Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its object, but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to Happiness.

Si loquamur de beatitudine hominis qualis in hac vita potest haberi, manifestum est quod ad eam ex necessitate requiritur bona dispositio corporis. Consistit enim haec beatitudo, secundum philosophum, "in operatione virtutis perfectae". Manifestum est autem quod per invaletudinem corporis, in omni operatione virtutis homo impediri potest.

If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect virtue"; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the body, from every operation of virtue.

1a 2ae q4 a5: Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness? No.

Sine corpore potest anima esse beata quia desiderium animae separatae totaliter quiescit ex parte appetibilis, quia scilicet habet id quod suo appetitui sufficit.

Without the body, the soul can be happy, because the desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices its appetite.

Sed non totaliter requiescit ex parte appetentis, quia illud bonum non possidet secundum omnem modum quo possidere vellet. Et ideo, corpore resumpto, beatitudo crescit non intensive, sed extensive.

But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that it would wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent.

1a 2ae q4 a4: Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness? Yes.

Rectitudo voluntatis requiritur ad beatitudinem et antecedenter et concomitanter: antecedenter quidem, quia rectitudo voluntatis est per debitum ordinem ad finem ultimum; concomitanter autem, quia, sicut dictum est, beatitudo ultima consistit in visione divinae essentiae, quae est ipsa essentia bonitatis.

Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both antecedently and concomitantly: antecedently, because rectitude of the will consists in being duly ordered to the last end; concomitantly, because as stated above (q3, a8), final Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness.

Nihil consequitur finem, nisi sit debito modo ordinatum ad ipsum. Et ideo nullus potest ad beatitudinem pervenire, nisi habeat rectitudinem voluntatis.

Nothing gains an end, except it be duly ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without rectitude of the will.

Omnis actus voluntatis praeceditur ab aliquo actu intellectus, aliquis tamen actus voluntatis est prior quam aliquis actus intellectus. Voluntas enim tendit in finalem actum intellectus, qui est beatitudo. Et ideo recta inclinatio voluntatis praeexigitur ad beatitudinem, sicut rectus motus sagittae ad percussionem signi.

Every act of the will is preceded by an act of the intellect, but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of the intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect which is happiness. And consequently right inclination of the will is required antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a right course in order to strike the target.

Non omne quod ordinatur ad finem, cessat adveniente fine, sed id tantum quod se habet in ratione imperfectionis, ut motus. Unde instrumenta motus non sunt necessaria postquam pervenitur ad finem, sed debitus ordo ad finem est necessarius.

Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with the getting of the end, but only that which has the formal aspect of imperfection, such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when the end has been gained, but the due order to the end is necessary.

Et ita voluntas videntis Dei essentiam, ex necessitate amat quidquid amat, sub ordine ad Deum; sicut voluntas non videntis Dei essentiam, ex necessitate amat quidquid amat, sub communi ratione boni quam novit. Et hoc ipsum est quod facit voluntatem rectam. Unde manifestum est quod beatitudo non potest esse sine recta voluntate.

So that the will of him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in subordination to God; just as the will of him who sees not God's Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common formal aspect of good which he knows. And this is precisely what makes the will right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without a right will.

1a 2ae q4 a3: Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness? Yes.

Comprehensio requiritur ad beatitudinem quia ea quae requiruntur ad beatitudinem sunt consideranda ex ipso ordine hominis ad finem.

Comprehension is necessary for Happiness because those things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the way in which man is ordered to an end.

Ad finem autem intelligibilem ordinatur homo partim quidem per intellectum, partim autem per voluntatem. Per intellectum quidem, inquantum in intellectu praeexistit aliqua cognitio finis imperfecta. Per voluntatem autem, primo quidem per amorem, qui est primus motus voluntatis in aliquid, secundo autem, per realem habitudinem amantis ad amatum, quae quidem potest esse triplex.

Now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly through his intellect, and partly through his will: through his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect: through the will, first by love which is the will's first movement towards anything; secondly, by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be threefold.

Et ideo necesse est ad beatitudinem ista tria concurrere, scilicet visionem, quae est cognitio perfecta intelligibilis finis; comprehensionem, quae importat praesentiam finis; delectationem, vel fruitionem, quae importat quietationem rei amantis in amato.

And therefore these three must concur with Happiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end; and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved.

Comprehensio non est aliqua operatio praeter visionem, sed est quaedam habitudo ad finem iam habitum.

Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision, but a certain relation to the end already gained.

1a 2ae q4 a2: Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight? Yes.

Visio est potior quam delectatio quia visio est causa delectationis et causa est potior effectu.

Vision ranks before delight because vision is the cause of delight and the cause is greater than its effect.

Apprehensio sensitiva non attingit ad communem rationem boni, sed ad aliquod bonum particulare quod est delectabile. Et ideo secundum appetitum sensitivum, qui est in animalibus, operationes quaeruntur propter delectationem. Sed intellectus apprehendit universalem rationem boni, ad cuius consecutionem sequitur delectatio. Unde principalius intendit bonum quam delectationem.

The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the universal formal aspect of the good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the intellect apprehends the universal formal aspect of the good, the attainment of which results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather than to delight.

Non est autem aliquid aestimandum simpliciter secundum ordinem sensitivi appetitus, sed magis secundum ordinem appetitus intellectivi.

And we should form our estimate of things not simply according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the intellectual appetite.

Istam quaestionem movet philosophus in X Ethic., et eam insolutam dimittit. Sed si quis diligenter consideret, ex necessitate oportet quod operatio intellectus, quae est visio, sit potior delectatione. Delectatio enim consistit in quadam quietatione voluntatis.

The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, the operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the will.

Quod autem voluntas in aliquo quietetur, non est nisi propter bonitatem eius in quo quietatur. Si ergo voluntas quietatur in aliqua operatione, ex bonitate operationis procedit quietatio voluntatis.

Now that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will reposes in an operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness of the operation.

Nec voluntas quaerit bonum propter quietationem; sic enim ipse actus voluntatis esset finis, quod est contra praemissa. Sed ideo quaerit quod quietetur in operatione, quia operatio est bonum eius. Unde manifestum est quod principalius bonum est ipsa operatio in qua quietatur voluntas, quam quietatio voluntatis in ipso.

Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act of the will would be the end, which has been disproved above (q1, a1, ad 2; q3, a4). But it seeks to be at rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident that the operation in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein.

Sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, "delectatio perficit operationem sicut decor iuventutem", qui est ad iuventutem consequens. Unde delectatio est quaedam perfectio concomitans visionem.

As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of youth. Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision.