Tuesday, March 24, 2009

Q84 A4: Whether the intelligible species are derived by the soul from certain separate forms?

No. The intelligible species, by which our soul understands, are not derived from separate forms because if this were true we should not need the senses in order to understand.

Species intelligibiles quibus anima nostra intelligit, non effluunt a formis separatis quia secundum hoc sensibus non indigeremus ad intelligendum.

And this is proved to be false especially from the fact that if a man be wanting in a sense, he cannot have any knowledge of the sensibles corresponding to that sense.

Quod patet esse falsum ex hoc praecipue quod qui caret uno sensu, nullo modo potest habere scientiam de sensibilibus illius sensus.

Material things, as to the being which they have outside the soul, may be actually sensible, but not actually intelligible.

Res materiales, secundum esse quod habent extra animam, possunt esse sensibiles actu, non autem actu intelligibiles.

Our passive intellect is reduced from potentiality to act by some being in act, that is, by the active intellect, which is a power of the soul, as we have said (Q79, A4), and not by a separate intelligence, as proximate cause; although perchance as remote cause.

Intellectus noster possibilis reducitur de potentia ad actum per aliquod ens actu, idest per intellectum agentem, qui est virtus quaedam animae nostrae, ut dictum est, non autem per aliquem intellectum separatum, sicut per causam proximam; sed forte sicut per causam remotam.

The intelligible species which are participated by our intellect are reduced, as to their first cause, to a first principle which is by its essence intelligible: namely, God. But they proceed from that principle by means of the sensible forms and material things, from which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii).

Species intelligibiles quas participat noster intellectus, reducuntur sicut in primam causam in aliquod principium per suam essentiam intelligibile: scilicet in Deum. Sed ab illo principio procedunt mediantibus formis rerum sensibilium et materialium, a quibus scientiam colligimus, ut Dionysius dicit.