Monday, March 09, 2009

Q81 A1: Is sensuality only an appetitive power?

Yes. Sensuality is defined as "the appetite of things belonging to the body" because the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to the bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended through the bodily senses, and thus the bodily senses appertain to sensuality as a preamble.

Sensualitas definitur esse "appetitus rerum ad corpus pertinentium" quia motus sensualitatis sit inclinatio quaedam ad sensus corporis, dum scilicet appetimus ea quae per corporis sensus apprehenduntur et sic corporis sensus pertinent ad sensualitatem quasi praeambuli.

Sensuality is divided against higher and lower reason, as having in common with them the act of movement; for the apprehensive power, to which belong the higher and lower reason, is a motive power, as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality.

Sensualitas dividitur contra rationem superiorem et inferiorem, inquantum communicant in actu motionis; vis enim cognitiva, ad quam pertinet ratio superior et inferior, est motiva, sicut et appetitiva, ad quam pertinet sensualitas.

The name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13), just as the name of a power is taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing.

Nomen sensualitatis sumptum videtur a sensuali motu, de quo Augustinus loquitur XII de Trin., sicut ab actu sumitur nomen potentiae, ut a visione visus.

Now the sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly called a movement, as the act of the appetite is, since the operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends; while the operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires is borne towards the thing desirable.

Motus autem sensualis est appetitus apprehensionem sensitivam consequens. Actus enim apprehensivae virtutis non ita proprie dicitur motus, sicut actio appetitus, nam operatio virtutis apprehensivae perficitur in hoc, quod res apprehensae sunt in apprehendente; operatio autem virtutis appetitivae perficitur in hoc, quod appetens inclinatur in rem appetibilem.

Therefore the operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest; whereas the operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement.

Et ideo operatio apprehensivae virtutis assimilatur quieti; operatio autem virtutis appetitivae magis assimilatur motui.

Wherefore by sensual movement we understand the operation of the appetitive power, so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive appetite.

Unde per sensualem motum intelligitur operatio appetitivae virtutis. Et sic sensualitas est nomen appetitus sensitivi.