Wednesday, March 04, 2009

Q79 A11: Whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers?

No. The speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers because what is accidental to the formal aspect of the object of a power, does not differentiate that power.

Intellectus speculativus et practicus non sunt diversae potentiae quia id quod accidentaliter se habet ad obiecti rationem quam respicit aliqua potentia, non diversificat potentiam.

Now, to a thing apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be directed to operation or not: and according to this the speculative and practical intellects differ.

Accidit autem alicui apprehenso per intellectum, quod ordinetur ad opus, vel non ordinetur. Secundum hoc autem differunt intellectus speculativus et practicus.

For it is the speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation.

Nam intellectus speculativus est, qui quod apprehendit, non ordinat ad opus, sed ad solam veritatis considerationem; practicus vero intellectus dicitur, qui hoc quod apprehendit, ordinat ad opus.

The speculative intellect by extension becomes practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power is not changed into another.

Intellectus speculativus per extensionem fit practicus. Una autem potentia non mutatur in aliam.

The practical intellect is a motive power, not as executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to it according to its mode of apprehension.

Intellectus practicus est motivus, non quasi exequens motum, sed quasi dirigens ad motum. Quod convenit ei secundum modum suae apprehensionis.

Truth and good include one another; for truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the aspect of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth; so the object of the practical intellect is good directed to the operation, and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth to operation.

Verum et bonum se invicem includunt, nam verum est quoddam bonum, alioquin non esset appetibile; et bonum est quoddam verum, alioquin non esset intelligibile. Sicut igitur obiectum appetitus potest esse verum, inquantum habet rationem boni, sicut cum aliquis appetit veritatem cognoscere; ita obiectum intellectus practici est bonum ordinabile ad opus, sub ratione veri. Intellectus enim practicus veritatem cognoscit, sicut et speculativus; sed veritatem cognitam ordinat ad opus.

And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10); that "the speculative differs from the practical in its end." Whence each is named from its end: the one speculative, the other practical--i.e. operative.

Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in III de anima, quod "speculativus differt a practico, fine". Unde et a fine denominatur uterque, hic quidem speculativus, ille vero practicus, idest operativus.