Visio est potior quam delectatio quia visio est causa delectationis et causa est potior effectu.
Vision ranks before delight because vision is the cause of delight and the cause is greater than its effect.
Apprehensio sensitiva non attingit ad communem rationem boni, sed ad aliquod bonum particulare quod est delectabile. Et ideo secundum appetitum sensitivum, qui est in animalibus, operationes quaeruntur propter delectationem. Sed intellectus apprehendit universalem rationem boni, ad cuius consecutionem sequitur delectatio. Unde principalius intendit bonum quam delectationem.
The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the universal formal aspect of the good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the intellect apprehends the universal formal aspect of the good, the attainment of which results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather than to delight.
Non est autem aliquid aestimandum simpliciter secundum ordinem sensitivi appetitus, sed magis secundum ordinem appetitus intellectivi.
And we should form our estimate of things not simply according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the intellectual appetite.
Istam quaestionem movet philosophus in X Ethic., et eam insolutam dimittit. Sed si quis diligenter consideret, ex necessitate oportet quod operatio intellectus, quae est visio, sit potior delectatione. Delectatio enim consistit in quadam quietatione voluntatis.
The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, the operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the will.
Quod autem voluntas in aliquo quietetur, non est nisi propter bonitatem eius in quo quietatur. Si ergo voluntas quietatur in aliqua operatione, ex bonitate operationis procedit quietatio voluntatis.
Now that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will reposes in an operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness of the operation.
Nec voluntas quaerit bonum propter quietationem; sic enim ipse actus voluntatis esset finis, quod est contra praemissa. Sed ideo quaerit quod quietetur in operatione, quia operatio est bonum eius. Unde manifestum est quod principalius bonum est ipsa operatio in qua quietatur voluntas, quam quietatio voluntatis in ipso.
Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act of the will would be the end, which has been disproved above (q1, a1, ad 2; q3, a4). But it seeks to be at rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident that the operation in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein.
Sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, "delectatio perficit operationem sicut decor iuventutem", qui est ad iuventutem consequens. Unde delectatio est quaedam perfectio concomitans visionem.
As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of youth. Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision.