1a 2ae q4 a2: Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight? Yes.

Visio est potior quam delectatio quia visio est causa delectationis et causa est potior effectu.

Vision ranks before delight because vision is the cause of delight and the cause is greater than its effect.

Apprehensio sensitiva non attingit ad communem rationem boni, sed ad aliquod bonum particulare quod est delectabile. Et ideo secundum appetitum sensitivum, qui est in animalibus, operationes quaeruntur propter delectationem. Sed intellectus apprehendit universalem rationem boni, ad cuius consecutionem sequitur delectatio. Unde principalius intendit bonum quam delectationem.

The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the universal formal aspect of the good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the intellect apprehends the universal formal aspect of the good, the attainment of which results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather than to delight.

Non est autem aliquid aestimandum simpliciter secundum ordinem sensitivi appetitus, sed magis secundum ordinem appetitus intellectivi.

And we should form our estimate of things not simply according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the intellectual appetite.

Istam quaestionem movet philosophus in X Ethic., et eam insolutam dimittit. Sed si quis diligenter consideret, ex necessitate oportet quod operatio intellectus, quae est visio, sit potior delectatione. Delectatio enim consistit in quadam quietatione voluntatis.

The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, the operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the will.

Quod autem voluntas in aliquo quietetur, non est nisi propter bonitatem eius in quo quietatur. Si ergo voluntas quietatur in aliqua operatione, ex bonitate operationis procedit quietatio voluntatis.

Now that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will reposes in an operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness of the operation.

Nec voluntas quaerit bonum propter quietationem; sic enim ipse actus voluntatis esset finis, quod est contra praemissa. Sed ideo quaerit quod quietetur in operatione, quia operatio est bonum eius. Unde manifestum est quod principalius bonum est ipsa operatio in qua quietatur voluntas, quam quietatio voluntatis in ipso.

Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act of the will would be the end, which has been disproved above (q1, a1, ad 2; q3, a4). But it seeks to be at rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident that the operation in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein.

Sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, "delectatio perficit operationem sicut decor iuventutem", qui est ad iuventutem consequens. Unde delectatio est quaedam perfectio concomitans visionem.

As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of youth. Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision.

1a 2ae q4 a1: Whether delight is required for happiness? Yes.

Delectatio requiritur ad beatitudinem quia delectatio causatur ex hoc quod appetitus requiescit in bono adepto.

Delight is necessary for happiness because it is caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained.

Unde, cum beatitudo nihil aliud sit quam adeptio summi boni, non potest esse beatitudo sine delectatione concomitante.

Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight.

Ex ipsa visione Dei causatur delectatio. Unde ille qui Deum videt, delectatione indigere non potest.

The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight.

Augustinus dicit, X Confess., quod "beatitudo est gaudium de veritate."

Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth."

1a 2ae q4: Things that are required for happiness

1. Is pleasure required for happiness?
2. Which is of greater account in happiness, pleasure or vision?
3. Is comprehension required?
4. Is rectitude of the will required?
5. Is the body necessary for man's happiness?
6. Is any perfection of the body necessary?
7. Are any external goods necessary?
8. Is the fellowship of friends necessary?

1a 2ae q3 a8: Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence? Yes.

Ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visione divinae essentiae quia homo non est perfecte beatus, quandiu restat sibi aliquid desiderandum et quaerendum.

Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence because man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek.

Uniuscuiusque potentiae perfectio attenditur secundum rationem sui obiecti. Obiectum autem intellectus est quod quid est, idest essentia rei, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde intantum procedit perfectio intellectus, inquantum cognoscit essentiam alicuius rei.

The perfection of any power is determined by the formal aspect of its object. Now the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," i.e. the essence of a thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing.

Si ergo intellectus aliquis cognoscat essentiam alicuius effectus, per quam non possit cognosci essentia causae, ut scilicet sciatur de causa quid est, non dicitur intellectus attingere ad causam simpliciter, quamvis per effectum cognoscere possit de causa an sit.

If therefore an intellect knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause "what it is", that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause is.

Et ideo remanet naturaliter homini desiderium, cum cognoscit effectum, et scit eum habere causam, ut etiam sciat de causa quid est. Et illud desiderium est admirationis, et causat inquisitionem, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys.

Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire to know about the cause, "what it is." And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2).

Puta si aliquis cognoscens eclipsim solis, considerat quod ex aliqua causa procedit, de qua, quia nescit quid sit, admiratur, et admirando inquirit. Nec ista inquisitio quiescit quousque perveniat ad cognoscendum essentiam causae.

For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some cause, and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause.

Si igitur intellectus humanus, cognoscens essentiam alicuius effectus creati, non cognoscat de Deo nisi an est; nondum perfectio eius attingit simpliciter ad causam primam, sed remanet ei adhuc naturale desiderium inquirendi causam. Unde nondum est perfecte beatus.

If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy.

Ad perfectam igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae. Et sic perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad obiectum, in quo solo beatitudo hominis consistit.

Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in which alone man's happiness consists.

Altior est beatitudo Dei suam essentiam intellectu comprehendentis, quam hominis vel Angeli videntis, et non comprehendentis.

The happiness of God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not.

1a 2ae q3 a7: Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels? No.

Ultima hominis gloria, vel beatitudo, non consistit nisi in cognitione Dei quia perfecta hominis beatitudo non consistit in eo quod est perfectio intellectus secundum alicuius participationem, sed in eo quod est per essentiam tale.

Man's final glory or happiness consists only in the knowledge of God because man's perfect happiness consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some participation, but in that which is so by its essence.

Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque intantum est perfectio alicuius potentiae, inquantum ad ipsum pertinet ratio proprii obiecti illius potentiae. Proprium autem obiectum intellectus est verum. Quidquid ergo habet veritatem participatam, contemplatum non facit intellectum perfectum ultima perfectione.

Now it is evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so insofar as the formal aspect of the proper object of that power belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of whatever has participated truth, does not perfect the intellect with its final perfection.

Attingi superiorem naturam ab inferiori contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum gradum potentiae participantis, et sic ultima perfectio hominis erit in hoc quod homo attinget ad contemplandum sicut Angeli contemplantur. Alio modo, sicut obiectum attingitur a potentia, et hoc modo ultima perfectio cuiuslibet potentiae est ut attingat ad id in quo plene invenitur ratio sui obiecti.

The lower nature may reach the higher in two ways. First, according to a degree of the participating power, and thus man's final perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained by the power, and thus the final perfection of each power is to attain that in which is found the fullness of the formal aspect of its object.

Angeli autem habent esse participatum, quia solius Dei suum esse est sua essentia, ut in primo ostensum est. Unde relinquitur quod solus Deus sit veritas per essentiam, et quod eius contemplatio faciat perfecte beatum. Aliqualem autem beatitudinem imperfectam nihil prohibet attendi in contemplatione Angelorum; et etiam altiorem quam in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum.

Now angels have the act of Be-ing by participation, because in God alone is His Be-ing His Essence, as was shown in I, 44, 1. It follows that God alone is truth in His Essence, that contemplation of Him makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we should not admit a certain imperfect happiness in the contemplation of the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative science.

Unde ultima perfectio intellectus humani est per coniunctionem ad Deum, qui est primum principium et creationis animae et illuminationis eius. Angelus autem illuminat tanquam minister, ut in primo habitum est. Unde suo ministerio adiuvat hominem ut ad beatitudinem perveniat; non autem est humanae beatitudinis obiectum.

The final perfection of the human intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of the creation of the soul and of its enlightenment. Whereas the angel enlightens as a minister, as stated in I, 111, 2, ad 2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness.

1a 2ae q3 a6: Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences? No.

Perfecta beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum essentialiter consistere non potest quia tota consideratio scientiarum speculativarum non potest ultra extendi quam sensibilium cognitio ducere potest.

Perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences because the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than knowledge of sensibles can lead.

Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod consideratio speculativae scientiae non se extendit ultra virtutem principiorum illius scientiae, quia in principiis scientiae virtualiter tota scientia continetur. Prima autem principia scientiarum speculativarum sunt per sensum accepta; ut patet per philosophum in principio Metaphys., et in fine Poster.

To prove this, we must observe that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles of that science, since the entire science is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15).

In cognitione autem sensibilium non potest consistere ultima hominis beatitudo, quae est ultima eius perfectio. Non enim aliquid perficitur ab aliquo inferiori, nisi secundum quod in inferiori est aliqua participatio superioris.

Now man's final happiness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something higher.

Omne autem quod est per aliud, reducitur ad id quod est per se. Unde oportet quod ultima perfectio hominis sit per cognitionem alicuius rei quae sit supra intellectum humanum.

Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which is of itself. Therefore man's final perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above the human intellect.

Naturaliter desideratur non solum perfecta beatitudo, sed etiam qualiscumque similitudo vel participatio ipsius.

Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but also any likeness or participation thereof.

Unde relinquitur quod ultima hominis beatitudo non possit esse in consideratione speculativarum scientiarum. Sed sicut in formis sensibilibus participatur aliqua similitudo superiorum substantiarum, ita consideratio scientiarum speculativarum est quaedam participatio verae et perfectae beatitudinis.

Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms there is a participation of the higher substances, so the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness.

Per considerationem scientiarum speculativarum reducitur intellectus noster aliquo modo in actum, non autem in ultimum et completum.

Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and perfect act.

1a 2ae q3 a5: Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative intellect? Yes.

Beatitudo magis consistit in operatione speculativi intellectus quam practici quia si beatitudo hominis est operatio, oportet quod sit optima operatio hominis: optima autem potentia est intellectus, cuius optimum obiectum est bonum divinum, quod quidem non est obiectum practici intellectus, sed speculativi.

Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than of the practical intellect because if man's happiness is an operation, it must needs be man's highest operation: and his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is the Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative intellect.

Contemplatio maxime quaeritur propter seipsam. Actus autem intellectus practici non quaeritur propter seipsum, sed propter actionem. Ipsae etiam actiones ordinantur ad aliquem finem.

Contemplation is sought principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of action. And these very actions are ordained to some end.

Ultimus hominis finis est aliquod bonum extrinsecum, scilicet Deus, ad quem per operationem intellectus speculativi attingimus.

Man's last end is something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an operation of the speculative intellect.

Intellectus practicus ordinatur ad bonum quod est extra ipsum, sed intellectus speculativus habet bonum in seipso, scilicet contemplationem veritatis. Et si illud bonum sit perfectum, ex eo totus homo perficitur et fit bonus: quod quidem intellectus practicus non habet, sed ad illud ordinat.

The practical intellect is ordained to good which is outside of it, but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz. the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the practical intellect has not, but it directs man thereto.

In vita contemplativa homo communicat cum superioribus, scilicet cum Deo et Angelis, quibus per beatitudinem assimilatur. Sed in his quae pertinent ad vitam activam, etiam alia animalia cum homine aliqualiter communicant, licet imperfectae.

In the contemplative life man has something in common with things above him, viz. with God and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things pertaining to the active life, other animals also have something in common with man, although imperfectly.

Et ideo ultima et perfecta beatitudo, quae expectatur in futura vita, tota consistit in contemplatione. Beatitudo autem imperfecta, qualis hic haberi potest, primo quidem et principaliter consistit in contemplatione, secundario vero in operatione practici intellectus ordinantis actiones et passiones humanas, ut dicitur in X Ethic.

Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and principally in contemplation, but secondarily, in an operation of the practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as stated in Ethic. x, 7,8.

Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., quod "contemplatio promittitur nobis, actionum omnium finis, atque aeterna perfectio gaudiorum."

Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting perfection of our joys."

1a 2ae q3 a4: Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the intellect? Yes.

Beatitudo hominis in cognitione Dei consistit, quae est actus intellectus, quia quantum ad id quod est essentialiter ipsa beatitudo, impossibile est quod consistat in actu voluntatis.

Man's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect, because as to the very essence of happiness, it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will.

Voluntas enim fertur in finem, et absentem (cum ipsum desiderat) et praesentem (cum in ipso requiescens delectatur). Manifestum est autem quod ipsum desiderium finis non est consecutio finis, sed est motus ad finem. Delectatio autem advenit voluntati ex hoc quod finis est praesens, non autem e converso ex hoc aliquid fit praesens, quia voluntas delectatur in ipso. Oportet igitur aliquid aliud esse quam actum voluntatis, per quod fit ipse finis praesens volenti.

For the will is directed to the end, both absent (when it desires it) and present (when it is delighted by resting therein). Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end is not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will from the end being present; and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be present to him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act of the will.

Nam a principio volumus consequi finem intelligibilem; consequimur autem ipsum per hoc quod fit praesens nobis per actum intellectus; et tunc voluntas delectata conquiescit in fine iam adepto.

For at first we desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained.

Sic igitur essentia beatitudinis in actu intellectus consistit, sed ad voluntatem pertinet delectatio beatitudinem consequens; secundum quod Augustinus dicit, X Confess., quod beatitudo est "gaudium de veritate"; quia scilicet ipsum gaudium est consummatio beatitudinis.

So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect, but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth," because, to wit, joy itself is the consummation of happiness.

Finem primo apprehendit intellectus quam voluntas, tamen motus ad finem incipit in voluntate. Et ideo voluntati debetur id quod ultimo consequitur consecutionem finis, scilicet delectatio vel fruitio.

The intellect apprehends the end before the will does, yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz., delight or enjoyment.

Dilectio praeeminet cognitioni in movendo, sed cognitio praevia est dilectioni in attingendo, non enim diligitur nisi cognitum, ut dicit Augustinus in X de Trin.

Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining, for "naught is loved save what is known," as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1).

1a 2ae q3 a3: Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part? No.

Beatitudo non consistit in operatione sensitiva quia essentialiter quidem non potest pertinere operatio sensus ad beatitudinem, nam beatitudo hominis consistit essentialiter in coniunctione ipsius ad bonum increatum, quod est ultimus finis.

Happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation because the operation of sense cannot belong to happiness essentially, for man's happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which is his last end.

Possunt autem operationes sensus pertinere ad beatitudinem antecedenter et consequenter. Antecedenter quidem, secundum beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in praesenti vita haberi potest, nam operatio intellectus praeexigit operationem sensus. Consequenter autem, in illa perfecta beatitudine quae expectatur in caelo, quia post resurrectionem, "ex ipsa beatitudine animae", ut Augustinus dicit in epistola ad Dioscorum, "fiet quaedam refluentia in corpus et in sensus corporeos, ut in suis operationibus perficiantur"—ut infra magis patebit, cum de resurrectione agetur. Non autem tunc operatio qua mens humana Deo coniungetur, a sensu dependebit.

Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection, "from the very happiness of the soul," as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"—a point which will be explained further on when we treat of the resurrection (II-II, 82 -85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united to God will not depend on the senses.

In perfecta beatitudine perficitur totus homo, sed in inferiori parte per redundantiam a superiori. In beatitudine autem imperfecta praesentis vitae, e converso a perfectione inferioris partis proceditur ad perfectionem superioris.

In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in the imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part.

1a 2ae q3 a2: Whether happiness is an operation? Yes.

Secundum quod beatitudo hominis est aliquid creatum, in ipso existens, necesse est dicere quod beatitudo hominis sit operatio, quia beatitudo est ultima hominis perfectio.

Insofar as man's happiness is something created, existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation, because happiness is man's supreme perfection.

Unumquodque autem intantum perfectum est, inquantum est actu, nam potentia sine actu imperfecta est. Oportet ergo beatitudinem in ultimo actu hominis consistere. Manifestum est autem quod operatio est ultimus actus operantis, unde et "actus secundus" a philosopho nominatur, in II de anima, nam habens formam potest esse in potentia operans, sicut sciens est in potentia considerans. Et inde est quod in aliis quoque rebus, res unaquaeque dicitur esse "propter suam operationem", ut dicitur in II de caelo. Necesse est ergo beatitudinem hominis operationem esse.

Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect. Consequently happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the Philosopher calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1), because that which has a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things, too, each one is said to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore man's happiness must of necessity consist in an operation.

Philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod "felicitas est operatio secundum virtutem perfectam."

The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue."

Solius enim Dei beatitudo est suum esse. Nam in Deo est beatitudo per essentiam, quia ipsum esse eius est operatio eius, qua non fruitur alio, sed seipso. In Angelis autem beatis est ultima perfectio secundum aliquam operationem, qua coniunguntur bono increato, et haec operatio in eis est unica et sempiterna.

Of God alone is it true that His Be-ing is His Happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially, since His very Be-ing is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good, and this operation of theirs is one only and everlasting.

In hominibus autem, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est ultima perfectio secundum operationem qua homo coniungitur Deo, sed haec operatio nec continua potest esse, et per consequens nec unica est, quia operatio intercisione multiplicatur. Et propter hoc in statu praesentis vitae, perfecta beatitudo ab homine haberi non potest.

But in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God, but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained by man.

Unde philosophus, in I Ethic., ponens beatitudinem hominis in hac vita, dicit eam imperfectam, post multa concludens, beatos autem dicimus ut homines. Sed promittitur nobis a Deo beatitudo perfecta, quando erimus sicut Angeli in caelo, sicut dicitur Matth. XXII.

Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as men." But God has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be "as the angels . . . in heaven" (Matthew 22:30).

Una et continua et sempiterna operatione, in illo beatitudinis statu, mens hominis Deo coniungetur. Sed in praesenti vita, quantum deficimus ab unitate et continuitate talis operationis, tantum deficimus a beatitudinis perfectione.

In that state of happiness, man's mind will be united to God by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation, so do we fall short of perfect happiness.

Est tamen aliqua participatio beatitudinis, et tanto maior, quanto operatio potest esse magis continua et una. Et ideo in activa vita, quae circa multa occupatur, est minus de ratione beatitudinis quam in vita contemplativa, quae versatur circa unum: idest circa veritatis contemplationem.

Nevertheless it is a participation of happiness, and so much the greater, as the operation can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life, which is busy with many things, has less of the formal aspect of happiness than the contemplative life, which is busied with one thing: i.e., the contemplation of truth.

1a 2ae q3 a1: Whether happiness is something uncreated? No.

Beatitudo non est aliquid increatum quia ultimus hominis finis est bonum increatum, scilicet Deus, qui solus sua infinita bonitate potest voluntatem hominis perfecte implere; sed ultimus finis hominis est aliquid creatum, in ipso existens, quod nihil est aliud quam adeptio vel fruitio finis ultimi—ultimus autem finis vocatur beatitudo.

Happiness is not something uncreated because man's last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will; but man's last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of the last end—called happiness.

Si ergo beatitudo hominis consideretur quantum ad causam vel obiectum, sic est aliquid increatum; si autem consideretur quantum ad ipsam essentiam beatitudinis, sic est aliquid creatum.

If, therefore, we consider man's happiness in its cause or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something created.

Deus est beatitudo per essentiam suam, non enim per adeptionem aut participationem alicuius alterius beatus est, sed per essentiam suam. Homines autem sunt beati, sicut dicit Boetius, per participationem; sicut et "dii" per participationem dicuntur. Ipsa autem participatio beatitudinis secundum quam homo dicitur beatus, aliquid creatum est.

God is happiness by His Essence, for He is happy not by acquisition or participation of something else, but by His Essence. On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by participation; just as they are called "gods," by participation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy, is something created.

1a 2ae q3: What is happiness

1. Is happiness something uncreated?
2. If it be something created, is it an operation?
3. Is it an operation of the sensitive, or only of the intellectual part?
4. If it be an operation of the intellectual part, is it an operation of the intellect, or of the will?
5. If it be an operation of the intellect, is it an operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect?
6. If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, does it consist in the consideration of speculative sciences?
7. Does it consist in the consideration of separate substances viz. angels?
8. Does it consist in the sole contemplation of God seen in His Essence?

1a 2ae q2 a8: Whether any created good constitutes man's happiness? No.

Impossibile est beatitudinem hominis esse in aliquo bono creato quia bonum creatum non est minus quam bonum cuius homo est capax (ut rei intrinsecae et inhaerentis), est tamen minus quam bonum cuius est capax, ut obiecti, quod est infinitum.

It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness because created good is not less than that good of which man is capable (as of something intrinsic and inherent to him), but it is less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite.

Obiectum autem voluntatis, quae est appetitus humanus, est universale bonum; sicut obiectum intellectus est universale verum. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare voluntatem hominis, nisi bonum universale.

Now the object of the will, i.e. of man's appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's will, save the universal good.

Quod non invenitur in aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo, quia omnis creatura habet bonitatem participatam.

This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone, because every creature has goodness by participation.

Universitas autem creaturarum, ad quam comparatur homo ut pars ad totum, non est ultimus finis, sed ordinatur in Deum sicut in ultimum finem.

Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to God, as to its last end.

Unde solus Deus voluntatem hominis implere potest; secundum quod dicitur in Psalmo CII, "qui replet in bonis desiderium tuum". In solo igitur Deo beatitudo hominis consistit.

Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Psalm 102:5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness.

Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, "ut vita carnis anima est, ita beata vita hominis Deus est".

Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): "As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness".

1a 2ae q2 a7: Whether some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness? No.

In nullo bono animae beatitudo consistit quia beatitudo ipsa, cum sit perfectio animae, est quoddam animae bonum inhaerens, sed id in quo beatitudo consistit (quod scilicet beatum facit) est aliquid extra animam.

Happiness consists in no good of the soul because happiness itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul, but that which constitutes happiness (viz. which makes man happy) is something outside his soul.

Sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de Doctr. Christ., "id in quo constituitur beata vita, propter se diligendum est". Sed homo non est propter seipsum diligendus, sed quidquid est in homine, est diligendum propter Deum.

As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake"; but man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man, is to be loved for God's sake.

Sicut supra dictum est, finis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet ipsa res quam adipisci desideramus; et usus, seu adeptio aut possessio illius rei. Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam rem quam appetimus sicut ultimum finem, impossibile est quod ultimus finis hominis sit ipsa anima, vel aliquid eius.

As stated above (q1 a8), the end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak of man's last end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul itself or something belonging to it.

Ipsa enim anima, in se considerata, est ut in potentia existens, fit enim de potentia sciente actu sciens, et de potentia virtuosa actu virtuosa. Cum autem potentia sit propter actum, sicut propter complementum, impossibile est quod id quod est secundum se in potentia existens, habeat rationem ultimi finis. Unde impossibile est quod ipsa anima sit ultimus finis sui ipsius.

Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality, for it becomes knowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its fulfillment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot have the formal aspect of last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last end.

Similiter etiam neque aliquid eius, sive sit potentia, sive habitus, sive actus. Bonum enim quod est ultimus finis, est bonum perfectum complens appetitum. Appetitus autem humanus—qui est voluntas—est boni universalis. Quodlibet bonum autem inhaerens ipsi animae, est bonum participatum, et per consequens particulatum. Unde impossibile est quod aliquod eorum sit ultimus finis hominis.

In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now the human appetite—which is the will—is for the universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man's last end.

Sed si loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam adeptionem vel possessionem, seu quemcumque usum ipsius rei quae appetitur ut finis, sic ad ultimum finem pertinet aliquid hominis ex parte animae, quia homo per animam beatitudinem consequitur. Res ergo ipsa quae appetitur ut finis, est id in quo beatitudo consistit, et quod beatum facit; sed huius rei adeptio vocatur beatitudo. Unde dicendum est quod beatitudo est aliquid animae; sed id in quo consistit beatitudo, est aliquid extra animam.

But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end, since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.

Beatitudo maxime amatur tanquam bonum concupitum, amicus autem amatur tanquam id cui concupiscitur bonum; et sic etiam homo amat seipsum.

Happiness is loved above all, as the good desired, whereas a friend is loved as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself.

1a 2ae q2 a6: Whether man's happiness consists in pleasure? No.

Beatitudo, quae est summum bonum, non consistit in voluptate, quia omnes appetunt delectationem, sicut et appetunt bonum, et tamen delectationem (quae nihil est aliud quam quietatio appetitus in bono) appetunt ratione boni, et non e converso.

Happiness, which is the supreme good, does not consist in pleasure, because all desire delight in the same way as they desire good, and yet they desire delight (which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good) under the formal aspect of the good and not conversely.

Unde non sequitur quod delectatio sit maximum et per se bonum, sed quod unaquaeque delectatio consequatur aliquod bonum, et quod aliqua delectatio consequatur id quod est per se et maximum bonum.

Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good.

Quia in unaquaque re aliud est quod pertinet ad essentiam eius, aliud est proprium accidens ipsius (sicut in homine aliud est quod est animal rationale mortale, aliud quod est risibile), est igitur considerandum quod omnis delectatio est quoddam proprium accidens quod consequitur beatitudinem, vel aliquam beatitudinis partem, ex hoc enim aliquis delectatur quod habet bonum aliquod sibi conveniens, vel in re, vel in spe, vel saltem in memoria.

Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is distinct from its proper accident (just as in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal), we must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness, since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory.

Bonum autem conveniens, si quidem sit perfectum, est ipsa hominis beatitudo; si autem sit imperfectum, est quaedam beatitudinis participatio, vel propinqua, vel remota, vel saltem apparens. Unde manifestum est quod nec ipsa delectatio, quae consequitur bonum perfectum, est ipsa essentia beatitudinis, sed quoddam consequens ad ipsam sicut per se accidens.

Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good, is precisely man's happiness; and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident.

Vehemens appetitus delectationis sensibilis contingit ex hoc quod operationes sensuum, quia sunt principia nostrae cognitionis, sunt magis perceptibiles. Unde etiam a pluribus delectationes sensibiles appetuntur.

The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.

"Quia delectationes corporales pluribus notae sunt, assumpserunt sibi nomen voluptatum," ut dicitur VII Ethic., cum tamen sint aliae delectationes potiores. In quibus tamen beatitudo principaliter non consistit.

Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13), although other delights excel them; and yet happiness does not consist in them.

Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., "tristes exitus esse voluptatum, quisquis reminisci libidinum suarum volet, intelliget. Quae si beatos efficere possent, nihil causae est quin pecudes quoque beatae esse dicantur."

Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had a sad ending; and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy too."

1a 2ae q2 a5: Whether man's happiness consists in any bodily good? No.

Beatitudo hominis non consistit in bonis corporis quia impossibile est quod ultimus finis rationis et voluntatis humanae sit conservatio humani esse, quia manifestum est quod homo ordinatur ad aliquid sicut ad finem: non enim homo est summum bonum.

Man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body because the last end of human reason and will cannot be the preservation of the act of human existence, for it is evident that man is ordained to something as to his end: since man is not the supreme good.

Esse enim hominis consistit in anima et corpore, et quamvis esse corporis dependeat ab anima, esse tamen humanae animae non dependet a corpore, ut supra ostensum es.

For the act of human existence consists in soul and body, and although the act of existence of the body depends on the soul, yet the act of existence of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above (I, 75, 2).

Unde omnia bona corporis ordinantur ad bona animae, sicut ad finem. Unde impossibile est quod in bonis corporis beatitudo consistat, quae est ultimus hominis finis.

Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is man's last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.

1a 2ae q2 a4: Whether man's happiness consists in power? No.

Impossibile est beatitudinem in potestate consistere: primo quidem, quia potestas habet rationem principii (ut patet in V Metaphys), beatitudo autem habet rationem ultimi finis; secundo, quia potestas se habet ad bonum et ad malum, beatitudo autem est proprium et perfectum hominis bonum.

It is impossible for happiness to consist in power: first, because power has the formal aspect of principle (as is stated in Metaph. v, 12), whereas happiness has the formal aspect of last end; secondly, because power has relation to good and to evil, whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good.

Unde magis posset consistere beatitudo aliqua in bono usu potestatis, qui est per virtutem, quam in ipsa potestate.

Wherefore some happiness might consist instead in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather than in power itself.

Divina potestas est sua bonitas, unde uti sua potestate non potest nisi bene. Sed hoc in hominibus non invenitur. Unde non sufficit ad beatitudinem hominis quod assimiletur Deo quantum ad potestatem, nisi etiam assimiletur ei quantum ad bonitatem.

God's power is His goodness, hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it is not enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he become like Him in goodness also.

Praemissa autem quatuor bona magis sunt a causis exterioribus, et ut plurimum a fortuna, unde et bona fortunae dicuntur. Unde patet quod in praemissis nullo modo beatitudo consistit.

Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune, for which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing.

1a 2ae q2 a3: Whether man's happiness consists in fame or glory? No.

Beatitudo hominis non consistit in fama seu gloria quia perfectio humani boni, quae beatitudo dicitur, non potest causari a notitia humana, sed magis notitia humana de beatitudine alicuius procedit et quodammodo causatur ab ipsa humana beatitudine, vel inchoata vel perfecta.

Man's happiness does not consist in fame or glory because the perfection of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human knowledge, but rather human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect.

Bonum alicuius hominis quod per famam vel gloriam est in cognitione multorum, si cognitio quidem vera sit, oportet quod derivetur a bono existente in ipso homine, et sic praesupponit beatitudinem perfectam vel inchoatam.

A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived from good existing in the man himself, and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness.

Si autem cognitio falsa sit, non concordat rei, et sic bonum non invenitur in eo cuius fama celebris habetur. Unde patet quod fama nullo modo potest facere hominem beatum.

But if the knowledge be false, it does not harmonize with the thing, and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that fame can nowise make man happy.

Res autem cognita aliter comparatur ad cognitionem humanam, et aliter ad cognitionem divinam, humana enim cognitio a rebus cognitis causatur, sed divina cognitio est causa rerum cognitarum.

Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's knowledge, for human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God's knowledge is the cause of the things known.

Sed bonum hominis dependet, sicut ex causa, ex cognitione Dei. Et ideo ex gloria quae est apud Deum, dependet beatitudo hominis sicut ex causa sua.

Man's good depends on God's knowledge as its cause, and therefore man's beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God.

Est etiam aliud considerandum, quod humana notitia saepe fallitur, et praecipue in singularibus contingentibus, cuiusmodi sunt actus humani. Et ideo frequenter humana gloria fallax est. Sed quia Deus falli non potest, eius gloria semper vera est.

We must observe that human knowledge often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true.

Fama non habet stabilitatem, immo falso rumore de facili perditur. Et si stabilis aliquando perseveret, hoc est per accidens. Sed beatitudo habet per se stabilitatem, et semper.

Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But happiness endures of itself, and for ever.

1a 2ae q2 a2: Whether man's happiness consists in honors? No.

In honore beatitudo non consistit quia verum praemium virtutis est ipsa beatitudo, propter quam virtuosi operantur; si autem propter honorem operarentur, iam non esset virtus, sed magis ambitio.

Happiness does not consist in honor because virtue's true reward is happiness itself, for which the virtuous work; whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be virtue, but instead ambition.

Sicut philosophus dicit, honor non est praemium virtutis propter quod virtuosi operantur, sed accipiunt honorem ab hominibus loco praemii, "quasi a non habentibus aliquid maius ad dandum".

As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work, but they receive honor from men instead of a reward, "as from those who have nothing greater to offer."

Honor enim exhibetur alicui propter aliquam eius excellentiam; et ita est signum et testimonium quoddam illius excellentiae quae est in honorato. Excellentia autem hominis maxime attenditur secundum beatitudinem, quae est hominis bonum perfectum, et secundum partes eius, idest secundum illa bona quibus aliquid beatitudinis participatur. Et ideo honor potest quidem consequi beatitudinem, sed principaliter in eo beatitudo consistere non potest.

For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion especially to his happiness, which is man's perfect good, and to its parts, i.e. to those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally consist therein.

Beatitudo est in beato. Honor autem non est in eo qui honoratur, sed magis in honorante, qui reverentiam exhibet honorato, ut philosophus dicit in I Ethic.

Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5).

1a 2ae q2 a1: Whether man's happiness consists in wealth? No.

In divitiis beatitudo non consistit quia quaeruntur propter aliud, scilicet ad sustentandam naturam hominis; et ideo non possunt esse ultimus finis hominis, sed magis ordinantur ad hominem sicut ad finem.

Man's happiness does not consist in wealth because it is sought for the sake of something else, viz., as a support of human nature; consequently it cannot be man's last end, rather is it ordained to man as to its end.

Appetitus naturalium divitiarum non est infinitus, quia secundum certam mensuram naturae sufficiunt. Sed appetitus divitiarum artificialium est infinitus, quia deservit concupiscentiae inordinatae, quae non modificatur, ut patet per philosophum in I Polit.

The desire for natural riches is not infinite, because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear (Polit. i, 3).

Omnia corporalia obediunt pecuniae, quantum ad multitudinem stultorum, qui sola corporalia bona cognoscunt, quae pecunia acquiri possunt. Iudicium autem de bonis humanis non debet sumi a stultis, sed a sapientibus; sicut et iudicium de saporibus ab his qui habent gustum bene dispositum.

All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise; just as it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable.