Saturday, September 26, 2009

1a 2ae q3 a5: Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative intellect? Yes.

Beatitudo magis consistit in operatione speculativi intellectus quam practici quia si beatitudo hominis est operatio, oportet quod sit optima operatio hominis: optima autem potentia est intellectus, cuius optimum obiectum est bonum divinum, quod quidem non est obiectum practici intellectus, sed speculativi.

Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than of the practical intellect because if man's happiness is an operation, it must needs be man's highest operation: and his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is the Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative intellect.

Contemplatio maxime quaeritur propter seipsam. Actus autem intellectus practici non quaeritur propter seipsum, sed propter actionem. Ipsae etiam actiones ordinantur ad aliquem finem.

Contemplation is sought principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of action. And these very actions are ordained to some end.

Ultimus hominis finis est aliquod bonum extrinsecum, scilicet Deus, ad quem per operationem intellectus speculativi attingimus.

Man's last end is something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an operation of the speculative intellect.

Intellectus practicus ordinatur ad bonum quod est extra ipsum, sed intellectus speculativus habet bonum in seipso, scilicet contemplationem veritatis. Et si illud bonum sit perfectum, ex eo totus homo perficitur et fit bonus: quod quidem intellectus practicus non habet, sed ad illud ordinat.

The practical intellect is ordained to good which is outside of it, but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz. the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the practical intellect has not, but it directs man thereto.

In vita contemplativa homo communicat cum superioribus, scilicet cum Deo et Angelis, quibus per beatitudinem assimilatur. Sed in his quae pertinent ad vitam activam, etiam alia animalia cum homine aliqualiter communicant, licet imperfectae.

In the contemplative life man has something in common with things above him, viz. with God and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things pertaining to the active life, other animals also have something in common with man, although imperfectly.

Et ideo ultima et perfecta beatitudo, quae expectatur in futura vita, tota consistit in contemplatione. Beatitudo autem imperfecta, qualis hic haberi potest, primo quidem et principaliter consistit in contemplatione, secundario vero in operatione practici intellectus ordinantis actiones et passiones humanas, ut dicitur in X Ethic.

Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and principally in contemplation, but secondarily, in an operation of the practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as stated in Ethic. x, 7,8.

Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., quod "contemplatio promittitur nobis, actionum omnium finis, atque aeterna perfectio gaudiorum."

Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting perfection of our joys."