Yes. It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of man, to signify the social union of man and woman.
Conveniens fuit mulierem formari de costa viri, ad significandum quod inter virum et mulierem debet esse socialis coniunctio.
Some say that the woman's body was formed by a material increase, without anything being added; in the same way as our Lord multiplied the five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such an increase of matter would either be by a change of the very substance of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. Not by change of the substance of the matter, both because matter, considered in itself, is quite unchangeable, since it has a potential existence, and has nothing but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and size are extraneous to the essence of matter itself.
Quidam dicunt per multiplicationem materiae absque alterius additione, formatum fuisse corpus mulieris; ad modum quo dominus quinque panes multiplicavit. Sed hoc est omnino impossibile. Multiplicatio enim praedicta aut accidit secundum transmutationem substantiae ipsius materiae; aut secundum transmutationem dimensionum eius. Non autem secundum transmutationem substantiae ipsius materiae, tum quia materia in se considerata, est omnino intransmutabilis, utpote existens in potentia, et habens solum rationem subiecti; tum etiam quia multitudo et magnitudo sunt praeter essentiam ipsius materiae.
Wherefore multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as the matter itself remains the same without anything added to it; unless it receives greater dimensions. This implies rarefaction, which is for the same matter to receive greater dimensions, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv). To say, therefore, that the same matter is enlarged, without being rarefied, is to combine contradictories --viz. the definition with the absence of the thing defined.
Et ideo nullo modo potest multiplicatio materiae intelligi, eadem materia manente absque additione, nisi per hoc quod maiores dimensiones accipiat. Hoc autem est rarefieri, scilicet materiam eandem accipere maiores dimensiones, ut philosophus dicit in IV Physic. Dicere ergo materiam multiplicari absque rarefactione, est ponere contradictoria simul, scilicet definitionem absque definito.
Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of matter, we must admit an addition of matter: either by creation, or which is more probable, by conversion. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in Joan.) that "Christ filled five thousand men with five loaves, in the same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest of corn"--that is, by transformation of the nourishment. Nevertheless, we say that the crowds were fed with five loaves, or that woman was made from the rib, because an addition was made to the already existing matter of the loaves and of the rib.
Unde, cum non appareat rarefactio in talibus multiplicationibus, necesse est ponere additionem materiae, vel per creationem; vel, quod probabilius est, per conversionem. Unde Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., quod "hoc modo Christus ex quinque panibus satiavit quinque millia hominum, quomodo ex paucis granis producit multitudinem segetum"; quod fit per conversionem alimenti. Dicitur tamen vel ex quinque panibus turbas pavisse, vel ex costa mulierem formasse, quia additio facta est ad materiam praeexistentem costae vel panum.
"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.
Tuesday, May 05, 2009
Monday, May 04, 2009
Q92 A2: Whether woman should have been made from man?
Yes. It was suitable for the woman to be made out of man, as out of her principle, because it gave the first man a certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is the principle of the whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to God, was the principle of the whole human race.
Convenienter ex viro formata est femina, sicut ex suo principio, quia in hoc quaedam dignitas primo homini servaretur, ut, secundum Dei similitudinem, esset ipse principium totius suae speciei, sicut Deus est principium totius universi.
Woman, however, was not produced from man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone.
Sed mulier non est producta a viro per naturalem generationem, sed sola virtute divina.
Convenienter ex viro formata est femina, sicut ex suo principio, quia in hoc quaedam dignitas primo homini servaretur, ut, secundum Dei similitudinem, esset ipse principium totius suae speciei, sicut Deus est principium totius universi.
Woman, however, was not produced from man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone.
Sed mulier non est producta a viro per naturalem generationem, sed sola virtute divina.
Sunday, May 03, 2009
Q92 A1: Whether the woman should have been made in the first production of things?
Yes. It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture says, as a "helper" to man, as a helper in the work of generation, because the human being is yet further ordered to a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation.
Necessarium fuit feminam fieri, sicut Scriptura dicit, in adiutorium viri, in adiutorium generationis, quia homo adhuc ordinatur ad nobilius opus vitae, quod est intelligere.
The noblest vital function in plants is generation. ... Among animals there is a vital operation nobler than generation, to which their life is principally directed; therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the female in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition.
Non enim est in plantis aliquod nobilius opus vitae quam generatio. ... Et quia est aliquod opus vitae nobilius in animalibus quam generatio, ad quod eorum vita principaliter ordinatur; ideo non omni tempore sexus masculinus feminino coniungitur in animalibus perfectis, sed solum tempore coitus.
It would seem that the woman should not have been made in the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 3), that "the female is a fortuitous male."
Videtur quod mulier non debuit produci in prima rerum productione. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de Generat. Animal., quod "femina est mas occasionatus."
On the one hand, when looking retrospectively at the particular nature, the female is something disappeared and fortuitous, for the active force in the seed of the male tends to the production of a complete likeness of itself, according to the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from infirmity in the active force, or from some contrary material arrangement, or even from some transposition by something external, e.g., such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2).
Per respectum ad naturam particularem, femina est aliquid deficiens et occasionatum, quia virtus activa quae est in semine maris, intendit producere sibi simile perfectum, secundum masculinum sexum; sed quod femina generetur, hoc est propter virtutis activae debilitatem, vel propter aliquam materiae indispositionem, vel etiam propter aliquam transmutationem ab extrinseco, puta a ventis Australibus, qui sunt humidi, ut dicitur in libro de Generat. Animal.
On the other hand, in relation to general human nature, the female is not something randomly fortuitous, but is ordered by nature's intention as directed to the work of generation.
Sed per comparationem ad naturam universalem, femina non est aliquid occasionatum, sed est de intentione naturae ad opus generationis ordinata.
However, the general intention of nature depends on God, Who is the general Author of nature. Therefore, in the first establishment of human nature, God brought forth not only the male but also the female.
Intentio autem naturae universalis dependet ex Deo, qui est universalis auctor naturae. Et ideo instituendo naturam, non solum marem, sed etiam feminam produxit.
Good order would have been wanting in the human community if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection a woman is naturally subject to a man, because in a human being the distinction of reason naturally predominates. Nor is inequality among humans excluded by the state of innocence.
Defuisset enim bonum ordinis in humana multitudine, si quidam per alios sapientiores gubernati non fuissent. Et sic ex tali subiectione naturaliter femina subiecta est viro, quia naturaliter in homine magis abundat discretio rationis. Nec inaequalitas hominum excluditur per innocentiae statum, ut infra dicetur.
If God had deprived the world of all those things which for humans proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been imperfect. Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that particular evil might be avoided; especially as God is so powerful that He can direct any evil to a good end.
Si omnia ex quibus homo sumpsit occasionem peccandi, Deus subtraxisset a mundo, remansisset universum imperfectum. Nec debuit bonum commune tolli, ut vitaretur particulare malum, praesertim cum Deus sit adeo potens, ut quodlibet malum possit ordinare in bonum.
It is written (Genesis 2:18): "It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself."
Dicitur Gen. II, "non est bonum hominem esse solum; faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi."
Necessarium fuit feminam fieri, sicut Scriptura dicit, in adiutorium viri, in adiutorium generationis, quia homo adhuc ordinatur ad nobilius opus vitae, quod est intelligere.
The noblest vital function in plants is generation. ... Among animals there is a vital operation nobler than generation, to which their life is principally directed; therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the female in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition.
Non enim est in plantis aliquod nobilius opus vitae quam generatio. ... Et quia est aliquod opus vitae nobilius in animalibus quam generatio, ad quod eorum vita principaliter ordinatur; ideo non omni tempore sexus masculinus feminino coniungitur in animalibus perfectis, sed solum tempore coitus.
It would seem that the woman should not have been made in the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 3), that "the female is a fortuitous male."
Videtur quod mulier non debuit produci in prima rerum productione. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de Generat. Animal., quod "femina est mas occasionatus."
On the one hand, when looking retrospectively at the particular nature, the female is something disappeared and fortuitous, for the active force in the seed of the male tends to the production of a complete likeness of itself, according to the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from infirmity in the active force, or from some contrary material arrangement, or even from some transposition by something external, e.g., such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2).
Per respectum ad naturam particularem, femina est aliquid deficiens et occasionatum, quia virtus activa quae est in semine maris, intendit producere sibi simile perfectum, secundum masculinum sexum; sed quod femina generetur, hoc est propter virtutis activae debilitatem, vel propter aliquam materiae indispositionem, vel etiam propter aliquam transmutationem ab extrinseco, puta a ventis Australibus, qui sunt humidi, ut dicitur in libro de Generat. Animal.
On the other hand, in relation to general human nature, the female is not something randomly fortuitous, but is ordered by nature's intention as directed to the work of generation.
Sed per comparationem ad naturam universalem, femina non est aliquid occasionatum, sed est de intentione naturae ad opus generationis ordinata.
However, the general intention of nature depends on God, Who is the general Author of nature. Therefore, in the first establishment of human nature, God brought forth not only the male but also the female.
Intentio autem naturae universalis dependet ex Deo, qui est universalis auctor naturae. Et ideo instituendo naturam, non solum marem, sed etiam feminam produxit.
Good order would have been wanting in the human community if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection a woman is naturally subject to a man, because in a human being the distinction of reason naturally predominates. Nor is inequality among humans excluded by the state of innocence.
Defuisset enim bonum ordinis in humana multitudine, si quidam per alios sapientiores gubernati non fuissent. Et sic ex tali subiectione naturaliter femina subiecta est viro, quia naturaliter in homine magis abundat discretio rationis. Nec inaequalitas hominum excluditur per innocentiae statum, ut infra dicetur.
If God had deprived the world of all those things which for humans proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been imperfect. Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that particular evil might be avoided; especially as God is so powerful that He can direct any evil to a good end.
Si omnia ex quibus homo sumpsit occasionem peccandi, Deus subtraxisset a mundo, remansisset universum imperfectum. Nec debuit bonum commune tolli, ut vitaretur particulare malum, praesertim cum Deus sit adeo potens, ut quodlibet malum possit ordinare in bonum.
It is written (Genesis 2:18): "It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself."
Dicitur Gen. II, "non est bonum hominem esse solum; faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi."
Saturday, May 02, 2009
Q91 A4: Whether the production of the human body is fittingly described in Scripture?
Yes. In describing man's production, Scripture uses a special way of speaking, to show that other things were made for man's sake, because we are accustomed to do with more deliberation and care what we have chiefly in mind.
Utitur Scriptura in productione hominis speciali modo loquendi, ad ostendendum quod alia propter hominem facta sunt, quia ea quae principaliter intendimus, cum maiori deliberatione et studio consuevimus facere.
Some have thought that man's body was formed first in priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused into the formed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the production of things, that God should have made either the body without the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part of human nature. This is especially unfitting as regards the body, for the body depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body.
Quidam intellexerunt corpus hominis prius tempore formatum, et postmodum Deum formato iam corpori animam infudisse. Sed contra rationem perfectionis primae institutionis rerum est, quod Deus vel corpus sine anima, vel animam sine corpore fecerit, cum utrumque sit pars humanae naturae. Et hoc etiam est magis inconveniens de corpore, quod dependet ex anima, et non e converso.
Utitur Scriptura in productione hominis speciali modo loquendi, ad ostendendum quod alia propter hominem facta sunt, quia ea quae principaliter intendimus, cum maiori deliberatione et studio consuevimus facere.
Some have thought that man's body was formed first in priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused into the formed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the production of things, that God should have made either the body without the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part of human nature. This is especially unfitting as regards the body, for the body depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body.
Quidam intellexerunt corpus hominis prius tempore formatum, et postmodum Deum formato iam corpori animam infudisse. Sed contra rationem perfectionis primae institutionis rerum est, quod Deus vel corpus sine anima, vel animam sine corpore fecerit, cum utrumque sit pars humanae naturae. Et hoc etiam est magis inconveniens de corpore, quod dependet ex anima, et non e converso.
Friday, May 01, 2009
Q91 A3: Whether the body of man was given an apt disposition?
Yes. God fashioned the human body in that disposition which was best, as most suited to such a form and to such operations, because the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its operations (since matter is for the sake of the form, and instruments are for the action of the agent).
Deus instituit corpus humanum in optima dispositione secundum convenientiam ad talem formam et ad tales operationes quia finis proximus humani corporis est anima rationalis et operationes ipsius (materia enim est propter formam, et instrumenta propter actiones agentis).
If defect exists in the disposition of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required in the body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its operations.
Si aliquis defectus in dispositione humani corporis esse videtur, considerandum est quod talis defectus sequitur ex necessitate materiae, ad ea quae requiruntur in corpore ut sit debita proportio ipsius ad animam et ad animae operationes.
God gave to each natural being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in the view of its proper end. This is what the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 7): "And because it is better so, not absolutely, but for each one's substance."
Deus unicuique rei naturali dedit optimam dispositionem, non quidem simpliciter, sed secundum ordinem ad proprium finem. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in II Physic., "et quia dignius est sic, non tamen simpliciter, sed ad uniuscuiusque substantiam."
It is written (Ecclesiastes 7:30): "God made man right."
Dicitur Eccle. VII, "Deus fecit hominem rectum."
Deus instituit corpus humanum in optima dispositione secundum convenientiam ad talem formam et ad tales operationes quia finis proximus humani corporis est anima rationalis et operationes ipsius (materia enim est propter formam, et instrumenta propter actiones agentis).
If defect exists in the disposition of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required in the body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its operations.
Si aliquis defectus in dispositione humani corporis esse videtur, considerandum est quod talis defectus sequitur ex necessitate materiae, ad ea quae requiruntur in corpore ut sit debita proportio ipsius ad animam et ad animae operationes.
God gave to each natural being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in the view of its proper end. This is what the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 7): "And because it is better so, not absolutely, but for each one's substance."
Deus unicuique rei naturali dedit optimam dispositionem, non quidem simpliciter, sed secundum ordinem ad proprium finem. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in II Physic., "et quia dignius est sic, non tamen simpliciter, sed ad uniuscuiusque substantiam."
It is written (Ecclesiastes 7:30): "God made man right."
Dicitur Eccle. VII, "Deus fecit hominem rectum."
Thursday, April 30, 2009
Q91 A2: Whether the human body was immediately produced by God?
Yes. The first human body was of necessity made immediately by God because no pre-existing body had been formed whereby another body of the same species could be generated.
Necesse fuit quod primum corpus hominis immediate formaretur a Deo quia corpus humanum nunquam formatum fuerat, cuius virtute per viam generationis aliud simile in specie formaretur.
Forms cannot be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as we have explained (Q65, A4).
Formis non competit per se fieri, sed composito, ut supra expositum est.
Although the angels are the ministers of God, as regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies beyond the angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight to the blind: and by this power He formed the body of the first man from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels could act as ministers in the formation of the body of the first man, in the same way as they will do at the last resurrection by collecting the dust.
Etsi Angeli aliquod ministerium Deo exhibeant in his quae circa corpora operatur; aliqua tamen Deus in creatura corporea facit, quae nullo modo Angeli facere possunt; sicut quod suscitat mortuos, et illuminat caecos. Secundum quam virtutem etiam corpus primi hominis de limo terrae formavit. Potuit tamen fieri ut aliquod ministerium in formatione corporis primi hominis Angeli exhiberent; sicut exhibebunt in ultima resurrectione, pulveres colligendo.
Because the agent must be like its effect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter, should produce a form which is in matter, and which form is only made by the fact that the composite is made.
Et quia oportet agens esse simile facto non convenit quod forma pura, quae est sine materia, producat formam quae est in materia, quae non fit nisi per hoc quod compositum fit.
So a form which is in matter can only be the cause of another form that is in matter, according as composite is made by composite.
Et ideo oportet quod forma quae est in materia, sit causa formae quae est in materia, secundum quod compositum a composito generatur.
Now God, though He is absolutely immaterial, can alone by His own power produce matter by creation: wherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, without the aid of any preceding material form.
Deus autem, quamvis omnino sit immaterialis, tamen solus est qui sua virtute materiam producere potest creando. Unde ipsius solius est formam producere in materia absque adminiculo praecedentis formae materialis.
An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal aspects of creatures, in two ways.
Secundum rationes causales in creaturis dicitur aliquid praeexistere dupliciter.
First, both in active and in passive potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can produce it.
Uno modo, secundum potentiam activam et passivam, ut non solum ex materia praeexistenti fieri possit, sed etiam ut aliqua praeexistens creatura hoc facere possit.
Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out of pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In this sense, according to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous works in their causal aspects.
Alio modo, secundum potentiam passivam tantum, ut scilicet de materia praeexistenti fieri possit a Deo. Et hoc modo, secundum Augustinum, corpus hominis praeextitit in operibus productis secundum causales rationes.
The movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are caused by the Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from the slime of the earth.
Motus caeli est causa transmutationum naturalium, non tamen transmutationum quae fiunt praeter naturae ordinem, et sola virtute divina, sicut quod mortui resuscitantur, quod caeci illuminantur. Quibus est simile quod homo ex limo terrae formatur.
It is written (Sirach 17:1): "God created man out of the earth."
Dicitur Eccli. XVII, "Deus de terra creavit hominem."
Necesse fuit quod primum corpus hominis immediate formaretur a Deo quia corpus humanum nunquam formatum fuerat, cuius virtute per viam generationis aliud simile in specie formaretur.
Forms cannot be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as we have explained (Q65, A4).
Formis non competit per se fieri, sed composito, ut supra expositum est.
Although the angels are the ministers of God, as regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies beyond the angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight to the blind: and by this power He formed the body of the first man from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels could act as ministers in the formation of the body of the first man, in the same way as they will do at the last resurrection by collecting the dust.
Etsi Angeli aliquod ministerium Deo exhibeant in his quae circa corpora operatur; aliqua tamen Deus in creatura corporea facit, quae nullo modo Angeli facere possunt; sicut quod suscitat mortuos, et illuminat caecos. Secundum quam virtutem etiam corpus primi hominis de limo terrae formavit. Potuit tamen fieri ut aliquod ministerium in formatione corporis primi hominis Angeli exhiberent; sicut exhibebunt in ultima resurrectione, pulveres colligendo.
Because the agent must be like its effect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter, should produce a form which is in matter, and which form is only made by the fact that the composite is made.
Et quia oportet agens esse simile facto non convenit quod forma pura, quae est sine materia, producat formam quae est in materia, quae non fit nisi per hoc quod compositum fit.
So a form which is in matter can only be the cause of another form that is in matter, according as composite is made by composite.
Et ideo oportet quod forma quae est in materia, sit causa formae quae est in materia, secundum quod compositum a composito generatur.
Now God, though He is absolutely immaterial, can alone by His own power produce matter by creation: wherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, without the aid of any preceding material form.
Deus autem, quamvis omnino sit immaterialis, tamen solus est qui sua virtute materiam producere potest creando. Unde ipsius solius est formam producere in materia absque adminiculo praecedentis formae materialis.
An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal aspects of creatures, in two ways.
Secundum rationes causales in creaturis dicitur aliquid praeexistere dupliciter.
First, both in active and in passive potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can produce it.
Uno modo, secundum potentiam activam et passivam, ut non solum ex materia praeexistenti fieri possit, sed etiam ut aliqua praeexistens creatura hoc facere possit.
Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out of pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In this sense, according to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous works in their causal aspects.
Alio modo, secundum potentiam passivam tantum, ut scilicet de materia praeexistenti fieri possit a Deo. Et hoc modo, secundum Augustinum, corpus hominis praeextitit in operibus productis secundum causales rationes.
The movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are caused by the Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from the slime of the earth.
Motus caeli est causa transmutationum naturalium, non tamen transmutationum quae fiunt praeter naturae ordinem, et sola virtute divina, sicut quod mortui resuscitantur, quod caeci illuminantur. Quibus est simile quod homo ex limo terrae formatur.
It is written (Sirach 17:1): "God created man out of the earth."
Dicitur Eccli. XVII, "Deus de terra creavit hominem."
Wednesday, April 29, 2009
Q91 A1: Whether the body of the first man was made of the slime of the earth?
Yes. The body of man is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth, because earth and water mingled are called slime, and for this reason man is called "a little world", because all creatures of the world are in a way to be found in him.
Dicitur corpus hominis de limo terrae formatum, quia limus dicitur terra aquae permixta. Et propter hoc homo dicitur "minor mundus", quia omnes creaturae mundi quodammodo inveniuntur in eo.
As God is perfect in His works, He bestowed perfection on all of them according to their capacity: "God's works are perfect" (Deuteronomy 32:4). He Himself is simply perfect by the fact that "all things are pre-contained" in Him, not as component parts, but as "united in one simple whole," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v); in the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause, according to its one virtue.
Cum Deus perfectus sit, operibus suis perfectionem dedit secundum eorum modum; secundum illud Deut. XXXII, "Dei perfecta sunt opera". Ipse autem simpliciter perfectus est, ex hoc quod "omnia in se praehabet", non per modum compositionis, sed "simpliciter et unite", ut Dionysius dicit, eo modo quo diversi effectus praeexistunt in causa, secundum unam eius essentiam.
This perfection is bestowed on the angels, inasmuch as all things which are produced by God in nature through various forms come under their knowledge. But on man this perfection is bestowed in an inferior way. For he does not possess a natural knowledge of all natural things, but is in a manner composed of all things, since he has in himself a rational soul of the genus of spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heavenly bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable temperament. As to the elements, he has them in their very substance.
Ista autem perfectio ad Angelos quidem derivatur, secundum quod omnia sunt in eorum cognitione quae sunt a Deo in natura producta, per formas diversas. Ad hominem vero derivatur inferiori modo huiusmodi perfectio. Non enim in sua cognitione naturali habet omnium naturalium notitiam, sed est ex rebus omnibus quodammodo compositus, dum de genere spiritualium substantiarum habet in se animam rationalem, de similitudine vero caelestium corporum habet elongationem a contrariis per maximam aequalitatem complexionis, elementa vero secundum substantiam.
It is written (Genesis 2:7): "God made man of the slime of the earth."
Dicitur Gen. II, "formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae."
Dicitur corpus hominis de limo terrae formatum, quia limus dicitur terra aquae permixta. Et propter hoc homo dicitur "minor mundus", quia omnes creaturae mundi quodammodo inveniuntur in eo.
As God is perfect in His works, He bestowed perfection on all of them according to their capacity: "God's works are perfect" (Deuteronomy 32:4). He Himself is simply perfect by the fact that "all things are pre-contained" in Him, not as component parts, but as "united in one simple whole," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v); in the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause, according to its one virtue.
Cum Deus perfectus sit, operibus suis perfectionem dedit secundum eorum modum; secundum illud Deut. XXXII, "Dei perfecta sunt opera". Ipse autem simpliciter perfectus est, ex hoc quod "omnia in se praehabet", non per modum compositionis, sed "simpliciter et unite", ut Dionysius dicit, eo modo quo diversi effectus praeexistunt in causa, secundum unam eius essentiam.
This perfection is bestowed on the angels, inasmuch as all things which are produced by God in nature through various forms come under their knowledge. But on man this perfection is bestowed in an inferior way. For he does not possess a natural knowledge of all natural things, but is in a manner composed of all things, since he has in himself a rational soul of the genus of spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heavenly bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable temperament. As to the elements, he has them in their very substance.
Ista autem perfectio ad Angelos quidem derivatur, secundum quod omnia sunt in eorum cognitione quae sunt a Deo in natura producta, per formas diversas. Ad hominem vero derivatur inferiori modo huiusmodi perfectio. Non enim in sua cognitione naturali habet omnium naturalium notitiam, sed est ex rebus omnibus quodammodo compositus, dum de genere spiritualium substantiarum habet in se animam rationalem, de similitudine vero caelestium corporum habet elongationem a contrariis per maximam aequalitatem complexionis, elementa vero secundum substantiam.
It is written (Genesis 2:7): "God made man of the slime of the earth."
Dicitur Gen. II, "formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae."
Tuesday, April 28, 2009
Q90 A4: Whether the human soul was produced before the body
No. Since the soul is the proper act of the body, the soul was produced in the body, because the proper act is produced in its proper potentiality.
Cum ergo anima sit proprius actus corporis, anima producta est in corpore quia actus proprius fit in potentia propria.
The soul is united to the body as its form, and is naturally a part of human nature.
Anima unitur corpori ut forma, et est naturaliter pars humanae naturae.
The soul, as a part of human nature, has its natural perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body.
Anima autem, cum sit pars humanae naturae, non habet naturalem perfectionem nisi secundum quod est corpori unita. Unde non fuisset conveniens animam sine corpore creari.
Cum ergo anima sit proprius actus corporis, anima producta est in corpore quia actus proprius fit in potentia propria.
The soul is united to the body as its form, and is naturally a part of human nature.
Anima unitur corpori ut forma, et est naturaliter pars humanae naturae.
The soul, as a part of human nature, has its natural perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body.
Anima autem, cum sit pars humanae naturae, non habet naturalem perfectionem nisi secundum quod est corpori unita. Unde non fuisset conveniens animam sine corpore creari.
Monday, April 27, 2009
Q90 A3: Whether the rational soul is produced by God immediately?
Yes. Since the rational soul cannot be produced by a change in matter, it cannot be produced, save immediately by God.
Quia anima rationalis non potest produci per transmutationem alicuius materiae, ideo non potest produci nisi a Deo immediate.
God alone can create; for the first agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of anything; while the second cause always presupposes something derived from the first cause, as above explained (Q75, A3): and every agent, that presupposes something to its act, acts by making a change therein. Therefore everything else acts by producing a change, whereas God alone acts by creation.
Solus autem Deus potest creare. Quia solius primi agentis est agere, nullo praesupposito, cum semper agens secundum praesupponat aliquid a primo agente, ut supra habitum est. Quod autem agit aliquid ex aliquo praesupposito, agit transmutando. Et ideo nullum aliud agens agit nisi transmutando; sed solus Deus agit creando.
Some have held that angels, acting by the power of God, produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is against faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot be produced except by creation (Q90, A2).
Quidam posuerunt quod Angeli, secundum quod operantur in virtute Dei, causant animas rationales. Sed hoc est omnino impossibile, et a fide alienum. Ostensum est enim quod anima rationalis non potest produci nisi per creationem.
Quia anima rationalis non potest produci per transmutationem alicuius materiae, ideo non potest produci nisi a Deo immediate.
God alone can create; for the first agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of anything; while the second cause always presupposes something derived from the first cause, as above explained (Q75, A3): and every agent, that presupposes something to its act, acts by making a change therein. Therefore everything else acts by producing a change, whereas God alone acts by creation.
Solus autem Deus potest creare. Quia solius primi agentis est agere, nullo praesupposito, cum semper agens secundum praesupponat aliquid a primo agente, ut supra habitum est. Quod autem agit aliquid ex aliquo praesupposito, agit transmutando. Et ideo nullum aliud agens agit nisi transmutando; sed solus Deus agit creando.
Some have held that angels, acting by the power of God, produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is against faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot be produced except by creation (Q90, A2).
Quidam posuerunt quod Angeli, secundum quod operantur in virtute Dei, causant animas rationales. Sed hoc est omnino impossibile, et a fide alienum. Ostensum est enim quod anima rationalis non potest produci nisi per creationem.
Wednesday, April 22, 2009
Q90 A2: Whether the soul was produced by creation?
Yes. The rational soul can be made only by creation (which, however, is not true of other forms); the reason is because, since to be made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in such a way as is suitable to its mode of existence.
Anima rationalis non potest fieri nisi per creationem (quod non est verum de aliis formis); cuius ratio est quia, cum fieri sit via ad esse, hoc modo alicui competit fieri, sicut ei competit esse.
Now that properly exists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence. Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is (modified) by it, and by this formal aspect is it called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by it something is white.
Illud autem proprie dicitur esse, quod ipsum habet esse, quasi in suo esse subsistens, unde solae substantiae proprie et vere dicuntur entia. Accidens vero non habet esse, sed eo aliquid est, et hac ratione ens dicitur; sicut albedo dicitur ens, quia ea aliquid est album.
Hence it is said Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 1 that an accident should be described as "of something rather than as something." The same aspect is to be said of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speaking, it does not belong to any non-existing form to be made, but such are said to be made through the composite substances being made.
Et propter hoc dicitur in VII Metaphys., quod accidens dicitur "magis entis quam ens". Et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis formis non subsistentibus. Et ideo nulli formae non subsistenti proprie competit fieri, sed dicuntur fieri per hoc quod composita subsistentia fiunt.
On the other hand, the rational soul is a subsistent form, as above explained (Q75, A2). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be made. And since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter--whether corporeal, which would render it a corporeal being--or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation.
Anima autem rationalis est forma subsistens, ut supra habitum est. Unde sibi proprie competit esse et fieri. Et quia non potest fieri ex materia praeiacente--neque corporali, quia sic esset naturae corporeae--neque spirituali, quia sic substantiae spirituales in invicem transmutarentur, necesse est dicere quod non fiat nisi per creationem.
The soul's simple essence is as the material element, while its participated existence is its formal element; which participated existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence, because existence naturally follows the form.
In anima est sicut materiale ipsa simplex essentia, formale autem in ipsa est esse participatum; quod quidem ex necessitate simul est cum essentia animae, quia esse per se consequitur ad formam.
The same formal aspect holds if the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as some maintain; because the said matter is not in potentiality to another form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; otherwise the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter.
Et eadem ratio esset, si poneretur composita ex quadam materia spirituali, ut quidam dicunt. Quia illa materia non est in potentia ad aliam formam, sicut nec materia caelestis corporis, alioquin anima esset corruptibilis. Unde nullo modo anima potest fieri ex materia praeiacente.
The production of act from the potentiality of matter is nothing else but something becoming actually that previously was in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen (Q75, A2), it is not educed from the potentiality of matter.
Actum extrahi de potentia materiae, nihil aliud est quam aliquid fieri actu, quod prius erat in potentia. Sed quia anima rationalis non habet esse suum dependens a materia corporali, sed habet esse subsistens, et excedit capacitatem materiae corporalis, ut supra dictum est, propterea non educitur de potentia materiae.
Anima rationalis non potest fieri nisi per creationem (quod non est verum de aliis formis); cuius ratio est quia, cum fieri sit via ad esse, hoc modo alicui competit fieri, sicut ei competit esse.
Now that properly exists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence. Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is (modified) by it, and by this formal aspect is it called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by it something is white.
Illud autem proprie dicitur esse, quod ipsum habet esse, quasi in suo esse subsistens, unde solae substantiae proprie et vere dicuntur entia. Accidens vero non habet esse, sed eo aliquid est, et hac ratione ens dicitur; sicut albedo dicitur ens, quia ea aliquid est album.
Hence it is said Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 1 that an accident should be described as "of something rather than as something." The same aspect is to be said of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speaking, it does not belong to any non-existing form to be made, but such are said to be made through the composite substances being made.
Et propter hoc dicitur in VII Metaphys., quod accidens dicitur "magis entis quam ens". Et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis formis non subsistentibus. Et ideo nulli formae non subsistenti proprie competit fieri, sed dicuntur fieri per hoc quod composita subsistentia fiunt.
On the other hand, the rational soul is a subsistent form, as above explained (Q75, A2). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be made. And since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter--whether corporeal, which would render it a corporeal being--or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation.
Anima autem rationalis est forma subsistens, ut supra habitum est. Unde sibi proprie competit esse et fieri. Et quia non potest fieri ex materia praeiacente--neque corporali, quia sic esset naturae corporeae--neque spirituali, quia sic substantiae spirituales in invicem transmutarentur, necesse est dicere quod non fiat nisi per creationem.
The soul's simple essence is as the material element, while its participated existence is its formal element; which participated existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence, because existence naturally follows the form.
In anima est sicut materiale ipsa simplex essentia, formale autem in ipsa est esse participatum; quod quidem ex necessitate simul est cum essentia animae, quia esse per se consequitur ad formam.
The same formal aspect holds if the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as some maintain; because the said matter is not in potentiality to another form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; otherwise the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter.
Et eadem ratio esset, si poneretur composita ex quadam materia spirituali, ut quidam dicunt. Quia illa materia non est in potentia ad aliam formam, sicut nec materia caelestis corporis, alioquin anima esset corruptibilis. Unde nullo modo anima potest fieri ex materia praeiacente.
The production of act from the potentiality of matter is nothing else but something becoming actually that previously was in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen (Q75, A2), it is not educed from the potentiality of matter.
Actum extrahi de potentia materiae, nihil aliud est quam aliquid fieri actu, quod prius erat in potentia. Sed quia anima rationalis non habet esse suum dependens a materia corporali, sed habet esse subsistens, et excedit capacitatem materiae corporalis, ut supra dictum est, propterea non educitur de potentia materiae.
Q90 A1: Whether the soul was made or was of God's substance?
Yes. It is evidently false that the soul is of the substance of God because it is not a pure act like God.
Manifeste falsum est animam esse de substantia Dei quia non est actus purus, sicut Deus.
Although the soul is a simple form in its essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by participation.
Etsi sit forma simplex secundum suam essentiam, non tamen est suum esse, sed est ens per participationem.
The human soul is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence -- acquires its knowledge somehow from things--and thus has various powers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is a pure act--receives nothing from any other--and admits of no variety in itself.
Anima humana est quandoque intelligens in potentia, et scientiam quodammodo a rebus acquirit, et habet diversas potentias, quae omnia aliena sunt a Dei natura, qui est actus purus, et nihil ab alio accipiens, et nullam in se diversitatem habens.
Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, 15) mentions certain opinions which he calls "exceedingly and evidently perverse, and contrary to the Catholic Faith," among which the first is the opinion that "God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself."
Augustinus, in libro de origine animae, enumerat quaedam quae dicit esse multum aperteque perversa, et fidei Catholicae adversa; inter quae primum est, quod quidam dixerunt "Deum animam non de nihilo, sed de seipso fecisse".
Manifeste falsum est animam esse de substantia Dei quia non est actus purus, sicut Deus.
Although the soul is a simple form in its essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by participation.
Etsi sit forma simplex secundum suam essentiam, non tamen est suum esse, sed est ens per participationem.
The human soul is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence -- acquires its knowledge somehow from things--and thus has various powers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is a pure act--receives nothing from any other--and admits of no variety in itself.
Anima humana est quandoque intelligens in potentia, et scientiam quodammodo a rebus acquirit, et habet diversas potentias, quae omnia aliena sunt a Dei natura, qui est actus purus, et nihil ab alio accipiens, et nullam in se diversitatem habens.
Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, 15) mentions certain opinions which he calls "exceedingly and evidently perverse, and contrary to the Catholic Faith," among which the first is the opinion that "God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself."
Augustinus, in libro de origine animae, enumerat quaedam quae dicit esse multum aperteque perversa, et fidei Catholicae adversa; inter quae primum est, quod quidam dixerunt "Deum animam non de nihilo, sed de seipso fecisse".
Tuesday, April 21, 2009
Q89 A8: Whether separated souls know what takes place on earth?
No. By natural knowledge, of which we are treating now, the souls of the dead do not know what passes on earth because the separated soul has knowledge of singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either by some vestige of previous knowledge or affection, or by the Divine order.
Secundum naturalem cognitionem, de qua nunc hic agitur, animae mortuorum nesciunt quae hic aguntur quia anima separata cognoscit singularia per hoc quod quodammodo determinata est ad illa, vel per vestigium alicuius praecedentis cognitionis seu affectionis, vel per ordinationem divinam.
The souls departed are in a state of separation from the living, both by Divine order and by their mode of existence, whilst they are joined to the world of incorporeal spiritual substances; and hence they are ignorant of what goes on among us.
Animae autem mortuorum, secundum ordinationem divinam, et secundum modum essendi, segregatae sunt a conversatione viventium, et coniunctae conversationi spiritualium substantiarum quae sunt a corpore separatae. Unde ea quae apud nos aguntur ignorant.
The souls of the blessed who see God do know all that passes here. For they are equal to the angels, of whom Augustine says that they know what happens among those living on earth. But as the souls of the blessed are most perfectly united to Divine justice, they do not suffer from sorrow, nor do they interfere in mundane affairs, except in accordance with Divine justice.
Animae sanctorum Deum videntes, omnia praesentia quae hic aguntur cognoscant. Sunt enim Angelis aequales, de quibus etiam Augustinus asserit quod ea quae apud vivos aguntur non ignorant. Sed quia sanctorum animae sunt perfectissime iustitiae divinae coniunctae, nec tristantur, nec rebus viventium se ingerunt, nisi secundum quod iustitiae divinae dispositio exigit.
The souls of the departed may care for the living, even if ignorant of their state; just as we care for the dead by pouring forth prayer on their behalf, though we are ignorant of their state. Moreover, the affairs of the living can be made known to them not immediately, but the souls who pass hence thither, or by angels and demons, or even by the revelation of the Holy Spirit.
Animae mortuorum possunt habere curam de rebus viventium, etiam si ignorent eorum statum; sicut nos curam habemus de mortuis, eis suffragia impendendo, quamvis eorum statum ignoremus. Possunt etiam facta viventium non per seipsos cognoscere, sed vel per animas eorum qui hinc ad eos accedunt, vel per Angelos seu Daemones, vel etiam spiritu Dei revelante.
That the dead appear to the living in any way whatever, is either by the special dispensation of God (in order that the souls of the dead may interfere in affairs of the living--and this is to be accounted as miraculous), or else such apparitions occur through the instrumentality of bad or good angels, without the knowledge of the departed.
Hoc quod mortui viventibus apparent qualitercumque, vel contingit per specialem Dei dispensationem (ut animae mortuorum rebus viventium intersint, et est inter divina miracula computandum), vel huiusmodi apparitiones fiunt per operationes Angelorum bonorum vel malorum, etiam ignorantibus mortuis.
Secundum naturalem cognitionem, de qua nunc hic agitur, animae mortuorum nesciunt quae hic aguntur quia anima separata cognoscit singularia per hoc quod quodammodo determinata est ad illa, vel per vestigium alicuius praecedentis cognitionis seu affectionis, vel per ordinationem divinam.
The souls departed are in a state of separation from the living, both by Divine order and by their mode of existence, whilst they are joined to the world of incorporeal spiritual substances; and hence they are ignorant of what goes on among us.
Animae autem mortuorum, secundum ordinationem divinam, et secundum modum essendi, segregatae sunt a conversatione viventium, et coniunctae conversationi spiritualium substantiarum quae sunt a corpore separatae. Unde ea quae apud nos aguntur ignorant.
The souls of the blessed who see God do know all that passes here. For they are equal to the angels, of whom Augustine says that they know what happens among those living on earth. But as the souls of the blessed are most perfectly united to Divine justice, they do not suffer from sorrow, nor do they interfere in mundane affairs, except in accordance with Divine justice.
Animae sanctorum Deum videntes, omnia praesentia quae hic aguntur cognoscant. Sunt enim Angelis aequales, de quibus etiam Augustinus asserit quod ea quae apud vivos aguntur non ignorant. Sed quia sanctorum animae sunt perfectissime iustitiae divinae coniunctae, nec tristantur, nec rebus viventium se ingerunt, nisi secundum quod iustitiae divinae dispositio exigit.
The souls of the departed may care for the living, even if ignorant of their state; just as we care for the dead by pouring forth prayer on their behalf, though we are ignorant of their state. Moreover, the affairs of the living can be made known to them not immediately, but the souls who pass hence thither, or by angels and demons, or even by the revelation of the Holy Spirit.
Animae mortuorum possunt habere curam de rebus viventium, etiam si ignorent eorum statum; sicut nos curam habemus de mortuis, eis suffragia impendendo, quamvis eorum statum ignoremus. Possunt etiam facta viventium non per seipsos cognoscere, sed vel per animas eorum qui hinc ad eos accedunt, vel per Angelos seu Daemones, vel etiam spiritu Dei revelante.
That the dead appear to the living in any way whatever, is either by the special dispensation of God (in order that the souls of the dead may interfere in affairs of the living--and this is to be accounted as miraculous), or else such apparitions occur through the instrumentality of bad or good angels, without the knowledge of the departed.
Hoc quod mortui viventibus apparent qualitercumque, vel contingit per specialem Dei dispensationem (ut animae mortuorum rebus viventium intersint, et est inter divina miracula computandum), vel huiusmodi apparitiones fiunt per operationes Angelorum bonorum vel malorum, etiam ignorantibus mortuis.
Q89 A7: Whether local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul?
No. Knowledge in the separated soul is not hindered by local distance because the soul when separated understands singulars by species derived from the Divine light, which is indifferent to what is near or distant.
Distantia localis nullo modo impedit animae separatae cognitionem quia intelligit anima separata singularia per influxum specierum ex divino lumine, quod quidem lumen aequaliter se habet ad propinquum et distans.
Some have held that the separated soul knows the singular by abstraction from the sensible. If that were so, it might be that local distance would impede its knowledge; for either the sensible would need to act upon the soul, or the soul upon the sensible; and in either case a determinate distance would be necessary. This is, however, impossible because abstraction of the species from the sensible is done through the senses and other sensible faculties which do not remain actually in the soul apart from the body.
Quidam posuerunt quod anima separata cognosceret singularia abstrahendo a sensibilibus. Quod si esset verum, posset dici quod distantia localis impediret animae separatae cognitionem; requireretur enim quod vel sensibilia agerent in animam separatam, vel anima separata in sensibilia; et quantum ad utrumque, requireretur distantia determinata. Sed praedicta positio est impossibilis, quia abstractio specierum a sensibilibus fit mediantibus sensibus et aliis potentiis sensitivis, quae in anima separata actu non manent.
The future, which is distant in time, does not actually exist, and therefore is not knowable in itself, because so far as a thing falls short of being, so far does it fall short of being knowable. But what is locally distant exists actually, and is knowable in itself.
Futura, quae distant secundum tempus, non sunt entia in actu. Unde in seipsis non sunt cognoscibilia, quia sicut deficit aliquid ab entitate, ita deficit a cognoscibilitate. Sed ea quae sunt distantia secundum locum, sunt entia in actu, et secundum se cognoscibilia.
Distantia localis nullo modo impedit animae separatae cognitionem quia intelligit anima separata singularia per influxum specierum ex divino lumine, quod quidem lumen aequaliter se habet ad propinquum et distans.
Some have held that the separated soul knows the singular by abstraction from the sensible. If that were so, it might be that local distance would impede its knowledge; for either the sensible would need to act upon the soul, or the soul upon the sensible; and in either case a determinate distance would be necessary. This is, however, impossible because abstraction of the species from the sensible is done through the senses and other sensible faculties which do not remain actually in the soul apart from the body.
Quidam posuerunt quod anima separata cognosceret singularia abstrahendo a sensibilibus. Quod si esset verum, posset dici quod distantia localis impediret animae separatae cognitionem; requireretur enim quod vel sensibilia agerent in animam separatam, vel anima separata in sensibilia; et quantum ad utrumque, requireretur distantia determinata. Sed praedicta positio est impossibilis, quia abstractio specierum a sensibilibus fit mediantibus sensibus et aliis potentiis sensitivis, quae in anima separata actu non manent.
The future, which is distant in time, does not actually exist, and therefore is not knowable in itself, because so far as a thing falls short of being, so far does it fall short of being knowable. But what is locally distant exists actually, and is knowable in itself.
Futura, quae distant secundum tempus, non sunt entia in actu. Unde in seipsis non sunt cognoscibilia, quia sicut deficit aliquid ab entitate, ita deficit a cognoscibilitate. Sed ea quae sunt distantia secundum locum, sunt entia in actu, et secundum se cognoscibilia.
Monday, April 20, 2009
Q89 A6: Whether the act of knowledge acquired here remains in the separated soul?
Yes. The act of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul, but in a different way, because through the intelligible species acquired in this life, the soul apart from the body can understand what it understood formerly, but in a different way; not by turning to phantasms, but by a mode suited to a soul existing apart from the body.
Manet in anima separata actus scientiae hic acquisitae, sed non secundum eundem modum, quia secundum species intelligibiles hic acquisitas, anima separata intelligere possit quae prius intellexit; non tamen eodem modo, scilicet per conversionem ad phantasmata, sed per modum convenientem animae separatae.
Action offers two things for our consideration--its species and its mode. Its species comes from the object, whereto the faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which is the object's similitude; whereas the mode is gathered from the power of the agent.
In actu est duo considerare, scilicet speciem actus, et modum ipsius. Et species quidem actus consideratur ex obiecto in quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis dirigitur per speciem, quae est obiecti similitudo, sed modus actus pensatur ex virtute agentis.
Thus that a person see a stone is due to the species of the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is due to the eye's visual power.
Sicut quod aliquis videat lapidem, contingit ex specie lapidis quae est in oculo, sed quod acute videat, contingit ex virtute visiva oculi.
The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused by that habit, in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just things, but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of political justice, whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethic. v, 8: Magn. Moral. i, 34).
Actus per quos acquiritur habitus, sunt similes actibus quos habitus causant, quantum ad speciem actus, non autem quantum ad modum agendi. Nam operari iusta, sed non iuste, idest delectabiliter, causat habitum iustitiae politicae, per quem delectabiliter operamur.
Manet in anima separata actus scientiae hic acquisitae, sed non secundum eundem modum, quia secundum species intelligibiles hic acquisitas, anima separata intelligere possit quae prius intellexit; non tamen eodem modo, scilicet per conversionem ad phantasmata, sed per modum convenientem animae separatae.
Action offers two things for our consideration--its species and its mode. Its species comes from the object, whereto the faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which is the object's similitude; whereas the mode is gathered from the power of the agent.
In actu est duo considerare, scilicet speciem actus, et modum ipsius. Et species quidem actus consideratur ex obiecto in quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis dirigitur per speciem, quae est obiecti similitudo, sed modus actus pensatur ex virtute agentis.
Thus that a person see a stone is due to the species of the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is due to the eye's visual power.
Sicut quod aliquis videat lapidem, contingit ex specie lapidis quae est in oculo, sed quod acute videat, contingit ex virtute visiva oculi.
The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused by that habit, in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just things, but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of political justice, whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethic. v, 8: Magn. Moral. i, 34).
Actus per quos acquiritur habitus, sunt similes actibus quos habitus causant, quantum ad speciem actus, non autem quantum ad modum agendi. Nam operari iusta, sed non iuste, idest delectabiliter, causat habitum iustitiae politicae, per quem delectabiliter operamur.
Q89 A5: Whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul?
Yes. Knowledge acquired in the present life does not remain in the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers; but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain; because it is evident that human knowledge is not corrupted through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an incorruptible faculty; and neither can the intelligible species in the passive intellect be corrupted by their contrary, for there is no contrary to intelligible "intentions," above all as regards simple intelligence of "what a thing is."
Quantum ergo ad id quod aliquis praesentis scientiae habet in inferioribus viribus, non remanebit in anima separata, sed quantum ad id quod habet in ipso intellectu, necesse est ut remaneat; quia manifestum est quod per corruptionem subiecti, scientia quae est in intellectu humano, corrumpi non potest, cum intellectus sit incorruptibilis; similiter etiam nec per contrarium corrumpi possunt species intelligibiles quae sunt in intellectu possibili, quia intentioni intelligibili nihil est contrarium; et praecipue quantum ad simplicem intelligentiam, qua intelligitur quod quid est.
Since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is "the abode of species," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), the habit of knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by considering the very actions from which knowledge arises. For "habits are like the actions whereby they are acquired" (Ethic. ii, 1).
Sed quia scientia est in intellectu, qui est locus specierum, ut dicitur in III de anima; oportet quod habitus scientiae hic acquisitae partim sit in praedictis viribus sensitivis, et partim in ipso intellectu. Et hoc potest considerari ex ipsis actibus ex quibus habitus scientiae acquiritur, nam "habitus sunt similes actibus ex quibus acquiruntur", ut dicitur in II Ethic.
Now the actions of the intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by the mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers. Hence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain facility in considering the species received: and the aforesaid sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the action of the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible object.
Actus autem intellectus ex quibus in praesenti vita scientia acquiritur, sunt per conversionem intellectus ad phantasmata, quae sunt in praedictis viribus sensitivis. Unde per tales actus et ipsi intellectui possibili acquiritur facultas quaedam ad considerandum per species susceptas; et in praedictis inferioribus viribus acquiritur quaedam habilitas ut facilius per conversionem ad ipsas intellectus possit intelligibilia speculari.
But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in the intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers, the same distinction is to be applied to habit.
Sed sicut actus intellectus principaliter quidem et formaliter est in ipso intellectu, materialiter autem et dispositive in inferioribus viribus, idem etiam dicendum est de habitu.
Quantum ergo ad id quod aliquis praesentis scientiae habet in inferioribus viribus, non remanebit in anima separata, sed quantum ad id quod habet in ipso intellectu, necesse est ut remaneat; quia manifestum est quod per corruptionem subiecti, scientia quae est in intellectu humano, corrumpi non potest, cum intellectus sit incorruptibilis; similiter etiam nec per contrarium corrumpi possunt species intelligibiles quae sunt in intellectu possibili, quia intentioni intelligibili nihil est contrarium; et praecipue quantum ad simplicem intelligentiam, qua intelligitur quod quid est.
Since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is "the abode of species," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), the habit of knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by considering the very actions from which knowledge arises. For "habits are like the actions whereby they are acquired" (Ethic. ii, 1).
Sed quia scientia est in intellectu, qui est locus specierum, ut dicitur in III de anima; oportet quod habitus scientiae hic acquisitae partim sit in praedictis viribus sensitivis, et partim in ipso intellectu. Et hoc potest considerari ex ipsis actibus ex quibus habitus scientiae acquiritur, nam "habitus sunt similes actibus ex quibus acquiruntur", ut dicitur in II Ethic.
Now the actions of the intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by the mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers. Hence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain facility in considering the species received: and the aforesaid sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the action of the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible object.
Actus autem intellectus ex quibus in praesenti vita scientia acquiritur, sunt per conversionem intellectus ad phantasmata, quae sunt in praedictis viribus sensitivis. Unde per tales actus et ipsi intellectui possibili acquiritur facultas quaedam ad considerandum per species susceptas; et in praedictis inferioribus viribus acquiritur quaedam habilitas ut facilius per conversionem ad ipsas intellectus possit intelligibilia speculari.
But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in the intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers, the same distinction is to be applied to habit.
Sed sicut actus intellectus principaliter quidem et formaliter est in ipso intellectu, materialiter autem et dispositive in inferioribus viribus, idem etiam dicendum est de habitu.
Sunday, April 19, 2009
Q89 A4: Whether the separated soul knows singulars?
Yes. The intellect does not know the singular by way of abstraction; neither does the separated soul know it thus, because the knowledge of the separated soul is confined to those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of determinate relation.
Intellectus per viam abstractionis non est cognoscitivus singularium; sic autem anima separata non intelligit, quia ad illarum rerum species vel individua cognitio animae separatae determinatur, ad quae anima separata habet aliquam determinatam habitudinem.
The separated soul has not the same relation to all singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others.
Anima separata non se habet aequaliter ad omnia singularia, sed ad quaedam habet aliquam habitudinem quam non habet ad alia.
Separated souls know some singulars, but not all, not even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider that there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of abstraction from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be directly known by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above (Q86, A1).
Animae separatae aliqua singularia cognoscunt, sed non omnia, etiam quae sunt praesentia. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod duplex est modus intelligendi. Unus per abstractionem a phantasmatibus, et secundum istum modum singularia per intellectum cognosci non possunt directe, sed indirecte, sicut supra dictum est.
The other way of understanding is by the infusion of species by God, and in that way it is possible for the intellect to know singulars. For as God knows all things, universal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of universal and individual principles (Q14, A2), so likewise separate substances can know singulars by species which are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine Essence.
Alius modus intelligendi est per influentiam specierum a Deo, et per istum modum intellectus potest singularia cognoscere. Sicut enim ipse Deus per suam essentiam, inquantum est causa universalium et individualium principiorum, cognoscit omnia et universalia et singularia, ut supra dictum est; ita substantiae separatae per species, quae sunt quaedam participatae similitudines illius divinae essentiae, possunt singularia cognoscere.
There is a difference, however, between angels and separated souls in the fact that through these species the angels have a perfect and proper knowledge of things; whereas separated have only a confused knowledge.
In hoc tamen est differentia inter Angelos et animas separatas, quia Angeli per huiusmodi species habent perfectam et propriam cognitionem de rebus, animae vero separatae confusam.
Hence the angels, by reason of their perfect intellect, through these species, know not only the specific natures of things, but also the singulars contained in those species; whereas separated souls by these species know only those singulars to which they are determined by former knowledge in this life, or by some affection, or by natural aptitude, or by the disposition of the Divine order; because whatever is received into anything is conditioned according to the mode of the recipient.
Unde Angeli, propter efficaciam sui intellectus, per huiusmodi species, non solum naturas rerum in speciali cognoscere possunt, sed etiam singularia sub speciebus contenta. Animae vero separatae non possunt cognoscere per huiusmodi species nisi solum singularia illa ad quae quodammodo determinantur, vel per praecedentem cognitionem, vel per aliquam affectionem, vel per naturalem habitudinem, vel per divinam ordinationem, quia omne quod recipitur in aliquo, determinatur in eo secundum modum recipientis.
Intellectus per viam abstractionis non est cognoscitivus singularium; sic autem anima separata non intelligit, quia ad illarum rerum species vel individua cognitio animae separatae determinatur, ad quae anima separata habet aliquam determinatam habitudinem.
The separated soul has not the same relation to all singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others.
Anima separata non se habet aequaliter ad omnia singularia, sed ad quaedam habet aliquam habitudinem quam non habet ad alia.
Separated souls know some singulars, but not all, not even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider that there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of abstraction from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be directly known by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above (Q86, A1).
Animae separatae aliqua singularia cognoscunt, sed non omnia, etiam quae sunt praesentia. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod duplex est modus intelligendi. Unus per abstractionem a phantasmatibus, et secundum istum modum singularia per intellectum cognosci non possunt directe, sed indirecte, sicut supra dictum est.
The other way of understanding is by the infusion of species by God, and in that way it is possible for the intellect to know singulars. For as God knows all things, universal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of universal and individual principles (Q14, A2), so likewise separate substances can know singulars by species which are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine Essence.
Alius modus intelligendi est per influentiam specierum a Deo, et per istum modum intellectus potest singularia cognoscere. Sicut enim ipse Deus per suam essentiam, inquantum est causa universalium et individualium principiorum, cognoscit omnia et universalia et singularia, ut supra dictum est; ita substantiae separatae per species, quae sunt quaedam participatae similitudines illius divinae essentiae, possunt singularia cognoscere.
There is a difference, however, between angels and separated souls in the fact that through these species the angels have a perfect and proper knowledge of things; whereas separated have only a confused knowledge.
In hoc tamen est differentia inter Angelos et animas separatas, quia Angeli per huiusmodi species habent perfectam et propriam cognitionem de rebus, animae vero separatae confusam.
Hence the angels, by reason of their perfect intellect, through these species, know not only the specific natures of things, but also the singulars contained in those species; whereas separated souls by these species know only those singulars to which they are determined by former knowledge in this life, or by some affection, or by natural aptitude, or by the disposition of the Divine order; because whatever is received into anything is conditioned according to the mode of the recipient.
Unde Angeli, propter efficaciam sui intellectus, per huiusmodi species, non solum naturas rerum in speciali cognoscere possunt, sed etiam singularia sub speciebus contenta. Animae vero separatae non possunt cognoscere per huiusmodi species nisi solum singularia illa ad quae quodammodo determinantur, vel per praecedentem cognitionem, vel per aliquam affectionem, vel per naturalem habitudinem, vel per divinam ordinationem, quia omne quod recipitur in aliquo, determinatur in eo secundum modum recipientis.
Q89 A3: Whether the separated soul knows all natural things?
No. Separated souls know all natural things not with a certain and proper knowledge but in a general and confused manner because the separated soul, like the angels, understands by means of species, received from the influence of the Divine light; nevertheless, as the soul by nature is inferior to an angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul apart from the body through such species does not receive perfect knowledge.
Animae separatae de omnibus naturalibus cognitionem habent, non certam et propriam, sed communem et confusam quia anima separata intelligit per species quas recipit ex influentia divini luminis, sicut et Angeli, sed tamen, quia natura animae est infra naturam Angeli, cui iste modus cognoscendi est connaturalis, anima separata per huiusmodi species non accipit perfectam rerum cognitionem.
Separated souls, therefore, have the same relation through such species to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge thereof. Now angels through such species know all natural things perfectly; because all that God has produced in the respective natures of natural things has been produced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8).
Sicut igitur se habent Angeli ad perfectam cognitionem rerum naturalium per huiusmodi species, ita animae separatae ad imperfectam et confusam. Angeli autem per huiusmodi species cognoscunt cognitione perfecta omnia naturalia, quia omnia quae Deus fecit in propriis naturis, fecit in intelligentia angelica, ut dicit Augustinus, super Gen. ad Litt.
As the soul separated from the body does not perfectly understand separate substances, so neither does it know all natural things perfectly.
Anima separata non perfecte intelligit substantias separatas ita nec omnia naturalia perfecte cognoscit, sed sub quadam confusione.
Animae separatae de omnibus naturalibus cognitionem habent, non certam et propriam, sed communem et confusam quia anima separata intelligit per species quas recipit ex influentia divini luminis, sicut et Angeli, sed tamen, quia natura animae est infra naturam Angeli, cui iste modus cognoscendi est connaturalis, anima separata per huiusmodi species non accipit perfectam rerum cognitionem.
Separated souls, therefore, have the same relation through such species to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge thereof. Now angels through such species know all natural things perfectly; because all that God has produced in the respective natures of natural things has been produced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8).
Sicut igitur se habent Angeli ad perfectam cognitionem rerum naturalium per huiusmodi species, ita animae separatae ad imperfectam et confusam. Angeli autem per huiusmodi species cognoscunt cognitione perfecta omnia naturalia, quia omnia quae Deus fecit in propriis naturis, fecit in intelligentia angelica, ut dicit Augustinus, super Gen. ad Litt.
As the soul separated from the body does not perfectly understand separate substances, so neither does it know all natural things perfectly.
Anima separata non perfecte intelligit substantias separatas ita nec omnia naturalia perfecte cognoscit, sed sub quadam confusione.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)