Wednesday, April 22, 2009

Q90 A2: Whether the soul was produced by creation?

Yes. The rational soul can be made only by creation (which, however, is not true of other forms); the reason is because, since to be made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in such a way as is suitable to its mode of existence.

Anima rationalis non potest fieri nisi per creationem (quod non est verum de aliis formis); cuius ratio est quia, cum fieri sit via ad esse, hoc modo alicui competit fieri, sicut ei competit esse.

Now that properly exists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence. Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is (modified) by it, and by this formal aspect is it called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by it something is white.

Illud autem proprie dicitur esse, quod ipsum habet esse, quasi in suo esse subsistens, unde solae substantiae proprie et vere dicuntur entia. Accidens vero non habet esse, sed eo aliquid est, et hac ratione ens dicitur; sicut albedo dicitur ens, quia ea aliquid est album.

Hence it is said Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 1 that an accident should be described as "of something rather than as something." The same aspect is to be said of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speaking, it does not belong to any non-existing form to be made, but such are said to be made through the composite substances being made.

Et propter hoc dicitur in VII Metaphys., quod accidens dicitur "magis entis quam ens". Et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis formis non subsistentibus. Et ideo nulli formae non subsistenti proprie competit fieri, sed dicuntur fieri per hoc quod composita subsistentia fiunt.

On the other hand, the rational soul is a subsistent form, as above explained (Q75, A2). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be made. And since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter--whether corporeal, which would render it a corporeal being--or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation.

Anima autem rationalis est forma subsistens, ut supra habitum est. Unde sibi proprie competit esse et fieri. Et quia non potest fieri ex materia praeiacente--neque corporali, quia sic esset naturae corporeae--neque spirituali, quia sic substantiae spirituales in invicem transmutarentur, necesse est dicere quod non fiat nisi per creationem.

The soul's simple essence is as the material element, while its participated existence is its formal element; which participated existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence, because existence naturally follows the form.

In anima est sicut materiale ipsa simplex essentia, formale autem in ipsa est esse participatum; quod quidem ex necessitate simul est cum essentia animae, quia esse per se consequitur ad formam.

The same formal aspect holds if the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as some maintain; because the said matter is not in potentiality to another form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; otherwise the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter.

Et eadem ratio esset, si poneretur composita ex quadam materia spirituali, ut quidam dicunt. Quia illa materia non est in potentia ad aliam formam, sicut nec materia caelestis corporis, alioquin anima esset corruptibilis. Unde nullo modo anima potest fieri ex materia praeiacente.

The production of act from the potentiality of matter is nothing else but something becoming actually that previously was in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen (Q75, A2), it is not educed from the potentiality of matter.

Actum extrahi de potentia materiae, nihil aliud est quam aliquid fieri actu, quod prius erat in potentia. Sed quia anima rationalis non habet esse suum dependens a materia corporali, sed habet esse subsistens, et excedit capacitatem materiae corporalis, ut supra dictum est, propterea non educitur de potentia materiae.