Voluntas potest ab aliquo exteriori moveri quia indiget moveri ab alio sicut a primo movente.
The will can be moved by something exterior because it needs to be moved by another as first mover.
De ratione voluntarii est quod principium eius sit intra, sed non oportet quod hoc principium intrinsecum sit primum principium non motum ab alio. Unde motus voluntarius etsi habeat principium proximum intrinsecum, tamen principium primum est ab extra.
The formal aspect of the voluntary act is that its principle be within the agent, but it is not necessary that this inward principle be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its first principle is from without.
Omne enim quod quandoque est agens in actu et quandoque in potentia, indiget moveri ab aliquo movente. Manifestum est autem quod voluntas incipit velle aliquid, cum hoc prius non vellet. Necesse est ergo quod ab aliquo moveatur ad volendum.
For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something to will it.
Hoc autem non est procedere in infinitum. Unde necesse est ponere quod in primum motum voluntatis voluntas prodeat ex instinctu alicuius exterioris moventis, ut Aristoteles concludit in quodam capitulo Ethicae Eudemicae.
But this process could not go on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics (vii, 14).
"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
Sunday, December 20, 2009
1a 2ae q9 a3: Whether the will moves itself? Yes.
Voluntas per hoc quod vult finem, movet seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem, quia inquantum actu vult finem, reducit se de potentia in actum respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem, ut scilicet actu ea velit.
The will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means, because inasmuch as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect of the means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.
Potentia voluntatis semper actu est sibi praesens, sed actus voluntatis, quo vult finem aliquem, non semper est in ipsa voluntate. Per hunc autem movet seipsam.
The power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself.
Voluntas movetur ab intellectu, et a seipsa. Sed ab intellectu quidem movetur secundum rationem obiecti, a seipsa vero, quantum ad exercitium actus, secundum rationem finis.
The will is moved by the intellect, and also by itself. By the intellect it is moved by the formal aspect of the object; whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, by the formal aspect of the end.
Sicut supra dictum est, ad voluntatem pertinet movere alias potentias ex ratione finis, qui est voluntatis obiectum. Sed sicut dictum est, hoc modo se habet finis in appetibilibus, sicut principium in intelligibilibus.
As stated above (q9 a1), it belongs to the will to move the other powers, by the formal aspect of the end which is the will's object. Now, as stated above (q8 a2), the end is in things appetible, what the principle is in things intelligible.
Manifestum est autem quod intellectus per hoc quod cognoscit principium, reducit seipsum de potentia in actum, quantum ad cognitionem conclusionum, et hoc modo movet seipsum. Et similiter voluntas per hoc quod vult finem, movet seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem.
But it is evident that the intellect, through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions, and thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.
The will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means, because inasmuch as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect of the means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.
Potentia voluntatis semper actu est sibi praesens, sed actus voluntatis, quo vult finem aliquem, non semper est in ipsa voluntate. Per hunc autem movet seipsam.
The power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself.
Voluntas movetur ab intellectu, et a seipsa. Sed ab intellectu quidem movetur secundum rationem obiecti, a seipsa vero, quantum ad exercitium actus, secundum rationem finis.
The will is moved by the intellect, and also by itself. By the intellect it is moved by the formal aspect of the object; whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, by the formal aspect of the end.
Sicut supra dictum est, ad voluntatem pertinet movere alias potentias ex ratione finis, qui est voluntatis obiectum. Sed sicut dictum est, hoc modo se habet finis in appetibilibus, sicut principium in intelligibilibus.
As stated above (q9 a1), it belongs to the will to move the other powers, by the formal aspect of the end which is the will's object. Now, as stated above (q8 a2), the end is in things appetible, what the principle is in things intelligible.
Manifestum est autem quod intellectus per hoc quod cognoscit principium, reducit seipsum de potentia in actum, quantum ad cognitionem conclusionum, et hoc modo movet seipsum. Et similiter voluntas per hoc quod vult finem, movet seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem.
But it is evident that the intellect, through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions, and thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.
Saturday, December 19, 2009
1a 2ae q9 a2: Whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite? Yes.
Appetitus sensitivus movet voluntatem quia secundum passionem appetitus sensitivi, immutatur homo ad aliquam dispositionem; unde secundum quod homo est in passione aliqua, videtur sibi aliquid conveniens, quod non videtur extra passionem existenti.
The sensitive appetite moves the will because according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition; wherefore according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected.
Id quod apprehenditur sub ratione boni et convenientis, movet voluntatem per modum obiecti. Quod autem aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus contingit: scilicet ex conditione eius quod proponitur, et eius cui proponitur. Conveniens enim secundum relationem dicitur, unde ex utroque extremorum dependet.
That which is apprehended under the formal aspect of good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing appear to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it depends on both extremes.
Et inde est quod gustus diversimode dispositus, non eodem modo accipit aliquid ut conveniens et ut non conveniens. Unde, ut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., "qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei."
And hence it is that taste, according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as a man is, such does the end seem to him."
Sicut philosophus dicit in I Polit., ratio, in qua est voluntas, movet suo imperio irascibilem et concupiscibilem, non quidem despotico principatu, sicut movetur servus a domino; sed principatu regali seu politico, sicut liberi homines reguntur a gubernante, qui tamen possunt contra movere. Unde et irascibilis et concupiscibilis possunt in contrarium movere ad voluntatem. Et sic nihil prohibet voluntatem aliquando ab eis moveri.
As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as a slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic sovereignty," as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times.
Dicitur Iac. I, "unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus."
It is written (James 1:14): "Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured."
The sensitive appetite moves the will because according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition; wherefore according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected.
Id quod apprehenditur sub ratione boni et convenientis, movet voluntatem per modum obiecti. Quod autem aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus contingit: scilicet ex conditione eius quod proponitur, et eius cui proponitur. Conveniens enim secundum relationem dicitur, unde ex utroque extremorum dependet.
That which is apprehended under the formal aspect of good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing appear to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it depends on both extremes.
Et inde est quod gustus diversimode dispositus, non eodem modo accipit aliquid ut conveniens et ut non conveniens. Unde, ut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., "qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei."
And hence it is that taste, according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as a man is, such does the end seem to him."
Sicut philosophus dicit in I Polit., ratio, in qua est voluntas, movet suo imperio irascibilem et concupiscibilem, non quidem despotico principatu, sicut movetur servus a domino; sed principatu regali seu politico, sicut liberi homines reguntur a gubernante, qui tamen possunt contra movere. Unde et irascibilis et concupiscibilis possunt in contrarium movere ad voluntatem. Et sic nihil prohibet voluntatem aliquando ab eis moveri.
As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as a slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic sovereignty," as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times.
Dicitur Iac. I, "unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus."
It is written (James 1:14): "Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured."
Saturday, December 05, 2009
1a 2ae q9 a1: Whether the will is moved by the intellect? Yes.
Intellectus movet voluntatem, sicut praesentans ei obiectum suum, quia primum principium formale est ens et verum universale, quod est obiectum intellectus.
The intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it, because the first formal principle is universal "being" and "truth," which is the object of the intellect.
Voluntas movet intellectum quantum ad exercitium actus, quia et ipsum verum, quod est perfectio intellectus, continetur sub universali bono ut quoddam bonum particulare. Sed quantum ad determinationem actus, quae est ex parte obiecti, intellectus movet voluntatem, quia et ipsum bonum apprehenditur secundum quandam specialem rationem comprehensam sub universali ratione veri.
The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal aspect of the true.
Sicut imaginatio formae sine aestimatione convenientis vel nocivi, non movet appetitum sensitivum; ita nec apprehensio veri sine ratione boni et appetibilis. Unde intellectus speculativus non movet, sed intellectus practicus, ut dicitur in III de anima.
Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive appetite; so neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).
Dupliciter autem aliqua vis animae invenitur esse in potentia ad diversa, uno modo, quantum ad agere et non agere; alio modo, quantum ad agere hoc vel illud. Sicut visus quandoque videt actu, et quandoque non videt; et quandoque videt album, et quandoque videt nigrum. Indiget igitur movente quantum ad duo, scilicet quantum ad exercitium vel usum actus; et quantum ad determinationem actus. Quorum primum est ex parte subiecti, quod quandoque invenitur agens, quandoque non agens, aliud autem est ex parte obiecti, secundum quod specificatur actus.
A power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects, viz. as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.
Bonum autem in communi, quod habet rationem finis, est obiectum voluntatis. Et ideo ex hac parte voluntas movet alias potentias animae ad suos actus, utimur enim aliis potentiis cum volumus. Nam fines et perfectiones omnium aliarum potentiarum comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona, semper autem ars vel potentia ad quam pertinet finis universalis, movet ad agendum artem vel potentiam ad quam pertinet finis particularis sub illo universali comprehensus; sicut dux exercitus, qui intendit bonum commune, scilicet ordinem totius exercitus, movet suo imperio aliquem ex tribunis, qui intendit ordinem unius aciei.
Good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will. For the end and perfection of every other power, is included under the object of the will as some particular good: and always the art or power to which the universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good--i.e. the order of the whole army--by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the order of one company.
Sed obiectum movet, determinando actum, ad modum principii formalis, a quo in rebus naturalibus actio specificatur.
On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are specified.
The intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it, because the first formal principle is universal "being" and "truth," which is the object of the intellect.
Voluntas movet intellectum quantum ad exercitium actus, quia et ipsum verum, quod est perfectio intellectus, continetur sub universali bono ut quoddam bonum particulare. Sed quantum ad determinationem actus, quae est ex parte obiecti, intellectus movet voluntatem, quia et ipsum bonum apprehenditur secundum quandam specialem rationem comprehensam sub universali ratione veri.
The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal aspect of the true.
Sicut imaginatio formae sine aestimatione convenientis vel nocivi, non movet appetitum sensitivum; ita nec apprehensio veri sine ratione boni et appetibilis. Unde intellectus speculativus non movet, sed intellectus practicus, ut dicitur in III de anima.
Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive appetite; so neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).
Dupliciter autem aliqua vis animae invenitur esse in potentia ad diversa, uno modo, quantum ad agere et non agere; alio modo, quantum ad agere hoc vel illud. Sicut visus quandoque videt actu, et quandoque non videt; et quandoque videt album, et quandoque videt nigrum. Indiget igitur movente quantum ad duo, scilicet quantum ad exercitium vel usum actus; et quantum ad determinationem actus. Quorum primum est ex parte subiecti, quod quandoque invenitur agens, quandoque non agens, aliud autem est ex parte obiecti, secundum quod specificatur actus.
A power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects, viz. as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.
Bonum autem in communi, quod habet rationem finis, est obiectum voluntatis. Et ideo ex hac parte voluntas movet alias potentias animae ad suos actus, utimur enim aliis potentiis cum volumus. Nam fines et perfectiones omnium aliarum potentiarum comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona, semper autem ars vel potentia ad quam pertinet finis universalis, movet ad agendum artem vel potentiam ad quam pertinet finis particularis sub illo universali comprehensus; sicut dux exercitus, qui intendit bonum commune, scilicet ordinem totius exercitus, movet suo imperio aliquem ex tribunis, qui intendit ordinem unius aciei.
Good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will. For the end and perfection of every other power, is included under the object of the will as some particular good: and always the art or power to which the universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good--i.e. the order of the whole army--by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the order of one company.
Sed obiectum movet, determinando actum, ad modum principii formalis, a quo in rebus naturalibus actio specificatur.
On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are specified.
Wednesday, December 02, 2009
1a 2ae q8 a3: Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means? No.
Non eodem actu voluntas fertur in utrumque quia diversae species boni sunt finis, et id quod est ad finem, quod dicitur utile, et actus diversificantur secundum obiecta.
The will is not moved to both by the same act because the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a useful good, and acts are diversified according to their objects.
Sic ergo voluntas in ipsum finem dupliciter fertur, uno modo, absolute secundum se; alio modo, sicut in rationem volendi ea quae sunt ad finem.
Accordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, to the end absolutely and in itself; secondly, as the formal aspect for willing the means.
Manifestum est ergo quod unus et idem motus voluntatis est quo fertur in finem, secundum quod est ratio volendi ea quae sunt ad finem, et in ipsa quae sunt ad finem. Sed alius actus est quod fertur in ipsum finem absolute.
Hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and the same movement, to the end, as the formal aspect for willing the means; and to the means themselves. But it is another act whereby the will is moved to the end absolutely.
Et quandoque praecedit tempore, sicut cum aliquis primo vult sanitatem, et postea, deliberans quomodo possit sanari, vult conducere medicum ut sanetur.
And sometimes this act precedes the other in time; for example when a man first wills to have health, and afterwards deliberating by what means to be healed, wills to send for the doctor to heal him.
The will is not moved to both by the same act because the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a useful good, and acts are diversified according to their objects.
Sic ergo voluntas in ipsum finem dupliciter fertur, uno modo, absolute secundum se; alio modo, sicut in rationem volendi ea quae sunt ad finem.
Accordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, to the end absolutely and in itself; secondly, as the formal aspect for willing the means.
Manifestum est ergo quod unus et idem motus voluntatis est quo fertur in finem, secundum quod est ratio volendi ea quae sunt ad finem, et in ipsa quae sunt ad finem. Sed alius actus est quod fertur in ipsum finem absolute.
Hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and the same movement, to the end, as the formal aspect for willing the means; and to the means themselves. But it is another act whereby the will is moved to the end absolutely.
Et quandoque praecedit tempore, sicut cum aliquis primo vult sanitatem, et postea, deliberans quomodo possit sanari, vult conducere medicum ut sanetur.
And sometimes this act precedes the other in time; for example when a man first wills to have health, and afterwards deliberating by what means to be healed, wills to send for the doctor to heal him.
Tuesday, December 01, 2009
1a 2ae q8 a2: Whether volition is of the end only? No, it is also of the means.
Si voluntas est finis, ipsa etiam est eorum quae sunt ad finem, quia ratio boni, quod est obiectum potentiae voluntatis, invenitur non solum in fine, sed etiam in his quae sunt ad finem.
If volition is of the end, it is also of the means, because the aspect of good, which is the object of the power of the will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means.
Voluntas quandoque dicitur ipsa potentia qua volumus; quandoque autem ipse voluntatis actus. Si ergo loquamur de voluntate secundum quod nominat potentiam, sic se extendit et ad finem, et ad ea quae sunt ad finem.
The word "voluntas" sometimes designates the power of the will, sometimes its act. Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to the end and to the means.
Ad ea enim se extendit unaquaeque potentia, in quibus inveniri potest quocumque modo ratio sui obiecti, sicut visus se extendit ad omnia quaecumque participant quocumque modo colorem.
For every power extends to those things in which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any way whatever: thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever that are in any way colored.
Si autem loquamur de voluntate secundum quod nominat proprie actum, sic, proprie loquendo, est finis tantum. Omnis enim actus denominatus a potentia, nominat simplicem actum illius potentiae, sicut intelligere nominat simplicem actum intellectus.
If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus "to understand" designates the simple act of the understanding.
Ea vero quae sunt ad finem, non sunt bona vel volita propter seipsa, sed ex ordine ad finem. Unde voluntas in ea non fertur, nisi quatenus fertur in finem, unde hoc ipsum quod in eis vult, est finis.
On the other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to them, only in so far as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the end.
Sicut et intelligere proprie est eorum quae secundum se cognoscuntur, scilicet principiorum, eorum autem quae cognoscuntur per principia, non dicitur esse intelligentia, nisi inquantum in eis ipsa principia considerantur.
Thus, to understand, is properly directed to things that are known in themselves, i.e. first principles: but we do not speak of understanding with regard to things known through first principles, except in so far as we see the principles in those things.
If volition is of the end, it is also of the means, because the aspect of good, which is the object of the power of the will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means.
Voluntas quandoque dicitur ipsa potentia qua volumus; quandoque autem ipse voluntatis actus. Si ergo loquamur de voluntate secundum quod nominat potentiam, sic se extendit et ad finem, et ad ea quae sunt ad finem.
The word "voluntas" sometimes designates the power of the will, sometimes its act. Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to the end and to the means.
Ad ea enim se extendit unaquaeque potentia, in quibus inveniri potest quocumque modo ratio sui obiecti, sicut visus se extendit ad omnia quaecumque participant quocumque modo colorem.
For every power extends to those things in which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any way whatever: thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever that are in any way colored.
Si autem loquamur de voluntate secundum quod nominat proprie actum, sic, proprie loquendo, est finis tantum. Omnis enim actus denominatus a potentia, nominat simplicem actum illius potentiae, sicut intelligere nominat simplicem actum intellectus.
If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus "to understand" designates the simple act of the understanding.
Ea vero quae sunt ad finem, non sunt bona vel volita propter seipsa, sed ex ordine ad finem. Unde voluntas in ea non fertur, nisi quatenus fertur in finem, unde hoc ipsum quod in eis vult, est finis.
On the other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to them, only in so far as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the end.
Sicut et intelligere proprie est eorum quae secundum se cognoscuntur, scilicet principiorum, eorum autem quae cognoscuntur per principia, non dicitur esse intelligentia, nisi inquantum in eis ipsa principia considerantur.
Thus, to understand, is properly directed to things that are known in themselves, i.e. first principles: but we do not speak of understanding with regard to things known through first principles, except in so far as we see the principles in those things.
Monday, November 30, 2009
1a 2ae q8 a1: Whether the will is of good only? Yes.
Omnis inclinatio est in bonum quia omnis res, inquantum est ens et substantia, est quoddam bonum.
Every inclination is to something good because everything, inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good.
Et inde est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt.
And hence it is that the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1) that "the good is that which all desire".
Ad hoc igitur quod voluntas in aliquid tendat, non requiritur quod sit bonum in rei veritate, sed quod apprehendatur in ratione boni.
In order that the will tend to anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended under the formal aspect of good.
Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod "finis est bonum, vel apparens bonum".
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that "the end is a good, or an apparent good".
Fuga autem mali magis dicitur noluntas. Unde sicut voluntas est boni, ita noluntas est mali.
The shunning of evil is better described as "nolition": wherefore, just as volition is of good, so nolition is of evil.
Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod "malum est praeter voluntatem, et quod omnia bonum appetunt".
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the scope of the will," and that "all things desire good."
Illud quod non est ens in rerum natura, accipitur ut ens in ratione, unde negationes et privationes dicuntur entia rationis. Per quem etiam modum futura, prout apprehenduntur, sunt entia. Inquantum igitur sunt huiusmodi entia, apprehenduntur sub ratione boni, et sic voluntas in ea tendit.
That which is not a being in nature, is considered as a being in formal aspect, wherefore negations and privations are said to be "beings of formal aspect". In this way, too, future things, insofar as they are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, insofar as such like are beings, they are apprehended under the formal aspect of good; and it is thus that the will is directed to them.
Unde philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod "carere malo habet rationem boni".
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "to lack evil is considered according to the formal aspect of a good".
Every inclination is to something good because everything, inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good.
Et inde est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt.
And hence it is that the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1) that "the good is that which all desire".
Ad hoc igitur quod voluntas in aliquid tendat, non requiritur quod sit bonum in rei veritate, sed quod apprehendatur in ratione boni.
In order that the will tend to anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended under the formal aspect of good.
Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod "finis est bonum, vel apparens bonum".
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that "the end is a good, or an apparent good".
Fuga autem mali magis dicitur noluntas. Unde sicut voluntas est boni, ita noluntas est mali.
The shunning of evil is better described as "nolition": wherefore, just as volition is of good, so nolition is of evil.
Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod "malum est praeter voluntatem, et quod omnia bonum appetunt".
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the scope of the will," and that "all things desire good."
Illud quod non est ens in rerum natura, accipitur ut ens in ratione, unde negationes et privationes dicuntur entia rationis. Per quem etiam modum futura, prout apprehenduntur, sunt entia. Inquantum igitur sunt huiusmodi entia, apprehenduntur sub ratione boni, et sic voluntas in ea tendit.
That which is not a being in nature, is considered as a being in formal aspect, wherefore negations and privations are said to be "beings of formal aspect". In this way, too, future things, insofar as they are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, insofar as such like are beings, they are apprehended under the formal aspect of good; and it is thus that the will is directed to them.
Unde philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod "carere malo habet rationem boni".
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "to lack evil is considered according to the formal aspect of a good".
Sunday, November 29, 2009
1a 2ae q7 a4: Whether the most important circumstances are "why" and "in what the act consists"? Yes.
Principalissimae circumstantiae sunt cuius gratia agitur, et quid est quod agitur, quia actus proprie dicuntur humani, prout sunt voluntarii; sed voluntatis motivum et obiectum est finis.
The most important circumstances are "why it is done" and "what is done" because acts are properly called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary; but the motive and object of the will is the end.
Finis, etsi non sit de substantia actus, est tamen causa actus principalissima, inquantum movet ad agendum. Unde et maxime actus moralis speciem habet ex fine.
Although the end is not part of the substance of the act, yet it is the most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it moves the agent to act. Wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly by the end.
Et ideo principalissima est omnium circumstantiarum illa quae attingit actum ex parte finis, scilicet cuius gratia, secundaria vero, quae attingit ipsam substantiam actus, idest quid fecit.
Therefore that circumstance is the most important of all which touches the act on the part of the end, viz. the circumstance "why": and the second in importance, is that which touches the very substance of the act, viz. the circumstance "what he did."
Aliae vero circumstantiae sunt magis vel minus principales, secundum quod magis vel minus ad has appropinquant.
As to the other circumstances, they are more or less important, according as they more or less approach to these.
The most important circumstances are "why it is done" and "what is done" because acts are properly called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary; but the motive and object of the will is the end.
Finis, etsi non sit de substantia actus, est tamen causa actus principalissima, inquantum movet ad agendum. Unde et maxime actus moralis speciem habet ex fine.
Although the end is not part of the substance of the act, yet it is the most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it moves the agent to act. Wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly by the end.
Et ideo principalissima est omnium circumstantiarum illa quae attingit actum ex parte finis, scilicet cuius gratia, secundaria vero, quae attingit ipsam substantiam actus, idest quid fecit.
Therefore that circumstance is the most important of all which touches the act on the part of the end, viz. the circumstance "why": and the second in importance, is that which touches the very substance of the act, viz. the circumstance "what he did."
Aliae vero circumstantiae sunt magis vel minus principales, secundum quod magis vel minus ad has appropinquant.
As to the other circumstances, they are more or less important, according as they more or less approach to these.
Saturday, November 28, 2009
1a 2ae q7 a3: Whether the circumstances are properly set forth in the third book of Ethics? Yes.
Circumstantia dicitur quod, extra substantiam actus existens, aliquo modo attingit ipsum, quia considerandum est in actibus quis fecit, quibus auxiliis vel instrumentis fecerit, quid fecerit, ubi fecerit, cur fecerit, quomodo fecerit, et quando fecerit.
A circumstance is described as something outside the substance of the act, and yet in a way touching it, because in acts we must take note of "who" did it, "by what aids" or "instruments" he did it, "what" he did, "where" he did it, "why" he did it, "how" and "when" he did it.
Tullius, in sua rhetorica, assignat septem circumstantias, quae hoc versu continentur, "quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando".
Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhetor. i), gives seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse: "who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when".
Sed Aristoteles, in III Ethic., addit aliam, scilicet circa quid, quae a Tullio comprehenditur sub quid.
But Aristotle in Ethic. iii, 1 adds yet another, to wit, "about what", which Tully includes in the circumstance "what".
Contingit autem hoc fieri tripliciter, uno modo, inquantum attingit ipsum actum; alio modo, inquantum attingit causam actus; tertio modo, inquantum attingit effectum.
Ipsum autem actum attingit, vel per modum mensurae, sicut tempus et locus;
vel per modum qualitatis actus, sicut modus agendi.
Ex parte autem effectus, ut cum consideratur quid aliquis fecerit.
Ex parte vero causae actus, quantum ad causam finalem, accipitur propter quid;
ex parte autem causae materialis, sive obiecti, accipitur circa quid;
ex parte vero causae agentis principalis, accipitur quis egerit;
ex parte vero causae agentis instrumentalis, accipitur quibus auxiliis.
Now this happens in three ways: first, inasmuch as it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as it touches the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the effect.
It touches the act itself, either by way of measure, as "time" and "place";
or by qualifying the act as the "mode of acting."
It touches the effect when we consider "what" is done.
It touches the cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circumstance "why";
as to the material cause, or object, in the circumstance "about what";
as to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance "who";
and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the circumstance "by what aids",
A circumstance is described as something outside the substance of the act, and yet in a way touching it, because in acts we must take note of "who" did it, "by what aids" or "instruments" he did it, "what" he did, "where" he did it, "why" he did it, "how" and "when" he did it.
Tullius, in sua rhetorica, assignat septem circumstantias, quae hoc versu continentur, "quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando".
Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhetor. i), gives seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse: "who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when".
Sed Aristoteles, in III Ethic., addit aliam, scilicet circa quid, quae a Tullio comprehenditur sub quid.
But Aristotle in Ethic. iii, 1 adds yet another, to wit, "about what", which Tully includes in the circumstance "what".
Contingit autem hoc fieri tripliciter, uno modo, inquantum attingit ipsum actum; alio modo, inquantum attingit causam actus; tertio modo, inquantum attingit effectum.
Ipsum autem actum attingit, vel per modum mensurae, sicut tempus et locus;
vel per modum qualitatis actus, sicut modus agendi.
Ex parte autem effectus, ut cum consideratur quid aliquis fecerit.
Ex parte vero causae actus, quantum ad causam finalem, accipitur propter quid;
ex parte autem causae materialis, sive obiecti, accipitur circa quid;
ex parte vero causae agentis principalis, accipitur quis egerit;
ex parte vero causae agentis instrumentalis, accipitur quibus auxiliis.
Now this happens in three ways: first, inasmuch as it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as it touches the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the effect.
It touches the act itself, either by way of measure, as "time" and "place";
or by qualifying the act as the "mode of acting."
It touches the effect when we consider "what" is done.
It touches the cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circumstance "why";
as to the material cause, or object, in the circumstance "about what";
as to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance "who";
and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the circumstance "by what aids",
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
1a 2ae q7 a2: Whether theologians should take note of the circumstances of human acts? Yes.
Consideratio circumstantiarum pertinet ad theologum quia theologus considerat actus humanos secundum quod sunt meritorii vel demeritorii, quod convenit actibus humanis; ad quod requiritur quod sint voluntarii.
The theologian has to consider circumstances because the theologian considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they be voluntary.
Ignorantia circumstantiarum causat involuntarium, ut Damascenus et Gregorius Nyssenus dicunt. Sed involuntarium excusat a culpa, cuius consideratio pertinet ad theologum.
Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.]. But involuntariness excuses from sin, the consideration of which belongs to the theologian.
Accidentia quae omnino per accidens se habent, relinquuntur ab omni arte, propter eorum incertitudinem et infinitatem. Sed talia accidentia non habent rationem circumstantiae, quia, ut dictum est, sic circumstantiae sunt extra actum, quod tamen actum aliquo modo contingunt, ordinatae ad ipsum. Accidentia autem per se cadunt sub arte.
Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity. But such like accidents do not have the formal aspect of circumstances; because circumstances although, as stated above (q7 a1), they are extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the consideration of art.
Bonum ordinatum ad finem dicitur utile, quod importat relationem quandam, unde philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod "in ad aliquid bonum est utile". In his autem quae ad aliquid dicuntur, denominatur aliquid non solum ab eo quod inest, sed etiam ab eo quod extrinsecus adiacet, ut patet in dextro et sinistro, aequali et inaequali, et similibus. Et ideo, cum bonitas actuum sit inquantum sunt utiles ad finem, nihil prohibet eos bonos vel malos dici secundum proportionem ad aliqua quae exterius adiacent.
Good directed to the end is said to be useful; and this implies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that "the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful." Now, in the genus "relation" a thing is denominated not only according to that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that which is extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the expressions "right" and "left," "equal" and "unequal," and such like. Accordingly, since the goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders their being called good or bad according to their proportion to extrinsic things that are adjacent to them.
The theologian has to consider circumstances because the theologian considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they be voluntary.
Ignorantia circumstantiarum causat involuntarium, ut Damascenus et Gregorius Nyssenus dicunt. Sed involuntarium excusat a culpa, cuius consideratio pertinet ad theologum.
Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.]. But involuntariness excuses from sin, the consideration of which belongs to the theologian.
Accidentia quae omnino per accidens se habent, relinquuntur ab omni arte, propter eorum incertitudinem et infinitatem. Sed talia accidentia non habent rationem circumstantiae, quia, ut dictum est, sic circumstantiae sunt extra actum, quod tamen actum aliquo modo contingunt, ordinatae ad ipsum. Accidentia autem per se cadunt sub arte.
Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity. But such like accidents do not have the formal aspect of circumstances; because circumstances although, as stated above (q7 a1), they are extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the consideration of art.
Bonum ordinatum ad finem dicitur utile, quod importat relationem quandam, unde philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod "in ad aliquid bonum est utile". In his autem quae ad aliquid dicuntur, denominatur aliquid non solum ab eo quod inest, sed etiam ab eo quod extrinsecus adiacet, ut patet in dextro et sinistro, aequali et inaequali, et similibus. Et ideo, cum bonitas actuum sit inquantum sunt utiles ad finem, nihil prohibet eos bonos vel malos dici secundum proportionem ad aliqua quae exterius adiacent.
Good directed to the end is said to be useful; and this implies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that "the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful." Now, in the genus "relation" a thing is denominated not only according to that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that which is extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the expressions "right" and "left," "equal" and "unequal," and such like. Accordingly, since the goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders their being called good or bad according to their proportion to extrinsic things that are adjacent to them.
Sunday, November 22, 2009
1a 2ae q7 a1: Whether a circumstance is an accident of a human act? Yes.
Circumstantiae actuum humanorum accidentia eorum dicenda sunt quia quod est extra substantiam rei ad rem ipsam pertinens, accidens eius dicitur.
The circumstances of human acts should be called their accidents because what is outside a thing's substance, while it belongs to that thing, is called its accident.
Nomen circumstantiae ab his quae in loco sunt, derivatur ad actus humanos. Dicitur autem in localibus aliquid circumstare, quod est quidem extrinsecum a re, tamen attingit ipsam, vel appropinquat ei secundum locum. Et ideo quaecumque conditiones sunt extra substantiam actus, et tamen attingunt aliquo modo actum humanum, circumstantiae dicuntur.
The word "circumstance" has passed from located things to human acts. Now in things located, that is said to surround something, which is outside it, but touches it, or is placed near it. Accordingly, whatever conditions are outside the substance of an act, and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circumstances.
Particulares conditiones cuiuslibet rei singularis dicuntur accidentia individuantia ipsam. Sed philosophus, in III Ethic., circumstantias nominat particularia, idest particulares singulorum actuum conditiones. Ergo circumstantiae sunt accidentia individualia humanorum actuum.
The particular conditions of any singular thing are called its individuating accidents. But the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) calls the circumstances particular things [ta kath' ekasta], i.e., the particular conditions of each act. Therefore the circumstances are individual accidents of human acts.
The circumstances of human acts should be called their accidents because what is outside a thing's substance, while it belongs to that thing, is called its accident.
Nomen circumstantiae ab his quae in loco sunt, derivatur ad actus humanos. Dicitur autem in localibus aliquid circumstare, quod est quidem extrinsecum a re, tamen attingit ipsam, vel appropinquat ei secundum locum. Et ideo quaecumque conditiones sunt extra substantiam actus, et tamen attingunt aliquo modo actum humanum, circumstantiae dicuntur.
The word "circumstance" has passed from located things to human acts. Now in things located, that is said to surround something, which is outside it, but touches it, or is placed near it. Accordingly, whatever conditions are outside the substance of an act, and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circumstances.
Particulares conditiones cuiuslibet rei singularis dicuntur accidentia individuantia ipsam. Sed philosophus, in III Ethic., circumstantias nominat particularia, idest particulares singulorum actuum conditiones. Ergo circumstantiae sunt accidentia individualia humanorum actuum.
The particular conditions of any singular thing are called its individuating accidents. But the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) calls the circumstances particular things [ta kath' ekasta], i.e., the particular conditions of each act. Therefore the circumstances are individual accidents of human acts.
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
1a 2ae q6 a8: Whether ignorance causes involuntariness? Yes.
Ignorantia habet causare involuntarium ea ratione qua privat cognitionem, quae praeexigitur ad voluntarium, ut supra dictum est, quia non quaelibet ignorantia huiusmodi cognitionem privat.
If ignorance causes involuntariness, it is insofar as its formal aspect deprives one of knowledge, which is a necessary condition of voluntariness, as was declared above (q6 a1), because it is not every ignorance that deprives one of this knowledge.
Et ideo sciendum quod ignorantia tripliciter se habet ad actum voluntatis, uno modo, concomitanter; alio modo, consequenter; tertio modo, antecedenter.
Accordingly, we must take note that ignorance has a threefold relationship to the act of the will: in one way, "concomitantly"; in another, "consequently"; in a third way, "antecedently."
Damascenus et philosophus dicunt, quod "involuntarium quoddam est per ignorantiam".
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that "what is done through ignorance is involuntary."
If ignorance causes involuntariness, it is insofar as its formal aspect deprives one of knowledge, which is a necessary condition of voluntariness, as was declared above (q6 a1), because it is not every ignorance that deprives one of this knowledge.
Et ideo sciendum quod ignorantia tripliciter se habet ad actum voluntatis, uno modo, concomitanter; alio modo, consequenter; tertio modo, antecedenter.
Accordingly, we must take note that ignorance has a threefold relationship to the act of the will: in one way, "concomitantly"; in another, "consequently"; in a third way, "antecedently."
Damascenus et philosophus dicunt, quod "involuntarium quoddam est per ignorantiam".
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that "what is done through ignorance is involuntary."
Wednesday, November 11, 2009
1a 2ae q6 a7: Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness? No.
Concupiscentia non causat involuntarium, sed magis facit aliquid voluntarium, quia dicitur aliquid voluntarium ex eo quod voluntas in id fertur.
Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but on the contrary makes something to be voluntary, because a thing is said to be voluntary, from the fact that the will is moved to it.
Per concupiscentiam autem voluntas inclinatur ad volendum id quod concupiscitur.
Concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence.
Nam incontinens concupiscentiae agit contra id quod prius proponebat, non autem contra id quod nunc vult; sed timidus agit contra id quod etiam nunc secundum se vult.
The man who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first, but not counter to that which he desires now; whereas the timid man acts counter to that which in itself he desires now.
Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but on the contrary makes something to be voluntary, because a thing is said to be voluntary, from the fact that the will is moved to it.
Per concupiscentiam autem voluntas inclinatur ad volendum id quod concupiscitur.
Concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence.
Nam incontinens concupiscentiae agit contra id quod prius proponebat, non autem contra id quod nunc vult; sed timidus agit contra id quod etiam nunc secundum se vult.
The man who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first, but not counter to that which he desires now; whereas the timid man acts counter to that which in itself he desires now.
Sunday, November 08, 2009
1a 2ae q6 a6: Whether fear causes involuntariness simply? No.
Sic autem hoc quod fit per metum, est voluntarium, inquantum scilicet est hic et nunc, prout scilicet in hoc casu est impedimentum maioris mali quod timebatur, sicut proiectio mercium in mare fit voluntarium tempore tempestatis, propter timorem periculi. Unde manifestum est quod simpliciter voluntarium est. Unde et competit ei ratio voluntarii, quia principium eius est intra.
And that which is done through fear is voluntary, inasmuch as it is here and now, that is to say, insofar as, under the circumstances, it hinders a greater evil which was feared; thus the throwing of the cargo into the sea becomes voluntary during the storm, through fear of the danger: wherefore it is clear that it is voluntary simply. And hence it is that what is done out of fear has the formal aspect of the voluntary, because its principle is within.
Sed quod accipiatur id quod per metum fit, ut extra hunc casum existens, prout repugnat voluntati, hoc non est nisi secundum considerationem tantum. Et ideo est involuntarium secundum quid, idest prout consideratur extra hunc casum existens.
But if we consider what is done through fear, as outside this particular case, and inasmuch as it is repugnant to the will, this is merely a consideration of the mind. And consequently what is done through fear is involuntary, considered in that respect, that is to say, outside the actual circumstances of the case.
Sicut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., et idem dicit Gregorius Nyssenus in libro suo de homine, huiusmodi quae per metum aguntur, "mixta sunt ex voluntario et involuntario". Id enim quod per metum agitur, in se consideratum, non est voluntarium, sed fit voluntarium in casu, scilicet ad vitandum malum quod timetur.
As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and likewise Gregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx), such things are done through fear "are of a mixed character," being partly voluntary and partly involuntary. For that which is done through fear, considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in this particular case, in order, namely, to avoid the evil feared.
Sed si quis recte consideret, magis sunt huiusmodi voluntaria quam involuntaria, sunt enim voluntaria simpliciter, involuntaria autem secundum quid. Unumquodque enim simpliciter esse dicitur secundum quod est in actu, secundum autem quod est in sola apprehensione, non est simpliciter, sed secundum quid.
But if the matter be considered aright, such things are voluntary rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be simply, according as it is in act; but according as it is only in apprehension, it is not simply, but in a certain respect.
Patet ergo quod in eo quod per vim agitur, voluntas interior nihil agit, sed in eo quod per metum agitur, voluntas aliquid agit.
It is clear therefore that in what is done from compulsion, the will does nothing inwardly; whereas in what is done through fear, the will does something.
And that which is done through fear is voluntary, inasmuch as it is here and now, that is to say, insofar as, under the circumstances, it hinders a greater evil which was feared; thus the throwing of the cargo into the sea becomes voluntary during the storm, through fear of the danger: wherefore it is clear that it is voluntary simply. And hence it is that what is done out of fear has the formal aspect of the voluntary, because its principle is within.
Sed quod accipiatur id quod per metum fit, ut extra hunc casum existens, prout repugnat voluntati, hoc non est nisi secundum considerationem tantum. Et ideo est involuntarium secundum quid, idest prout consideratur extra hunc casum existens.
But if we consider what is done through fear, as outside this particular case, and inasmuch as it is repugnant to the will, this is merely a consideration of the mind. And consequently what is done through fear is involuntary, considered in that respect, that is to say, outside the actual circumstances of the case.
Sicut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., et idem dicit Gregorius Nyssenus in libro suo de homine, huiusmodi quae per metum aguntur, "mixta sunt ex voluntario et involuntario". Id enim quod per metum agitur, in se consideratum, non est voluntarium, sed fit voluntarium in casu, scilicet ad vitandum malum quod timetur.
As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and likewise Gregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx), such things are done through fear "are of a mixed character," being partly voluntary and partly involuntary. For that which is done through fear, considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in this particular case, in order, namely, to avoid the evil feared.
Sed si quis recte consideret, magis sunt huiusmodi voluntaria quam involuntaria, sunt enim voluntaria simpliciter, involuntaria autem secundum quid. Unumquodque enim simpliciter esse dicitur secundum quod est in actu, secundum autem quod est in sola apprehensione, non est simpliciter, sed secundum quid.
But if the matter be considered aright, such things are voluntary rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be simply, according as it is in act; but according as it is only in apprehension, it is not simply, but in a certain respect.
Patet ergo quod in eo quod per vim agitur, voluntas interior nihil agit, sed in eo quod per metum agitur, voluntas aliquid agit.
It is clear therefore that in what is done from compulsion, the will does nothing inwardly; whereas in what is done through fear, the will does something.
Thursday, November 05, 2009
1a 2ae q6 a5: Whether violence causes involuntariness? Yes.
Violentia directe opponitur voluntario, sicut etiam et naturali, quia commune est voluntario et naturali quod utrumque sit a principio intrinseco, violentum autem est a principio extrinseco.
Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as likewise to the natural, because the voluntary and the natural have this in common, that both are from an intrinsic principle, whereas violence is from an extrinsic principle.
Quantum igitur ad actum qui est immediate ipsius voluntatis, ut supra dictum est, violentia voluntati inferri non potest, unde talem actum violentia involuntarium facere non potest. Sed quantum ad actum imperatum, voluntas potest pati violentiam. Et quantum ad hunc actum, violentia involuntarium facit.
As to the act which proceeds immediately from the will, violence cannot be done to the will, as stated above (q6 a4): wherefore violence cannot make that act involuntary. But as to the commanded act, the will can suffer violence: and consequently in this respect violence causes involuntariness.
Philosophus et Damascenus dicunt, quod "aliquid est involuntarium per violentiam".
The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) say that "things done under compulsion are involuntary."
Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as likewise to the natural, because the voluntary and the natural have this in common, that both are from an intrinsic principle, whereas violence is from an extrinsic principle.
Quantum igitur ad actum qui est immediate ipsius voluntatis, ut supra dictum est, violentia voluntati inferri non potest, unde talem actum violentia involuntarium facere non potest. Sed quantum ad actum imperatum, voluntas potest pati violentiam. Et quantum ad hunc actum, violentia involuntarium facit.
As to the act which proceeds immediately from the will, violence cannot be done to the will, as stated above (q6 a4): wherefore violence cannot make that act involuntary. But as to the commanded act, the will can suffer violence: and consequently in this respect violence causes involuntariness.
Philosophus et Damascenus dicunt, quod "aliquid est involuntarium per violentiam".
The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) say that "things done under compulsion are involuntary."
Monday, November 02, 2009
1a 2ae q6 a4: Whether violence can be done to the will? No.
Voluntas non potest cogi ad agendum quia actus voluntatis nihil est aliud quam inclinatio quaedam procedens ab interiori principio cognoscente, sed quod est coactum vel violentum, est ab exteriori principio; unde contra rationem ipsius actus voluntatis est, quod sit coactus vel violentus.
The will cannot be compelled to act because the act of the will is nothing else than an inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge, whereas what is compelled or violent is from an exterior principle; consequently it is contrary to the formal aspect of the will's own act, that it should be subject to compulsion and violence.
Duplex est actus voluntatis, unus quidem qui est eius immediate, velut ab ipsa elicitus, scilicet velle; alius autem est actus voluntatis a voluntate imperatus, et mediante alia potentia exercitus, ut ambulare et loqui, qui a voluntate imperantur mediante potentia motiva.
The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, "to wish"; the other is an act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some other power, such as "to walk" and "to speak," which are commanded by the will to be executed by means of the motive power.
Quantum igitur ad actus a voluntate imperatos, voluntas violentiam pati potest, inquantum per violentiam exteriora membra impediri possunt ne imperium voluntatis exequantur. Sed quantum ad ipsum proprium actum voluntatis, non potest ei violentia inferri.
As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer violence, insofar as violence can prevent the exterior members from executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act, violence cannot be done to the will.
Deus, qui est potentior quam voluntas humana, potest voluntatem humanam movere; secundum illud Prov. XXI, "cor regis in manu Dei est, et quocumque voluerit, vertet illud". Sed si hoc esset per violentiam, iam non esset cum actu voluntatis, nec ipsa voluntas moveretur, sed aliquid contra voluntatem.
God Who is more powerful than the human will, can move the will of man, according to Proverbs 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it." But if this were by compulsion, it would no longer be by an act of the will, nor would the will itself be moved, but something else against the will.
The will cannot be compelled to act because the act of the will is nothing else than an inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge, whereas what is compelled or violent is from an exterior principle; consequently it is contrary to the formal aspect of the will's own act, that it should be subject to compulsion and violence.
Duplex est actus voluntatis, unus quidem qui est eius immediate, velut ab ipsa elicitus, scilicet velle; alius autem est actus voluntatis a voluntate imperatus, et mediante alia potentia exercitus, ut ambulare et loqui, qui a voluntate imperantur mediante potentia motiva.
The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, "to wish"; the other is an act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some other power, such as "to walk" and "to speak," which are commanded by the will to be executed by means of the motive power.
Quantum igitur ad actus a voluntate imperatos, voluntas violentiam pati potest, inquantum per violentiam exteriora membra impediri possunt ne imperium voluntatis exequantur. Sed quantum ad ipsum proprium actum voluntatis, non potest ei violentia inferri.
As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer violence, insofar as violence can prevent the exterior members from executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act, violence cannot be done to the will.
Deus, qui est potentior quam voluntas humana, potest voluntatem humanam movere; secundum illud Prov. XXI, "cor regis in manu Dei est, et quocumque voluerit, vertet illud". Sed si hoc esset per violentiam, iam non esset cum actu voluntatis, nec ipsa voluntas moveretur, sed aliquid contra voluntatem.
God Who is more powerful than the human will, can move the will of man, according to Proverbs 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it." But if this were by compulsion, it would no longer be by an act of the will, nor would the will itself be moved, but something else against the will.
Sunday, November 01, 2009
1a 2ae q6 a3: Whether there can be voluntariness without any act? Yes.
Sicut agere et velle est voluntarium, ita et non agere et non velle, quia voluntas, volendo et agendo, potest impedire hoc quod est non velle et non agere, et aliquando debet; hoc quod est non velle et non agere, imputatur ei, quasi ab ipsa existens.
Just as to act and to will are voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will, because the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing and not-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will.
Et sic voluntarium potest esse absque actu, quandoque quidem absque actu exteriori, cum actu interiori, sicut cum vult non agere; aliquando autem et absque actu interiori, sicut cum non vult.
And thus it is that we can have the voluntary without an act; sometimes without outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one wills not to act; and sometimes without even an interior act, as when one does not will to act.
Eo modo requiritur ad voluntarium actus cognitionis, sicut et actus voluntatis; ut scilicet sit in potestate alicuius considerare et velle et agere. Et tunc sicut non velle et non agere, cum tempus fuerit, est voluntarium, ita etiam non considerare.
Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it be in one's power to consider, to wish and to act. And then, just as not to wish, and not to act, when it is time to wish and to act, is voluntary, so is it voluntary not to consider.
Just as to act and to will are voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will, because the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing and not-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will.
Et sic voluntarium potest esse absque actu, quandoque quidem absque actu exteriori, cum actu interiori, sicut cum vult non agere; aliquando autem et absque actu interiori, sicut cum non vult.
And thus it is that we can have the voluntary without an act; sometimes without outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one wills not to act; and sometimes without even an interior act, as when one does not will to act.
Eo modo requiritur ad voluntarium actus cognitionis, sicut et actus voluntatis; ut scilicet sit in potestate alicuius considerare et velle et agere. Et tunc sicut non velle et non agere, cum tempus fuerit, est voluntarium, ita etiam non considerare.
Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it be in one's power to consider, to wish and to act. And then, just as not to wish, and not to act, when it is time to wish and to act, is voluntary, so is it voluntary not to consider.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)