Q103 A2: Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the world?

Yes. The end of all things is something extrinsic to them because God is outside the entire order of the universe.

Finis rerum est quoddam bonum extrinsecum quia Deus ipse est extra totum ordinem universi.

A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this, however, is not its ultimate end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10.

Finis quidem universi est aliquod bonum in ipso existens, scilicet ordo ipsius universi; hoc autem bonum non est ultimus finis, sed ordinatur ad bonum extrinsecum ut ad ultimum finem; sicut etiam ordo exercitus ordinatur ad ducem, ut dicitur in XII Metaphys.

The universal end of all things is the Universal Good, Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas a particular good is good by participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which is not such by participation. Wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good outside the universe.

Bonum autem universale est quod est per se et per suam essentiam bonum, quod est ipsa essentia bonitatis; bonum autem particulare est quod est participative bonum. Manifestum est autem quod in tota universitate creaturarum nullum est bonum quod non sit participative bonum. Unde illud bonum quod est finis totius universi, oportet quod sit extrinsecum a toto universo.

As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what has been expounded above (Q44, A1; Q44, A2), that we must conclude that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by reason.

Cum finis respondeat principio, non potest fieri ut, principio cognito, quid sit rerum finis ignoretur. Cum igitur principium rerum sit aliquid extrinsecum a toto universo, scilicet Deus, ut ex supra dictis patet, necesse est quod etiam finis rerum sit quoddam bonum extrinsecum. Et hoc ratione apparet.

Q103 A1: Whether the world is governed by anyone?

Yes. The world is governed because it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence, so to lead them to their end, and this is to govern.

Mundus gubernatur quia ad divinam bonitatem pertinet ut, sicut produxit res in esse, ita etiam eas ad finem perducat, quod est gubernare.

In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement we include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later (Q104, A1).

In omnibus rebus creatis est aliquid stabile, ad minus prima materia; et aliquid ad motum pertinens, ut sub motu etiam operationem comprehendamus. Et quantum ad utrumque, res indiget gubernatione, quia hoc ipsum quod in rebus est stabile, in nihilum decideret (quia ex nihilo est), nisi manu gubernatoris servaretur, ut infra patebit.

The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.

Necessitas naturalis inhaerens rebus quae determinantur ad unum, est impressio quaedam Dei dirigentis ad finem, sicut necessitas qua sagitta agitur ut ad certum signum tendat, est impressio sagittantis, et non sagittae. Sed in hoc differt, quia id quod creaturae a Deo recipiunt, est earum natura; quod autem ab homine rebus naturalibus imprimitur praeter earum naturam, ad violentiam pertinet. Unde sicut necessitas violentiae in motu sagittae demonstrat sagittantis directionem; ita necessitas naturalis creaturarum demonstrat divinae providentiae gubernationem.

Q103: The government of things in general

1. Is the world governed by someone?
2. What is the end of this government?
3. Is the world governed by one?
4. What are the effects of this government?
5. Are all things subject to Divine government?
6. Are all things immediately governed by God?
7. Is the Divine government frustrated in anything?
8. Is anything contrary to the Divine Providence?

Q102 A4: Whether man was created in paradise?

No. God made man outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there during the whole of his animal life and, having attained to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven, because incorruptibility was man's, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God.

Deus hominem extra Paradisum fecit, et postea ipsum in Paradiso posuit, ut habitaret ibi toto tempore animalis vitae, postmodum, cum spiritualem vitam adeptus esset, transferendus in caelum, quia incorruptio non erat hominis secundum naturam, sed ex supernaturali Dei dono.

Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state.

Paradisus fuit locus congruus habitationi humanae, quantum ad incorruptionem primi status.

Therefore that this might be attributed to God, and not to human nature: "God took man and placed him in paradise" (Genesis 2:15).

Ut ergo hoc gratiae Dei imputaretur, non humanae naturae: dicitur Gen. II, "tulit Deus hominem, et posuit eum in Paradiso."

Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been born in paradise, where their parents were already.

Mulier facta fuit in Paradiso non propter dignitatem suam, sed propter dignitatem principii ex quo corpus eius formabatur. Quia similiter et filii in Paradiso fuissent nati, in quo parentes iam erant positi.

Q102 A3: Whether man was placed in paradise to dress it and keep it?

Yes. God placed man in paradise that man might dress and keep paradise (which dressing would not have involved labor, as it did after sin, but would have been pleasant on account of man's practical knowledge of the powers of nature), because paradise was ordered to man's benefit, and not conversely.

Deus posuit hominem in Paradiso, ut homo operaretur et custodiret Paradisum (nec tamen illa operatio esset laboriosa, sicut post peccatum, sed fuisset iucunda, propter experientiam virtutis naturae), quia Paradisus ordinatur ad bonum hominis, et non e converso.

God placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and keep him: by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once relapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases to shine); and by keeping man from all corruption and evil.

Deus posuit hominem in Paradiso, ut ipse Deus operaretur et custodiret hominem: operaretur, inquam, iustificando ipsum, cuius operatio si ab homine cesset, continuo obtenebratur, sicut aer obtenebratur si cesset influentia luminis; ut custodiret vero ab omni corruptione et malo.

It is written (Genesis 2:15): "The Lord God took man and placed in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it."

Dicitur Gen. II, "tulit dominus Deus hominem, et posuit illum in Paradiso voluptatis, ut operaretur et custodiret illum."

Q102 A2: Whether paradise was a place adapted to be the abode of man?

Yes. Paradise was most fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his original state of immortality, because paradise was situated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator or elsewhere.

Paradisus est locus conveniens habitationi humanae, secundum primae immortalitatis statum, quia credendum est Paradisum in loco temperatissimo constitutum esse, vel sub aequinoctiali vel alibi.

As above stated (Q97, A1), Man was incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to incorruptibility, but because in his soul there was a power preserving the body from corruption. Now the human body may be corrupted from within or from without. From within, the body is corrupted by the consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above explained (Q97, A4), and man was able to ward off such corruption by food. Among those things which corrupt the body from without, the chief seems to be an atmosphere of unequal temperature; and to such corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature.

Sicut supra dictum est, homo sic erat incorruptibilis et immortalis, non quia corpus eius dispositionem incorruptibilitatis haberet, sed quia inerat animae vis quaedam ad praeservandum corpus a corruptione. Corrumpi autem potest corpus humanum et ab interiori et ab exteriori. Ab interiori quidem corrumpitur per consumptionem humidi, et per senectutem, ut supra dictum est, cui corruptioni occurrere poterat primus homo per esum ciborum. Inter ea vero quae exterius corrumpunt, praecipuum videtur esse distemperatus aer, unde huic corruptioni maxime occurritur per temperiem aeris.

It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some particular place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual substances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as regards both his body and his soul--that is, inasmuch as in his soul was the force which preserved the human body from corruption. This could not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "No irrational animal inhabited paradise"; although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither by God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the complicity of the devil.

Ridiculum est dicere quod animae, aut alicui spirituali substantiae, sit aliquis locus naturalis, sed per congruentiam quandam aliquis specialis locus creaturae incorporali attribuitur. Paradisus ergo terrestris erat locus congruens homini et quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus, inquantum scilicet in anima erat vis praeservandi corpus humanum a corruptione. Quod non competebat aliis animalibus. Et ideo, ut Damascenus dicit, in Paradiso nullum irrationalium habitabat, licet ex quadam dispensatione animalia fuerint illuc divinitus adducta ad Adam, et serpens illuc accesserit per operationem Diaboli.

Paradise did not become useless through being unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred on man in vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God's kindness to man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise.

Non propter hoc locus est frustra, quia non est ibi hominum habitatio post peccatum, sicut etiam non frustra fuit homini attributa immortalitas quaedam, quam conservaturus non erat. Per huiusmodi enim ostenditur benignitas Dei ad hominem, et quid homo peccando amiserit. Quamvis, ut dicitur, nunc Enoch et Elias in illo Paradiso habitent.

The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places, and is outside the region of change. By the first of these two conditions, it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as Augustine says (De Trin. ii), "God rules corporeal creatures through spiritual creatures."

Caelum Empyreum est supremum corporalium locorum, et est extra omnem mutabilitatem. Et quantum ad primum horum, est locus congruus naturae angelicae, quia, sicut Augustinus dicit in III de Trin., "Deus regit creaturam corporalem per spiritualem".

Q102 A1: Whether paradise is a corporeal place?

Yes. As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 21): "Nothing prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise; so long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having there occurred." For whatever Scripture tells us about paradise is set down as matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of this method, we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer.

Sicut Augustinus dicit XIII de Civ. Dei, "quae commode dici possunt de intelligendo spiritualiter Paradiso, nemine prohibente dicantur; dum tamen et illius historiae fidelissima veritas rerum gestarum narratione commendata credatur." Ea enim quae de Paradiso in Scriptura dicuntur, per modum narrationis historicae proponuntur, in omnibus autem quae sic Scriptura tradit, est pro fundamento tenenda veritas historiae, et desuper spirituales expositiones fabricandae.

The situation of paradise is shut off from the habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which cannot be crossed; and so people who have written about topography make no mention of it.

Locus ille seclusus est a nostra habitatione aliquibus impedimentis vel montium, vel marium, vel alicuius aestuosae regionis, quae pertransiri non potest. Et ideo scriptores locorum de hoc loco mentionem non fecerunt.

The tree of life is a material tree, and so called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above stated (Q97, A4). Yet it had a spiritual signification; as the rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified Christ. In like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after eating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the consequent punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of rebellion. It may also be said to signify spiritually the free-will as some say.

Lignum vitae est quaedam materialis arbor, sic dicta quia eius fructus habebat virtutem conservandi vitam, ut supra dictum est. Et tamen aliquid significabat spiritualiter, sicut et petra in deserto fuit aliquod materiale, et tamen significavit Christum. Similiter etiam lignum scientiae boni et mali materialis arbor fuit, sic nominata propter eventum futurum, quia post eius esum homo, per experimentum poenae, didicit quid interesset inter obedientiae bonum et inobedientiae malum. Et tamen spiritualiter potuit significare liberum arbitrium, ut quidam dicunt.

According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3), the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their seminal virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants, both of paradise and others, were actually produced.

Secundum Augustinum, tertio die productae sunt plantae non in actu, sed secundum quasdam rationes seminales; sed post opera sex dierum productae sunt plantae tam Paradisi quam aliae in actu.

Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): "Three general opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place merely corporeal; others a place entirely spiritual; while others, whose opinion, I confess, hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual."

Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., "tres sunt de Paradiso generales sententiae, una eorum qui tantummodo corporaliter Paradisum intelligi volunt; alia eorum qui spiritualiter tantum; tertia eorum qui utroque modo Paradisum accipiunt, quam mihi fateor placere sententiam."

Q102: Man's abode, which is paradise

1. Is paradise a corporeal place?
2. Is it a place apt for human habitation?
3. for what purpose was man placed in paradise?
4. Should he have been created in paradise?

Q101 A2: Whether children would have had perfect use of reason at birth?

No. Children would not have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset because in all things produced by generation nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect.

Pueri non statim a principio habuissent perfectum usum rationis quia natura procedit ab imperfecto ad perfectum in omnibus generatis.

Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be observed in other animals.

Etiam alia animalia non habent ita perfectum usum industriae naturalis statim a principio, sicut postea. Quod ex hoc patet, quod aves docent volare pullos suos, et similia in aliis generibus animalium inveniuntur.

The use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tired and the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or delirious.

Usus rationis dependet quodammodo ex usu virium sensitivarum, unde ligato sensu, et impeditis interioribus viribus sensitivis, homo perfectum usum rationis non habet, ut patet in dormientibus et phreneticis.

Now the sensitive powers are situated in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hindered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason.

Vires autem sensitivae sunt virtutes quaedam corporalium organorum, et ideo, impeditis earum organis, necesse est quod earum actus impediantur, et per consequens rationis usus.

Now children are hindered in the use of these powers; wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on in life.

In pueris autem est impedimentum harum virium. Et ideo in eis non est perfectus usus rationis, sicut nec aliorum membrorum. Et ideo pueri in statu innocentiae non habuissent perfectum usum rationis, sicut habituri erant in perfecta aetate.

Yet they would have had a more perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding that particular state, as explained above regarding the use of their limbs (Q99, A1).

Habuissent tamen perfectiorem quam nunc, quantum ad ea quae ad eos pertinebant quantum ad statum illum; sicut et de usu membrorum superius est dictum.

The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to man at all ages.

Aggravatio additur ex corruptione corporis in hoc, quod usus rationis impeditur quantum ad ea etiam quae pertinent ad hominem secundum quamcumque aetatem.

Q101 A1: Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge?

No. In the state of innocence, children would not have been born with perfect knowledge, but in course of time they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learning, because as regards belief in matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so, when authority is wanting, we must be guided by the ordinary course of nature; it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses.

Pueri in statu innocentiae non nascerentur perfecti in scientia, sed eam in processu temporis absque difficultate acquisivissent, inveniendo vel addiscendo, quia de his quae sunt supra naturam, soli auctoritati creditur, unde ubi auctoritas deficit, sequi debemus naturae conditionem; sed est naturale homini ut scientiam per sensus acquirat.

The human soul is naturally "like a blank tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4).

Anima nostra per naturam est "sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum", ut dicitur in III de anima.

For this reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers.

Et ideo anima unitur corpori, quia indiget eo ad suam propriam operationem; quod non esset, si statim a principio scientiam haberet non acquisitam per sensitivas virtutes.

The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature.

Esse perfectum in scientia fuit individuale accidens primi parentis, inquantum scilicet ipse instituebatur ut pater et instructor totius humani generis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc, non generabat filios similes sibi, sed solum quantum ad accidentia naturalia vel gratuita totius naturae.

Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise their knowledge of other universal principles.

Pueri habuissent sufficientem scientiam ad dirigendum eos in operibus iustitiae in quibus homines diriguntur per universalia principia iuris; quam multo plenius tunc habuissent quam nunc naturaliter habemus, et similiter aliorum universalium principiorum.

Q101: The condition of the offspring as regards knowledge

1. Would children in the state of innocence have been born with perfect knowledge?
2. Would they have had perfect use of reason at the moment of birth?

Q100 A2: Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness?

No. It does not seem possible that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness because the rational creature is confirmed in righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vision of God; and when once it has seen God, it cannot but cleave to Him Who is the essence of goodness, wherefrom no one can turn away, since nothing is desired or loved but under the aspect of good.

Non videtur possibile quod pueri in statu innocentiae nascerentur in iustitia confirmati, quia ex hoc creatura rationalis in iustitia confirmatur: quod efficitur beata per apertam Dei visionem, cui viso non potest non inhaerere, cum ipse sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, a qua nullus potest averti, cum nihil desideretur et ametur nisi sub ratione boni.

(I say this according to the general law; for it may be otherwise in the case of special privilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of God.)

(Et hoc dico secundum legem communem, quia ex aliquo privilegio speciali secus accidere potest, sicut creditur de virgine matre Dei.)

And as soon as Adam had attained to that happy state of seeing God in His Essence, he would have become spiritual in soul and body; and his animal life would have ceased, wherein alone there is generation. Hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in righteousness.

Quam cito autem Adam ad illam beatitudinem pervenisset quod Deum per essentiam videret, efficeretur spiritualis et mente et corpore, et animalis vita cessaret, in qua sola generationis usus fuisset. Unde manifestum est quod parvuli non nascerentur in iustitia confirmati.

For it is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater perfection than their parents at the time of begetting. Now the parents, as long as they begot children, would not have been confirmed in righteousness.

Manifestum est enim quod pueri in sua nativitate non habuissent plus perfectionis quam eorum parentes in statu generationis. Parentes autem, quandiu generassent, non fuissent confirmati in iustitia.

For even if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might have done evil.

Etiam si primi homines non peccassent, aliqui ex eorum stirpe potuissent iniquitatem committere.

Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "Happy would have been the whole human race if neither they--that is our first parents--had committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they would have been condemned."

Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, "tam felix universa esset humana societas si nec illi," scilicet primi parentes, "malum quod in posteros traiicerent, nec quisquam ex stirpe eorum iniquitatem committeret, quae damnationem reciperet."

Q100 A1: Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?

Yes. "As long as man did not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with righteousness together with the rational soul," because man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself.

"Simul cum rationalem haberent animam, iusti essent quos generaret homo, si non peccaret," quia naturaliter homo generat sibi simile secundum speciem.

Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of innocence.

Unde quaecumque accidentia consequuntur naturam speciei, in his necesse est quod filii parentibus similentur, nisi sit error in operatione naturae, qui in statu innocentiae non fuisset.

But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human nature.

In accidentibus autem individualibus non est necesse quod filii parentibus similentur. Iustitia autem originalis, in qua primus homo conditus fuit, fuit accidens naturae speciei, non quasi ex principiis speciei causatum, sed sicut quoddam donum divinitus datum toti naturae.

This is clear from the fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the children would have been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness.

Et hoc apparet, quia opposita sunt unius generis, peccatum autem originale, quod opponitur illi iustitiae, dicitur esse peccatum naturae; unde traducitur a parente in posteros. Et propter hoc etiam filii parentibus assimilati fuissent quantum ad originalem iustitiam.

Some say that children would have been born, not with the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness, which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, as above explained (Q95, A1), we must conclude that if children were born in original righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that the first man was created in grace (Q95, A1).

Quidam dicunt quod pueri non fuissent nati cum iustitia gratuita, quae est merendi principium, sed cum iustitia originali. Sed cum radix originalis iustitiae, in cuius rectitudine factus est homo, consistat in subiectione supernaturali rationis ad Deum, quae est per gratiam gratum facientem, ut supra dictum est; necesse est dicere quod, si pueri nati fuissent in originali iustitia, quod etiam nati fuissent cum gratia; sicut et de primo homine supra diximus quod fuit cum gratia conditus.

This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted by the parent, is infused by God as soon as the human body is apt to receive it.

Non tamen fuisset propter hoc gratia naturalis, quia non fuisset transfusa per virtutem seminis, sed fuisset collata homini statim cum habuisset animam rationalem. Sicut etiam statim cum corpus est dispositum infunditur a Deo anima rationalis, quae tamen non est ex traduce.

Q100: The condition of the offspring as regards righteousness

1. Would men have been born in a state of righteousness?
2. Would they have been born confirmed in righteousness?

Q99 A2: Whether, in the primitive state, women would have been born?

Yes. In the state of innocence, both sexes would have been begotten, because nothing belonging to the completeness of human nature would have been lacking in the state of innocence; and as different grades belong to the perfection of the universe, so also diversity of sex belongs to the perfection of human nature.

In statu innocentiae uterque sexus per generationem productus fuisset, quia nihil eorum quae ad complementum humanae naturae pertinent, in statu innocentiae defuisset; sicut autem ad perfectionem universi pertinent diversi gradus rerum, ita etiam diversitas sexus est ad perfectionem humanae naturae.

Woman is said to be a "fortuitous male," as being a product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual case: but not against the purpose of universal nature, as above explained (Q92, A1, ad 1).

Femina dicitur mas occasionatus, quia est praeter intentionem naturae particularis, non autem praeter intentionem naturae universalis, ut supra dictum est.

Q99 A1: Whether in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of body as to the use of its members immediately after birth?

No. Children would not have had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the purpose of performing every kind of act, but only for the acts befitting the state of infancy, such as suckling, and the like, because it is as natural as it is befitting to the principles of human nature that children should not have sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immediately after birth.

Pueri mox nati non habuissent sufficientem virtutem ad movendum membra ad quoslibet actus, sed ad actus pueritiae convenientes, puta ad sugendum ubera, et ad alia huiusmodi, quia manifestum est naturale hoc esse, utpote et principiis humanae naturae competens, quod pueri mox nati non habeant sufficientem virtutem ad movendum membra.

By faith alone do we hold truths which are above nature, and what we believe rests on authority. Wherefore, in making any assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in those things which are above nature, and are made known to us by Divine authority.

Ea quae sunt supra naturam, sola fide tenemus; quod autem credimus, auctoritati debemus. Unde in omnibus asserendis sequi debemus naturam rerum, praeter ea quae auctoritate divina traduntur, quae sunt supra naturam.

In the state of innocence man would have been born, yet not subject to corruption. Therefore in that state there could have been certain infantile defects which result from birth; but not senile defects leading to corruption.

Homo in statu innocentiae generatus fuisset, sed non fuisset corruptus. Et ideo in statu illo potuissent esse aliqui defectus pueriles, qui consequuntur generationem; non autem defectus seniles, qui ordinantur ad corruptionem.

Q99: The condition of the offspring as to the body

1. Would children in the state of innocence have had full powers of the body immediately after birth?
2. Would all infants have been of the male sex?

Q98 A2: Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation by coition?

Yes. Generation by coition is natural to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed even before sin (just as it is natural to other perfect animals, as the corporeal members make it clear), so we cannot allow that these members would not have had a natural use, as other members had, before sin, because what is natural to man was neither acquired nor forfeited by sin.

Homini, secundum animalem vitam, quam etiam ante peccatum habebat, naturale est generare per coitum (sicut et ceteris animalibus perfectis, et hoc declarant naturalia membra ad hunc usum deputata), et ideo non est dicendum quod usus horum membrorum naturalium non fuisset ante peccatum, sicut et ceterorum membrorum, quia ea quae sunt naturalia homini, neque subtrahuntur neque dantur homini per peccatum.

In paradise man would have been like an angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After the resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and body.

Homo in Paradiso fuisset sicut Angelus per spiritualem mentem, cum tamen haberet, vitam animalem quantum ad corpus. Sed post resurrectionem erit homo similis Angelo, spiritualis effectus et secundum animam et secundum corpus.

Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate concupiscence.

Bestiae carent ratione. Unde secundum hoc homo in coitu bestialis efficitur, quod delectationem coitus et fervorem concupiscentiae ratione moderari non potest.

In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight of sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight have been the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately.

Sed in statu innocentiae nihil huiusmodi fuisset quod ratione non moderaretur, non quia esset minor delectatio secundum sensum, ut quidam dicunt (fuisset enim tanto maior delectatio sensibilis, quanto esset purior natura, et corpus magis sensibile); sed quia vis concupiscibilis non ita inordinate se effudisset super huiusmodi delectatione, regulata per rationem, ad quam non pertinet ut sit minor delectatio in sensu, sed ut vis concupiscibilis non immoderate delectationi inhaereat.

By "immoderately" I mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures.

Et dico immoderate, praeter mensuram rationis. Sicut sobrius in cibo moderate assumpto non minorem habet delectationem quam gulosus; sed minus eius concupiscibilis super huiusmodi delectatione requiescit.

Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "We must be far from supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence. All the bodily members would have been equally moved by the will, without ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of soul and body."

Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, "absit ut suspicemur non potuisse prolem seri sine libidinis morbo. Sed eo voluntatis nutu moverentur illa membra quo cetera, et sine ardore et illecebroso stimulo, cum tranquillitate animi et corporis."

The words quoted do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind. Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not because it removes fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate desire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust:

Et hoc sonant verba Augustini, quae a statu innocentiae non excludunt magnitudinem delectationis, sed ardorem libidinis et inquietudinem animi. Et ideo continentia in statu innocentiae non fuisset laudabilis, quae in tempore isto laudatur non propter defectum fecunditatis, sed propter remotionem inordinatae libidinis. Tunc autem fuisset fecunditas absque libidine:

as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26), "not of lustful desire, but of deliberate action."

sicut Augustinus dicit XIV de Civ. Dei, "non libidinis appetitus, sed voluntarius usus".

Q98 A1: Whether in the state of innocence generation existed?

Yes. In the state of innocence there would have been generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race, because in the state of innocence the human body was in itself corruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul; therefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man was not to be deprived thereof.

In statu innocentiae fuisset generatio ad multiplicationem humani generis, quia corpus hominis in statu innocentiae, quantum erat de se, corruptibile erat, sed potuit praeservari a corruptione per animam; et ideo non fuit homini subtrahenda generatio, quae debetur corruptibilibus rebus.

In our present state a division of possessions is necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as community of possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher says (Politic. ii, 5). In the state of innocence, however, the will of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife they would have used in common, according to each one's need, those things of which they were masters--a state of things to be observed even now among many good men.

In statu isto, multiplicatis dominis, necesse est fieri divisionem possessionum, quia communitas possessionis est occasio discordiae, ut philosophus dicit in II Politic. Sed in statu innocentiae fuissent voluntates hominum sic ordinatae, quod absque omni periculo discordiae communiter usi fuissent, secundum quod unicuique eorum competeret, rebus quae eorum dominio subdebantur, cum hoc etiam modo apud multos bonos viros observetur.

Q98: The preservation of the species

1. In the state of innocence, would there have been generation?
2. Would generation have been through coition?