1a 2ae q14 a6: Whether the process of counsel is indefinite? No.

Inquisitio consilii est finita in actu ex duplici parte, scilicet ex parte principii, et ex parte termini, quia accipitur in inquisitione consilii duplex principium: sicut enim finis habet rationem principii, ita id quod agitur propter finem, habet rationem conclusionis.

Counsel's investigation is actually finite on both sides, on that of its principle, and on that of its term, because a twofold principle is available in counsel's investigation: just as the end holds the formal aspect of a principle, so the means hold the formal aspect of a conclusion.

Unde id quod primo agendum occurrit, habet rationem ultimae conclusionis, ad quam inquisitio terminatur.

Wherefore that which presents itself as to be done first, holds the formal aspect of an ultimate conclusion whereat the investigation comes to an end.

Nihil autem prohibet consilium potentia infinitum esse, secundum quod in infinitum possunt aliqua occurrere consilio inquirenda.

Nothing however prevents counsel from being infinite potentially, for as much as an infinite number of things may present themselves to be inquired into by means of counsel.

Singularia non sunt infinita actu, sed in potentia tantum.

Singulars are infinite; not actually, but only potentially.

1a 2ae q14 a5: Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis? Yes.

Inquisitio consilii sit resolutiva, incipiendo scilicet, ab eo quod in futuro intenditur, quousque perveniatur ad id quod statim agendum est, quia autem in inquisitione consilii est finis, qui quidem est prior in intentione, posterior tamen in esse.

Counsel's investigation must needs be one of analysis, beginning that is to say, from that which is intended in the future, and continuing until it arrives at that which is to be done at once, because the principle in counsel's investigation is the end, which precedes indeed in intention, but comes afterwards into execution.

Consilium est quidem de operationibus. Sed ratio operationum accipitur ex fine, et ideo ordo ratiocinandi de operationibus, est contrarius ordini operandi.

Counsel is indeed about action. But actions take their formal aspect from the end, and consequently the order of reasoning about actions is contrary to the order of actions.

Philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod "ille qui consiliatur, videtur quaerere et resolvere."

The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "he who takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze."

1a 2ae q14 a4: Whether counsel is about all things that we do? No.

Non oportet in omnibus quae ratione aguntur, esse inquisitionem consilii, quia ratio in rebus manifestis non inquirit, sed statim iudicat.

There is no need of counsel's investigation in all that is done by formal aspect, because in matters that are evident, aspectual apprehension makes no investigation, but judges at once.

Electio praesupponit consilium ratione iudicii vel sententiae. Unde quando iudicium vel sententia manifesta est absque inquisitione, non requiritur consilii inquisitio.

Choice presupposes counsel by aspectual apprehension of its judgment or decision. Consequently when the judgment or decision is evident without investigation, there is no need for counsel's investigation.

De duobus non consiliamur, quamvis ordinentur ad finem; scilicet, de rebus parvis, et de his quae sunt determinata qualiter fieri debent (sicut est in operibus artium, praeter quasdam coniecturales, ut puta medicinalis, negotiativa, et huiusmodi):

There are two things of which we do not take counsel, although they conduce to the end; namely, minute things, and those which have a fixed way of being done (as in works produced by art, with the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture, such as medicine, commerce, and the like):

1. Per determinatas vias proceditur ad determinatos fines, sicut contingit in artibus quae habent certas vias operandi (sicut scriptor non consiliatur quomodo debeat trahere litteras, hoc enim determinatum est per artem).

1. Certain determinate ends are gained by certain determinate means, as happens in the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of action (thus a writer does not take counsel how to form his letters, for this is determined by art)

2. Non multum refert utrum sic vel sic fiat: et ista sunt minima, quae parum adiuvant vel impediunt respectu finis consequendi; quod autem parum est, quasi nihil accipit ratio.

2. It little matters whether it is done this or that way: this occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder but little with regard to the end aimed at; and aspectual apprehension looks upon small things as mere nothings.

1a 2ae q14 a3: Whether counsel is only of things that we do? Yes.

Consilium est circa ea quae aguntur a nobis quia inquisitio consilii proprie pertinet ad contingentia singularia.

Counsel is about things done by us because counsel's investigation is concerned, properly speaking, with contingent singulars.

Consilium non solum est de his quae aguntur, sed de his quae ordinantur ad operationes. Et propter hoc consultatio dicitur fieri de futuris eventibus, inquantum homo per futuros eventus cognitos dirigitur ad aliquid faciendum vel vitandum.

Counsel is not only about what is done, but also about whatever has relation to what is done. And for this reason we speak of consulting about future events, insofar as man is induced to do or omit something, through the knowledge of future events.

Est autem considerandum quod in particularibus contingentibus, ad hoc quod aliquid certum cognoscatur, plures conditiones seu circumstantias considerare oportet, quas ab uno non facile est considerari, sed a pluribus certius percipiuntur, dum quod unus considerat, alii non occurrit; in necessariis autem et universalibus est absolutior et simplicior consideratio, ita quod magis ad huiusmodi considerationem unus per se sufficere potest.

Now we must take note that in contingent particular cases, in order that anything be known for certain, it is necessary to take several conditions or circumstances into consideration, which it is not easy for one to consider, but are considered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes note of, escapes the notice of another; whereas in necessary and universal things, our view is brought to bear on matters much more absolutely and simply, so that one man by himself may be sufficient to consider these things.

Cognitio autem veritatis in talibus non habet aliquid magnum, ut per se sit appetibilis, sicut cognitio universalium et necessariorum, sed appetitur secundum quod est utilis ad operationem, quia actiones sunt circa contingentia singularia.

Now the knowledge of the truth in such matters [i.e., contingent singulars] does not rank so high as to be desirable of itself, as is the knowledge of things universal and necessary, but it is desired as being useful towards action, because actions bear on things singular and contingent.

1a 2ae q14 a2: Whether counsel is not only of the means but also of the end? No.

De fine non est consilium, sed solum de his quae sunt ad finem, quia consilium est quaestio.

Counsel is not of the end, but of the means, because counsel is an investigation.

Finis in operabilibus habet rationem principii, eo quod rationes eorum quae sunt ad finem ex fine sumuntur. Principium autem non cadit sub quaestione, sed principia oportet supponere in omni inquisitione.

The end has the formal aspect of the principle in practical matters, because the formal aspects of the means are found in the end. Now the principle cannot be made subject to the investigation, but must be presupposed in every investigation.

De operationibus est consilium, inquantum ordinantur ad aliquem finem. Unde si aliqua operatio humana sit finis, de ea, inquantum huiusmodi, non est consilium.

Counsel is about [practical] operations, insofar as they are ordained to some end. Consequently if any human act be an end, it will not, as such, be the matter of counsel.

Tamen contingit id quod est finis respectu quorundam, ordinari ad alium finem (sicut etiam id quod est principium unius demonstrationis, est conclusio alterius). Et ideo id quod accipitur ut finis in una inquisitione, potest accipi ut ad finem in alia inquisitione: et sic de eo erit consilium.

Nevertheless it may happen that what is the end in regard to some things, is ordained to something else (just as also what is the principle of one demonstration, is the conclusion of another). And consequently that which is looked upon as the end in one investigation, may be looked upon as the means in another: and thus it will become an object of counsel.

1a 2ae q14 a1: Whether counsel is an inquiry? Yes.

Necessaria est inquisitio rationis ante iudicium de eligendis (et haec inquisitio consilium vocatur), quia actiones sunt circa singularia contingentia, quae propter sui variabilitatem incerta sunt; et in rebus dubiis et incertis ratio non profert iudicium absque inquisitione praecedente.

The inquiry of formal aspect is necessary before judgment on the objects of choice (and this inquiry is called counsel), because actions are concerned with contingent singulars, which by reason of their vicissitude, are uncertain; and in things doubtful and uncertain aspectual apprehension does not pronounce judgment without previous inquiry.

Propter quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod "electio est appetitus praeconsiliati".

Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is the "desire of what has been already counselled."

Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, "omne quidem consilium quaestio est; non autem omnis quaestio consilium."

Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says: "Every counsel is an investigation; but not every investigation is a counsel."

Consilium attribuitur Deo quantum ad certitudinem sententiae vel iudicii, quae in nobis provenit ex inquisitione consilii. Sed huiusmodi inquisitio in Deo locum non habet, et ideo consilium secundum hoc Deo non attribuitur. Et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit quod "Deus non consiliatur, ignorantis enim est consiliari".

We ascribe counsel to God, as to the certainty of His knowledge or judgment, which certainty in us arises from the inquiry of counsel. But such inquiry has no place in God; wherefore in this respect it is not ascribed to God: in which sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22): "God takes not counsel: those only take counsel who lack knowledge."

1a 2ae q14: Counsel, which precedes choice

1. Is counsel an inquiry?
2. Is counsel of the end or of the means?
3. Is counsel only of things that we do?
4. Is counsel of all things that we do?
5. Is the process of counsel one of analysis?
6. Is the process of counsel indefinite?

1a 2ae q13 a6: Whether man chooses of necessity? No.

Homo non ex necessitate eligit, quia quod possibile est non esse, non necesse est esse.

Man does not choose of necessity, because that which is possible not to be, is not of necessity.

Sententia sive iudicium rationis de rebus agendis est circa contingentia, quae a nobis fieri possunt, in quibus conclusiones non ex necessitate sequuntur ex principiis necessariis absoluta necessitate, sed necessariis solum ex conditione.

The formal aspect of decision or judgment is of what is to be done is about things that are contingent and possible to us. In such matters the conclusions do not follow of necessity from principles that are absolutely necessary, but from such as are so conditionally.

Quod autem possibile sit non eligere vel eligere, huius ratio ex duplici hominis potestate accipi potest. Potest enim homo velle et non velle, agere et non agere, potest etiam velle hoc aut illud, et agere hoc aut illud.

Now this formal aspect why it is possible not to choose, or to choose, may be gathered from a twofold power in man. For man can will and not will, act and not act; again, he can will this or that, and do this or that.

Cuius ratio ex ipsa virtute rationis accipitur. Quidquid enim ratio potest apprehendere ut bonum, in hoc voluntas tendere potest. Potest autem ratio apprehendere ut bonum non solum hoc quod est velle aut agere; sed hoc etiam quod est non velle et non agere.

The formal aspect of this is seated in the very power of aspectual apprehension of form. For the will can tend to whatever aspect is apprehended as good. Now formal aspect can apprehend as good, not only this, viz. "to will" or "to act," but also this, viz. "not to will" or "not to act."

Et rursum in omnibus particularibus bonis potest considerare rationem boni alicuius, et defectum alicuius boni, quod habet rationem mali, et secundum hoc, potest unumquodque huiusmodi bonorum apprehendere ut eligibile, vel fugibile.

Again, in all particular goods, it can consider an aspect of some good, and the lack of some good, which has the aspect of evil, and in this respect, it can apprehend any single one of such goods as to be chosen or to be avoided.

Solum autem perfectum bonum, quod est beatitudo, non potest ratio apprehendere sub ratione mali, aut alicuius defectus. Et ideo ex necessitate beatitudinem homo vult, nec potest velle non esse beatus, aut miser.

The perfect good alone, which is Happiness, is the formal aspect that cannot be apprehended under a formal aspect as an evil, or as lacking in any way. Consequently man wills Happiness of necessity, nor can he will not to be happy, or to be unhappy.

Electio autem, cum non sit de fine, sed de his quae sunt ad finem, ut iam dictum est, non est perfecti boni, quod est beatitudo, sed aliorum particularium bonorum. Et ideo homo non ex necessitate, sed libere eligit.

Now since choice is not of the end, but of the means, as stated above (q13 a3), it is not of the perfect good, which is Happiness, but of other particular goods. Therefore man chooses not of necessity, but freely.

1a 2ae q13 a5: Whether choice is only of possible things? Yes.

Electio non sit nisi possibilium quia ratio eligendi aliquid est ex hoc quod ducit ad finem; per id autem quod est impossibile, non potest aliquis consequi finem.

Choice is only of possible things because the formal aspect under which a thing is to be chosen is that it conduces to an end; but what is impossible cannot conduce to an end.

Cum obiectum voluntatis sit bonum apprehensum, hoc modo iudicandum est de obiecto voluntatis, secundum quod cadit sub apprehensione. Et ideo sicut quandoque voluntas est alicuius quod apprehenditur ut bonum, et tamen non est vere bonum; ita quandoque est electio eius quod apprehenditur ut possibile eligenti, quod tamen non est ei possibile.

Since the object of the will is the apprehended good, we must judge of the object of the will according as it is apprehended. And so, just as sometimes the will tends to something which is apprehended as good, and yet is not really good; so is choice sometimes made of something apprehended as possible to the chooser, and yet impossible to him.

Voluntas media est inter intellectum et exteriorem operationem, nam intellectus proponit voluntati suum obiectum, et ipsa voluntas causat exteriorem actionem. Sic igitur principium motus voluntatis consideratur ex parte intellectus, qui apprehendit aliquid ut bonum in universali, sed terminatio seu perfectio actus voluntatis attenditur secundum ordinem ad operationem, per quam aliquis tendit ad consecutionem rei; nam motus voluntatis est ab anima ad rem.

The will stands between the intellect and the external action: for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and the will causes the external action. Hence the principle of the movement in the will is to be found in the intellect, which apprehends something under the universal aspect of good, but the term or perfection of the will's act is to be observed in its relation to the action, whereby a man tends to the attainment of a thing; for the movement of the will is from the soul to the thing.

Et ideo perfectio actus voluntatis attenditur secundum hoc quod est aliquid bonum alicui ad agendum. Hoc autem est possibile. Et ideo voluntas completa non est nisi de possibili, quod est bonum volenti. Sed voluntas incompleta est de impossibili, quae secundum quosdam "velleitas" dicitur, quia scilicet aliquis vellet illud, si esset possibile. Electio autem nominat actum voluntatis iam determinatum ad id quod est huic agendum. Et ideo nullo modo est nisi possibilium.

Consequently the perfect act of the will is in respect of something that is good for one to do. Now this cannot be something impossible. Wherefore the complete act of the will is only in respect of what is possible and good for him that wills. But the incomplete act of the will is in respect of the impossible; and by some is called "velleity," because, to wit, one would will [vellet] such a thing, were it possible. But choice is an act of the will, fixed on something to be done by the chooser. And therefore it is by no means of anything but what is possible.

1a 2ae q13 a4: Whether choice is of those things only that are done by us? Yes.

Electio semper est humanorum actuum quia necesse est ut id quod est ad finem: vel sit actio, vel res aliqua (interveniente aliqua actione, per quam facit id quod est ad finem, vel utitur eo).

Choice is always in regard to human acts because the means must needs be: either an action, or a thing (with some action intervening whereby man either makes the thing which is the means, or uses it).

1a 2ae q13 a3: Whether choice is only of the means? Yes.

Voluntas est finis, electio autem eorum quae sunt ad finem, quia finis, inquantum est huiusmodi, non cadit sub electione.

Volition is of the end, but choice of the means, because the end, as such, is not a matter of choice.

Ultimus finis est unus tantum. Unde ubicumque occurrunt plures fines, inter eos potest esse electio, secundum quod ordinantur ad ulteriorem finem.

There is but one last end. Accordingly wherever there are several ends, they can be the subject of choice, in so far as they are ordained to a further end.

Fines proprii virtutum ordinantur ad beatitudinem sicut ad ultimum finem. Et hoc modo potest esse eorum electio.

The proper ends of virtues are ordained to Happiness as to their last end. And thus it is that they can be a matter of choice.

Electio consequitur sententiam vel iudicium, quod est sicut conclusio syllogismi operativi. Unde illud cadit sub electione, quod se habet ut conclusio in syllogismo operabilium. Finis autem in operabilibus se habet ut principium, et non ut conclusio.

Choice results from the decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a practical syllogism. Hence that which is the conclusion of a practical syllogism, is the matter of choice. Now in practical things the end stands in the position of a principle, not of a conclusion.

Sicut in operatione medici, sanitas se habet ut finis; unde hoc non cadit sub electione medici, sed hoc supponit tanquam principium.

Thus in the work of a physician health is the end; wherefore it is not a matter of choice for a physician, but a matter of principle.

Sed sanitas corporis ordinatur ad bonum animae, unde apud eum qui habet curam de animae salute, potest sub electione cadere esse sanum vel esse infirmum; nam apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. XII, "cum enim infirmor, tunc potens sum". Sed ultimus finis nullo modo sub electione cadit.

Now the health of the body is ordained to the good of the soul, consequently with one who has charge of the soul's health, health or sickness may be a matter of choice; for the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 12:10): "For when I am weak, then am I powerful." But the last end is nowise a matter of choice.

1a 2ae q13 a2: Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals? No.

Brutis animalibus non est electio quia proprie voluntatis est eligere, non autem appetitus sensitivi, qui solus est in brutis animalibus.

Choice is not in irrational animals because choice belongs properly to the will, and not to the sensitive appetite which is all that irrational animals have.

Appetitus sensitivus est determinatus ad unum aliquid particulare secundum ordinem naturae; voluntas autem est quidem, secundum naturae ordinem, determinata ad unum commune, quod est bonum, sed indeterminate se habet respectu particularium bonorum.

The sensitive appetite is determinate to one particular thing, according to the order of nature; whereas the will, although determinate to one thing in general, viz. the good, according to the order of nature, is nevertheless indeterminate in respect of particular goods.

Brutum animal accipit unum prae alio, quia appetitus eius est naturaliter determinatus ad ipsum. Unde statim quando per sensum vel per imaginationem repraesentatur sibi aliquid ad quod naturaliter inclinatur eius appetitus, absque electione in illud solum movetur.

An irrational animal takes one thing in preference to another, because its appetite is naturally determinate to that thing. Wherefore as soon as an animal, whether by its sense or by its imagination, represents to itself something to which its appetite is naturally inclined, it is moved to that alone, without making any choice.

In operibus brutorum animalium apparent quaedam sagacitates, inquantum habent inclinationem naturalem ad quosdam ordinatissimos processus, utpote a summa arte ordinatos. Et propter hoc etiam quaedam animalia dicuntur prudentia vel sagacia, non quod in eis sit aliqua ratio vel electio. Quod ex hoc apparet, quod omnia quae sunt unius naturae, similiter operantur.

In the works of irrational animals we notice certain marks of sagacity, in so far as they have a natural inclination to set about their actions in a most orderly manner through being ordained by the Supreme art. For which reason, too, certain animals are called prudent or sagacious, and not because they reason or exercise any choice about things. This is clear from the fact that all that share in one nature, invariably act in the same way.

Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, quod "pueri et irrationalia voluntarie quidem faciunt, non tamen eligentia".

Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.] says that "children and irrational animals act willingly but not from choice."

1a 2ae q13 a1: Whether choice is an act of will? Yes.

Electio substantialiter non est actus rationis, sed voluntatis, quia perficitur electio in motu quodam animae ad bonum quod eligitur; unde manifeste actus est appetitivae potentiae.

Choice is substantially not an act of the reason but of the will, because choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul towards the good which is chosen; consequently it is evidently an act of the appetitive power.

Ille actus quo voluntas tendit in aliquid quod proponitur ut bonum, ex eo quod per rationem est ordinatum ad finem, materialiter quidem est voluntatis, formaliter autem rationis. In huiusmodi autem substantia actus materialiter se habet ad ordinem qui imponitur a superiori potentia.

That act whereby the will tends to something proposed to it as being good, through being ordained to the end by the reason, is materially an act of the will, but formally an act of the reason. Now in such like matters the substance of the act is as the matter in comparison to the order imposed by the higher power.

1a 2ae q13: Choice, which is an act of the will with regard to the means

1. Of what power is it the act of the will or of the reason?
2. Is choice to be found in irrational animals?
3. Is choice only the means, or sometimes also of the end?
4. Is choice only of things that we do ourselves?
5. Is choice only of possible things?
6. Does man choose of necessity or freely?

1a 2ae q12 a5: Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals? No.

Cum bruta animalia non habeant rationem, videtur quod non intendant finem, quia intendere finem proprie et principaliter est moventis, prout scilicet ordinat motum alicuius (vel sui vel alterius) in finem, quod est rationis tantum.

Since irrational animals do not grasp formal aspect, it seems that they do not intend an end, because to intend properly and principally belongs to the mover, according as he ordains the movement of something (either his own or another's) to an end, which only pertains to formal aspect.

Bruta animalia moventur ad finem, non quasi considerantia quod per motum suum possunt consequi finem (quod est proprie intendentis), sed concupiscentia finem naturali instinctu, moventur ad finem: quasi ab alio mota, sicut et cetera quae moventur naturaliter.

Irrational animals are moved to an end, not as though they thought that they can gain the end by this movement (for this belongs to one that intends), but through desiring the end by natural teleonomy, they are moved to an end: moved, as it were, by another [viz., that which their aestimative capacity must assess as either (+, 0, or -)], just like other things that are moved naturally.

Intendere est in aliud tendere; quod quidem est et moventis et moti. Secundum quidem igitur quod dicitur intendere finem id quod movetur ad finem ab alio: sic natura dicitur intendere finem, quasi mota ad suum finem a Deo, sicut sagitta a sagittante. Et hoc modo etiam bruta animalia intendunt finem, inquantum moventur instinctu naturali ad aliquid.

To intend is to tend to something; and this belongs to the mover and to the moved. According, therefore, as that which is moved to an end by another is said to intend the end: thus nature is said to intend an end, as being moved to its end by God, as the arrow is moved by the archer. And in this way, irrational animals intend an end, inasmuch as they are moved to something by natural teleonomy.

Bruta animalia agunt propter finem: movetur enim animal vel ad cibum quaerendum, vel ad aliquid huiusmodi. Sed fruitio non importat ordinationem alicuius in aliquid, sicut intentio, sed absolutam quietem in fine.

Irrational animals act for an end: for an animal is moved either to seek food, or to do something of the kind. But enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of one thing to another, as intention does, but absolute repose in the end.

1a 2ae q12 a4: Whether intention of the end is the same act as the volition of the means? Yes.

In rebus voluntariis, idem motus est intentio finis et voluntas eius quod est ad finem, quia voluntas fertur in id quod est ad finem, propter finem.

In things pertaining to the will, the intention of the end is the same movement as the willing of the means, because the will is moved to the means for the sake of the end.

Finis, inquantum est res quaedam, est aliud voluntatis obiectum quam id quod est ad finem. Sed inquantum est ratio volendi id quod est ad finem, est unum et idem obiectum.

The end, considered as a thing, is other than the object of the will that is the means to that end. But insofar as the end is the formal aspect for willing the means, they are one and the same object.

Cum enim dico, "volo medicinam propter sanitatem," non designo nisi unum motum voluntatis. Cuius ratio est quia finis ratio est volendi ea quae sunt ad finem.

For when I say: "I wish to take medicine for the sake of health," I signify no more than one movement of my will. And the formal aspect of this is that the end is the formal aspect for willing the means.

Idem autem actus cadit super obiectum, et super rationem obiecti; sicut eadem visio est coloris et luminis, ut supra dictum est.

Now the object, and the formal aspect by which it is an object, come under the same act; thus it is the same act of sight that perceives color and light, as stated above (q8 a3 ad 2).

Et est simile de intellectu: quia si absolute principium et conclusionem consideret, diversa est consideratio utriusque; in hoc autem quod conclusioni propter principia assentit, est unus actus intellectus tantum.

And the same applies to the intellect: for if it consider principle and conclusion absolutely, it considers each by a distinct act; but when it assents to the conclusion on account of the principles, there is but one act of the intellect.

Motus qui est unus subiecto, potest ratione differre: secundum principium et finem.

A movement which is one as to the subject, may differ according to the formal aspect: as to its beginning and end.

Sic igitur inquantum motus voluntatis fertur in id quod est ad finem, prout ordinatur ad finem, est electio. Motus autem voluntatis qui fertur in finem, secundum quod acquiritur per ea quae sunt ad finem, vocatur intentio.

Accordingly, in so far as the movement of the will is to the means, as ordained to the end, it is "choice". But the movement of the will to the end, as acquired by the means, it is called "intention".

Cuius signum est quod intentio finis esse potest, etiam nondum determinatis his quae sunt ad finem, quorum est electio.

A sign of this is that we can have intention of the end, without having determined the means, which are the object of choice.

1a 2ae q12 a3: Whether one can intend two things at the same time? Yes.

Homo potest simul multa intendere, quia est intentio non solum finis ultimi, sed etiam finis medii: simul autem intendit aliquis et finem proximum, et ultimum (sicut confectionem medicinae, et sanitatem).

A man can intend several things at the same time, because intention is not only of the last end, but also of an intermediary end: for a man intends at the same time both the proximate and the last end (as the mixing of a medicine and the giving of health).

Ea quae sunt plura secundum rem, possunt accipi ut unus terminus intentionis, prout sunt unum secundum rationem, vel quia aliqua duo concurrunt ad integrandum aliquid unum (sicut ad sanitatem concurrunt calor et frigus commensurata), vel quia aliqua duo sub uno communi continentur, quod potest esse intentum (puta acquisitio vini et vestis continetur sub lucro, sicut sub quodam communi, unde nihil prohibet quin ille qui intendit lucrum, simul haec duo intendat).

Where we have many things in reality, we may take them as one term of intention, insofar as the formal aspect takes them as one: either because two things concur in the integrity of one whole (as a proper measure of heat and cold conduce to health), or because two things are included in one which may be intended (for instance, the acquiring of wine and clothing is included in wealth as in something common to both, wherefore nothing hinders the man who intends to acquire wealth, from intending both the others).

1a 2ae q12 a2: Whether intention is only of the last end? No.

Etsi semper intentio sit finis, non tamen oportet quod semper sit ultimi finis, quia terminus habet rationem ultimi, sed non semper ultimi respectu totius, sed quandoque respectu alicuius partis.

Though intention is always of the end, it need not be always of the last end, because a terminus has the formal aspect of something last, not always in respect of the whole, but sometimes in respect of a part.

Sicut in motu quo itur de a in c per b, c est terminus ultimus, b autem est terminus, sed non ultimus. Et utriusque potest esse intentio.

Thus in the movement from A to C through B, C is the last terminus, while B is a terminus, but not the last. And intention can be both.

Fruitio importat quietem in fine, quod pertinet solum ad ultimum finem. Sed intentio importat motum in finem, non autem quietem.

Enjoyment implies rest in the end; and this belongs to the last end alone. But intention implies movement towards an end, not rest.

Intentio cordis dicitur clamor ad Deum, non quod Deus sit obiectum intentionis semper, sed quia est intentionis cognitor. Vel quia, cum oramus, intentionem nostram ad Deum dirigimus, quae quidem intentio vim clamoris habet.

The intention of the heart is called a cry to God, not that God is always the object of intention, but because He sees our intention. Or because, when we pray, we direct our intention to God, which intention has the force of a cry.

1a 2ae q12 a1: Whether intention is an act of the intellect? No.

Intentio proprie est actus voluntatis quia voluntas movet omnes alias vires animae ad finem.

Intention, properly speaking, is an act of the will because intention belongs first and principally to that which moves to the end, and the will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end (q9 a1).

Intentio est actus voluntatis respectu finis. Sed voluntas respicit finem tripliciter. Uno modo, absolute, et sic dicitur voluntas, prout absolute volumus vel sanitatem, vel si quid aliud est huiusmodi. Alio modo consideratur finis secundum quod in eo quiescitur, et hoc modo fruitio respicit finem. Tertio modo consideratur finis secundum quod est terminus alicuius quod in ipsum ordinatur, et sic intentio respicit finem. Non enim solum ex hoc intendere dicimur sanitatem, quia volumus eam, sed quia volumus ad eam per aliquid aliud pervenire.

Intention is an act of the will in regard to the end. Now the will stands in a threefold relation to the end. First, absolutely; and thus we have "volition," whereby we will absolutely to have health, and so forth. Secondly, it considers the end, as its place of rest; and thus "enjoyment" regards the end. Thirdly, it considers the end as the term towards which something is ordained; and thus "intention" regards the end. For when we speak of intending to have health, we mean not only that we have it, but that we will have it by means of something else.

Voluntas quidem non ordinat, sed tamen in aliquid tendit secundum ordinem rationis. Unde hoc nomen intentio nominat actum voluntatis, praesupposita ordinatione rationis ordinantis aliquid in finem.

The will does not ordain, but tends to something according to the order of formal aspect. Consequently this word "intention" indicates an act of the will, presupposing the [actual] ordination of the [formal] aspect that orders something to the end.

Augustinus dicit, in XI de Trin., quod "voluntatis intentio copulat corpus visum visui, et similiter speciem in memoria existentem ad aciem animi interius cogitantis".

Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4,8,9) that "the intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the images retained in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul's inner thought."

1a 2ae q12: Intention

1. Is intention an act of intellect or of the will?
2. Is it only of the last end?
3. Can one intend two things at the same time?
4. Is intention of the end the same act as volition of the means?
5. Is intention within the competency of irrational animals?

1a 2ae q11 a4: Whether enjoyment is only of the end possessed? No.

Frui potest esse etiam finis non habiti quia perfecta est fruitio finis iam habiti realiter, sed imperfecta est etiam finis non habiti realiter, sed in intentione tantum.

It is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not possessed because perfect enjoyment is of the end already possessed, but imperfect enjoyment is also of the end possessed not really, but only in intention.

Quies voluntatis dupliciter impeditur: uno modo, ex parte obiecti, quia scilicet non est ultimus finis, sed ad aliud ordinatur; alio modo, ex parte appetentis finem qui nondum adipiscitur finem.

The will is hindered in two ways from being at rest: first, on the part of the object, by reason of its not being the last end, but ordained to something else; secondly, on the part of the one who desires the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession of it.

Obiectum autem est quod dat speciem actui, sed ab agente dependet modus agendi, ut sit perfectus vel imperfectus, secundum conditionem agentis.

Now it is the object that gives the specifies to an act, but on the agent depends the manner of acting, so that [the act] may be perfect or imperfect, according to the actual circumstances of the agent.

Et ideo eius quod non est ultimus finis, fruitio est impropria, quasi deficiens a specie fruitionis. Finis autem ultimi non habiti, est fruitio propria quidem, sed imperfecta, propter imperfectum modum habendi ultimum finem.

Therefore enjoyment of anything but the last end is enjoyment improperly speaking, as falling short of the formal nature of enjoyment. But enjoyment of the last end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly speaking, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect way in which it is possessed.

"Frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei propter seipsam", ut Augustinus dicit.

"To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4).

1a 2ae q11 a3: Whether enjoyment is only of the last end? Yes.

Solius ultimi finis est fruitio quia non quiescit simpliciter nisi in ultimo: quia quandiu aliquid expectatur, motus voluntatis remanet in suspenso, licet iam ad aliquid pervenerit.

Enjoyment is of the last end alone because rest is not absolute save in the possession of the last end: for as long as something is looked for, the movement of the will remains in suspense, although it has reached something.

Augustinus, in X de Trin., dicit quod "fruimur cognitis in quibus voluntas delectata conquiescit".

Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10) that "we enjoy what we know, when the delighted will is at rest therein".

Deus igitur est ultimus finis, sicut res quae ultimo quaeritur: fruitio autem sicut adeptio huius ultimi finis. Sicut igitur non est alius finis Deus, et fruitio Dei; ita eadem ratio fruitionis est qua fruimur Deo, et qua fruimur divina fruitione.

Accordingly God is the last end, as that which is ultimately sought for: while the enjoyment is as the attainment of this last end. And so, just as God is not one end, and the enjoyment of God, another; so it is the same formal aspect of enjoyment whereby we enjoy God, and whereby we enjoy our enjoyment of God.

Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., "non fruitur si quis id quod in facultatem voluntatis assumit, propter aliud appetit".

Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "A man does not enjoy that which he desires for the sake of something else."

1a 2ae q11 a2: Whether to enjoy belongs to the rational creature alone? No.

Rationali naturae convenit fruitio secundum rationem perfectam; brutis autem animalibus secundum rationem imperfectam; aliis autem creaturis nullo modo; quia appetitus sensitivus consequitur aliquam cognitionem.

Enjoyment belongs to the rational nature under a perfect formal aspect; to irrational animals, under an imperfect aspect; to other creatures, not at all; because the sensitive appetite follows some knowledge.

Frui non est actus potentiae pervenientis ad finem sicut exequentis, sed potentiae imperantis executionem; dictum est enim quod est appetitivae potentiae.

To enjoy is not the act of the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that commands the achievement; for it has been said to belong to the appetitive power.

Sed cognitio finis est duplex: perfecta, et imperfecta. Perfecta quidem, qua non solum cognoscitur id quod est finis et bonum, sed universalis ratio finis et boni, et talis cognitio est solius rationalis naturae.

Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that known which is the end and the good, but also the universal formal aspect of the end and the good, and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone.

Imperfecta autem cognitio est qua cognoscitur particulariter finis et bonum, et talis cognitio est in brutis animalibus. Quorum etiam virtutes appetitivae non sunt imperantes libere, sed secundum naturalem instinctum ad ea quae apprehenduntur, moventur.

On the other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the good are known in the particular. Such knowledge is in irrational animals, whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are moved according to a natural "Umwelt" to whatever they apprehend.

1a 2ae q11 a1: Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power? Yes.

Frui est actus appetitivae potentiae quia finis et bonum est obiectum appetitivae potentiae.

To enjoy is an act of the appetitive power because the end and the good is the object of the appetitive power.

Fruitio pertinere videtur ad amorem vel delectationem quam aliquis habet de ultimo expectato, quod est finis.

Hence fruition seems to have relation to love, or to the delight which one has in realizing the longed-for term, which is the end.

Perfectio et finis cuiuslibet potentiae, inquantum est quoddam bonum, pertinet ad appetitivam. Propter quod appetitiva potentia movet alias ad suos fines, et ipsa consequitur finem, quando quaelibet aliarum pertingit ad finem.

The perfection and end of each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive power. Wherefore the appetitive power moves the other powers to their ends, and itself realizes the end, when each of them reaches the end.

Nihil prohibet unum et idem, secundum diversas rationes, ad diversas potentias pertinere. Ipsa igitur visio Dei, inquantum est visio, est actus intellectus, inquantum autem est bonum et finis, est voluntatis obiectum. Et hoc modo est eius fruitio. Et sic hunc finem intellectus consequitur tanquam potentia agens, voluntas autem tanquam potentia movens ad finem, et fruens fine iam adepto.

Nothing hinders one and the same thing from belonging, under different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly the vision of God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good and an end, is the object of the will. And as such is the fruition thereof: so that the intellect attains this end, as the executive power, but the will as the motive power, moving (the powers) towards the end and enjoying the end attained.

1a 2ae q11: Enjoyment which is an act of the will

1. Is enjoyment an act of the appetitive power?
2. Does it belong to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals?
3. Is enjoyment only of the last end?
4. Is it only of the end possessed?

1a 2ae q10 a4: Whether the will is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God? No.

Deus non ex necessitate movet voluntatem hominis quia voluntas est activum principium non determinatum ad unum, sed indifferenter se habens ad multa.

God does not of necessity move man's will because the will is an active principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things.

Sic Deus ipsam movet, quod non ex necessitate ad unum determinat, sed remanet motus eius contingens et non necessarius, nisi in his ad quae naturaliter movetur.

God so moves it that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.

Magis repugnaret divinae motioni, si voluntas ex necessitate moveretur, quod suae naturae non competit, quam si moveretur libere, prout competit suae naturae.

It would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature, than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.

Sicut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., ad providentiam divinam non pertinet naturam rerum corrumpere, sed servare. Unde omnia movet secundum eorum conditione: ita quod ex causis necessariis, per motionem divinam, consequuntur effectus ex necessitate; ex causis autem contingentibus, sequuntur effectus contingenter.

As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "it belongs to Divine providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things." Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions: so that from necessary causes, through the Divine motion, effects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently.

1a 2ae q10 a3: Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by the lower appetite? No.Iin so far as the reason remains free, and not subject to the passio

Non voluntas hominis ex necessitate movetur ab appetitu inferiori: inquantum ratio manet libera, et passioni non subiecta, intantum voluntatis motus qui manet, non ex necessitate tendit ad hoc ad quod passio inclinat, quia potest voluntas non velle concupiscere, aut concupiscentiae non consentire, et sic non ex necessitate sequitur concupiscentiae motum.

Man's will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite: insofar as the reason remains free, and not subject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it, because it is in the power of the will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence, and thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.

Passio appetitus sensitivi movet voluntatem, ex ea parte qua voluntas movetur ab obiecto: inquantum scilicet homo aliqualiter dispositus per passionem, iudicat aliquid esse conveniens et bonum quod extra passionem existens non iudicaret.

The passion of the sensitive appetite moves the will, insofar as the will is moved by its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such and such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, which he would not judge thus were it not for the passion.

Voluntas non solum movetur a bono universali apprehenso per rationem, sed etiam a bono apprehenso per sensum. Et ideo potest moveri ad aliquod particulare bonum absque passione appetitus sensitivi. Multa enim volumus et operamur absque passione, per solam electionem, ut maxime patet in his in quibus ratio renititur passioni.

The will is moved not only by the universal good apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense. And it can be moved to some particular good independently of a passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things without passion, and through choice alone, as is most evident in those cases wherein reason resists passion.

1a 2ae q10 a2: Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its object? No.

Voluntas non ex necessitate movetur ad alterum oppositorum, quia voluntas est potentia rationalis, est enim in ratione, et potentiae rationales sunt ad opposita.

The will is not moved, of necessity, to either of the opposites, because the will is a rational power, since it is in the reason, and the rational powers are directed to opposites.

Finis ultimus ex necessitate movet voluntatem, quia est bonum perfectum. Et similiter illa quae ordinantur ad hunc finem, sine quibus finis haberi non potest, sicut esse et vivere et huiusmodi. Alia vero, sine quibus finis haberi potest, non ex necessitate vult qui vult finem.

The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is the perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that end, and without which the end cannot be attained, such as "to be" and "to live," and the like. But other things without which the end can be gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end.

Voluntas movetur dupliciter, uno modo, quantum ad exercitium actus; alio modo, quantum ad specificationem actus, quae est ex obiecto.

The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived from the object.

Primo ergo modo, voluntas a nullo obiecto ex necessitate movetur, potest enim aliquis de quocumque obiecto non cogitare, et per consequens neque actu velle illud. Sed quantum ad secundum motionis modum, voluntas ab aliquo obiecto ex necessitate movetur, ab aliquo autem non. In motu enim cuiuslibet potentiae a suo obiecto, consideranda est ratio per quam obiectum movet potentiam.

As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man's power not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second manner of motion, the will is moved by one object necessarily, by another not. For in the movement of a power by its object, we must consider under what aspect the object moves the power.

Visibile enim movet visum sub ratione coloris actu visibilis. Unde si color proponatur visui, ex necessitate movet visum, nisi aliquis visum avertat, quod pertinet ad exercitium actus. Si autem proponeretur aliquid visui quod non omnibus modis esset color in actu, sed secundum aliquid esset tale, secundum autem aliquid non tale, non ex necessitate visus tale obiectum videret, posset enim intendere in ipsum ex ea parte qua non est coloratum in actu, et sic ipsum non videret.

For the visible moves the sight, under the aspect of color actually visible. Wherefore if color be offered to the sight, it moves the sight necessarily: unless one turns one's eyes away; which belongs to the exercise of the act. But if the sight were confronted with something not in all respects colored actually, but only so in some respects, and in other respects not, the sight would not of necessity see such an object: for it might look at that part of the object which is not actually colored, and thus it would not see it.

Sicut autem coloratum in actu est obiectum visus, ita bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Unde si proponatur aliquod obiectum voluntati quod sit universaliter bonum et secundum omnem considerationem, ex necessitate voluntas in illud tendet, si aliquid velit, non enim poterit velle oppositum.

Now just as the actually colored is the object of sight, so is good the object of the will. Wherefore if the will be offered an object which is good universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will the opposite.

Si autem proponatur sibi aliquod obiectum quod non secundum quamlibet considerationem sit bonum, non ex necessitate voluntas feretur in illud. Et quia defectus cuiuscumque boni habet rationem non boni, ideo illud solum bonum quod est perfectum et cui nihil deficit, est tale bonum quod voluntas non potest non velle, quod est beatitudo.

If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever, is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and lacking in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it: and this is Happiness.

Alia autem quaelibet particularia bona, inquantum deficiunt ab aliquo bono, possunt accipi ut non bona, et secundum hanc considerationem, possunt repudiari vel approbari a voluntate, quae potest in idem ferri secundum diversas considerationes.

Whereas any other particular goods, in so far as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will, which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.

1a 2ae q10 a1: Whether the will is moved to anything naturally? Yes.

Principium motuum voluntariorum est bonum in communi, in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit, sicut etiam quaelibet potentia in suum obiectum (et etiam ipse finis ultimus, qui hoc modo se habet in appetibilibus, sicut prima principia demonstrationum in intelligibilibus, et universaliter omnia illa quae conveniunt volenti secundum suam naturam), quia non per voluntatem appetimus solum ea quae pertinent ad potentiam voluntatis, sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas potentias, et ad totum hominem.

The principle of voluntary movements is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as does each power to its object (and again it is the last end, which stands in the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of demonstrations to things intelligible and, speaking generally, it is all those things which belong to the willer according to his nature), because it is not only things pertaining to the will that the will desires, but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire man.

Unde naturaliter homo vult non solum obiectum voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae conveniunt aliis potentiis, ut cognitionem veri, quae convenit intellectui; et esse et vivere et alia huiusmodi, quae respiciunt consistentiam naturalem; quae omnia comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quadam particularia bona.

Wherefore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to the other powers; such as the knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect; and to be and to live and other like things which regard the natural well-being; all of which are included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.

Cum igitur voluntas sit quaedam vis immaterialis sicut et intellectus, respondet sibi naturaliter aliquod unum commune, scilicet bonum, sicut etiam intellectui aliquod unum commune, scilicet verum, vel ens, vel quod quid est. Sub bono autem communi multa particularia bona continentur, ad quorum nullum voluntas determinatur.

Since, therefore, the will is an immaterial power like the intellect, some one general thing corresponds to it naturally, which is the good; just as to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which is the true, or being, or "what a thing is." And under good in general are included many particular goods, to none of which is the will determined.

Sicut Boetius dicit in libro de duabus naturis, et philosophus in V Metaphys., natura dicitur multipliciter. Quandoque enim dicitur principium intrinsecum in rebus mobilibus. Et talis natura est vel materia, vel forma materialis, ut patet ex II Physic. Alio modo dicitur natura quaelibet substantia, vel etiam quodlibet ens. Et secundum hoc, illud dicitur esse naturale rei, quod convenit ei secundum suam substantiam. Et hoc est quod per se inest rei. In omnibus autem, ea quae non per se insunt, reducuntur in aliquid quod per se inest, sicut in principium. Et ideo necesse est quod, hoc modo accipiendo naturam, semper principium in his quae conveniunt rei, sit naturale. Et hoc manifeste apparet in intellectu, nam principia intellectualis cognitionis sunt naturaliter nota. Similiter etiam principium motuum voluntariorum oportet esse aliquid naturaliter volitum.

As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.) and the Philosopher also (Metaph. v, 4) the word "nature" is used in a manifold sense. For sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things. In this sense nature is either matter or the material form, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. In another sense nature stands for any substance, or even for any being. And in this sense, that is said to be natural to a thing which befits it in respect of its substance. And this is that which of itself is in a thing. Now all things that do not of themselves belong to the thing in which they are, are reduced to something which belongs of itself to that thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing, be a natural principle. This is evident in regard to the intellect: for the principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like manner the principle of voluntary movements must be something naturally willed.

In rebus naturalibus id quod est naturale quasi consequens formam tantum, semper actu inest, sicut calidum igni. Quod autem est naturale sicut consequens materiam, non semper actu inest, sed quandoque secundum potentiam tantum. Nam forma est actus, materia vero potentia.

In the case of natural things, that which is natural, as a result of the form only, is always in them actually, as heat is in fire. But that which is natural as a result of matter, is not always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality: because form is act, whereas matter is potentiality.

Et similiter non oportet quod voluntas, quae de potentia in actum reducitur dum aliquid vult, semper actu velit, sed solum quando est in aliqua dispositione determinata. Voluntas autem Dei, quae est actus purus, semper est in actu volendi.

And in like manner it is not necessary that the will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills something), should always be in the act of volition; but only when it is in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will, which is pure act, is always in the act of volition.

1a 2ae q10: The manner in which the will is moved

1. Is the will moved to anything naturally?
2. Is it moved of necessity by its object?
3. Is it moved of necessity by the lower appetite?
4. Is it moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?

1a 2ae q9 a6: Whether the will is moved by God alone, as exterior principle? Yes.

Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis motor, ad universale obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum, quia sine hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle.

God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good, because without this universal motion, man cannot will anything.

Sed homo per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud, quod est vere bonum vel apparens bonum. Sed tamen interdum specialiter Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum, quod est bonum, sicut in his quos movet per gratiam, ut infra dicetur.

But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later on (q109, a2).

Sic ergo hominem, voluntatem habentem, contingit moveri ab aliquo qui non est causa eius, sed quod motus voluntarius eius sit ab aliquo principio extrinseco quod non est causa voluntatis, est impossibile.

Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something that is not his cause; but that his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle that is not the cause of his will, is impossible.

Voluntatis autem causa nihil aliud esse potest quam Deus. Et hoc patet dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex hoc quod voluntas est potentia animae rationalis, quae a solo Deo causatur per creationem, ut in primo dictum est. Secundo vero ex hoc patet, quod voluntas habet ordinem ad universale bonum.

Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was stated in Ia, q90, a2. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good.

Unde nihil aliud potest esse voluntatis causa, nisi ipse Deus, qui est universale bonum. Omne autem aliud bonum per participationem dicitur, et est quoddam particulare bonum, particularis autem causa non dat inclinationem universalem. Unde nec materia prima, quae est in potentia ad omnes formas, potest causari ab aliquo particulari agente.

Wherefore nothing else can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal good: while every other good is good by participation, and is some particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination. Hence neither can primary matter, which is potentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent.

1a 2ae q9 a5: Whether the will is moved by a heavenly body? No.

Impossibile est quod corpus caeleste imprimat directe in intellectum aut voluntatem quia res incorporeae et immateriales sunt formalioris et universalioris virtutis quam quaecumque res corporales.

It is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect or will because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more formal and more universal than any corporeal things whatever.

Voluntas enim, ut dicitur in III de anima, est in ratione. Ratio autem est potentia animae non alligata organo corporali. Unde relinquitur quod voluntas sit potentia omnino immaterialis et incorporea.

For the "will," as stated in De Anima iii, 9, "is in the reason." Now the reason is a power of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the reverse.

Et propter hoc Aristoteles, in libro de anima, opinionem dicentium quod talis est voluntas in hominibus, "qualem in diem ducit pater deorum virorumque" (scilicet Iupiter, per quem totum caelum intelligunt), attribuit eis qui ponebant intellectum non differre a sensu. Omnes enim vires sensitivae, cum sint actus organorum corporalium, per accidens moveri possunt a caelestibus corporibus, motis scilicet corporibus quorum sunt actus.

For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) ascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from sense, the theory that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods bring on" [Odyssey xviii. 135 (referring to Jupiter, by whom they understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally, by the heavenly bodies, i.e. through those bodies being moved, whose acts they are.

Appetitus intellectivus quodammodo movetur ab appetitu sensitivo; indirecte redundat motus caelestium corporum in voluntatem, inquantum scilicet per passiones appetitus sensitivi voluntatem moveri contingit.

The intellectual appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite; the movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will, insofar as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the sensitive appetite.

Motus corporales humani reducuntur in motum caelestis corporis sicut in causam:

• inquantum ipsa dispositio organorum congrua ad motum, est aliqualiter ex impressione caelestium corporum;
  
• et inquantum etiam appetitus sensitivus commovetur ex impressione caelestium corporum;
  
• et ulterius inquantum corpora exteriora moventur secundum motum caelestium corporum, ex quorum occursu voluntas incipit aliquid velle vel non velle.

Sicut adveniente frigore incipit aliquis velle facere ignem. Sed ista motio voluntatis est ex parte obiecti exterius praesentati, non ex parte interioris instinctus.

The movements of the human body are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body:

• insofar as the disposition suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to the influence of heavenly bodies;
  
• also, insofar as the sensitive appetite is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies;
  
• and again, insofar as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to will or not to will something.

For instance, when our body is chilled, we begin to wish to make a fire. But this movement of the will is on the part of the object offered from without: not on the part of an inward instigation.

Appetitus sensitivus est actus organi corporalis. Unde nihil prohibet ex impressione corporum caelestium aliquos esse habiles ad irascendum vel concupiscendum, vel aliquam huiusmodi passionem, sicut et ex complexione naturali. Plures autem hominum sequuntur passiones, quibus soli sapientes resistunt. Et ideo ut in pluribus verificantur ea quae praenuntiantur de actibus hominum secundum considerationem caelestium corporum. Sed tamen, ut Ptolomaeus dicit in Centiloquio, "sapiens dominatur astris".

The sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ. Wherefore there is no reason why man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence, or some like passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by reason of his natural complexion. But the majority of men are led by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the majority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the observation of heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says (Centiloquium v), "the wise man governs the stars".

1a 2ae q9 a4: Whether the will is moved by an exterior principle? Yes.

Voluntas potest ab aliquo exteriori moveri quia indiget moveri ab alio sicut a primo movente.

The will can be moved by something exterior because it needs to be moved by another as first mover.

De ratione voluntarii est quod principium eius sit intra, sed non oportet quod hoc principium intrinsecum sit primum principium non motum ab alio. Unde motus voluntarius etsi habeat principium proximum intrinsecum, tamen principium primum est ab extra.

The formal aspect of the voluntary act is that its principle be within the agent, but it is not necessary that this inward principle be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its first principle is from without.

Omne enim quod quandoque est agens in actu et quandoque in potentia, indiget moveri ab aliquo movente. Manifestum est autem quod voluntas incipit velle aliquid, cum hoc prius non vellet. Necesse est ergo quod ab aliquo moveatur ad volendum.

For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something to will it.

Hoc autem non est procedere in infinitum. Unde necesse est ponere quod in primum motum voluntatis voluntas prodeat ex instinctu alicuius exterioris moventis, ut Aristoteles concludit in quodam capitulo Ethicae Eudemicae.

But this process could not go on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics (vii, 14).

1a 2ae q9 a3: Whether the will moves itself? Yes.

Voluntas per hoc quod vult finem, movet seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem, quia inquantum actu vult finem, reducit se de potentia in actum respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem, ut scilicet actu ea velit.

The will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means, because inasmuch as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect of the means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.

Potentia voluntatis semper actu est sibi praesens, sed actus voluntatis, quo vult finem aliquem, non semper est in ipsa voluntate. Per hunc autem movet seipsam.

The power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself.

Voluntas movetur ab intellectu, et a seipsa. Sed ab intellectu quidem movetur secundum rationem obiecti, a seipsa vero, quantum ad exercitium actus, secundum rationem finis.

The will is moved by the intellect, and also by itself. By the intellect it is moved by the formal aspect of the object; whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, by the formal aspect of the end.

Sicut supra dictum est, ad voluntatem pertinet movere alias potentias ex ratione finis, qui est voluntatis obiectum. Sed sicut dictum est, hoc modo se habet finis in appetibilibus, sicut principium in intelligibilibus.

As stated above (q9 a1), it belongs to the will to move the other powers, by the formal aspect of the end which is the will's object. Now, as stated above (q8 a2), the end is in things appetible, what the principle is in things intelligible.

Manifestum est autem quod intellectus per hoc quod cognoscit principium, reducit seipsum de potentia in actum, quantum ad cognitionem conclusionum, et hoc modo movet seipsum. Et similiter voluntas per hoc quod vult finem, movet seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem.

But it is evident that the intellect, through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions, and thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.

1a 2ae q9 a2: Whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite? Yes.

Appetitus sensitivus movet voluntatem quia secundum passionem appetitus sensitivi, immutatur homo ad aliquam dispositionem; unde secundum quod homo est in passione aliqua, videtur sibi aliquid conveniens, quod non videtur extra passionem existenti.

The sensitive appetite moves the will because according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition; wherefore according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected.

Id quod apprehenditur sub ratione boni et convenientis, movet voluntatem per modum obiecti. Quod autem aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus contingit: scilicet ex conditione eius quod proponitur, et eius cui proponitur. Conveniens enim secundum relationem dicitur, unde ex utroque extremorum dependet.

That which is apprehended under the formal aspect of good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing appear to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it depends on both extremes.

Et inde est quod gustus diversimode dispositus, non eodem modo accipit aliquid ut conveniens et ut non conveniens. Unde, ut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., "qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei."

And hence it is that taste, according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as a man is, such does the end seem to him."

Sicut philosophus dicit in I Polit., ratio, in qua est voluntas, movet suo imperio irascibilem et concupiscibilem, non quidem despotico principatu, sicut movetur servus a domino; sed principatu regali seu politico, sicut liberi homines reguntur a gubernante, qui tamen possunt contra movere. Unde et irascibilis et concupiscibilis possunt in contrarium movere ad voluntatem. Et sic nihil prohibet voluntatem aliquando ab eis moveri.

As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as a slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic sovereignty," as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times.

Dicitur Iac. I, "unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus."

It is written (James 1:14): "Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured."

1a 2ae q9 a1: Whether the will is moved by the intellect? Yes.

Intellectus movet voluntatem, sicut praesentans ei obiectum suum, quia primum principium formale est ens et verum universale, quod est obiectum intellectus.

The intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it, because the first formal principle is universal "being" and "truth," which is the object of the intellect.

Voluntas movet intellectum quantum ad exercitium actus, quia et ipsum verum, quod est perfectio intellectus, continetur sub universali bono ut quoddam bonum particulare. Sed quantum ad determinationem actus, quae est ex parte obiecti, intellectus movet voluntatem, quia et ipsum bonum apprehenditur secundum quandam specialem rationem comprehensam sub universali ratione veri.

The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal aspect of the true.

Sicut imaginatio formae sine aestimatione convenientis vel nocivi, non movet appetitum sensitivum; ita nec apprehensio veri sine ratione boni et appetibilis. Unde intellectus speculativus non movet, sed intellectus practicus, ut dicitur in III de anima.

Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive appetite; so neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).

Dupliciter autem aliqua vis animae invenitur esse in potentia ad diversa, uno modo, quantum ad agere et non agere; alio modo, quantum ad agere hoc vel illud. Sicut visus quandoque videt actu, et quandoque non videt; et quandoque videt album, et quandoque videt nigrum. Indiget igitur movente quantum ad duo, scilicet quantum ad exercitium vel usum actus; et quantum ad determinationem actus. Quorum primum est ex parte subiecti, quod quandoque invenitur agens, quandoque non agens, aliud autem est ex parte obiecti, secundum quod specificatur actus.

A power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects, viz. as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.

Bonum autem in communi, quod habet rationem finis, est obiectum voluntatis. Et ideo ex hac parte voluntas movet alias potentias animae ad suos actus, utimur enim aliis potentiis cum volumus. Nam fines et perfectiones omnium aliarum potentiarum comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona, semper autem ars vel potentia ad quam pertinet finis universalis, movet ad agendum artem vel potentiam ad quam pertinet finis particularis sub illo universali comprehensus; sicut dux exercitus, qui intendit bonum commune, scilicet ordinem totius exercitus, movet suo imperio aliquem ex tribunis, qui intendit ordinem unius aciei.

Good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will. For the end and perfection of every other power, is included under the object of the will as some particular good: and always the art or power to which the universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good--i.e. the order of the whole army--by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the order of one company.

Sed obiectum movet, determinando actum, ad modum principii formalis, a quo in rebus naturalibus actio specificatur.

On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are specified.

1a 2ae q9: That which moves the will

1. Is the will moved by the intellect?
2. Is it moved by the sensitive appetite?
3. Does the will move itself?
4. Is it moved by an extrinsic principle?
5. Is it moved by a heavenly body?
6. Is the will moved by God alone as by an extrinsic principle?

1a 2ae q8 a3: Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means? No.

Non eodem actu voluntas fertur in utrumque quia diversae species boni sunt finis, et id quod est ad finem, quod dicitur utile, et actus diversificantur secundum obiecta.

The will is not moved to both by the same act because the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a useful good, and acts are diversified according to their objects.

Sic ergo voluntas in ipsum finem dupliciter fertur, uno modo, absolute secundum se; alio modo, sicut in rationem volendi ea quae sunt ad finem.

Accordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, to the end absolutely and in itself; secondly, as the formal aspect for willing the means.

Manifestum est ergo quod unus et idem motus voluntatis est quo fertur in finem, secundum quod est ratio volendi ea quae sunt ad finem, et in ipsa quae sunt ad finem. Sed alius actus est quod fertur in ipsum finem absolute.

Hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and the same movement, to the end, as the formal aspect for willing the means; and to the means themselves. But it is another act whereby the will is moved to the end absolutely.

Et quandoque praecedit tempore, sicut cum aliquis primo vult sanitatem, et postea, deliberans quomodo possit sanari, vult conducere medicum ut sanetur.

And sometimes this act precedes the other in time; for example when a man first wills to have health, and afterwards deliberating by what means to be healed, wills to send for the doctor to heal him.

1a 2ae q8 a2: Whether volition is of the end only? No, it is also of the means.

Si voluntas est finis, ipsa etiam est eorum quae sunt ad finem, quia ratio boni, quod est obiectum potentiae voluntatis, invenitur non solum in fine, sed etiam in his quae sunt ad finem.

If volition is of the end, it is also of the means, because the aspect of good, which is the object of the power of the will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means.

Voluntas quandoque dicitur ipsa potentia qua volumus; quandoque autem ipse voluntatis actus. Si ergo loquamur de voluntate secundum quod nominat potentiam, sic se extendit et ad finem, et ad ea quae sunt ad finem.

The word "voluntas" sometimes designates the power of the will, sometimes its act. Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to the end and to the means.

Ad ea enim se extendit unaquaeque potentia, in quibus inveniri potest quocumque modo ratio sui obiecti, sicut visus se extendit ad omnia quaecumque participant quocumque modo colorem.

For every power extends to those things in which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any way whatever: thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever that are in any way colored.

Si autem loquamur de voluntate secundum quod nominat proprie actum, sic, proprie loquendo, est finis tantum. Omnis enim actus denominatus a potentia, nominat simplicem actum illius potentiae, sicut intelligere nominat simplicem actum intellectus.

If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus "to understand" designates the simple act of the understanding.

Ea vero quae sunt ad finem, non sunt bona vel volita propter seipsa, sed ex ordine ad finem. Unde voluntas in ea non fertur, nisi quatenus fertur in finem, unde hoc ipsum quod in eis vult, est finis.

On the other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to them, only in so far as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the end.

Sicut et intelligere proprie est eorum quae secundum se cognoscuntur, scilicet principiorum, eorum autem quae cognoscuntur per principia, non dicitur esse intelligentia, nisi inquantum in eis ipsa principia considerantur.

Thus, to understand, is properly directed to things that are known in themselves, i.e. first principles: but we do not speak of understanding with regard to things known through first principles, except in so far as we see the principles in those things.