Non eodem actu voluntas fertur in utrumque quia diversae species boni sunt finis, et id quod est ad finem, quod dicitur utile, et actus diversificantur secundum obiecta.
The will is not moved to both by the same act because the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a useful good, and acts are diversified according to their objects.
Sic ergo voluntas in ipsum finem dupliciter fertur, uno modo, absolute secundum se; alio modo, sicut in rationem volendi ea quae sunt ad finem.
Accordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, to the end absolutely and in itself; secondly, as the formal aspect for willing the means.
Manifestum est ergo quod unus et idem motus voluntatis est quo fertur in finem, secundum quod est ratio volendi ea quae sunt ad finem, et in ipsa quae sunt ad finem. Sed alius actus est quod fertur in ipsum finem absolute.
Hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and the same movement, to the end, as the formal aspect for willing the means; and to the means themselves. But it is another act whereby the will is moved to the end absolutely.
Et quandoque praecedit tempore, sicut cum aliquis primo vult sanitatem, et postea, deliberans quomodo possit sanari, vult conducere medicum ut sanetur.
And sometimes this act precedes the other in time; for example when a man first wills to have health, and afterwards deliberating by what means to be healed, wills to send for the doctor to heal him.