Q74 A1: Whether these days are sufficiently enumerated?

Yes. These days are devoted to the first instituting of the world and the reason of the distinction of these days is made clear by what has been said above (Q70, A1), namely, that the parts of the world had first to be distinguished, and then each part adorned and filled, as it were, by the beings that inhabit it.

Dies isti deputantur primae institutioni mundi et ratio distinctionis horum dierum ex praemissis potest esse manifesta. Oportuit enim primo distingui partes mundi; et postmodum singulas partes ornari, per hoc quod quasi suis habitatoribus replentur.

Now the parts into which the corporeal creation is divided are three, according to some holy writers, these parts being the heaven, or highest part, the water, or middle part, and the earth, or the lowest part. (Thus the Pythagoreans teach that perfection consists in three things, the beginning, the middle, and the end.)

Secundum ergo alios sanctos, in creatura corporali tres partes designantur, prima, quae significatur nomine caeli; media, quae significatur nomine aquae; et, infima quae significatur nomine terrae. (Unde et secundum Pythagoricos, perfectio in tribus ponitur, principio, medio et fine, ut dicitur in I de caelo.)

The first part, then, is distinguished on the first day, and adorned on the fourth, the middle part distinguished on the middle day, and adorned on the fifth, and the third part distinguished on the third day, and adorned on the sixth.

Prima ergo pars distinguitur prima die, et ornatur quarta; media distinguitur secunda die, et ornatur quinta; infima distinguitur tertia die, et ornatur sexta.

But Augustine, while agreeing with the above writers as to the last three days, differs as to the first three, for, according to him, spiritual creatures are formed on the first day, and corporeal on the two others, the higher bodies being formed on the first these two days, and the lower on the second. (Thus, then, the perfection of the Divine works corresponds to the perfection of the number six, which is the sum of its aliquot parts, one, two, three; since one day is assigned to the forming of spiritual creatures, two to that of corporeal creatures, and three to the work of adornment.)

Augustinus vero convenit quidem cum eis in ultimis tribus diebus, differt autem in tribus primis. Quia secundum eum, in primo die formatur creatura spiritualis, in duobus aliis creatura corporalis; ita quod in secundo corpora superiora, in tertio corpora inferiora. (Et sic perfectio divinorum operum respondet perfectioni senarii numeri, qui consurgit ex suis partibus aliquotis simul iunctis; quae quidem partes sunt unum, duo, tria. Una enim dies deputatur formationi creaturae spiritualis, duae formationi creaturae corporalis, et tres ornatui.)

According to Augustine, the work of creation belongs to the production of formless matter, and of the formless spiritual nature, both of which are outside of time, as he himself says (Confess. xii, 12). Thus, then, the creation of either is set down before there was any day.

Secundum Augustinum, opus creationis pertinet ad productionem materiae informis, et naturae spiritualis informis. Quae quidem duo sunt extra tempus, ut ipse dicit in XII Confess., et ideo creatio utriusque ponitur ante omnem diem.

But it may also be said, following other holy writers, that the works of distinction and adornment imply certain changes in the creature which are measurable by time; whereas the work of creation lies only in the Divine act producing the substance of beings instantaneously. For this reason, therefore, every work of distinction and adornment is said to take place "in a day," but creation "in the beginning" which denotes something indivisible.

Sed secundum alios sanctos, potest dici quod opus distinctionis et ornatus attenditur secundum aliquam mutationem creaturae, quae tempore mensuratur. Opus autem creationis consistit in sola divina actione in instanti rerum substantiam producentis. Et ideo quodlibet opus distinctionis et ornatus dicitur factum in die, creatio autem dicitur facta in principio, quod sonat aliquid indivisibile.

The nature of light, as existing in a subject, was made on the first day; and the making of the luminaries on the fourth day does not mean that their substance was produced anew, but that they then received a form that they had not before, as said above (Q70, A1, RO2).

Prima die facta est natura lucis in aliquo subiecto. Sed quarto die facta dicuntur luminaria, non quia eorum substantia sit de novo producta; sed quia sunt aliquo modo formata, quo prius non erant, ut supra dictum est.

According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 15), after all that has been recorded that is assigned to the six days, something distinct is attributed to the seventh--namely, that on it God rested in Himself from His works: and for this reason it was right that the seventh day should be mentioned after the six.

Septimae diei, secundum Augustinum, deputatur aliquid post omnia quae sex diebus attribuuntur, scilicet quod Deus a suis operibus in seipso requiescit. Et ideo oportuit post sex dies fieri mentionem de septimo.

It may also be said, with the other writers, that the world entered on the seventh day upon a new state, in that nothing new was to be added to it, and that therefore the seventh day is mentioned after the six, from its being devoted to cessation from work.

Secundum vero alios, potest dici quod in septimo die mundus habuit quendam novum statum, ut scilicet ei nihil adderetur de novo. Et ideo post sex dies ponitur septima, deputata cessationi ab opere.

Q74: All the seven days in common

1. The sufficiency of these days
2. Are they all one day, or more than one?
3. Certain modes of speaking which Scripture uses in narrating the works of the six days

Q73 A3: Whether blessing and sanctifying are due to the seventh day?

Yes. The seventh day is said to be sanctified not because anything can accrue to God, or be taken from Him, but because something is added to creatures by their multiplying, and by their resting in God.

Non propter hoc dies septimus sanctificatur, quia Deo possit aliquid accrescere vel decrescere, sed quia creaturis aliquid accrescit per multiplicationem et quietem in Deo.

God's rest on the seventh day is understood in two ways.

Requies Dei in die septima dupliciter accipitur.

First, in that He ceased from producing new works, though He still preserves and provides for the creatures He has made.

Primo quidem, quantum ad hoc, quod cessavit a novis operibus condendis, ita tamen quod creaturam conditam conservat et administrat.

According to the first meaning, then, a blessing befits the seventh day, since, as we explained (Q72, A1, RO4), the blessing referred to the increase by multiplication; for which reason God said to the creatures which He blessed: "Increase and multiply." Now, this increase is effected through God's Providence over His creatures, securing the generation of like from like.

Quantum ergo ad primum, competit septimae diei benedictio. Quia, sicut supra dictum est, benedictio ad multiplicationem pertinet, unde dictum est creaturis quas benedixit, crescite et multiplicamini. Multiplicatio autem rerum fit per administrationem creaturae, secundum quam ex similibus similia generantur.

Secondly, in that after all His works He rested in Himself.

Alio modo, secundum quod post opera requievit in seipso.

And according to the second meaning, it is right that the seventh day should have been sanctified, since the special sanctification of every creature consists in resting in God. For this reason things dedicated to God are said to be sanctified.

Quantum vero ad secundum, competit septimae diei sanctificatio. Maxime enim sanctificatio cuiuslibet attenditur in hoc quod in Deo requiescit, unde et res Deo dedicatae sanctae dicuntur.

In the first six days creatures were produced in their first causes, but after being thus produced, they are multiplied and preserved, and this work also belongs to the Divine goodness. And the perfection of this goodness is made most clear by the knowledge that in it alone God finds His own rest, and we may find ours in its fruition.

In primis sex diebus productae sunt res in suis primis causis. Sed postea ex illis primis causis res multiplicantur et conservantur, quod etiam ad bonitatem divinam pertinet. Cuius etiam perfectio in hoc maxime ostenditur quod in ipsa sola et ipse requiescit, et nos requiescere possumus, ea fruentes.

The good mentioned in the works of each day belongs to the first institution of nature; but the blessing attached to the seventh day, to its propagation.

Bonum quod in singulis diebus commemoratur, pertinet ad primam naturae institutionem, benedictio autem diei septimae pertinet ad naturae propagationem.

Q73 A2: Whether God rested on the seventh day from all His work?

Yes. God did rest on the seventh day from all His work. First, because He ceased from creating new creatures on that day, for, as said above (Q73, A1, RO3), He made nothing afterwards that had not existed previously, in some degree, in the first works; secondly, because He Himself had no need of the things that He had made, but was happy in the fruition of Himself.

Septima die requievit ab omni opere. Primo quidem, quia die septima cessavit novas creaturas condere, nihil enim postea fecit, quod non aliquo modo praecesserit in primis operibus, ut dictum est. Alio modo, secundum quod rebus conditis ipse non indigebat, sed seipso fruendo beatus est.

Hence, when all things were made He is not said to have rested "in" His works, as though needing them for His own happiness, but to have rested "from" them, as in fact resting in Himself, as He suffices for Himself and fulfils His own desire.

Unde post conditionem omnium operum, non dicitur quod in suis operibus requievit, quasi eis ad suam beatitudinem indigens, sed ab eis requievit, utique in seipso, quia ipse sufficit sibi et implet desiderium suum.

And even though from all eternity He rested in Himself, yet the rest in Himself, which He took after He had finished His works, is that rest which belongs to the seventh day. And this, says Augustine, is the meaning of God's resting from His works on that day (Gen. ad lit. iv).

Et quamvis ab aeterno in seipso requieverit, tamen quod post opera condita in seipso requievit, hoc pertinet ad septimum diem. Et hoc est ab operibus requiescere, ut Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt.

Rest is here not opposed to labor or to movement, but to the production of new creatures, and to the desire tending to an external object.

Requies non opponitur labori sive motui, sed productioni novarum rerum, et desiderio in aliud tendenti, ut dictum est.

Even as God rests in Himself alone and is happy in the enjoyment of Himself, so our own sole happiness lies in the enjoyment of God. Thus, also, He makes us find rest in Himself, both from His works and our own. It is not, then, unreasonable to say that God rested in giving rest to us. Still, this explanation must not be set down as the only one, and the other is the first and principal explanation.

Sicut Deus in solo se requiescit, et se fruendo beatus est; ita et nos per solam Dei fruitionem beati efficimur. Et sic etiam facit nos a suis et nostris operibus in seipso requiescere. Est ergo conveniens expositio, ut dicatur Deus requievisse, quia nos requiescere facit. Sed non est haec sola ponenda, sed alia expositio est principalior et prior.

God indeed "worketh until now" by preserving and providing for the creatures He has made, but not by the making of new ones.

Deus usque modo operatur, conservando et administrando creaturam conditam, non autem novam creaturam condendo.

Q73 A1: Whether the completion of the Divine works ought to be ascribed to the seventh day?

Yes. The completion of the Divine works does belong to the seventh day because on the seventh day was the consummation of nature; in Christ's Incarnation, the consummation of grace; and at the end of the world will be the consummation of glory.

Completio divinorum operum competit diei septimo quod in septima die fuit consummatio naturae; in incarnatione Christi, consummatio gratiae; in fine mundi, consummatio gloriae.

The perfection of a thing is twofold, the first perfection and the second perfection. The 'first' perfection is that according to which a thing is substantially perfect, and this perfection is the form of the whole; which form results from the whole having its parts complete.

Duplex est rei perfectio, prima, et secunda. Prima quidem perfectio est, secundum quod res in sua substantia est perfecta. Quae quidem perfectio est forma totius, quae ex integritate partium consurgit.

But the 'second' perfection is the end, which is either an operation, as the end of the harpist is to play the harp; or something that is attained by an operation, as the end of the builder is the house that he makes by building. But the first perfection is the cause of the second, because the form is the principle of operation.

Perfectio autem secunda est finis. Finis autem vel est operatio, sicut finis citharistae est citharizare, vel est aliquid ad quod per operationem pervenitur, sicut finis aedificatoris est domus, quam aedificando facit. Prima autem perfectio est causa secundae, quia forma est principium operationis.

Now the final perfection, which is the end of the whole universe, is the perfect beatitude of the Saints at the consummation of the world; and the first perfection is the completeness of the universe at its first founding, and this is what is ascribed to the seventh day.

Ultima autem perfectio, quae est finis totius universi, est perfecta beatitudo sanctorum; quae erit in ultima consummatione saeculi. Prima autem perfectio, quae est in integritate universi, fuit in prima rerum institutione. Et haec deputatur septimo diei.

Now for the attaining of beatitude two things are required, nature and grace.

Ad beatitudinem autem consequendam duo requiruntur, natura et gratia.

But this consummation existed previously in its causes, as to nature, at the first founding of the world, as to grace, in the Incarnation of Christ. For, "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" (John 1:17).

Sed ista consummatio praecessit causaliter, quantum ad naturam quidem, in prima rerum institutione, quantum ad gratiam vero, in incarnatione Christi, quia "gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est," ut dicitur Ioan. I.

God did act on the seventh day, not by creating new creatures, but by directing and moving His creatures to the work proper to them, and thus He made some beginning of the "second" perfection.

Septima die Deus aliquid operatus est, non novam creaturam condendo, sed creaturam administrando, et ad propriam operationem eam movendo, quod iam aliqualiter pertinet ad inchoationem quandam secundae perfectionis.

Nothing entirely new was afterwards made by God, but all things subsequently made had in a sense been made before in the work of the six days.

Nihil postmodum a Deo factum est totaliter novum, quin aliqualiter in operibus sex dierum praecesserit.

The glory that is spiritual was anticipated in the angels by way of similitude; and that of the body in the heaven, especially the empyrean. Hence it is written (Ecclesiastes 1:10), "Nothing under the sun is new, for it hath already gone before, in the ages that were before us."

Gloria etiam spiritualis secundum similitudinem praecessit in Angelis, corporalis vero in caelo, praecipue Empyreo. Unde dicitur Eccle. I, "nihil sub sole novum; iam enim praecessit in saeculis quae fuerunt ante nos."

Q73: The things that belong to the seventh day

1. The completion of the works
2. The resting of God
3. The blessing and sanctifying of this day

Igitur perfecti sunt caeli et terra et omnis exercitus eorum.

Complevitque Deus die septimo opus suum, quod fecerat, et requievit die septimo ab universo opere, quod patrarat.

Et benedixit Deus diei septimo et sanctificavit illum, quia in ipso requieverat ab omni opere suo, quod creavit Deus, ut faceret.

(Gen 2:1-3)

Q72 A1: The work of the sixth day

Is the work of the sixth day fittingly described?

Dixit quoque Deus: “Producat terra animam viventem in genere suo, iumenta et reptilia et bestias terrae secundum species suas”. Factumque est ita.

Et fecit Deus bestias terrae iuxta species suas et iumenta secundum species suas et omne reptile terrae in genere suo. Et vidit Deus quod esset bonum.

Et ait Deus: “Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; et praesint piscibus maris et volatilibus caeli et bestiis universaeque terrae omnique reptili, quod movetur in terra”.

Et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam;
ad imaginem Dei creavit illum;
masculum et feminam creavit eos.

Benedixitque illis Deus et ait illis Deus: “Crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram et subicite eam et dominamini piscibus maris et volatilibus caeli et universis animantibus, quae moventur super terram”.

Dixitque Deus: “Ecce dedi vobis omnem herbam afferentem semen super terram et universa ligna, quae habent in semetipsis fructum ligni portantem sementem, ut sint vobis in escam

et cunctis animantibus terrae omnique volucri caeli et universis, quae moventur in terra et in quibus est anima vivens, omnem herbam virentem ad vescendum”. Et factum est ita.

Viditque Deus cuncta, quae fecit, et ecce erant valde bona. Et factum est vespere et mane, dies sextus.

(Gen 1:24-31)

Yes. Therefore the words, "Let the earth bring forth the living creature," should not rather have been, "Let the earth bring forth the living four-footed creatures," because Scripture does not call fishes "living creatures," but "creeping creatures having life"; whereas it does call land animals "living creatures" on account of their more perfect life, and seems to imply that fishes are merely bodies having in them something of a soul, whilst land animals, from the higher perfection of their life, are, as it were, living souls with bodies subject to them.

Convenienter dicitur, "producat terra animam viventem"; sed non debuit dici, "producat terra quadrupedia animae viventis".

Et ideo pisces vocat, non animam viventem, sed reptile animae viventis, sed terrena animalia vocat animam viventem, propter perfectionem vitae in eis, ac si pisces sint corpora habentia aliquid animae, terrestria vero animalia, propter perfectionem vitae, sint quasi animae dominantes corporibus.

But the life of man, as being the most perfect grade, is not said to be produced, like the life of other animals, by earth or water, but immediately by God.

Perfectissimus autem gradus vitae est in homine. Et ideo vitam hominis non dicit produci a terra vel aqua, sicut ceterorum animalium, sed a Deo.

Again, animals and plants may be said to be produced according to their kinds, to signify their remoteness from the Divine image and likeness, whereas man is said to be made "to the image and likeness of God."

Vel quia animalia et plantae producuntur secundum genus et speciem suam, quasi longe a similitudine divina remota, homo autem dicitur formatus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei.

In the words of Augustine (Super. Gen. contr. Manich. i): "If an unskilled person enters the workshop of an artificer he sees in it many appliances of which he does not understand the use, and which, if he is a foolish fellow, he considers unnecessary. Moreover, should he carelessly fall into the fire, or wound himself with a sharp-edged tool, he is under the impression that many of the things there are hurtful; whereas the craftsman, knowing their use, laughs at his folly. And thus some people presume to find fault with many things in this world, through not seeing the reasons for their existence. For though not required for the furnishing of our house, these things are necessary for the perfection of the universe."

Augustinus dicit in I super Gen. contra Manichaeos, "si in alicuius opificis officinam imperitus intraverit, videt ibi multa instrumenta quorum causas ignorat, et si multum est insipiens, superflua putat. Iam vero si in fornacem incautus ceciderit, aut ferramento aliquo acuto se vulneraverit, noxia existimat ibi esse multa, quorum usum quia novit artifex, insipientiam eius irridet. Sic in hoc mundo quidam audent multa reprehendere, quorum causas non vident, multa enim, etsi domui nostrae non sunt necessaria, eis tamen completur universitatis integritas."

Q71 A1: The work of the fifth day

Is the work of the fifth day fittingly described?

Dixit etiam Deus: “Pullulent aquae reptile animae viventis, et volatile volet super terram sub firmamento caeli”.

Creavitque Deus cete grandia et omnem animam viventem atque motabilem, quam pullulant aquae secundum species suas, et omne volatile secundum genus suum. Et vidit Deus quod esset bonum;

benedixitque eis Deus dicens: “Crescite et multiplicamini et replete aquas maris, avesque multiplicentur super terram”.

Et factum est vespere et mane, dies quintus.

(Gen 1:20-23)

Yes. The words, "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the earth," fittingly describe this work because at the first beginning of the world the active principle was the Word of God, which produced animals from material elements, either in act, as some holy writers say, or virtually, as Augustine teaches.

Convenienter dicitur, "producant aquae reptile animae viventis, et volatile super terram," quod in prima autem rerum institutione, fuit principium activum verbum Dei, quod ex materia elementari produxit animalia vel in actu, secundum alios sanctos; vel virtute, secundum Augustinum.

Not as though the power possessed by water or earth of producing all animals resides in the earth and the water themselves, as Avicenna held, but in the power originally given to the elements of producing them from elemental matter by the power of seed or the influence of the stars.

Non quod aqua aut terra habeat in se virtutem producendi omnia animalia, ut Avicenna posuit, sed quia hoc ipsum quod ex materia elementari, virtute seminis vel stellarum, possunt animalia produci, est ex virtute primitus elementis data.

Augustine differs from other writers in his opinion about the production of fishes and birds, as he differs about the production of plants. For while others say that fishes and birds were produced on the fifth day actually, he holds that the nature of the waters produced them on that day potentially.

Alii enim dicunt pisces et aves quinta die esse productos in actu, Augustinus autem dicit, V super Gen. ad Litt., quod quinta die aquarum natura produxit pisces et aves potentialiter.

Q70 A3: Whether the lights of heaven are living beings?

No. The heavenly bodies are not living beings in the same sense as plants and animals, and that if they are called so, it can only be equivocally because the difference of opinion between those who affirm, and those who deny, that these bodies have life, is not a difference of things but of words.

Sic igitur patet quod corpora caelestia non sunt animata eo modo quo plantae et animalia, sed aequivoce. Unde inter ponentes ea esse animata, et ponentes ea inanimata, parva vel nulla differentia invenitur in re, sed in voce tantum.

The movement of the heavenly bodies demands a soul as the motive power, not that the soul, in order to move the heavenly body, need be united to the latter as its form; but by contact of power, as a mover is united to that which he moves.

Relinquitur ergo quod propter solam motionem. Ad hoc autem quod moveat, non oportet quod uniatur ei ut forma; sed per contactum virtutis, sicut motor unitur mobili.

Wherefore Aristotle (Phys. viii, text. 42,43), after showing that the first mover is made up of two parts, the moving and the moved, goes on to show the nature of the union between these two parts. This, he says, is effected by contact which is mutual if both are bodies; on the part of one only, if one is a body and the other not.

Unde Aristoteles, libro VIII Physic., postquam ostendit quod primum movens seipsum componitur ex duabus partibus, quarum una est movens et alia mota; assignans quomodo hae duae partes uniantur, dicit quod per contactum vel duorum ad invicem, si utrumque sit corpus, vel unius ad alterum et non e converso, si unum sit corpus et aliud non corpus.

The Platonists explain the union of soul and body in the same way, as a contact of a moving power with the object moved, and since Plato holds the heavenly bodies to be living beings, this means nothing else but that substances of spiritual nature are united to them, and act as their moving power.

Platonici etiam animas corporibus uniri non ponebant nisi per contactum virtutis, sicut motor mobili. Et sic per hoc quod Plato ponit corpora caelestia animata, nihil aliud datur intelligi, quam quod substantiae spirituales uniuntur corporibus caelestibus ut motores mobilibus.

A proof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the direct influence and contact of some spiritual substance, and not, like bodies of specific gravity, by nature, lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to one fixed end which having attained, it rests; this does not appear in the movement of heavenly bodies. Hence it follows that they are moved by some intellectual substances.

Quod autem corpora caelestia moveantur ab aliqua substantia apprehendente, et non solum a natura, sicut gravia et levia, patet ex hoc, quod natura non movet nisi ad unum, quo habito quiescit, quod in motu corporum caelestium non apparet.

Augustine appears to be of the same opinion when he expresses his belief that all corporeal things are ruled by God through the spirit of life (De Trin. iii, 4).

Unde relinquitur quod moventur ab aliqua substantia apprehendente Augustinus etiam dicit, III de Trin., corpora omnia administrari a Deo per spiritum vitae.

Augustine leaves the matter in doubt, without committing himself to either theory, though he goes so far as to say that if the heavenly bodies are really living beings, their souls must be akin to the angelic nature (Gen. ad lit. ii, 18; Enchiridion lviii).

Augustinus vero sub dubio dereliquit, in neutram partem declinans, ut patet in II supra Gen. ad Litt.; et in Enchirid., ubi etiam dicit quod, si sunt animata caelestia corpora, pertinent ad societatem Angelorum eorum animae.

The movements of the heavenly bodies are natural, not on account of their active principle, but on account of their passive principle; that is to say, from a certain natural aptitude for being moved by an intelligent power.

Motus corporis caelestis est naturalis, non propter principium activum, sed propter principium passivum, quia scilicet habet in sua natura aptitudinem ut tali motu ab intellectu moveatur.

Since the heavenly body is a mover moved, it is of the nature of an instrument, which acts in virtue of the agent: and therefore since this agent is a living substance the heavenly body can impart life in virtue of that agent.

Corpus caeleste, cum sit movens motum, habet rationem instrumenti, quod agit in virtute principalis agentis. Et ideo ex virtute sui motoris, qui est substantia vivens, potest causare vitam.

Q70 A2: Whether the cause assigned for the production of the lights is reasonable?

Yes. The heavenly lights were made to be signs because light was given to the earth for the service of man, who, by reason of his soul, is nobler than the heavenly bodies.

Luminaria in signa facta sunt quod in illuminatione terrae intelligitur utilitas hominis, qui secundum animam praefertur corporibus luminarium.

The lights in the heaven are set for signs of changes effected in corporeal creatures, but not of those changes which depend upon the free-will.

Luminaria sunt in signa corporalium transmutationum, non autem eorum quae dependent ex libero arbitrio.

The general division of time into day and night took place on the first day, as regards the diurnal movement, which is common to the whole heaven and may be understood to have begun on that first day. But the particular distinctions of days and seasons and years, according as one day is hotter than another, one season than another, and one year than another, are due to certain particular movements of the stars: which movements may have had their beginning on the fourth day.

In prima die facta est communis distinctio temporis per diem et noctem, secundum motum diurnum, qui est communis totius caeli; qui potest intelligi incoepisse primo die. Sed speciales distinctiones dierum et temporum, secundum quod dies est calidior die, et tempus tempore, et annus anno, fiunt secundum speciales motus stellarum; qui possunt intelligi quarto die incoepisse.

For although the perfect is developed from the imperfect by natural processes, yet the perfect must exist simply before the imperfect. Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. ii), does not say this, for he says that it is not unfitting that God made things imperfect, which He afterwards perfected.

Licet enim naturali processu ab imperfecto ad perfectum deveniatur, simpliciter tamen perfectum prius est imperfecto. Augustinus tamen hoc non asserit, quia dicit non esse inconveniens quod Deus imperfecta fecerit, quae postmodum ipse perfecit.

As we have said above (Q65, A2), a corporeal creature can be considered as made either for the sake of its proper act, or for other creatures (nor is it untrue to say that a higher creature may be made for the sake of a lower, considered not in itself, but as ordained to the good of the universe), or for the whole universe, or for the glory of God.

Sicut dictum est supra, creatura aliqua corporalis potest dici esse facta vel propter actum proprium, vel propter aliam creaturam (nihil tamen prohibet dici quod dignior creatura facta est propter inferiorem, non secundum quod in se consideratur sed secundum quod ordinatur ad integritatem universi), vel propter totum universum, vel propter gloriam Dei.

Of these reasons only that which points out the usefulness of these things to man, is touched upon by Moses, in order to withdraw his people from idolatry. Hence it is written (Deuteronomy 4:19): "Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all nations."

Sed Moyses, ut populum ab idololatria revocaret, illam solam causam tetigit, secundum quod sunt facta ad utilitatem hominum. Unde dicitur Deut. IV, "ne forte, elevatis oculis ad caelum, videas solem et lunam et omnia astra caeli, et errore deceptus adores ea et colas, quae creavit dominus Deus in ministerium cunctis gentibus."

Q70 A1: Whether the lights ought to have been produced on the fourth day?

Yes. The lights were produced on the fourth day because just as distinction of certain things is made most evident by their local movement, as separating one from another, so the work of adornment is set forth by the production of things having movement in the heavens, and upon the earth.

Luminaria sunt facta quarta die. Distinctio autem aliquorum maxime manifestatur per motum localem, quo ab invicem separantur. Et ideo ad opus ornatus pertinet productio illarum rerum quae habent motum in caelo et in terra.

In Augustine's opinion there is no difficulty here; for he does not hold a succession of time in these works, and so there was no need for the matter of the lights to exist under another form. Nor is there any difficulty in the opinion of those who hold the heavenly bodies to be of the nature of the four elements, for it may be said that they were formed out of matter already existing, as animals and plants were formed. For those, however, who hold the heavenly bodies to be of another nature from the elements, and naturally incorruptible, the answer must be that the lights were substantially created at the beginning, but that their substance, at first formless, is formed on this day, by receiving not its substantial form, but a determination of power.

Secundum Augustinum, nulla difficultas ex hoc oritur. Non enim ponit successionem temporis in istis operibus, et ideo non oportet dicere quod materia luminarium fuerit sub alia forma. Secundum etiam eos qui ponunt caelestia corpora ex natura quatuor elementorum, nulla difficultas accidit, quia potest dici quod sunt formata ex praeiacenti materia, sicut animalia et plantae. Sed secundum eos qui ponunt corpora caelestia esse alterius naturae ab elementis et incorruptibilia per naturam, oportet dicere quod substantia luminarium a principio fuit creata; sed prius erat informis, et nunc formatur; non quidem forma substantiali, sed per collationem determinatae virtutis.

Three things are recorded as created, namely, the heaven, the water, and the earth; and these three received their form from the three days' work of distinction, so that heaven was formed on the first day; on the second day the waters were separated; and on the third day, the earth was divided into sea and dry land.

De tribus fit mentio in creatione, scilicet de caelo et aqua et terra. Et haec tria etiam formantur per opus distinctionis tribus diebus, primo die, caelum; secundo die distinguuntur aquae; tertio die fit distinctio in terra, maris et aridae.

So also is it in the work of adornment; on the first day of this work, which is the fourth of creation, are produced the lights, to adorn the heaven by their movements; on the second day, which is the fifth, birds and fishes are called into being, to make beautiful the intermediate element, for they move in air and water, which are here taken as one; while on the third day, which is the sixth, animals are brought forth, to move upon the earth and adorn it.

Et similiter in opere ornatus, primo die, qui est quartus, producuntur luminaria, quae moventur in caelo, ad ornatum ipsius. Secundo die, qui est quintus, aves et pisces, ad ornatum medii elementi, quia habent motum in aere et aqua, quae pro uno accipiuntur. Tertio die, qui est sextus, producuntur animalia quae habent motum in terra, ad ornatum ipsius.

It must also here be noted that Augustine's opinion (Gen. ad lit. v, 5) on the production of lights is not at variance with that of other holy writers, since he says that they were made actually, and not merely virtually, for the firmament has not the power of producing lights, as the earth has of producing plants. Wherefore Scripture does not say: "Let the firmament produce lights," though it says: "Let the earth bring forth the green herb."

Sed sciendum est quod in productione luminarium non discordat Augustinus ab aliis sanctis. Dicit enim luminaria esse facta in actu, non in virtute tantum, non enim habet firmamentum virtutem productivam luminarium, sicut habet terra virtutem productivam plantarum. Unde Scriptura non dicit, producat firmamentum luminaria; sicut dicit, germinet terra herbam virentem.

Q70: The work of adornment, as regards the fourth day

1. The production of the lights
2. The end of their production
3. Are they living beings?

Dixit autem Deus: “Fiant luminaria in firmamento caeli, ut dividant diem ac noctem et sint in signa et tempora et dies et annos,

ut luceant in firmamento caeli et illuminent terram. Et factum est ita.

Fecitque Deus duo magna luminaria: luminare maius, ut praeesset diei, et luminare minus, ut praeesset nocti, et stellas.

Et posuit eas Deus in firmamento caeli, ut lucerent super terram

et praeessent diei ac nocti et dividerent lucem ac tenebras. Et vidit Deus quod esset bonum.

Et factum est vespere et mane, dies quartus.

(Gen 1:14-19)

Q69 A2: Whether it was fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day?

Yes. The production of plants in their causes, within the earth, took place before they sprang up from the earth's surface because in these first days God created all things in their origin or causes, and on the third day, as was said (Q69, A1), the formless state of the earth comes to an end.

Ante ergo quam orirentur super terram, factae sunt causaliter in terra ... quia in illis primis diebus condidit Deus creaturam originaliter vel causaliter, et sicut supra dictum est, in tertia die informitas terrae removetur.

Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5; viii, 3) says that the earth is said to have then produced plants and trees in their causes, that is, it received then the power to produce them.

Augustinus autem, V Sup. Gen. ad Litt., dicit quod "causaliter tunc dictum est produxisse terram herbam et lignum, idest producendi accepisse virtutem".

Life in plants is hidden, since they lack sense and local movement, by which the animate and the inanimate are chiefly discernible. And therefore, since they are firmly fixed in the earth, their production is treated as a part of the earth's formation.

Vita in plantis est occulta, quia carent motu locali et sensu, quibus animatum ab inanimato maxime distinguitur. Et ideo, quia immobiliter terrae inhaerent, earum productio ponitur quasi quaedam terrae formatio.

Moses put before the people such things only as were manifest to their senses, as we have said (Q67, A4; Q68, A3). But minerals are generated in hidden ways within the bowels of the earth. Moreover they seem hardly specifically distinct from earth, and would seem to be species thereof. For this reason, therefore, he makes no mention of them.

Moyses ea tantum proposuit quae in manifesto apparent, sicut iam dictum est. Corpora autem mineralia habent generationem occultam in visceribus terrae. Et iterum, non habent manifestam distinctionem a terra, sed quaedam terrae species videntur. Et ideo de eis mentionem non fecit.

Q69 A1: Whether it was fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place, as recorded, on the third day?

Yes. The words, "Let the waters be gathered together, and the dry land appear," mean that corporeal matter was impressed with the substantial form of water, so as to have such movement, and with the substantial form of earth, so as to have such an appearance.

Unde per hoc quod dicitur, congregentur aquae, et appareat arida, intelligitur quod materiae corporali impressa est forma substantialis aquae, per quam competit sibi talis motus; et forma substantialis terrae, per quam competit sibi sic videri.

In all these works, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15; iv, 22,34; De Gen. Contr. Manich. i, 5, 7), there is no order of duration, but only of origin and nature. He says that the formless spiritual and formless corporeal natures were created first of all, and that the latter are at first indicated by the words "earth" and "water." Not that this formlessness preceded formation, in time, but only in origin; nor yet that one formation preceded another in duration, but merely in the order of nature. Agreeably, then, to this order, the formation of the highest or spiritual nature is recorded in the first place, where it is said that light was made on the first day. For as the spiritual nature is higher than the corporeal, so the higher bodies are nobler than the lower.

Augustinus enim in omnibus his operibus non ponit durationis ordinem, sed solum originis et naturae. Dicit enim primo creatam naturam spiritualem informem, et naturam corporalem absque omni forma (quam dicit primo significari nomine terrae et aquae), non quia haec informitas formationem praecesserit tempore, sed origine tantum. Neque una formatio, secundum eum, praecessit aliam duratione; sed solum naturae ordine. Secundum quem ordinem necesse fuit ut primo poneretur formatio supremae naturae, scilicet spiritualis, per hoc quod legitur prima die lux facta. Sicut autem spiritualis natura praeeminet corporali, ita superiora corpora praeeminent inferioribus.

Hence the formation of the higher bodies is indicated in the second place, by the words, "Let there be made a firmament," by which is to be understood the impression of celestial forms on formless matter, that preceded with priority not of time, but of origin only.

Unde secundo loco tangitur formatio superiorum corporum, cum dicitur, fiat firmamentum; per quod intelligitur impressio formae caelestis in materiam informem, non prius existentem tempore, sed origine tantum.

But in the third place the impression of elemental forms on formless matter is recorded, also with a priority of origin only.

Tertio vero loco ponitur impressio formarum elementarium in materiam informem, non tempore, sed origine praecedentem.

According to Augustine (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i), primary matter is meant by the word earth, where first mentioned, but in the present passage it is to be taken for the element itself.

Secundum Augustinum, per terram de qua primo fiebat mentio, intelligitur materia prima, nunc autem intelligitur ipsum elementum terrae.

Q69: The work of the third day (The work of distinction in itself)

1. The gathering together of the waters
2. The production of plants

Dixit vero Deus: “Congregentur aquae, quae sub caelo sunt, in locum unum, et appareat arida”. Factumque est ita.

Et vocavit Deus aridam Terram congregationesque aquarum appellavit Maria. Et vidit Deus quod esset bonum.

Et ait Deus: “Germinet terra herbam virentem et herbam facientem semen et lignum pomiferum faciens fructum iuxta genus suum, cuius semen in semetipso sit super terram”. Et factum est ita.

Et protulit terra herbam virentem et herbam afferentem semen iuxta genus suum lignumque faciens fructum, qui habet in semetipso sementem secundum speciem suam. Et vidit Deus quod esset bonum.

Et factum est vespere et mane, dies tertius.

(Gen 1:9-13)

Q68 A4: Whether there is only one heaven?

No. There are many heavens because the difference is more nominal than real.

Basilius autem, et Damascenus sequens eum, dicunt plures esse caelos. Sed haec diversitas magis est in voce quam in re.

In order, then, to understand the distinction of heavens, it must be borne in mind that Scripture speaks of heaven in a threefold sense. Sometimes it uses the word in its proper and natural meaning, when it denotes that body on high which is luminous actually or potentially, and incorruptible by nature. In this body there are three heavens; the first is the empyrean, which is wholly luminous; the second is the aqueous or crystalline, wholly transparent; and the third is called the starry heaven, in part transparent, and in part actually luminous, and divided into eight spheres. One of these is the sphere of the fixed stars; the other seven, which may be called the seven heavens, are the spheres of the planets.

Ad distinctionem ergo caelorum sciendam, considerandum est quod caelum tripliciter dicitur in Scripturis. Quandoque enim dicitur proprie et naturaliter. Et sic dicitur caelum corpus aliquod sublime, et luminosum actu vel potentia, et incorruptibile per naturam. Et secundum hoc, ponuntur tres caeli. Primum totaliter lucidum, quod vocant Empyreum. Secundum totaliter diaphanum, quod vocant caelum aqueum vel crystallinum. Tertium partim diaphanum et partim lucidum actu, quod vocant caelum sidereum, et dividitur in octo sphaeras, scilicet in sphaeram stellarum fixarum, et septem sphaeras planetarum; quae possunt dici octo caeli.

In the second place, the name heaven is applied to a body that participates in any property of the heavenly body, as sublimity and luminosity, actual or potential.

Secundo dicitur caelum per participationem alicuius proprietatis caelestis corporis, scilicet sublimitatis et luminositatis actu vel potentia.

Thirdly, there are metaphorical uses of the word heaven.

Tertio dicitur caelum metaphorice.

Q68 A3: Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?

Yes. The firmament does divide the waters from the waters because Moses was speaking to ignorant people, and that out of condescension to their weakness he put before them only such things as are apparent to sense.

Dividit firmamentum aquas ab aquis quod Moyses rudi populo loquebatur, quorum imbecillitati condescendens, illa solum eis proposuit, quae manifeste sensui apparent.

Now even the most uneducated can perceive by their senses that earth and water are corporeal, whereas it is not evident to all that air also is corporeal, for there have even been philosophers who said that air is nothing, and called a space filled with air a vacuum.

Omnes autem, quantumcumque rudes, terram et aquam esse corpora sensu deprehendunt. Aer autem non percipitur ab omnibus esse corpus, intantum quod etiam quidam philosophi aerem dixerunt nihil esse, plenum aere vacuum nominantes.

Moses, then, while he expressly mentions water and earth, makes no express mention of air by name, to avoid setting before ignorant persons something beyond their knowledge. In order, however, to express the truth to those capable of understanding it, he implies in the words: "Darkness was upon the face of the deep," the existence of air as attendant, so to say, upon the water. For it may be understood from these words that over the face of the water a transparent body was extended, the subject of light and darkness, which, in fact, is the air.

Et ideo Moyses de aqua et terra mentionem facit expressam, aerem autem non expresse nominat, ne rudibus quoddam ignotum proponeret. Ut tamen capacibus veritatem exprimeret, dat locum intelligendi aerem, significans ipsum quasi aquae annexum, cum dicit quod tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi; per quod datur intelligi super faciem aquae esse aliquod corpus diaphanum quod est subiectum lucis et tenebrarum.

Whether, then, we understand by the firmament the starry heaven, or the cloudy region of the air, it is true to say that it divides the waters from the waters, according as we take water to denote formless matter, or any kind of transparent body, as fittingly designated under the name of waters. For the starry heaven divides the lower transparent bodies from the higher, and the cloudy region divides that higher part of the air, where the rain and similar things are generated, from the lower part, which is connected with the water and included under that name.

Sic igitur sive per firmamentum intelligamus caelum in quo sunt sidera, sive spatium aeris nubilosum, convenienter dicitur quod firmamentum dividit aquas ab aquis, secundum quod per aquam materia informis significatur; vel secundum quod omnia corpora diaphana sub nomine aquarum intelliguntur. Nam caelum sidereum distinguit corpora inferiora diaphana a superioribus. Aer vero nubilosus distinguit superiorem aeris partem, in qua generantur pluviae et huiusmodi impressiones, ab inferiori parte aeris, quae aquae connectitur, et sub nomine aquarum intelligitur.

Q68 A2: Whether there are waters above the firmament?

Yes. There are waters above the firmament because it is written (Genesis 1:7), "(God) divided the waters that were under the firmament, from those that were above the firmament", and I answer with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that, "These words of Scripture have more authority than the most exalted human intellect. Hence, whatever these waters are, and whatever their mode of existence, we cannot for a moment doubt that they are there."

Aquae sunt supra firmamentum quod dicitur Gen. I, quod "divisit aquas quae erant supra firmamentum, ab his quae erant sub firmamento" et respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, II super Gen. ad Litt., "maior est Scripturae huius auctoritas quam omnis humani ingenii capacitas. Unde quomodo et quales aquae ibi sint, eas tamen ibi esse, minime dubitamus."

1. If by the firmament we understand the starry heaven, and as being of the nature of the four elements, for the same reason it may be believed that the waters above the heaven are of the same nature as the elemental waters.

Si enim per firmamentum intelligitur caelum sidereum quod ponitur esse de natura quatuor elementorum, pari ratione et aquae quae super caelos sunt, eiusdem naturae poterunt credi cum elementaribus aquis.

According to the first opinion, Basil gives two replies (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). He answers first, that a body seen as concave beneath need not necessarily be rounded, or convex, above. Secondly, that the waters above the firmament are not fluid, but exist outside it in a solid state, as a mass of ice, and that this is the crystalline heaven of some writers.

Secundum vero primam, respondet Basilius dupliciter. Uno modo, quia non est necessarium ut omne quod in concavo apparet rotundum, sit etiam supra rotundum secundum convexum. Secundo, quia aquae quae sunt supra caelos, non sunt fluidae; sed quasi glaciali soliditate circa caelum firmatae. Unde et a quibusdam dicuntur caelum crystallinum.

According to the first opinion these waters are set there to temper the heat of the celestial bodies, as Basil supposes (Hom. iii in Hexaem.).

Secundum vero primam opinionem, aquae sunt ibi, ut Basilius dicit, ad contemperandum calorem caelestium corporum.

2. But if by the firmament we understand the starry heaven, not, however, as being of the nature of the four elements then the waters above the firmament will not be of the same nature as the elemental waters, but just as, according to Strabus, one heaven is called empyrean, that is, fiery, solely on account of its splendor: so this other heaven will be called aqueous solely on account of its transparence; and this heaven is above the starry heaven. Again, if the firmament is held to be of other nature than the elements, it may still be said to divide the waters, if we understand by water not the element but formless matter. Augustine, in fact, says (Super Gen. cont. Manich. i, 5,7) that whatever divides bodies from bodies can be said to divide waters from waters.

Si autem per firmamentum intelligatur caelum sidereum quod non sit de natura quatuor elementorum, tunc et aquae illae quae sunt supra firmamentum, non erunt de natura elementarium aquarum, sed sicut, secundum Strabum, dicitur caelum Empyreum, idest igneum, propter solum splendorem; ita dicetur aliud caelum aqueum propter solam diaphaneitatem, quod est supra caelum sidereum. Posito etiam quod firmamentum sit alterius naturae praeter quatuor elementa, adhuc potest dici quod aquas dividit, si per aquam non elementum aquae, sed materiam informem corporum intelligamus, ut Augustinus dicit, super Gen. contra Manich., quia secundum hoc, quidquid est inter corpora, dividit aquas ab aquis.

According to the second opinion, the waters are above the heaven that is wholly transparent and starless. This, according to some, is the primary mobile, the cause of the daily revolution of the entire heaven, whereby the continuance of generation is secured. In the same way the starry heaven, by the zodiacal movement, is the cause whereby different bodies are generated or corrupted, through the rising and setting of the stars, and their various influences.

Secundum vero secundam opinionem, aquae sunt supra firmamentum, idest caelum totum diaphanum absque stellis. Quod quidam ponunt primum mobile, quod revolvit totum caelum motu diurno, ut operetur per motum diurnum continuitatem generationis, sicut caelum in quo sunt sidera, per motum qui est secundum zodiacum, operatur diversitatem generationis et corruptionis, per accessum et recessum, et per diversas virtutes stellarum.

An order of the elements must be supposed different from that given by Aristotle, that is to say, that the waters surrounding the earth are of a dense consistency, and those around the firmament of a rarer consistency, in proportion to the respective density of the earth and of the heaven.

Oportet ponere alium ordinem in elementis quam Aristoteles ponat; ut quaedam aquae spissae sint circa terram, quaedam vero tenues circa caelum; ut sic se habeant illae ad caelum, sicut istae ad terram.

Or by the water, as stated, we may understand the matter of bodies to be signified.

Vel quod per aquam intelligatur materia corporum, ut dictum est.

3. If, however, we understand by the firmament that part of the air in which the clouds are collected, then the waters above the firmament must rather be the vapors resolved from the waters which are raised above a part of the atmosphere, and from which the rain falls.

Si autem per firmamentum intelligatur pars aeris in qua nubes condensantur, sic aquae quae supra firmamentum sunt, sunt aquae quae, vaporabiliter resolutae, supra aliquam partem aeris elevantur ex quibus pluviae generantur.

Q68 A1: Whether the firmament was made on the second day?

Yes. The words which speak of the firmament as made on the second day can be understood in two senses because to produce the substance of the firmament belongs to the work of creation; but its formation, in some degree, belongs to the second day, according to both opinions.

Sciendum est ergo quod hoc quod legitur firmamentum secunda die factum, dupliciter intelligi potest quod productio substantiae firmamenti ad opus creationis pertinet. Sed aliqua formatio eius, secundum has duas opiniones, pertinet ad opus secundae diei.

According to the first opinion, it may, strictly speaking, be granted that the firmament was made, even as to substance, on the second day. For it is part of the work of creation to produce the substance of the elements, while it belongs to the work of distinction and adornment to give forms to the elements that pre-exist.

Secundum igitur primam opinionem, absolute posset concedi quod firmamentum factum fuerit secunda die, etiam secundum suam substantiam. Nam ad opus creationis pertinet producere ipsam elementorum substantiam, ad opus autem distinctionis et ornatus pertinet formare aliqua ex praeexistentibus elementis.

If we take these days to denote merely sequence in the natural order, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,24), and not succession in time, there is then nothing to prevent our saying, whilst holding any one of the opinions of the philosophers, that the substantial formation of the firmament belongs to the second day.

Si autem per istos dies non designetur temporis successio, sed solum ordo naturae, ut Augustinus vult; nihil prohibebit dicere, secundum quamcumque harum opinionum formationem secundum substantiam firmamenti ad secundam diem pertinere.

1. Some of these believed it to be composed of the elements; and this was the opinion of Empedocles, who, however, held further that the body of the firmament was not susceptible of dissolution, because its parts are, so to say, not in disunion, but in harmony.

Quidam enim dixerunt firmamentum illud esse ex elementis compositum. Et haec fuit opinio Empedoclis; qui tamen dixit ideo illud corpus indissolubile esse, quia in eius compositione lis non erat sed amicitia tantum.

2. Others held the firmament to be of the nature of the four elements, not, indeed, compounded of them, but being as it were a simple element. Such was the opinion of Plato, who held that element to be fire. Others, again, have held that the heaven is not of the nature of the four elements, but is itself a fifth body, existing over and above these. This is the opinion of Aristotle (De Coel. i, text. 6,32).

Alii vero dixerunt firmamentum esse de natura quatuor elementorum non quasi ex elementis compositum, sed quasi elementum simplex. Et haec opinio fuit Platonis, qui posuit corpus caeleste esse elementum ignis. Alii vero dixerunt caelum non esse de natura quatuor elementorum, sed esse quintum corpus, praeter quatuor elementa. Et haec est opinio Aristotelis.

3. Another possible explanation is to understand by the firmament that was made on the second day, not that in which the stars are set, but the part of the atmosphere where the clouds are collected, and which has received the name firmament from the firmness and density of the air. "For a body is called firm," that is dense and solid, "thereby differing from a mathematical body" as is remarked by Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.).

Potest autem et alio modo intelligi, ut per firmamentum quod legitur secunda die factum, non intelligatur firmamentum illud in quo fixae sunt stellae, sed illa pars aeris in qua condensantur nubes. Et dicitur firmamentum propter spissitudinem aeris in parte illa, nam quod est spissum et solidum, "dicitur esse corpus firmum, ad differentiam corporis mathematici," ut dicit Basilius.

If, then, this explanation is adopted none of these opinions will be found repugnant to reason. Augustine, in fact (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4), recommends it thus: "I consider this view of the question worthy of all commendation, as neither contrary to faith nor difficult to be proved and believed."

Et secundum hanc expositionem, nihil repugnans sequitur cuicumque opinioni. Unde Augustinus, II super Gen. ad Litt., hanc expositionem commendans, dicit, "hanc considerationem laude dignissimam iudico; quod enim dixit, neque est contra fidem, et in promptu, posito documento, credi potest."

Q68: The work of the second day (The work of distinction in itself)

1. Was the firmament made on the second day?
2. Are there waters above the firmament?
3. Does the firmament divide waters from waters?
4. Is there more than one heaven?

Dixit quoque Deus: “Fiat firmamentum in medio aquarum et dividat aquas ab aquis”.

Et fecit Deus firmamentum divisitque aquas, quae erant sub firmamento, ab his, quae erant super firmamentum. Et factum est ita.

Vocavitque Deus firmamentum Caelum. Et factum est vespere et mane, dies secundus.

(Gen 1:6-8)

Q67 A4: Whether the production of light is fittingly assigned to the first day?

Yes. It was fitting, then, as an evidence of the Divine wisdom, that among the works of distinction the production of light should take first place, since light is a form of the primary body, and because it is more common quality.

Oportuit ordinem divinae sapientiae manifestari, ut primo inter opera distinctionis produceretur lux, tanquam primi corporis forma, et tanquam communior.

It seems to be required, for two reasons, that the formlessness of darkness should be removed first of all by the production of light. In the first place because light is a quality of the first body, as was stated (Q67 A3), and thus by means of light it was fitting that the world should first receive its form.

Necessarium autem fuit ut informitas tenebrarum primo removeretur per lucis productionem, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia lux, ut dictum est, est qualitas primi corporis, unde secundum eam primo fuit mundus formandus.

The second reason is because light is a common quality. For light is common to terrestrial and celestial bodies.

Secundo, propter communitatem lucis, communicant enim in ea inferiora corpora cum superioribus.

Basil [Hom. ii in Hexaem.], indeed, adds a third reason: that all other things are made manifest by light.

Basilius autem ponit tertiam rationem, quia per lucem omnia alia manifestantur.

And there is yet a fourth, already touched upon in the objections; that day cannot be unless light exists, which was made therefore on the first day.

Potest et quarta ratio addi, quae in obiiciendo est tacta, quia dies non potest esse sine luce; unde oportuit in prima die fieri lucem.

Q67 A3: Whether light is a quality?

Yes. Light is a species of quality because light produces natural effects, for by the rays of the sun bodies are warmed, and natural changes cannot be brought about by mere intentions.

Lux est quaedam qualitas quod lumen habet effectum in natura, quia per radios solis calefiunt corpora. Intentiones autem non causant transmutationes naturales.

Some writers have said that the light in the air has not a natural being such as the color on a wall has, but only an intentional being, as a similitude of color in the air. But this cannot be the case because light gives a name to the air, since by it the air becomes actually luminous. But color does not do this, for we do not speak of the air as colored.

Quidam dixerunt quod lumen in aere non habet esse naturale, sicut color in pariete; sed esse intentionale, sicut similitudo coloris in aere. Sed hoc non potest esse ... quia lumen denominat aerem, fit enim aer luminosus in actu. Color vero non denominat ipsum, non enim dicitur aer coloratus.

Others have said that light is the sun's substantial form, but this also seems impossible for two reasons. First, because substantial forms are not of themselves objects of the senses; for the object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said De Anima iii, text. 26: whereas light is visible of itself.

Alii vero dixerunt quod lux est forma substantialis solis. Sed hoc etiam apparet impossibile, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia nulla forma substantialis est per se sensibilis, quia quod quid est est obiectum intellectus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Lux autem est secundum se visibilis.

In the second place, because it is impossible that what is the substantial form of one thing should be the accidental form of another; since substantial forms of their very nature constitute species: wherefore the substantial form always and everywhere accompanies the species. But light is not the substantial form of air, for if it were, the air would be destroyed when light is withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the substantial form of the sun.

Secundo, quia impossibile est ut id quod est forma substantialis in uno, sit forma accidentalis in alio, quia formae substantiali per se convenit constituere in specie; unde semper et in omnibus adest ei. Lux autem non est forma substantialis aeris, alioquin, ea recedente, corrumperetur. Unde non potest esse forma substantialis solis.

We must say, then, that as heat is an active quality consequent on the substantial form of fire, so light is an active quality consequent on the substantial form of the sun, or of another body that is of itself luminous, if there is any such body. A proof of this is that the rays of different stars produce different effects according to the diverse natures of bodies.

Dicendum est ergo quod, sicut calor est qualitas activa consequens formam substantialem ignis, ita lux est qualitas activa consequens formam substantialem solis, vel cuiuscumque alterius corporis a se lucentis, si aliquod aliud tale est. Cuius signum est, quod radii diversarum stellarum habent diversos effectus, secundum diversas naturas corporum.

Light is not produced by the transmutation of matter, as though matter were in receipt of a substantial form, and light were a certain inception of substantial form. For this reason light disappears on the disappearance of its active cause.

Illuminatio non fit per aliquam transmutationem materiae ad susceptionem formae substantialis, ut fiat quasi inchoatio aliqua formae. Et ideo lumen non remanet nisi ad praesentiam agentis.

Q67 A2: Whether light is a body?

No. Light cannot be a body because the place of any one body is different from that of any other, nor is it possible, naturally speaking, for any two bodies of whatever nature, to exist simultaneously in the same place; since contiguity requires distinction of place.

Impossibile est lumen esse corpus quod locus cuiuslibet corporis est alius a loco alterius corporis, nec est possibile, secundum naturam, duo corpora esse simul in eodem loco, qualiacumque corpora sint; quia contiguum requirit distinctionem in situ.

Augustine takes light to be a luminous body in act--in other words, to be fire, the noblest of the four elements.

Augustinus accipit lucem pro corpore lucido in actu, scilicet pro igne, quod inter quatuor elementa nobilissimum est.

Aristotle pronounces light to be fire existing in its own proper matter: just as fire in aerial matter is "flame," or in earthly matter is "burning coal." Nor must too much attention be paid to the instances adduced by Aristotle in his works on logic, as he merely mentions them as the more or less probable opinions of various writers.

Aristoteles lumen nominat ignem in propria materia, sicut ignis in materia aerea dicitur flamma, et in materia terrea dicitur carbo. Non tamen est multum curandum de eis exemplis quae Aristoteles inducit in libris logicalibus, quia inducit ea ut probabilia secundum opinionem aliorum.

The powers of movement, intersection, reflection, belong properly to bodies; and all these are attributes of light and its rays. Moreover, different rays of light, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) are united and separated, which seems impossible unless they are bodies.

Ferri, intersecari, et reflecti est proprie corporum, haec autem omnia attribuuntur lumini vel radio. Coniunguntur etiam diversi radii et separantur, ut Dionysius dicit, II cap. de Div. Nom., quod etiam videtur non nisi corporibus convenire posse.

But all these properties are assigned to light metaphorically, and might in the same way be attributed to heat. For because movement from place to place is naturally first in the order of movement as is proved Phys. viii, text. 55, we use terms belonging to local movement in speaking of alteration and movement of all kinds. For even the word distance is derived from the idea of remoteness of place, to that of all contraries, as is said Metaph. x, text. 13.

Sed omnia illa attribuuntur lumini metaphorice, sicut etiam possent attribui calori. Quia enim motus localis est naturaliter primus motuum, ut probatur in VIII Physic., utimur nominibus pertinentibus ad motum localem, in alteratione et in omnibus motibus, sicut etiam nomen distantiae derivatum est a loco ad omnia contraria, ut dicitur in X Metaphys.

Q67 A1: Whether the word "light" is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things?

No. Light is not used in its proper sense in spiritual matters because in its primary meaning it signifies that which makes manifest to the sense of sight; afterwards it was extended to that which makes manifest to cognition of any kind.

Lux proprie non dicitur in spiritualibus. Nam primo quidem est institutum ad significandum id quod facit manifestationem in sensu visus, postmodum autem extensum est ad significandum omne illud quod facit manifestationem secundum quamcumque cognitionem.

If, then, the word is taken in its strict and primary meaning, it is to be understood metaphorically when applied to spiritual things.

Si ergo accipiatur nomen luminis secundum suam primam impositionem, metaphorice in spiritualibus dicitur.

But if taken in its common and extended use, as applied to manifestation of every kind, it may properly be applied to spiritual things.

Si autem accipiatur secundum quod est in usu loquentium ad omnem manifestationem extensum, sic proprie in spiritualibus dicitur.

Q67: The work of the first day (The work of distinction in itself)

1. Is the word light used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things?
2. Is light, in corporeal things, itself corporeal?
3. Is light a quality?
4. Was light fittingly made on the first day?

In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram.

Terra autem erat inanis et vacua, et tenebrae super faciem abyssi, et spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquas.

Dixitque Deus: “Fiat lux”. Et facta est lux.

Et vidit Deus lucem quod esset bona et divisit Deus lucem ac tenebras.

Appellavitque Deus lucem Diem et tenebras Noctem. Factumque est vespere et mane, dies unus.

(Gen 1:1-5)

Q66 A4: Whether time was created simultaneously with formless matter?

Yes. Time was created simultaneously with formless matter because even if the formlessness of matter preceded by duration its form, this view postulates the existence of time as the measure of duration: for otherwise there would be no such measure.

Tempus est concreatum materiae informi quod si informitas materiae duratione praecessit formationem, ... tunc pro illa duratione necesse est ponere tempus aliquod; aliter enim mensura durationis accipi non posset.

The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion that the angelic nature and formless matter, precede time and the formation, by origin or nature only, and not by duration; and therefore, as they precede formation, so do they precede movement and time.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus hoc dicit ea ratione qua natura angelica et materia informis praecedunt origine, seu natura, tempus. Haec autem duo, scilicet natura angelica et materia informis, praecedunt formationem non duratione, sed natura. Et sicut natura praecedunt formationem, ita etiam et motum et tempus.

If the movement of the firmament did not begin immediately from the beginning, then the time that preceded was the measure, not of the firmament's movement, but of the first movement of whatsoever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure of the firmament's movement, in so far as this is the first movement. But if the first movement was another than this, time would have been its measure, for everything is measured by the first of its kind.

Si motus firmamenti non statim a principio incoepit, tunc tempus quod praecessit, non erat numerus motus firmamenti, sed cuiuscumque primi motus. Accidit enim tempori quod sit numerus motus firmamenti, inquantum hic motus est primus motuum, si autem esset alius motus primus, illius motus esset tempus mensura, quia omnia mensurantur primo sui generis.

And it must be granted that forthwith from the beginning, there was movement of some kind, at least in the succession of concepts and affections in the angelic mind: while movement without time cannot be conceived, since time is nothing else than "the measure of priority and succession in movement."

Oportet autem dicere statim a principio fuisse aliquem motum, ad minus secundum successionem conceptionum et affectionum in mente angelica. Motum autem non est intelligere sine tempore, cum nihil aliud sit tempus quam numerus prioris et posterioris in motu.

Among the first created things are to be reckoned those which have a general relationship to things. And, therefore, among these time must be included, as having the nature of a common measure; but not movement, which is related only to the movable subject.

Inter primo creata computantur ea quae habent generalem habitudinem ad res. Et ideo computari debuit tempus, quod habet rationem communis mensurae, non autem motus, qui comparatur solum ad subiectum mobile.

Place is implied as existing in the empyrean heaven, this being the boundary of the universe. And since place has reference to things permanent, it was created at once in its totality. But time, as not being permanent, was created in its beginning: even as actually we cannot lay hold of any part of time save the "now."

Locus intelligitur in caelo Empyreo omnia continente. Et quia locus est de permanentibus, concreatus est totus simul. Tempus autem, quod non est permanens, concreatum est in suo principio, sicut etiam modo nihil est accipere in actu de tempore nisi nunc.

Q66 A3: Whether the empyrean heaven was created at the same time as formless matter?

Yes. The empyrean heaven was created together with formless matter because when glory is finally consummated, the movement of bodies will cease; and such must have been from the beginning the condition of the empyrean.

Caelum Empyreum est aliquid materiae informi concreatum quod in ultima consummatione gloriae cessabit corporum motus; et talem oportuit esse a principio dispositionem caeli Empyrei.

For in the reward to come a two-fold glory is looked for, spiritual and corporeal, not only in the human body to be glorified, but in the whole world which is to be made new. Now the spiritual glory began with the beginning of the world, in the blessedness of the angels, equality with whom is promised to the saints. It was fitting, then, that even from the beginning, there should be made some beginning of bodily glory in something corporeal, free at the very outset from the servitude of corruption and change, and wholly luminous, even as the whole bodily creation, after the Resurrection, is expected to be. So, then, that heaven is called the empyrean, i.e. fiery, not from its heat, but from its brightness.

Expectatur enim in futura remuneratione duplex gloria, scilicet spiritualis, et corporalis, non solum in corporibus humanis glorificandis, sed etiam in toto mundo innovando. Inchoata est autem spiritualis gloria ab ipso mundi principio in beatitudine Angelorum, quorum aequalitas sanctis promittitur. Unde conveniens fuit ut etiam a principio corporalis gloria inchoaretur in aliquo corpore, quod etiam a principio fuerit absque servitute corruptionis et mutabilitatis, et totaliter lucidum; sicut tota creatura corporalis expectatur post resurrectionem futura. Et ideo illud caelum dicitur Empyreum, idest igneum, non ab ardore, sed a splendore.

It may be said that the influence of the empyrean upon that which is called the first heaven, and is moved, produces therein not something that comes and goes as a result of movement, but something of a fixed and stable nature, as the power of conservation or causation, or something of the kind pertaining to dignity.

Et propter hoc potest dici quod influit in primum caelum quod movetur, non aliquid transiens et adveniens per motum, sed aliquid fixum et stabile; puta virtutem continendi et causandi, vel aliquid huiusmodi ad dignitatem pertinens.

We may also say that the empyrean has light, not condensed so as to emit rays, as the sun does, but of a more subtle nature. Or it may have the brightness of glory which differs from mere natural brightness.

Potest aliter dici quod habet lucem caelum Empyreum non condensatam, ut radios emittat, sicut corpus solis, sed magis subtilem. Vel habet claritatem gloriae, quae non est conformis cum claritate naturali.

Q66 A2: Whether the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same?

No. The formless matter of all corporeal things is not the same because supposing that no form exists in corruptible bodies which remains subsisting beneath generation and corruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of corruptible and incorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it is in itself, is in potentiality to form.

Una non est materia informis omnium corporalium. Supposito autem quod nulla forma quae sit in corpore corruptibili remaneat ut substrata generationi et corruptioni, sequitur de necessitate quod non sit eadem materia corporum corruptibilium et incorruptibilium. Materia enim, secundum id quod est, est in potentia ad formam.

Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all those forms to which it is common, and in receiving any one form it is in act only as regards that form. Hence it remains in potentiality to all other forms. And this is the case even where some forms are more perfect than others, and contain these others virtually in themselves. For potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in potentiality to a perfect form, and vice versa.

Oportet ergo quod materia, secundum se considerata, sit in potentia ad formam omnium illorum quorum est materia communis. Per unam autem formam non fit in actu nisi quantum ad illam formam. Remanet ergo in potentia quantum ad omnes alias formas. Nec hoc excluditur, si una illarum formarum sit perfectior et continens in se virtute alias. Quia potentia, quantum est de se, indifferenter se habet ad perfectum et imperfectum, unde sicut quando est sub forma imperfecta, est in potentia ad formam perfectam, ita e converso.

Matter, therefore, whilst existing under the form of an incorruptible body, would be in potentiality to the form of a corruptible body; and as it does not actually possess the latter, it has both form and the privation of form; for want of a form in that which is in potentiality thereto is privation. But this condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore impossible that bodies by nature corruptible, and those by nature incorruptible, should possess the same matter.

Sic ergo materia, secundum quod est sub forma incorruptibilis corporis, erit adhuc in potentia ad formam corruptibilis corporis. Et cum non habeat eam in actu, erit simul sub forma et privatione, quia carentia formae in eo quod est in potentia ad formam, est privatio. Haec autem dispositio est corruptibilis corporis. Impossibile ergo est quod corporis corruptibilis et incorruptibilis per naturam, sit una materia.

So, then, the matter of the heavenly bodies and of the elements is not the same, except by analogy, insofar as they agree in the character of potentiality.

Et sic non est eadem materia corporis caelestis et elementorum, nisi secundum analogiam, secundum quod conveniunt in ratione potentiae.

Q66 A1: Did formlessness of created matter precede in time its formation?

No. The formlessness of matter was not prior in time to its formation because an imperfect effect proves imperfection in the agent, but God is an agent absolutely perfect.

Informitas materiae corporalis non praecesserit tempore formationem ipsius. Quod imperfectio effectus attestatur imperfectioni agentis. Sed Deus est agens perfectissimum.

Nature produces effect in act from being in potentiality; and consequently in the operations of nature potentiality must precede act in time, and formlessness precede form. But God produces being in act out of nothing, and can, therefore, produce a perfect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of His power.

Natura producit effectum in actu de ente in potentia, et ideo oportet ut in eius operatione potentia tempore praecedat actum, et informitas formationem. Sed Deus producit ens actu ex nihilo, et ideo statim potest producere rem perfectam, secundum magnitudinem suae virtutis.

If formless matter preceded in duration, it already existed; for this is implied by duration, since the end of creation is being in act: and act itself is a form. To say, then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to say that being existed actually, yet without act, which is a contradiction in terms.

Si enim materia informis praecessit duratione, haec erat iam in actu, hoc enim duratio importat, creationis enim terminus est ens actu. Ipsum autem quod est actus, est forma. Dicere igitur materiam praecedere sine forma, est dicere ens actu sine actu, quod implicat contradictionem.

Nor can it be said that it possessed some common form, on which afterwards supervened the different forms that distinguish it. The supervening form would not simply make an actual being, but 'this' actual being; which is the proper effect of an accidental form. Thus the consequent forms would be merely accidents, implying not generation, but alteration.

Nec etiam potest dici quod habuit aliquam formam communem et postmodum supervenerunt ei formae diversae, quibus sit distincta. ... Superveniens forma non faceret simpliciter ens actu, sed ens actu hoc, quod est proprium formae accidentalis; et sic sequentes formae essent accidentia, secundum quae non attenditur generatio, sed alteratio.

Hence we must assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless, nor under any one common form, but under distinct forms.

Unde oportet dicere quod materia prima neque fuit creata omnino sine forma, neque sub forma una communi, sed sub formis distinctis.

Q66: The order of creation towards distinction

1. Did formlessness of created matter precede in time its formation?
2. Is the matter of all corporeal things the same?
3. Was the empyrean heaven created contemporaneously with formless matter?
4. Was time created simultaneously with it?

Q65 A4: Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels?

No. Corporeal forms are not from the angels but from God because all contrary opinions seem to have a common error (they all, in fact, seek for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself brought into being) whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26,27,28), proves, what is, properly speaking, made, is the "composite."

Thus material forms come, not by emanation, but by motion.

We must not look for the cause of corporeal forms in any immaterial form, but in something that is composite, as this fire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms, therefore, are caused, not as emanations from some immaterial form, but by matter being brought from potentiality into act by some composite agent.

But since the composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5), it follows further that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, not emanating from them, but as the term of their movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic intellect, which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms, must be referred to God as the first cause.

But in the first production of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies had when first produced came immediately from God, whose bidding alone matter obeys, as its own proper cause.

According to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to the order of those separate substances; for example, that there is a single separate substance, which is horse and the cause of all horses, whilst above this is separate life, or "per se" life, as they term it, which is the cause of all life, and that above this again is that which they call being itself, which is the cause of all being.

Avicenna, however, and certain others, have maintained that the forms of corporeal things do not subsist "per se" in matter, but in the intellect only. Thus they say that from forms existing in the intellect of spiritual creatures (called "intelligences" by them, but "angels" by us) proceed all the forms of corporeal matter, as the form of his handiwork proceeds from the forms in the mind of the craftsman. This theory seems to be the same as that of certain heretics of modern times, who say that God indeed created all things, but that the devil formed corporeal matter, and differentiated it into species.

Q65 A3: Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels?

No. Corporeal creatures were produced immediately by God because in the act of coming into being the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and it is impossible that anything should be created, save by God alone.

No secondary cause can produce anything, unless there is presupposed in the thing produced something that is caused by a higher cause. But creation is the production of a thing in its entire substance, nothing being presupposed either uncreated or created. Hence it remains that nothing can create except God alone, Who is the first cause.

Therefore, in order to show that all bodies were created immediately by God, Moses said: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."

Q65 A2: Whether corporeal things were made on account of God's goodness?

Yes. The Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things because the entire universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end, inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine goodness, to the glory of God.

Reasonable creatures, however, have in some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him.

Origen laid down [Peri Archon ii.] that corporeal creatures were not made according to God's original purpose, but in punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God, and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given an higher or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others turned from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the degree of their turning away.

But this position is erroneous. In the first place, because it is contrary to Scripture, which, after narrating the production of each kind of corporeal creatures, subjoins, "God saw that it was good" (Genesis 1), as if to say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be. But according to Origen's opinion, the corporeal creature was made, not because it was good that it should be, but that the evil in another might be punished.

Q65 A1: Whether corporeal creatures are from God?

Yes. There must be one principle of being from which all things in whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible and spiritual, or visible and corporeal because being is found to be common to all things, however otherwise different.

Q65: The work of creation of corporeal creatures

1. Are corporeal creatures from God?
2. Were they created on account of God's goodness?
3. Were they created by God through the medium of the angels?
4. Are the forms of bodies from the angels or immediately from God?