1a 2ae q4 a1: Whether delight is required for happiness? Yes.

Delectatio requiritur ad beatitudinem quia delectatio causatur ex hoc quod appetitus requiescit in bono adepto.

Delight is necessary for happiness because it is caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained.

Unde, cum beatitudo nihil aliud sit quam adeptio summi boni, non potest esse beatitudo sine delectatione concomitante.

Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight.

Ex ipsa visione Dei causatur delectatio. Unde ille qui Deum videt, delectatione indigere non potest.

The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight.

Augustinus dicit, X Confess., quod "beatitudo est gaudium de veritate."

Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth."

1a 2ae q4: Things that are required for happiness

1. Is pleasure required for happiness?
2. Which is of greater account in happiness, pleasure or vision?
3. Is comprehension required?
4. Is rectitude of the will required?
5. Is the body necessary for man's happiness?
6. Is any perfection of the body necessary?
7. Are any external goods necessary?
8. Is the fellowship of friends necessary?

1a 2ae q3 a8: Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence? Yes.

Ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visione divinae essentiae quia homo non est perfecte beatus, quandiu restat sibi aliquid desiderandum et quaerendum.

Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence because man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek.

Uniuscuiusque potentiae perfectio attenditur secundum rationem sui obiecti. Obiectum autem intellectus est quod quid est, idest essentia rei, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde intantum procedit perfectio intellectus, inquantum cognoscit essentiam alicuius rei.

The perfection of any power is determined by the formal aspect of its object. Now the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," i.e. the essence of a thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing.

Si ergo intellectus aliquis cognoscat essentiam alicuius effectus, per quam non possit cognosci essentia causae, ut scilicet sciatur de causa quid est, non dicitur intellectus attingere ad causam simpliciter, quamvis per effectum cognoscere possit de causa an sit.

If therefore an intellect knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause "what it is", that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause is.

Et ideo remanet naturaliter homini desiderium, cum cognoscit effectum, et scit eum habere causam, ut etiam sciat de causa quid est. Et illud desiderium est admirationis, et causat inquisitionem, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys.

Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire to know about the cause, "what it is." And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2).

Puta si aliquis cognoscens eclipsim solis, considerat quod ex aliqua causa procedit, de qua, quia nescit quid sit, admiratur, et admirando inquirit. Nec ista inquisitio quiescit quousque perveniat ad cognoscendum essentiam causae.

For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some cause, and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause.

Si igitur intellectus humanus, cognoscens essentiam alicuius effectus creati, non cognoscat de Deo nisi an est; nondum perfectio eius attingit simpliciter ad causam primam, sed remanet ei adhuc naturale desiderium inquirendi causam. Unde nondum est perfecte beatus.

If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy.

Ad perfectam igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae. Et sic perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad obiectum, in quo solo beatitudo hominis consistit.

Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in which alone man's happiness consists.

Altior est beatitudo Dei suam essentiam intellectu comprehendentis, quam hominis vel Angeli videntis, et non comprehendentis.

The happiness of God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not.

1a 2ae q3 a7: Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels? No.

Ultima hominis gloria, vel beatitudo, non consistit nisi in cognitione Dei quia perfecta hominis beatitudo non consistit in eo quod est perfectio intellectus secundum alicuius participationem, sed in eo quod est per essentiam tale.

Man's final glory or happiness consists only in the knowledge of God because man's perfect happiness consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some participation, but in that which is so by its essence.

Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque intantum est perfectio alicuius potentiae, inquantum ad ipsum pertinet ratio proprii obiecti illius potentiae. Proprium autem obiectum intellectus est verum. Quidquid ergo habet veritatem participatam, contemplatum non facit intellectum perfectum ultima perfectione.

Now it is evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so insofar as the formal aspect of the proper object of that power belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of whatever has participated truth, does not perfect the intellect with its final perfection.

Attingi superiorem naturam ab inferiori contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum gradum potentiae participantis, et sic ultima perfectio hominis erit in hoc quod homo attinget ad contemplandum sicut Angeli contemplantur. Alio modo, sicut obiectum attingitur a potentia, et hoc modo ultima perfectio cuiuslibet potentiae est ut attingat ad id in quo plene invenitur ratio sui obiecti.

The lower nature may reach the higher in two ways. First, according to a degree of the participating power, and thus man's final perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained by the power, and thus the final perfection of each power is to attain that in which is found the fullness of the formal aspect of its object.

Angeli autem habent esse participatum, quia solius Dei suum esse est sua essentia, ut in primo ostensum est. Unde relinquitur quod solus Deus sit veritas per essentiam, et quod eius contemplatio faciat perfecte beatum. Aliqualem autem beatitudinem imperfectam nihil prohibet attendi in contemplatione Angelorum; et etiam altiorem quam in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum.

Now angels have the act of Be-ing by participation, because in God alone is His Be-ing His Essence, as was shown in I, 44, 1. It follows that God alone is truth in His Essence, that contemplation of Him makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we should not admit a certain imperfect happiness in the contemplation of the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative science.

Unde ultima perfectio intellectus humani est per coniunctionem ad Deum, qui est primum principium et creationis animae et illuminationis eius. Angelus autem illuminat tanquam minister, ut in primo habitum est. Unde suo ministerio adiuvat hominem ut ad beatitudinem perveniat; non autem est humanae beatitudinis obiectum.

The final perfection of the human intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of the creation of the soul and of its enlightenment. Whereas the angel enlightens as a minister, as stated in I, 111, 2, ad 2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness.

1a 2ae q3 a6: Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences? No.

Perfecta beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum essentialiter consistere non potest quia tota consideratio scientiarum speculativarum non potest ultra extendi quam sensibilium cognitio ducere potest.

Perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences because the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than knowledge of sensibles can lead.

Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod consideratio speculativae scientiae non se extendit ultra virtutem principiorum illius scientiae, quia in principiis scientiae virtualiter tota scientia continetur. Prima autem principia scientiarum speculativarum sunt per sensum accepta; ut patet per philosophum in principio Metaphys., et in fine Poster.

To prove this, we must observe that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles of that science, since the entire science is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15).

In cognitione autem sensibilium non potest consistere ultima hominis beatitudo, quae est ultima eius perfectio. Non enim aliquid perficitur ab aliquo inferiori, nisi secundum quod in inferiori est aliqua participatio superioris.

Now man's final happiness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something higher.

Omne autem quod est per aliud, reducitur ad id quod est per se. Unde oportet quod ultima perfectio hominis sit per cognitionem alicuius rei quae sit supra intellectum humanum.

Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which is of itself. Therefore man's final perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above the human intellect.

Naturaliter desideratur non solum perfecta beatitudo, sed etiam qualiscumque similitudo vel participatio ipsius.

Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but also any likeness or participation thereof.

Unde relinquitur quod ultima hominis beatitudo non possit esse in consideratione speculativarum scientiarum. Sed sicut in formis sensibilibus participatur aliqua similitudo superiorum substantiarum, ita consideratio scientiarum speculativarum est quaedam participatio verae et perfectae beatitudinis.

Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms there is a participation of the higher substances, so the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness.

Per considerationem scientiarum speculativarum reducitur intellectus noster aliquo modo in actum, non autem in ultimum et completum.

Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and perfect act.

1a 2ae q3 a5: Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative intellect? Yes.

Beatitudo magis consistit in operatione speculativi intellectus quam practici quia si beatitudo hominis est operatio, oportet quod sit optima operatio hominis: optima autem potentia est intellectus, cuius optimum obiectum est bonum divinum, quod quidem non est obiectum practici intellectus, sed speculativi.

Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than of the practical intellect because if man's happiness is an operation, it must needs be man's highest operation: and his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is the Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative intellect.

Contemplatio maxime quaeritur propter seipsam. Actus autem intellectus practici non quaeritur propter seipsum, sed propter actionem. Ipsae etiam actiones ordinantur ad aliquem finem.

Contemplation is sought principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of action. And these very actions are ordained to some end.

Ultimus hominis finis est aliquod bonum extrinsecum, scilicet Deus, ad quem per operationem intellectus speculativi attingimus.

Man's last end is something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an operation of the speculative intellect.

Intellectus practicus ordinatur ad bonum quod est extra ipsum, sed intellectus speculativus habet bonum in seipso, scilicet contemplationem veritatis. Et si illud bonum sit perfectum, ex eo totus homo perficitur et fit bonus: quod quidem intellectus practicus non habet, sed ad illud ordinat.

The practical intellect is ordained to good which is outside of it, but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz. the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the practical intellect has not, but it directs man thereto.

In vita contemplativa homo communicat cum superioribus, scilicet cum Deo et Angelis, quibus per beatitudinem assimilatur. Sed in his quae pertinent ad vitam activam, etiam alia animalia cum homine aliqualiter communicant, licet imperfectae.

In the contemplative life man has something in common with things above him, viz. with God and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things pertaining to the active life, other animals also have something in common with man, although imperfectly.

Et ideo ultima et perfecta beatitudo, quae expectatur in futura vita, tota consistit in contemplatione. Beatitudo autem imperfecta, qualis hic haberi potest, primo quidem et principaliter consistit in contemplatione, secundario vero in operatione practici intellectus ordinantis actiones et passiones humanas, ut dicitur in X Ethic.

Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and principally in contemplation, but secondarily, in an operation of the practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as stated in Ethic. x, 7,8.

Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., quod "contemplatio promittitur nobis, actionum omnium finis, atque aeterna perfectio gaudiorum."

Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting perfection of our joys."

1a 2ae q3 a4: Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the intellect? Yes.

Beatitudo hominis in cognitione Dei consistit, quae est actus intellectus, quia quantum ad id quod est essentialiter ipsa beatitudo, impossibile est quod consistat in actu voluntatis.

Man's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect, because as to the very essence of happiness, it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will.

Voluntas enim fertur in finem, et absentem (cum ipsum desiderat) et praesentem (cum in ipso requiescens delectatur). Manifestum est autem quod ipsum desiderium finis non est consecutio finis, sed est motus ad finem. Delectatio autem advenit voluntati ex hoc quod finis est praesens, non autem e converso ex hoc aliquid fit praesens, quia voluntas delectatur in ipso. Oportet igitur aliquid aliud esse quam actum voluntatis, per quod fit ipse finis praesens volenti.

For the will is directed to the end, both absent (when it desires it) and present (when it is delighted by resting therein). Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end is not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will from the end being present; and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be present to him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act of the will.

Nam a principio volumus consequi finem intelligibilem; consequimur autem ipsum per hoc quod fit praesens nobis per actum intellectus; et tunc voluntas delectata conquiescit in fine iam adepto.

For at first we desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained.

Sic igitur essentia beatitudinis in actu intellectus consistit, sed ad voluntatem pertinet delectatio beatitudinem consequens; secundum quod Augustinus dicit, X Confess., quod beatitudo est "gaudium de veritate"; quia scilicet ipsum gaudium est consummatio beatitudinis.

So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect, but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth," because, to wit, joy itself is the consummation of happiness.

Finem primo apprehendit intellectus quam voluntas, tamen motus ad finem incipit in voluntate. Et ideo voluntati debetur id quod ultimo consequitur consecutionem finis, scilicet delectatio vel fruitio.

The intellect apprehends the end before the will does, yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz., delight or enjoyment.

Dilectio praeeminet cognitioni in movendo, sed cognitio praevia est dilectioni in attingendo, non enim diligitur nisi cognitum, ut dicit Augustinus in X de Trin.

Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining, for "naught is loved save what is known," as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1).

1a 2ae q3 a3: Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part? No.

Beatitudo non consistit in operatione sensitiva quia essentialiter quidem non potest pertinere operatio sensus ad beatitudinem, nam beatitudo hominis consistit essentialiter in coniunctione ipsius ad bonum increatum, quod est ultimus finis.

Happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation because the operation of sense cannot belong to happiness essentially, for man's happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which is his last end.

Possunt autem operationes sensus pertinere ad beatitudinem antecedenter et consequenter. Antecedenter quidem, secundum beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in praesenti vita haberi potest, nam operatio intellectus praeexigit operationem sensus. Consequenter autem, in illa perfecta beatitudine quae expectatur in caelo, quia post resurrectionem, "ex ipsa beatitudine animae", ut Augustinus dicit in epistola ad Dioscorum, "fiet quaedam refluentia in corpus et in sensus corporeos, ut in suis operationibus perficiantur"—ut infra magis patebit, cum de resurrectione agetur. Non autem tunc operatio qua mens humana Deo coniungetur, a sensu dependebit.

Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection, "from the very happiness of the soul," as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"—a point which will be explained further on when we treat of the resurrection (II-II, 82 -85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united to God will not depend on the senses.

In perfecta beatitudine perficitur totus homo, sed in inferiori parte per redundantiam a superiori. In beatitudine autem imperfecta praesentis vitae, e converso a perfectione inferioris partis proceditur ad perfectionem superioris.

In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in the imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part.

1a 2ae q3 a2: Whether happiness is an operation? Yes.

Secundum quod beatitudo hominis est aliquid creatum, in ipso existens, necesse est dicere quod beatitudo hominis sit operatio, quia beatitudo est ultima hominis perfectio.

Insofar as man's happiness is something created, existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation, because happiness is man's supreme perfection.

Unumquodque autem intantum perfectum est, inquantum est actu, nam potentia sine actu imperfecta est. Oportet ergo beatitudinem in ultimo actu hominis consistere. Manifestum est autem quod operatio est ultimus actus operantis, unde et "actus secundus" a philosopho nominatur, in II de anima, nam habens formam potest esse in potentia operans, sicut sciens est in potentia considerans. Et inde est quod in aliis quoque rebus, res unaquaeque dicitur esse "propter suam operationem", ut dicitur in II de caelo. Necesse est ergo beatitudinem hominis operationem esse.

Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect. Consequently happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the Philosopher calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1), because that which has a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things, too, each one is said to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore man's happiness must of necessity consist in an operation.

Philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod "felicitas est operatio secundum virtutem perfectam."

The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue."

Solius enim Dei beatitudo est suum esse. Nam in Deo est beatitudo per essentiam, quia ipsum esse eius est operatio eius, qua non fruitur alio, sed seipso. In Angelis autem beatis est ultima perfectio secundum aliquam operationem, qua coniunguntur bono increato, et haec operatio in eis est unica et sempiterna.

Of God alone is it true that His Be-ing is His Happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially, since His very Be-ing is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good, and this operation of theirs is one only and everlasting.

In hominibus autem, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est ultima perfectio secundum operationem qua homo coniungitur Deo, sed haec operatio nec continua potest esse, et per consequens nec unica est, quia operatio intercisione multiplicatur. Et propter hoc in statu praesentis vitae, perfecta beatitudo ab homine haberi non potest.

But in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God, but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained by man.

Unde philosophus, in I Ethic., ponens beatitudinem hominis in hac vita, dicit eam imperfectam, post multa concludens, beatos autem dicimus ut homines. Sed promittitur nobis a Deo beatitudo perfecta, quando erimus sicut Angeli in caelo, sicut dicitur Matth. XXII.

Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as men." But God has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be "as the angels . . . in heaven" (Matthew 22:30).

Una et continua et sempiterna operatione, in illo beatitudinis statu, mens hominis Deo coniungetur. Sed in praesenti vita, quantum deficimus ab unitate et continuitate talis operationis, tantum deficimus a beatitudinis perfectione.

In that state of happiness, man's mind will be united to God by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation, so do we fall short of perfect happiness.

Est tamen aliqua participatio beatitudinis, et tanto maior, quanto operatio potest esse magis continua et una. Et ideo in activa vita, quae circa multa occupatur, est minus de ratione beatitudinis quam in vita contemplativa, quae versatur circa unum: idest circa veritatis contemplationem.

Nevertheless it is a participation of happiness, and so much the greater, as the operation can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life, which is busy with many things, has less of the formal aspect of happiness than the contemplative life, which is busied with one thing: i.e., the contemplation of truth.

1a 2ae q3 a1: Whether happiness is something uncreated? No.

Beatitudo non est aliquid increatum quia ultimus hominis finis est bonum increatum, scilicet Deus, qui solus sua infinita bonitate potest voluntatem hominis perfecte implere; sed ultimus finis hominis est aliquid creatum, in ipso existens, quod nihil est aliud quam adeptio vel fruitio finis ultimi—ultimus autem finis vocatur beatitudo.

Happiness is not something uncreated because man's last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will; but man's last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of the last end—called happiness.

Si ergo beatitudo hominis consideretur quantum ad causam vel obiectum, sic est aliquid increatum; si autem consideretur quantum ad ipsam essentiam beatitudinis, sic est aliquid creatum.

If, therefore, we consider man's happiness in its cause or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something created.

Deus est beatitudo per essentiam suam, non enim per adeptionem aut participationem alicuius alterius beatus est, sed per essentiam suam. Homines autem sunt beati, sicut dicit Boetius, per participationem; sicut et "dii" per participationem dicuntur. Ipsa autem participatio beatitudinis secundum quam homo dicitur beatus, aliquid creatum est.

God is happiness by His Essence, for He is happy not by acquisition or participation of something else, but by His Essence. On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by participation; just as they are called "gods," by participation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy, is something created.

1a 2ae q3: What is happiness

1. Is happiness something uncreated?
2. If it be something created, is it an operation?
3. Is it an operation of the sensitive, or only of the intellectual part?
4. If it be an operation of the intellectual part, is it an operation of the intellect, or of the will?
5. If it be an operation of the intellect, is it an operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect?
6. If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, does it consist in the consideration of speculative sciences?
7. Does it consist in the consideration of separate substances viz. angels?
8. Does it consist in the sole contemplation of God seen in His Essence?

1a 2ae q2 a8: Whether any created good constitutes man's happiness? No.

Impossibile est beatitudinem hominis esse in aliquo bono creato quia bonum creatum non est minus quam bonum cuius homo est capax (ut rei intrinsecae et inhaerentis), est tamen minus quam bonum cuius est capax, ut obiecti, quod est infinitum.

It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness because created good is not less than that good of which man is capable (as of something intrinsic and inherent to him), but it is less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite.

Obiectum autem voluntatis, quae est appetitus humanus, est universale bonum; sicut obiectum intellectus est universale verum. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare voluntatem hominis, nisi bonum universale.

Now the object of the will, i.e. of man's appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's will, save the universal good.

Quod non invenitur in aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo, quia omnis creatura habet bonitatem participatam.

This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone, because every creature has goodness by participation.

Universitas autem creaturarum, ad quam comparatur homo ut pars ad totum, non est ultimus finis, sed ordinatur in Deum sicut in ultimum finem.

Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to God, as to its last end.

Unde solus Deus voluntatem hominis implere potest; secundum quod dicitur in Psalmo CII, "qui replet in bonis desiderium tuum". In solo igitur Deo beatitudo hominis consistit.

Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Psalm 102:5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness.

Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, "ut vita carnis anima est, ita beata vita hominis Deus est".

Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): "As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness".

1a 2ae q2 a7: Whether some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness? No.

In nullo bono animae beatitudo consistit quia beatitudo ipsa, cum sit perfectio animae, est quoddam animae bonum inhaerens, sed id in quo beatitudo consistit (quod scilicet beatum facit) est aliquid extra animam.

Happiness consists in no good of the soul because happiness itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul, but that which constitutes happiness (viz. which makes man happy) is something outside his soul.

Sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de Doctr. Christ., "id in quo constituitur beata vita, propter se diligendum est". Sed homo non est propter seipsum diligendus, sed quidquid est in homine, est diligendum propter Deum.

As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake"; but man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man, is to be loved for God's sake.

Sicut supra dictum est, finis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet ipsa res quam adipisci desideramus; et usus, seu adeptio aut possessio illius rei. Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam rem quam appetimus sicut ultimum finem, impossibile est quod ultimus finis hominis sit ipsa anima, vel aliquid eius.

As stated above (q1 a8), the end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak of man's last end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul itself or something belonging to it.

Ipsa enim anima, in se considerata, est ut in potentia existens, fit enim de potentia sciente actu sciens, et de potentia virtuosa actu virtuosa. Cum autem potentia sit propter actum, sicut propter complementum, impossibile est quod id quod est secundum se in potentia existens, habeat rationem ultimi finis. Unde impossibile est quod ipsa anima sit ultimus finis sui ipsius.

Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality, for it becomes knowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its fulfillment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot have the formal aspect of last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last end.

Similiter etiam neque aliquid eius, sive sit potentia, sive habitus, sive actus. Bonum enim quod est ultimus finis, est bonum perfectum complens appetitum. Appetitus autem humanus—qui est voluntas—est boni universalis. Quodlibet bonum autem inhaerens ipsi animae, est bonum participatum, et per consequens particulatum. Unde impossibile est quod aliquod eorum sit ultimus finis hominis.

In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now the human appetite—which is the will—is for the universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man's last end.

Sed si loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam adeptionem vel possessionem, seu quemcumque usum ipsius rei quae appetitur ut finis, sic ad ultimum finem pertinet aliquid hominis ex parte animae, quia homo per animam beatitudinem consequitur. Res ergo ipsa quae appetitur ut finis, est id in quo beatitudo consistit, et quod beatum facit; sed huius rei adeptio vocatur beatitudo. Unde dicendum est quod beatitudo est aliquid animae; sed id in quo consistit beatitudo, est aliquid extra animam.

But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end, since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.

Beatitudo maxime amatur tanquam bonum concupitum, amicus autem amatur tanquam id cui concupiscitur bonum; et sic etiam homo amat seipsum.

Happiness is loved above all, as the good desired, whereas a friend is loved as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself.

1a 2ae q2 a6: Whether man's happiness consists in pleasure? No.

Beatitudo, quae est summum bonum, non consistit in voluptate, quia omnes appetunt delectationem, sicut et appetunt bonum, et tamen delectationem (quae nihil est aliud quam quietatio appetitus in bono) appetunt ratione boni, et non e converso.

Happiness, which is the supreme good, does not consist in pleasure, because all desire delight in the same way as they desire good, and yet they desire delight (which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good) under the formal aspect of the good and not conversely.

Unde non sequitur quod delectatio sit maximum et per se bonum, sed quod unaquaeque delectatio consequatur aliquod bonum, et quod aliqua delectatio consequatur id quod est per se et maximum bonum.

Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good.

Quia in unaquaque re aliud est quod pertinet ad essentiam eius, aliud est proprium accidens ipsius (sicut in homine aliud est quod est animal rationale mortale, aliud quod est risibile), est igitur considerandum quod omnis delectatio est quoddam proprium accidens quod consequitur beatitudinem, vel aliquam beatitudinis partem, ex hoc enim aliquis delectatur quod habet bonum aliquod sibi conveniens, vel in re, vel in spe, vel saltem in memoria.

Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is distinct from its proper accident (just as in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal), we must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness, since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory.

Bonum autem conveniens, si quidem sit perfectum, est ipsa hominis beatitudo; si autem sit imperfectum, est quaedam beatitudinis participatio, vel propinqua, vel remota, vel saltem apparens. Unde manifestum est quod nec ipsa delectatio, quae consequitur bonum perfectum, est ipsa essentia beatitudinis, sed quoddam consequens ad ipsam sicut per se accidens.

Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good, is precisely man's happiness; and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident.

Vehemens appetitus delectationis sensibilis contingit ex hoc quod operationes sensuum, quia sunt principia nostrae cognitionis, sunt magis perceptibiles. Unde etiam a pluribus delectationes sensibiles appetuntur.

The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.

"Quia delectationes corporales pluribus notae sunt, assumpserunt sibi nomen voluptatum," ut dicitur VII Ethic., cum tamen sint aliae delectationes potiores. In quibus tamen beatitudo principaliter non consistit.

Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13), although other delights excel them; and yet happiness does not consist in them.

Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., "tristes exitus esse voluptatum, quisquis reminisci libidinum suarum volet, intelliget. Quae si beatos efficere possent, nihil causae est quin pecudes quoque beatae esse dicantur."

Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had a sad ending; and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy too."

1a 2ae q2 a5: Whether man's happiness consists in any bodily good? No.

Beatitudo hominis non consistit in bonis corporis quia impossibile est quod ultimus finis rationis et voluntatis humanae sit conservatio humani esse, quia manifestum est quod homo ordinatur ad aliquid sicut ad finem: non enim homo est summum bonum.

Man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body because the last end of human reason and will cannot be the preservation of the act of human existence, for it is evident that man is ordained to something as to his end: since man is not the supreme good.

Esse enim hominis consistit in anima et corpore, et quamvis esse corporis dependeat ab anima, esse tamen humanae animae non dependet a corpore, ut supra ostensum es.

For the act of human existence consists in soul and body, and although the act of existence of the body depends on the soul, yet the act of existence of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above (I, 75, 2).

Unde omnia bona corporis ordinantur ad bona animae, sicut ad finem. Unde impossibile est quod in bonis corporis beatitudo consistat, quae est ultimus hominis finis.

Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is man's last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.

1a 2ae q2 a4: Whether man's happiness consists in power? No.

Impossibile est beatitudinem in potestate consistere: primo quidem, quia potestas habet rationem principii (ut patet in V Metaphys), beatitudo autem habet rationem ultimi finis; secundo, quia potestas se habet ad bonum et ad malum, beatitudo autem est proprium et perfectum hominis bonum.

It is impossible for happiness to consist in power: first, because power has the formal aspect of principle (as is stated in Metaph. v, 12), whereas happiness has the formal aspect of last end; secondly, because power has relation to good and to evil, whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good.

Unde magis posset consistere beatitudo aliqua in bono usu potestatis, qui est per virtutem, quam in ipsa potestate.

Wherefore some happiness might consist instead in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather than in power itself.

Divina potestas est sua bonitas, unde uti sua potestate non potest nisi bene. Sed hoc in hominibus non invenitur. Unde non sufficit ad beatitudinem hominis quod assimiletur Deo quantum ad potestatem, nisi etiam assimiletur ei quantum ad bonitatem.

God's power is His goodness, hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it is not enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he become like Him in goodness also.

Praemissa autem quatuor bona magis sunt a causis exterioribus, et ut plurimum a fortuna, unde et bona fortunae dicuntur. Unde patet quod in praemissis nullo modo beatitudo consistit.

Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune, for which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing.

1a 2ae q2 a3: Whether man's happiness consists in fame or glory? No.

Beatitudo hominis non consistit in fama seu gloria quia perfectio humani boni, quae beatitudo dicitur, non potest causari a notitia humana, sed magis notitia humana de beatitudine alicuius procedit et quodammodo causatur ab ipsa humana beatitudine, vel inchoata vel perfecta.

Man's happiness does not consist in fame or glory because the perfection of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human knowledge, but rather human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect.

Bonum alicuius hominis quod per famam vel gloriam est in cognitione multorum, si cognitio quidem vera sit, oportet quod derivetur a bono existente in ipso homine, et sic praesupponit beatitudinem perfectam vel inchoatam.

A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived from good existing in the man himself, and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness.

Si autem cognitio falsa sit, non concordat rei, et sic bonum non invenitur in eo cuius fama celebris habetur. Unde patet quod fama nullo modo potest facere hominem beatum.

But if the knowledge be false, it does not harmonize with the thing, and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that fame can nowise make man happy.

Res autem cognita aliter comparatur ad cognitionem humanam, et aliter ad cognitionem divinam, humana enim cognitio a rebus cognitis causatur, sed divina cognitio est causa rerum cognitarum.

Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's knowledge, for human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God's knowledge is the cause of the things known.

Sed bonum hominis dependet, sicut ex causa, ex cognitione Dei. Et ideo ex gloria quae est apud Deum, dependet beatitudo hominis sicut ex causa sua.

Man's good depends on God's knowledge as its cause, and therefore man's beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God.

Est etiam aliud considerandum, quod humana notitia saepe fallitur, et praecipue in singularibus contingentibus, cuiusmodi sunt actus humani. Et ideo frequenter humana gloria fallax est. Sed quia Deus falli non potest, eius gloria semper vera est.

We must observe that human knowledge often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true.

Fama non habet stabilitatem, immo falso rumore de facili perditur. Et si stabilis aliquando perseveret, hoc est per accidens. Sed beatitudo habet per se stabilitatem, et semper.

Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But happiness endures of itself, and for ever.

1a 2ae q2 a2: Whether man's happiness consists in honors? No.

In honore beatitudo non consistit quia verum praemium virtutis est ipsa beatitudo, propter quam virtuosi operantur; si autem propter honorem operarentur, iam non esset virtus, sed magis ambitio.

Happiness does not consist in honor because virtue's true reward is happiness itself, for which the virtuous work; whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be virtue, but instead ambition.

Sicut philosophus dicit, honor non est praemium virtutis propter quod virtuosi operantur, sed accipiunt honorem ab hominibus loco praemii, "quasi a non habentibus aliquid maius ad dandum".

As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work, but they receive honor from men instead of a reward, "as from those who have nothing greater to offer."

Honor enim exhibetur alicui propter aliquam eius excellentiam; et ita est signum et testimonium quoddam illius excellentiae quae est in honorato. Excellentia autem hominis maxime attenditur secundum beatitudinem, quae est hominis bonum perfectum, et secundum partes eius, idest secundum illa bona quibus aliquid beatitudinis participatur. Et ideo honor potest quidem consequi beatitudinem, sed principaliter in eo beatitudo consistere non potest.

For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion especially to his happiness, which is man's perfect good, and to its parts, i.e. to those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally consist therein.

Beatitudo est in beato. Honor autem non est in eo qui honoratur, sed magis in honorante, qui reverentiam exhibet honorato, ut philosophus dicit in I Ethic.

Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5).

1a 2ae q2 a1: Whether man's happiness consists in wealth? No.

In divitiis beatitudo non consistit quia quaeruntur propter aliud, scilicet ad sustentandam naturam hominis; et ideo non possunt esse ultimus finis hominis, sed magis ordinantur ad hominem sicut ad finem.

Man's happiness does not consist in wealth because it is sought for the sake of something else, viz., as a support of human nature; consequently it cannot be man's last end, rather is it ordained to man as to its end.

Appetitus naturalium divitiarum non est infinitus, quia secundum certam mensuram naturae sufficiunt. Sed appetitus divitiarum artificialium est infinitus, quia deservit concupiscentiae inordinatae, quae non modificatur, ut patet per philosophum in I Polit.

The desire for natural riches is not infinite, because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear (Polit. i, 3).

Omnia corporalia obediunt pecuniae, quantum ad multitudinem stultorum, qui sola corporalia bona cognoscunt, quae pecunia acquiri possunt. Iudicium autem de bonis humanis non debet sumi a stultis, sed a sapientibus; sicut et iudicium de saporibus ab his qui habent gustum bene dispositum.

All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise; just as it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable.

Things in which man's happiness consists

1. Does happiness consist in wealth?
2. In honor?
3. In fame or glory?
4. In power?
5. In any good of the body?
6. In pleasure?
7. In any good of the soul?
8. In any created good?

1a 2ae q1 a8: Whether other creatures concur in that last end? No.

In ultimo fine hominis alia conveniunt quia beatitudo nominat adeptionem ultimi finis.

Other things do not concur in man's last end because happiness means the acquisition of the last end.

Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam rem quae est finis, sic in ultimo fine hominis omnia alia conveniunt, quia Deus est ultimus finis hominis et omnium aliarum rerum.

If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the end, thus all other things concur in man's last end, since God is the last end of man and of all other things.

Si autem loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad consecutionem finis, sic in hoc fine hominis non communicant creaturae irrationales. Nam homo et aliae rationales creaturae consequuntur ultimum finem cognoscendo et amando Deum, quod non competit aliis creaturis, quae adipiscuntur ultimum finem inquantum participant aliquam similitudinem Dei, secundum quod sunt, vel vivunt, vel etiam cognoscunt.

If, however, we speak of man's last end, as of the acquisition of the end, then irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving God; this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in so far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know.

"Sed non cadit in animalia rationis expertia ut beata sint", sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.

"Happiness is not possible for animals bereft of reason," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5).

1a 2ae q1 a7: Whether all men have the same last end? Yes.

Quantum ad rationem ultimi finis, omnes conveniunt in appetitu finis ultimi, quia omnes appetunt suam perfectionem adimpleri, quae est ratio ultimi finis.

As to the formal aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end, because all desire the fulfillment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfillment which is the formal aspect of the last end.

Sed quantum ad id in quo ista ratio invenitur, non omnes homines conveniunt in ultimo fine: nam quidam appetunt divitias tanquam consummatum bonum; quidam autem voluptatem; quidam vero quodcumque aliud. Sicut et omni gustui delectabile est dulce, sed quibusdam maxime delectabilis est dulcedo vini; quibusdam dulcedo mellis; aut alicuius talium.

But as to the thing in which this formal aspect is realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else. So too for every taste the sweet is pleasant, but to some the sweetness of wine is most pleasant; to others, the sweetness of honey; or of something similar.

Diversa studia vivendi contingunt in hominibus propter diversas res in quibus quaeritur ratio summi boni.

Various pursuits in life are found among humans on account of the various things in which men seek to find [perfection, i.e.,] the formal aspect of their last end.

Illud tamen dulce oportet esse simpliciter melius delectabile, in quo maxime delectatur qui habet optimum gustum. Et similiter illud bonum oportet esse completissimum, quod tanquam ultimum finem appetit habens affectum bene dispositum.

Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in which he who has the best taste takes the most pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with well disposed affections desires for his last end.

Illi qui peccant, avertuntur ab eo in quo vere invenitur ratio ultimi finis, non autem ab ipsa ultimi finis intentione, quam quaerunt falso in aliis rebus.

Those who sin turn from that in which the formal aspect of their last end really consists, but they do not turn away from the very intention of the last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things.

Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., quod omnes homines conveniunt in appetendo ultimum finem, qui est beatitudo.

Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness.

1a 2ae q1 a6: Whether man wills all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end? Yes.

Necesse est quod omnia quae homo appetit, appetat propter ultimum finem, quia quidquid homo appetit, appetit sub ratione boni.

Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end, because whatever man desires, he desires it under the formal aspect of good.

Quod quidem si non appetitur ut bonum perfectum, quod est ultimus finis, necesse est ut appetatur ut tendens in bonum perfectum, quia semper inchoatio alicuius ordinatur ad consummationem ipsius; sicut patet tam in his quae fiunt a natura, quam in his quae fiunt ab arte. Et ideo omnis inchoatio perfectionis ordinatur in perfectionem consummatam, quae est per ultimum finem.

And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the beginning of anything is always ordained to its completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art. Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved through the last end.

Secundo, quia ultimus finis hoc modo se habet in movendo appetitum, sicut se habet in aliis motionibus primum movens. Manifestum est autem quod causae secundae moventes non movent nisi secundum quod moventur a primo movente. Unde secunda appetibilia non movent appetitum nisi in ordine ad primum appetibile, quod est ultimus finis.

Secondly, because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements. Now it is clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the last end.

Non oportet ut semper aliquis cogitet de ultimo fine, quandocumque aliquid appetit vel operatur, sed virtus primae intentionis, quae est respectu ultimi finis, manet in quolibet appetitu cuiuscumque rei, etiam si de ultimo fine actu non cogitetur. Sicut non oportet quod qui vadit per viam, in quolibet passu cogitet de fine.

One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or does something, but the power of the first intention, which is in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed to any object whatever, even though one's thoughts be not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every step.

Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, "illud est finis boni nostri, propter quod amantur cetera, illud autem propter seipsum".

Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the end of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we love it for its own sake."

1a 2ae q1 a5: Whether one man can have several last ends? No.

Impossibile est quod voluntas unius hominis simul se habeat ad diversa, sicut ad ultimos fines, quia potestas voluntatis non habet ut faciat opposita esse simul (quod contingeret, si tenderet in plura disparata sicut in ultimos fines).

It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to diverse things, as last ends, because the power of the will does not extend to making opposites exist at the same time (which would be the case were it to tend to several diverse objects as last ends).

Etsi plura accipi possint quae ad invicem oppositionem non habeant, tamen bono perfecto opponitur quod sit aliquid de perfectione rei extra ipsum.

Although it is possible to find several things which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's perfect good, that anything besides be required for that thing's perfection.

Cum unumquodque appetat suam perfectionem, illud appetit aliquis ut ultimum finem, quod appetit, ut bonum perfectum et completivum sui ipsius. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, "finem boni nunc dicimus, non quod consumatur ut non sit, sed quod perficiatur ut plenum sit".

Since everything desires its own perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which he desires as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "In speaking of the end of good we mean now, not that it passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be complete."

Oportet igitur quod ultimus finis ita impleat totum hominis appetitum, quod nihil extra ipsum appetendum relinquatur. Quod esse non potest, si aliquid extraneum ad ipsius perfectionem requiratur. Unde non potest esse quod in duo sic tendat appetitus, ac si utrumque sit bonum perfectum ipsius.

It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to desire. Which is not possible, if something else be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good.

Sicut omnium hominum est naturaliter unus finis ultimus, ita huius hominis voluntas in uno ultimo fine statuatur.

Just as of all men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end.

Sicut in processu rationis, principium est id quod naturaliter cognoscitur, ita in processu rationalis appetitus, qui est voluntas, oportet esse principium id quod naturaliter desideratur. Hoc autem oportet esse unum, quia natura non tendit nisi ad unum. Principium autem in processu rationalis appetitus est ultimus finis. Unde oportet id in quod tendit voluntas sub ratione ultimi finis, esse unum.

Just as in the process of reasoning, the principle is that which is naturally known, so in the process of the rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that which is naturally desired. Now this must needs be one: since nature tends to one thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational appetite is the last end. Therefore that to which the will tends, under the formal aspect of its last end, is one.

1a 2ae q1 a4: Whether there is one last end of human life? Yes.

In finibus humanae voluntatis non proceditur in infinitum, et est aliquis ultimus finis humanae voluntatis, quia contra rationem finis est quod procedatur in infinitum.

There is not an infinite series of ends of the human will, and there is one last end of the human will, because it is contrary to the formal aspect of an end to proceed indefinitely.

Ea vero quae non habent ordinem per se, sed per accidens sibi invicem coniunguntur, nihil prohibet infinitatem habere; causae enim per accidens indeterminatae sunt. Et hoc etiam modo contingit esse infinitatem per accidens in finibus, et in his quae sunt ad finem.

On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; for accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the end.

Sed quia primum bonum habet diffusionem secundum intellectum, cuius est secundum aliquam certam formam profluere in causata; aliquis certus modus adhibetur bonorum effluxui a primo bono, a quo omnia alia bona participant virtutem diffusivam. Et ideo diffusio bonorum non procedit in infinitum, sed, sicut dicitur Sap. XI, Deus omnia disposuit in numero, pondere et mensura.

But, since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper to flow forth into its effects according to a certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from the First Good from Which all other goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely but, as it is written (Wisdom 11:21), God disposes all things "in number, weight and measure."

In omnibus enim quae per se habent ordinem ad invicem, oportet quod, remoto primo, removeantur ea quae sunt ad primum.

For in whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of necessity be removed also.

In finibus autem invenitur duplex ordo, scilicet ordo intentionis, et ordo executionis, et in utroque ordine oportet esse aliquid primum. Id enim quod est primum in ordine intentionis est quasi principium movens appetitum, unde, subtracto principio, appetitus a nullo moveretur. Id autem quod est principium in executione, est unde incipit operatio; unde, isto principio subtracto, nullus inciperet aliquid operari.

Now there is to be observed a twofold order in ends--the order of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders there must be something first. For that which is first in the order of intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite; consequently, if you remove this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is that wherein operation has its beginning; and if this principle be taken away, no one will begin to work.

Principium autem intentionis est ultimus finis, principium autem executionis est primum eorum quae sunt ad finem.

Now the principle in the intention is the last end; while the principle in execution is the first of the things which are ordained to the end.

Sic ergo ex neutra parte possibile est in infinitum procedere, quia si non esset ultimus finis, nihil appeteretur, nec aliqua actio terminaretur, nec etiam quiesceret intentio agentis; si autem non esset primum in his quae sunt ad finem, nullus inciperet aliquid operari, nec terminaretur consilium, sed in infinitum procederet.

Consequently, on neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any action have its term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there is no first thing among those that are ordained to the end, none would begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would continue indefinitely.

Unde philosophus probat, in VIII Physic., quod non est possibile in causis moventibus procedere in infinitum, quia iam non esset primum movens, quo subtracto alia movere non possunt, cum non moveant nisi per hoc quod moventur a primo movente.

Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement, because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first mover.

1a 2ae q1 a3: Whether human acts are specified by their end? Yes.

Actus humani recipiunt speciem a fine quia finis non est omnino aliquid extrinsecum ab actu, quia comparatur ad actum ut principium vel terminus; et hoc ipsum est de ratione actus, ut scilicet sit ab aliquo, quantum ad actionem, et ut sit ad aliquid, quantum ad passionem.

Human acts are specified by their end because the end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it is just this that is the formal aspect of an act, viz. to proceed from something, considered as action, and to proceed towards something, considered as passion.

Unumquodque sortitur speciem secundum actum, et non secundum potentiam, unde ea quae sunt composita ex materia et forma, constituuntur in suis speciebus per proprias formas. Et hoc etiam considerandum est in motibus propriis. Cum enim motus quodammodo distinguatur per actionem et passionem, utrumque horum ab actu speciem sortitur, actio quidem ab actu qui est principium agendi; passio vero ab actu qui est terminus motus.

Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed of matter and form are established in their respective species by their own forms. And this is also to be observed in proper movements. For since movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these receives its species from an act; action indeed from the act which is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is the terminus of the movement.

Finis secundum quod est prior in intentione, ut dictum est, secundum hoc pertinet ad voluntatem. Et hoc modo dat speciem actui humano sive morali.

The end, insofar as it pre-exists in the intention, pertains to the will, as stated above (q1 ad 1). And it is thus that it gives the species to the human or moral act.

Idem actus numero, secundum quod semel egreditur ab agente, non ordinatur nisi ad unum finem proximum, a quo habet speciem, sed potest ordinari ad plures fines remotos, quorum unus est finis alterius.

One and the same act, insofar as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which it has its species; but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of which one is the end of the other.

1a 2ae q1 a2: Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end? No.

Omnia quae carent ratione, moveantur in fines particulares ab aliqua voluntate rationali, quae se extendit in bonum universale, scilicet a voluntate divina, quia manifestum est quod particulares causae moventur a causa universali.

All things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some rational will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will, because it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause.

Omnia agentia necesse est agere propter finem. Causarum enim ad invicem ordinatarum, si prima subtrahatur, necesse est alias subtrahi. Prima autem inter omnes causas est causa finalis.

Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause.

Cuius ratio est, quia materia non consequitur formam nisi secundum quod movetur ab agente, nihil enim reducit se de potentia in actum. Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis. Si enim agens non esset determinatum ad aliquem effectum, non magis ageret hoc quam illud, ad hoc ergo quod determinatum effectum producat, necesse est quod determinetur ad aliquid certum, quod habet rationem finis.

The reason of which is that matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the formal aspect of an end.

Haec autem determinatio, sicut in rationali natura fit per "rationalem appetitum", qui dicitur voluntas; ita in aliis fit per inclinationem naturalem, quae dicitur "appetitus naturalis".

And just as this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite."

Obiectum voluntatis est finis et bonum in universali. Unde non potest esse voluntas in his quae carent ratione et intellectu, cum non possint apprehendere universale; sed est in eis appetitus naturalis vel sensitivus, determinatus ad aliquod bonum particulare.

The object of the will is the end and the good in universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate to some particular good.

Philosophus probat in II Physic., quod "non solum intellectus, sed etiam natura agit propter finem".

The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not only mind but also nature acts for an end."

1a 2ae q1 a1: Whether it belongs to man to act for an end? Yes.

Homini convenit omnia agere propter finem quia differt homo ab aliis irrationalibus creaturis in hoc, quod est suorum actuum dominus.

It belongs to man to do everything for an end because man differs from irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions.

Unde illae solae actiones vocantur proprie humanae, quarum homo est dominus. Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem—unde et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illae ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt. Si quae autem aliae actiones homini conveniant, possunt dici quidem "hominis" actiones, sed non proprie "humanae", cum non sint hominis inquantum est homo.

Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is master. Now man is master of his actions through his [formally aspectual] reason and will—whence, too, free choice is defined as "the faculty of will and reason". Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of a man", but not properly "human" actions, since they are not proper to man as man.

Manifestum est autem quod omnes actiones quae procedunt ab aliqua potentia, causantur ab ea secundum rationem sui obiecti. Obiectum autem voluntatis est finis et bonum. Unde oportet quod omnes actiones humanae propter finem sint.

Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power, are caused by that power in accordance with the formal aspect of its object. But the object of the will is the end, i.e., the good. Therefore all human actions must be for an end.

Finis, etsi sit postremus in executione, est tamen primus in intentione agentis. Et hoc modo habet rationem causae.

Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is in this way that it has the formal aspect of a cause.

Sed multa homo agit absque deliberatione, de quibus etiam quandoque nihil cogitat; sicut cum aliquis movet pedem vel manum, aliis intentus, vel fricat barbam.

But man does many things without deliberation, sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent on something else.

Huiusmodi actiones non sunt proprie humanae, quia non procedunt ex deliberatione rationis, quae est proprium principium humanorum actuum. Et ideo habent quidem finem imaginatum, non autem per rationem praestitutum.

Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from the deliberation of formal aspect, which is the proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an envisioned end, but not one that is fixed by formal aspect.

1a2ae q1: Man's last end

1. Does it belong to man to act for an end?
2. Is this proper to the rational nature?
3. Are a man's actions specified by their end?
4. Is there any last end of human life?
5. Can one man have several last ends?
6. Does man ordain all to the last end?
7. Do all men have the same last end?
8. Do all other creatures concur with man in that last end?

1a2ae: First Part of the Second Part (Prima Secundæ Partis)

Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur—secundum quod per imaginem significatur "intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum"—postquam praedictum est de exemplari (scilicet de Deo) et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem, restat ut consideremus de eius imagine (idest de homine), secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.

Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orthod. ii. 12), man is said to be made to God's image—insofar as the image implies an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement—now that we have treated of the exemplar (i.e., God) and of those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will, it remains for us to treat of His image (i.e., man), inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.

Q119 A2: Whether the semen is produced from surplus food?

Yes. The semen is produced from the substance of the generator because generation is from the substance of the generator in animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its power to the form of the generator, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the substance.

Semen est de substantia generantis quia generatio est de substantia generantis in animalibus et plantis, inquantum semen habet virtutem ex forma generantis, et inquantum est in potentia ad substantiam ipsius.

The semen is not something separated from what was before the actual whole; rather is it the whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of the generator, to produce the whole body.

Semen non sit decisum ab eo quod erat actu totum; sed magis sit in potentia totum, habens virtutem ad productionem totius corporis, derivatam an anima generantis.

Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into the substance of the members. Therefore the semen is taken from this. In this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power: because what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the generative power.

Hoc autem quod est in potentia ad totum, est illud quod generatur ex alimento, antequam convertatur in substantiam membrorum. Et ideo ex hoc semen accipitur. Et secundum hoc, virtus nutritiva dicitur deservire generativae, quia id quod est conversum per virtutem nutritivam, accipitur a virtute generativa ut semen.

A sign of this, according to the Philosopher, is that animals of great size, which require much food, have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and generated seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason.

Et huius signum ponit philosophus, quod animalia magni corporis, quae indigent multo nutrimento, sunt pauci seminis secundum quantitatem sui corporis, et paucae generationis; et similiter homines pingues sunt pauci seminis, propter eandem causam.

The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener. Animal. i, 18) that "the semen is surplus food."

Philosophus probat multipliciter, in libro de Generat. Animal., "quod semen est superfluum alimenti".

The likeness of the generator to the generated is on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that generates its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a certain power derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father.

Assimilatio generantis ad genitum non fit propter materiam, sed propter formam agentis, quod generat sibi simile. Unde non oportet ad hoc quod aliquis assimiletur avo, quod materia corporalis seminis fuerit in avo; sed quod sit in semine aliqua virtus derivata ab anima avi, mediante patre.

Kinship is not in relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms.

Affinitas non attenditur secundum materiam, sed magis secundum derivationem formae.

Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were in Adam "not only by seminal formal aspect, but also in the very substance of the body."

Augustinus dicit, X super Gen. ad Litt., quod nos fuimus in Adam non solum secundum "seminalem rationem, sed etiam secundum corpulentam substantiam".

These words of Augustine are not to be understood as though the immediate seminal formal aspect, or the corporeal substance from which this individual was formed, were actually in Adam: but so that both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal matter, which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance, is originally derived from Adam: and likewise the active seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal formal aspect [in the production] of this man.

Verbum Augustini non est sic intelligendum, quasi in Adam actu fuerit aut seminalis ratio huius hominis propinqua, aut corpulenta eius substantia, sed utrumque fuit in Adam secundum originem. Nam et materia corporalis, quae ministrata est a matre, quam vocat corpulentam substantiam, derivatur originaliter ab Adam, et similiter virtus activa existens in semine patris, quae est huius hominis propinqua ratio seminalis.

But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the "corporeal substance," not according to the seminal formal aspect. Because the matter from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin Mother, was derived from Adam; whereas the active power was not derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal power of a man, but by the operation of the Holy Spirit. For "such a birth was becoming to Him" [Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary, O. P.], WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen.

Sed Christus dicitur fuisse in Adam secundum corpulentam substantiam, sed non secundum seminalem rationem. Quia materia corporis eius, quae ministrata est a matre virgine, derivata est ab Adam, sed virtus activa non est derivata ab Adam, quia corpus eius non est formatum per virtutem virilis seminis, sed operatione spiritus sancti. Talis enim partus decebat eum, qui est super omnia benedictus Deus in saecula. Amen.

Q119 A1: Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature?

Yes. Food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts.

Alimentum vere convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae, inquantum vere accipit speciem carnis et ossis et huiusmodi partium.

This is what the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh."

Et hoc est quod dicit philosophus in II de anima, quod "alimentum nutrit inquantum est potentia caro."

According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being." Therefore that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature.

Secundum philosophum, II Metaphys., "hoc modo se habet unumquodque ad veritatem, sicut se habet ad esse." Illud ergo pertinet ad veritatem naturae alicuius, quod est de constitutione naturae ipsius.

But nature can be considered in two ways: firstly, in general according to the formal aspect of the species; secondly, as in this individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong to a thing's true nature considered in general, individual signate matter, and the form individualized by that matter, belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body.

Sed natura dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, in communi, secundum rationem speciei; alio modo, secundum quod est in hoc individuo. Ad veritatem igitur naturae alicuius in communi consideratae, pertinet forma et materia eius in communi accepta, ad veritatem autem naturae in hoc particulari consideratae, pertinet materia individualis signata, et forma per huiusmodi materiam individuata. Sicut de veritate humanae naturae in communi, est anima humana et corpus, sed de veritate humanae naturae in Petro et Martino, est haec anima et hoc corpus.

Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this; and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5).

Omnis virtus in corpore passibili per continuam actionem debilitatur, quia huiusmodi agentia etiam patiuntur. Et ideo virtus conversiva in principio quidem tam fortis est, ut possit convertere non solum quod sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, sed etiam ad augmentum. Postea vero non potest convertere nisi quantum sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, et tunc cessat augmentum. Demum nec hoc potest, et tunc fit diminutio. Deinde, deficiente huiusmodi virtute totaliter, animal moritur. Sicut virtus vini convertentis aquam admixtam, paulatim per admixtionem aquae debilitatur, ut tandem totum fiat aquosum, ut philosophus exemplificat in I de Generat.

Q119: The propagation of man as to the body

1. Is any part of the food changed into true human nature?
2. Is the semen, which is the principle of human generation, produced from the surplus food?