Sunday, June 28, 2009

Q105 A4: Whether God can move the created will?

Yes. The will can be moved by good as its object, but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously, because nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at least equals the passive power of the thing movable.

Potest autem voluntas moveri sicut ab obiecto, a quocumque bono, non tamen sufficienter et efficaciter nisi a Deo, quia non sufficienter aliquid potest movere aliquod mobile, nisi virtus activa moventis excedat, vel saltem adaequet, virtutem passivam mobilis.

God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural inclination.

Deus, movendo voluntatem, non cogit ipsam, quia dat ei eius propriam inclinationem.

To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another.

Moveri voluntarie est moveri ex se, idest a principio intrinseco, sed illud principium intrinsecum potest esse ab alio principio extrinseco. Et sic moveri ex se non repugnat ei quod movetur ab alio.

If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated, it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.

Si voluntas ita moveretur ab alio quod ex se nullatenus moveretur, opera voluntatis non imputarentur ad meritum vel demeritum. Sed quia per hoc quod movetur ab alio, non excluditur quin moveatur ex se, ut dictum est, ideo per consequens non tollitur ratio meriti vel demeriti.

Now the passive power of the will extends to the universal good: for its object is universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal being. But every created good is some particular good; God alone is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills [the capacity of] the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object.

Virtus autem passiva voluntatis se extendit ad bonum in universali: est enim eius obiectum bonum universale, sicut et intellectus obiectum est ens universale. Quodlibet autem bonum creatum est quoddam particulare bonum; solus autem Deus est bonum universale. Unde ipse solus implet voluntatem, et sufficienter eam movet ut obiectum.

In like manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but a kind of inclination towards the object of the will, which is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate, just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects to the common weal.

Similiter autem et virtus volendi a solo Deo causatur. Velle enim nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam in obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum universale. Inclinare autem in bonum universale est primi moventis, cui proportionatur ultimus finis, sicut in rebus humanis dirigere ad bonum commune est eius qui praeest multitudini.

Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God to move the will, but especially in the second way, by an interior inclination of the will.

Unde utroque modo proprium est Dei movere voluntatem, sed maxime secundo modo, interius eam inclinando.

It is written (Philippians 2:13): "It is God who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish."

Dicitur ad Philipp. II, "Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere."