1a 2ae q38 a5: Whether pain and sadness are assuaged by sleep and baths? Yes.

Huiusmodi remediis reducitur natura ad debitum statum, causatur ex his delectatio, quia hoc est quod delectationem facit, ut supra dictum est.

Such remedies, from the very fact that they bring nature back to its normal state, are causes of pleasure, because this is precisely in what pleasure consists, as stated above (q31 a1).

Unde, cum omnis delectatio tristitiam mitiget, per huiusmodi remedia corporalia tristitia mitigatur.

Therefore, since every pleasure assuages sadness, sadness is assuaged by such like bodily remedies.

1a 2ae q38 a4: Whether pain and sadness are assuaged by the contemplation of truth? Yes.

In contemplatione veritatis maxima delectatio consistit, quia omnis delectatio dolorem mitigat, ut supra dictum est, et ideo contemplatio veritatis mitigat tristitiam vel dolorem, et tanto magis, quanto perfectius aliquis est amator sapientiae.

The greatest of all pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth because every pleasure assuages pain, as stated above (q38 a1), and hence the contemplation of truth assuages pain or sadness, and the more so, the more perfectly one is a lover of wisdom.

In viribus animae fit redundantia a superiori ad inferius. Et secundum hoc, delectatio contemplationis, quae est in superiori parte, redundat ad mitigandum etiam dolorem qui est in sensu.

In the powers of the soul there is an overflow from the higher to the lower powers: and accordingly, the pleasure of contemplation, which is in the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate even that pain which is in the senses.

Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., "videbatur mihi, si se ille mentibus nostris veritatis fulgor aperiret, aut non me sensurum fuisse illum dolorem, aut certe pro nihilo toleraturum."

Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "It seemed to me that if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I should not feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing to me."

1a 2ae q38 a3: Whether pain or sadness are assuaged by the sympathy of friends? Yes.

Naturaliter amicus condolens in tristitiis, est consolativus, quia per hoc quod amici contristantur ei, percipit se ab eis amari: quod est delectabile, ut supra dictum est.

When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy of a friend should afford consolation, because when a man's friends console him, he sees that he is loved by them: and this affords him pleasure, as stated above (q32 a5).

Unde, cum omnis delectatio mitiget tristitiam, sicut supra dictum est, sequitur quod amicus condolens tristitiam mitiget.

Consequently, since every pleasure assuages pain, as stated above (q38 a1), it follows that pain is mitigated by a sympathizing friend.

Philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., quod in tristitiis amicus condolens consolatur.

The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those who are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them.

1a 2ae q38 a2: Whether pain or sadness is assuaged by tears? Yes.

Lacrimae et gemitus naturaliter mitigant tristitiam, quia omne nocivum interius clausum magis affligit, quia magis multiplicatur intentio animae circa ipsum; sed quando ad exteriora diffunditur, tunc animae intentio ad exteriora quodammodo disgregatur, et sic interior dolor minuitur. (Et propter hoc, quando homines qui sunt in tristitiis, exterius suam tristitiam manifestant vel fletu aut gemitu, vel etiam verbo, mitigatur tristitia.)

Tears and groans naturally assuage sadness, because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we keep it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it; whereas if it be allowed to escape, the soul's intention is dispersed as it were on outward things, so that the inward pain is lessened. (This is why when men, burdened with sorrow, make outward show of their sadness, by tears or groans or even by words, their sadness is assuaged.)

Secundo, quia semper operatio conveniens homini secundum dispositionem in qua est, sibi est delectabilis. Fletus autem et gemitus sunt quaedam operationes convenientes tristato vel dolenti. Et ideo efficiuntur ei delectabiles. Cum igitur omnis delectatio aliqualiter mitiget tristitiam vel dolorem, ut dictum est, sequitur quod per planctum et gemitum tristitia mitigetur.

Secondly, because an action, that befits a man according to his actual disposition, is always pleasant to him. Now tears and groans are actions befitting a man who is in sadness or pain; and consequently they become pleasant to him. Since then, as stated above (q38 a1), every pleasure assuages sadness or pain somewhat, it follows that sadness is assuaged by weeping and groans.

Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., quod quando dolebat de morte amici, "in solis gemitibus et lacrimis erat ei aliquantula requies".

Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that when he mourned the death of his friend, "in groans and in tears alone did he find some little refreshment".

1a 2ae q38 a1: Whether pain or sadness is assuaged by every pleasure? Yes.

Ex parte dispositionis subiecti, quaelibet tristitia per quamlibet delectationem mitigari potest, quia licet non omnis delectatio contrarietur omni tristitiae secundum speciem, contrariatur tamen secundum genus, ut supra dictum est.

On the part of the disposition of the subject, any sadness can be assuaged by any delight, because although not every delight is specifically contrary to every sadness, yet it is generically, as stated above (q35, a4).

Delectationes malorum non causant tristitiam in praesenti, sed in futuro, inquantum scilicet mali poenitent de malis de quibus laetitiam habuerunt. Et huic tristitiae subvenitur per contrarias delectationes.

The delights of the wicked are not a cause of sadness while they are enjoyed, but afterwards; that is to say, insofar as the wicked repent of those things in which they took pleasure. This sadness is healed by contrary delights.

Delectatio est quaedam quies appetitus in bono convenienti; tristitia autem est ex eo quod repugnat appetitui.

Delight is a kind of repose of the appetite in a befitting good; while sadness arises from something unsuited to the appetite.

Philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod "expellit delectatio tristitiam, et quae contraria, et quae contingens, si sit fortis".

The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "sadness is driven forth by delight, both by a contrary pleasure and by any other, provided it be intense."

1a 2ae q38: The remedies of sadness or pain

1. Is pain or sorrow assuaged by every pleasure?
2. Is it assuaged by weeping?
3. Is it assuaged by the sympathy of friends?
4. Is it assuaged by contemplating the truth?
5. Is it assuaged by sleep and baths?

1a 2ae q37 a4: Whether sadness is more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul? Yes.

Tristitia, inter omnes animae passiones, magis corpori nocet, quia tristitia repugnat humanae vitae quantum ad speciem sui motus, et non solum quantum ad mensuram seu quantitatem, sicut aliae animae passiones.

Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful to the body, because sorrow is repugnant to human life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with the other passions of the soul.

Est autem attendendum in omnibus animae passionibus, quod transmutatio corporalis, quae est in eis materialis, est conformis et proportionata motui appetitus, qui est formalis: sicut in omnibus materia proportionatur formae.

Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the bodily transmutation which is their material element, is in conformity with and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which is the formal element: just as in everything matter is proportionate to form.

Illae ergo animae passiones quae important motum appetitus ad prosequendum aliquid, non repugnant vitali motioni secundum speciem, sed possunt repugnare secundum quantitatem: ut amor, gaudium, desiderium, et huiusmodi. Et ideo ista secundum speciem suam iuvant naturam corporis, sed propter excessum possunt nocere.

Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in pursuit of something, are not repugnant to the vital movement as regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its measure: such are love, joy, desire and the like; wherefore these passions conduce to the well-being of the body; though, if they be excessive, they may be harmful to it.

Passiones autem quae important motum appetitus cum fuga vel retractione quadam, repugnant vitali motioni non solum secundum quantitatem, sed etiam secundum speciem motus, et ideo simpliciter nocent: sicut timor et desperatio, et prae omnibus tristitia, quae aggravat animum ex malo praesenti, cuius est fortior impressio quam futuri.

On the other hand, those passions which denote in the appetite a movement of flight or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all sadness which depresses the soul by reason of a present evil, which makes a stronger impression than future evil.

1a 2ae q37 a3: Whether sadness or pain weakens all activity? Yes.

Tristitia quamlibet operationem impedit, nunquam enim illud quod cum tristitia facimus, ita bene facimus sicut illud quod facimus cum delectatione, vel sine tristitia, quia voluntas est causa operationis humanae, unde quando operatio est de qua aliquis contristatur, necesse est quod actio debilitetur.

Sadness hinders any action, for we never do that which we do with sadness as well as that which we do with pleasure, or without sadness, because the will is the cause of human action, and consequently when we do something that gives pain, the action must of necessity be weakened in consequence.

Philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod delectatio perficit operationem, sed e contrario tristitia impedit.

The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects action," whereas on the other hand, "sadness hinders it" (Ethic. x, 5).

1a 2ae q37 a2: Whether the effect of sadness or pain is to burden the soul? Yes.

Tristitia contingit ex aliquo malo praesenti, quod quidem, ex hoc ipso quod repugnat motui voluntatis, aggravat animum, inquantum impedit ipsum ne fruatur eo quod vult.

Sadness is caused by a present evil, and this evil, from the very fact that it is repugnant to the movement of the will, depresses the soul, inasmuch as it hinders it from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy.

Et si quidem non sit tanta vis mali contristantis ut auferat spem evadendi, licet animus aggravetur quantum ad hoc, quod in praesenti non potitur eo quod vult, remanet tamen motus ad repellendum nocivum contristans.

And if the evil which is the cause of sadness be not so strong as to deprive one of the hope of avoiding it, although the soul be depressed insofar as, for the present, it fails to grasp that which it craves for, yet it retains the movement whereby to repulse that evil.

Si vero superexcrescat vis mali intantum ut spem evasionis excludat, tunc simpliciter impeditur etiam interior motus animi angustiati, ut neque hac neque illac divertere valeat.

If, on the other hand, the strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope of evasion, then even the interior movement of the afflicted soul is absolutely hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or that.

Et quandoque etiam impeditur exterior motus corporis, ita quod remaneat homo stupidus in seipso.

Sometimes even the external movement of the body is paralyzed, so that a man becomes completely stupefied.

1a 2ae q37 a1: Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn? Yes.

Si sit dolor intensus, impeditur homo ne tunc aliquid addiscere possit (et tantum potest intendi, quod nec etiam, instante dolore, potest homo aliquid considerare etiam quod prius scivit) quia omnes potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicantur: necesse est quod, quando intentio animae vehementer trahitur ad operationem unius potentiae, retrahatur ab operatione alterius, unius enim animae non potest esse nisi una intentio.

If the pain be acute, man is prevented at the time from learning anything (indeed it can be so acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man is unable to give his attention even to that which he knew already) because all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one essence of the soul: it must needs happen, when the intention of the soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, that it is withdrawn from the action of another power, because the soul, being one, can only have one intention.

Et propter hoc, si aliquid ad se trahat totam intentionem animae, vel magnam partem ipsius, non compatitur secum aliquid aliud quod magnam attentionem requirat.

The result is that if one thing draws upon itself the entire intention of the soul, or a great portion thereof, anything else requiring considerable attention is incompatible therewith.

In hoc tamen attenditur diversitas secundum diversitatem amoris quem homo habet ad addiscendum vel considerandum, qui quanto maior fuerit, magis retinet intentionem animi, ne omnino feratur ad dolorem.

However a difference is to be observed according to the difference of love that a man has for learning or for considering, because the greater his love, the more will he retain the intention of his mind so as to prevent it from turning entirely to the pain.

Tam delectatio quam dolor, inquantum ad se trahunt animae intentionem, impediunt considerationem rationis, unde in VII Ethic. dicitur quod "impossibile est in ipsa delectatione venereorum, aliquid intelligere". Sed tamen dolor magis trahit ad se intentionem animae quam delectatio.

Both pleasure and pain, insofar as they draw upon themselves the soul's intention, hinder the reason from the act of consideration, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that "in the moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything." Nevertheless pain attracts the soul's intention more than pleasure does.

Si ergo dolor seu tristitia fuerit moderata, per accidens potest conferre ad addiscendum, inquantum aufert superabundantiam delectationum. Sed per se impedit, et si intendatur, totaliter aufert.

If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, it can conduce accidentally to the facility of learning, insofar as it takes away an excess of pleasure. But, of itself, it is a hindrance; and if it be intense, it prevents it altogether.

Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., "quanquam acerrimo dolore dentium his diebus torquerer, non quidem sinebar animo volvere nisi ea quae iam forte didiceram. A discendo autem penitus impediebar, ad quod mihi tota intentione animi opus erat."

Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "Although during those days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, I was not able to turn over in my mind other things than those I had already learnt; and as to learning anything, I was quite unequal to it, because it required undivided attention."

1a 2ae q37: The effects of pain or sorrow

1. Does pain deprive one of the power to learn?
2. Is the effect of sorrow or pain to burden the soul?
3. Does sorrow or pain weaken all activity?
4. Is sorrow more harmful to the body than all the other passions of the soul?

1a 2ae q36 a4: Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow? Yes.

Potestas maior ponitur causa doloris quia exteriora agentia possunt esse causa motuum appetitivorum, inquantum causant praesentiam obiecti.

A greater power is reckoned to be the cause of pain because external agents can be the causes of appetitive movements, insofar as they cause the presence of the object.

Id ergo quod est causa coniunctionis mali, debet poni causa doloris vel tristitiae.

Therefore that which is the cause of the evil being present, should be reckoned as causing pain or sadness.

Maior potestas dolorem causat, non secundum quod est agens in potentia, sed secundum quod est agens actu: dum scilicet facit coniunctionem mali corruptivi.

A greater power causes pain, as acting not potentially but actually: i.e., by causing the actual presence of the corruptive evil.

Sic igitur si aliqua potestas maior intantum invalescat quod auferat inclinationem voluntatis vel appetitus sensitivi, ex ea non sequitur dolor vel tristitia; sed tunc solum sequitur, quando remanet inclinatio appetitus in contrarium.

If some greater power prevail so far as to take away from the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective inclinations, pain or sadness will not result therefrom; such is the result only when the contrary inclination of the appetite remains.

Et inde est quod Augustinus dicit quod voluntas resistens potestati fortiori, causat dolorem; si enim non resisteret, sed cederet consentiendo, non sequeretur dolor, sed delectatio.

And hence Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that pain is caused by the will "resisting a stronger power"; for were it not to resist, but to yield by consenting, the result would be not pain but pleasure.

Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura boni, "in animo dolorem facit voluntas resistens potestati maiori; in corpore dolorem facit sensus resistens corpori potentiori".

Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Pain in the soul is caused by the will resisting a stronger power; while pain in the body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body."

1a 2ae q36 a3: Whether the craving for unity is a cause of pain? Yes.

Eo modo quo concupiscentia vel cupiditas boni est causa doloris, etiam appetitus unitatis, vel amor, causa doloris ponendus est quia bonum uniuscuiusque rei in quadam unitate consistit, prout scilicet unaquaeque res habet in se unita illa ex quibus consistit eius perfectio.

Inasmuch as the desire or craving for good is reckoned as a cause of pain, so must a craving for unity, and love, be accounted as causing pain, because the good of each thing consists in a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, the elements of which its perfection consists.

Unde et Platonici posuerunt unum esse principium, sicut et bonum. Unde naturaliter unumquodque appetit unitatem, sicut et bonitatem. Et propter hoc, sicut amor vel appetitus boni est causa doloris, ita etiam amor vel appetitus unitatis.

Wherefore the Platonists held that "one" is a principle, just as "good" is. Hence everything naturally craves unity, just as it desires goodness. And therefore, just as love or craving for good is a cause of pain, so also is the love or craving for unity.

Non omnis unio perficit rationem boni, sed solum illa a qua dependet esse perfectum rei. Et propter hoc etiam, non cuiuslibet appetitus unitatis est causa doloris vel tristitiae, ut quidam opinabantur. Quorum opinionem ibi philosophus excludit per hoc, quod quaedam repletiones non sunt delectabiles: sicut repleti cibis non delectantur in ciborum sumptione. Talis enim repletio, sive unio, magis repugnaret ad perfectum esse, quam ipsum constitueret.

Not every kind of union perfects the formal aspect of the good, but only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence neither does the craving of any kind of unity cause pain or sadness, as some have maintained, whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher from the fact that repletion is not always pleasant: for instance, when a man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further pleasure in eating; because repletion, or union of this kind, is repugnant rather than conducive to perfect being.

Unde dolor non causatur ex appetitu cuiuslibet unitatis, sed eius in qua consistit perfectio naturae.

Consequently pain is caused by the craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity in which the perfection of nature consists.

Separatio nocivorum et corrumpentium appetitur, inquantum tollunt debitam unitatem. Unde appetitus huiusmodi separationis non est prima causa doloris, sed magis appetitus unitatis.

Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is craved, insofar as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore the craving for this sort of separation is not the first cause of pain, whereas the craving for unity is.

Augustinus dicit, in III de libero arbitrio, "quod ex dolore quem bestiae sentiunt, satis apparet in regendis animandisque suis corporibus, quam sint animae appetentes unitatis. Quid enim est aliud dolor, nisi quidam sensus divisionis vel corruptionis impatiens?"

Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that "from the pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls desire unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is pain but a certain feeling of not wanting to suffer division or corruption?"

1a 2ae q36 a2: Whether desire is a cause of sadness? Yes.

Concupiscentia est causa doloris quia omne quod impedit motum ne perveniat ad terminum, est contrarium motui.

Desire is a cause of pain because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement.

Illud autem quod est contrarium motui appetitus, est contristans. Et sic per consequens concupiscentia fit causa tristitiae, inquantum de retardatione boni concupiti, vel totali ablatione, tristamur.

Now that which is contrary to the movement of the appetite, is a cause of sadness. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sadness, insofar as we are sad for the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal.

Universalis autem causa doloris esse non potest, quia magis dolemus de subtractione bonorum praesentium, in quibus iam delectamur, quam futurorum, quae concupiscimus.

But it cannot be a universal cause of pain, because we are pained more for the loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which we desire to have.

Concupiscentia est delectabilis, quandiu manet spes adipiscendi quod concupiscitur. Sed, subtracta spe per impedimentum appositum, concupiscentia dolorem causat.

Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope of obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through the presence of an obstacle, desire causes pain.

Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., "subintrantibus ignorantia agendarum rerum, et concupiscentia noxiarum, comites subinferuntur error et dolor".

Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance of things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found their way in, then error and pain stole an entrance in their company."

1a 2ae q36 a1: Whether sadness is caused by the loss of good rather than by the presence of evil? No.

Expectatum malum timorem constituit, praesens vero tristitiam quia tristitia est motus appetitus apprehensionem sequentis; in apprehensione autem ipsa privatio habet rationem cuiusdam entis, unde dicitur "ens rationis".

The dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of sorrow, because sadness is a movement of the appetite following upon an apprehension; and even a privation, as apprehended, has the formal aspect of a certain being, wherefore it is called "a being of reason".

Et sic malum, cum sit privatio, se habet per modum contrarii. Et ideo, quantum ad motum appetitivum, differt utrum respiciat principalius malum coniunctum, vel bonum amissum.

And in this way evil, since it is a privation, is a kind of "contrary". Accordingly, inasmuch as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a difference which of the two it regards chiefly, the present evil or the good which is lost.

Sic igitur, cum tristitia in motibus appetitivis se habeat per modum fugae vel recessus, delectatio autem per modum prosecutionis vel accessus; sicut delectatio per prius respicit bonum adeptum, quasi proprium obiectum, ita tristitia respicit malum coniunctum.

Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sadness is a kind of flight or withdrawal, while delight is a kind of pursuit or approach; just as delight regards first the good possessed, as its proper object, so sadness regards the evil that is present.

Sed causa delectationis et tristitiae, scilicet amor, per prius respicit bonum quam malum. Sic ergo eo modo quo obiectum est causa passionis, magis proprie est causa tristitiae vel doloris malum coniunctum, quam bonum amissum.

On the other hand, love, which is the cause of delight and sadness, first regards good rather than evil. And therefore, inasmuch as the object is the cause of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of sadness or pain, than the good which is lost.

1a 2ae q36: The causes of sorrow or pain

1. Is sorrow caused by the loss of a good or rather by the presence of an evil?
2. Is desire a cause of sorrow?
3. Is the craving for unity a cause of sorrow?
4. Is an irresistible power a cause of sorrow?

1a 2ae q35 a8: Whether there are only four species of sadness? Yes.

Et hoc modo loquendi assignantur hic species tristitiae, per applicationem rationis tristitiae ad aliquid extraneum. Quod quidem extraneum accipi potest vel ex parte causae, obiecti; vel ex parte effectus. Proprium enim obiectum tristitiae est proprium malum.

The species of sadness are reckoned by an application of the formal aspect of sadness to something foreign to it, because this foreign matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the object, or of the effect: for the proper object of sadness is "one's own evil."

Unde extraneum obiectum tristitiae accipi potest vel secundum alterum tantum, quia scilicet est malum, sed non proprium, et sic est misericordia, quae est tristitia de alieno malo, inquantum tamen aestimatur ut proprium.

Hence sadness may be concerned for an object foreign to it, either through one's being sorry for an evil that is not one's own; and thus we have "pity" which is sadness for another's evil, considered, however, as one's own.

Vel quantum ad utrumque, quia neque est de proprio, neque de malo, sed de bono alieno, inquantum tamen bonum alienum aestimatur ut proprium malum, et sic est invidia.

Or through one's being sorry for something that is neither evil nor one's own, but another's good, considered, however, as one's own evil: and thus we have "envy."

Proprius autem effectus tristitiae consistit in quadam fuga appetitus. Unde extraneum circa effectum tristitiae, potest accipi quantum ad alterum tantum, quia scilicet tollitur fuga: et sic est anxietas quae sic aggravat animum, ut non appareat aliquod refugium; unde alio nomine dicitur angustia.

The proper effect of sadness consists in a certain "flight of the appetite." Wherefore the foreign element in the effect of sadness, may be taken so as to affect the first part only, by excluding flight: and thus we have "anxiety" which weighs on the mind, so as to make escape seem impossible; hence it is also called "perplexity."

Si vero intantum procedat talis aggravatio, ut etiam exteriora membra immobilitet ab opere, quod pertinet ad acediam; sic erit extraneum quantum ad utrumque, quia nec est fuga, nec est in appetitu. Ideo autem specialiter acedia dicitur vocem amputare, quia vox inter omnes exteriores motus magis exprimit interiorem conceptum et affectum, non solum in hominibus, sed etiam in aliis animalibus, ut dicitur in I Polit.

If, however, the mind be weighed down so much, that even the limbs become motionless, which belongs to "torpor," then we have the foreign element affecting both, since there is neither flight, nor is the effect in the appetite. And the reason why torpor especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the external movements the voice is the best expression of the inward thought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is stated in Polit. i, 1.

Delectatio causatur ex bono, quod uno modo dicitur. Et ideo delectationis non assignantur tot species sicut tristitiae, quae causatur ex malo, quod "multifariam contingit", ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom.

Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one meaning. And so pleasure is not divided into several species as sadness is; for the latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many ways", as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

1a 2ae q35 a7: Whether outward pain is greater than interior sadness? No.

Tristitia cordis omnem plagam exteriorem excedit quia tristitia interior non procedit ex similitudine rei apprehensa, sicut ex causa: non enim homo tristatur interius de ipsa similitudine apprehensa, sed de re cuius est similitudo.

Sadness of the heart surpasses every outward wound because inward pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness of a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the apprehended likeness itself, but by the thing which the likeness represents.

Quae quidem res tanto perfectius apprehenditur per aliquam similitudinem, quanto similitudo est magis immaterialis et abstracta.

And this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and abstract.

Et ideo dolor interior, per se loquendo, est maior, tanquam de maiori malo existens, propter hoc quod interiori apprehensione magis cognoscitur malum.

Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being caused by a greater evil, inasmuch as evil is better known by an inward apprehension.

1a 2ae q35 a6: Whether sadness is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought? No.

Appetitus delectationis est fortior quam fuga tristitiae quia naturaliter maior est appetitus delectationis quam fuga tristitiae.

The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than the shunning of sadness because desire for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning of sadness.

Cuius ratio est, quia causa delectationis est bonum conveniens, causa autem doloris sive tristitiae est aliquod malum repugnans. Contingit autem aliquod bonum esse conveniens absque omni dissonantia, non autem potest esse aliquod malum totaliter, absque omni convenientia, repugnans. Unde delectatio potest esse integra et perfecta, tristitia autem est semper secundum partem.

The reason of this is that the cause of pleasure is a conforming good; while the cause of pain or sadness is an unconforming evil. Now it happens that a certain good is conforming without any repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to be so unconforming as not to be conforming in some way. Wherefore pleasure can be entire and perfect, whereas sadness is always partial.

Alia vero ratio est, quia bonum, quod est obiectum delectationis, propter seipsum appetitur, malum autem, quod est obiectum tristitiae, est fugiendum inquantum est privatio boni. Quod autem est per se, potius est illo quod est per aliud.

Another reason is because the good, which is the object of pleasure, is sought for its own sake; whereas the evil, which is the object of sadness, is to be shunned as being a privation of good: and that which is, by reason of itself, is stronger than that which is by reason of something else.

Bonum est fortius quam malum, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom.

Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv).

1a 2ae q35 a5: Whether there is any sadness contrary to the pleasure of contemplation? No.

Nulla tristitia est quae sit contraria delectationi contemplationis quia delectatio contemplationis non causatur ex hoc quod excluditur aliqua molestia, sed ex hoc quod est secundum seipsam delectabilis: non est enim generatio, sed operatio quaedam perfecta, ut dictum est.

There is no sadness contrary to the pleasure of contemplation because the pleasure of contemplation is not caused by one's being quit of an annoyance, but by the fact that contemplation is pleasant in itself: for pleasure is not a "becoming," but a perfect operation, as stated above (q31 a1).

Contemplatio, secundum se, nunquam habet rationem mali, cum contemplatio nihil aliud sit quam consideratio veri, quod est bonum intellectus; sed per accidens tantum, inquantum scilicet contemplatio vilioris impedit contemplationem melioris; vel ex parte rei contemplatae, ad quam inordinatae appetitus afficitur.

Contemplation, in itself, never has the formal aspect of evil, since it is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of the intellect; it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e., insofar as the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation of a more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to which the appetite is inordinately attached.

Ea quae sunt contraria in rerum natura, secundum quod sunt in mente, non habent contrarietatem. Non enim rationes contrariorum sunt contrariae, sed magis unum contrarium est ratio cognoscendi aliud.

Things which are contrary according to nature are not contrary according as they exist in the mind. For things that are contrary in reality are not contrary in formal aspect; indeed rather is one contrary the formal aspect for knowing the other.

Dicitur Sap. VIII, "non habet amaritudinem conversatio illius," scilicet sapientiae, "nec taedium convictus eius, sed laetitiam et gaudium".

It is written (Wisdom 8:16): "Her," i.e. wisdom's, "conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness."

Dicit Gregorius Nyssenus, "ei delectationi quae est secundum contemplationem, non opponitur aliqua tristitia".

According to Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], "no sadness contests the pleasure which is from contemplation".