Yes. The wicked angels assail men by instigating them to sin (and thus they are not sent by God to assail us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just judgments), but sometimes their assault is a punishment to man (and thus they are sent by God) because punishment is referred to God as its first author.
Mali Angeli impugnant homines instigando ad peccatum (et sic non mittuntur a Deo ad impugnandum, sed aliquando permittuntur, secundum Dei iusta iudicia), aliquando autem impugnant homines puniendo (et sic mittuntur a Deo) quia poena refertur in Deum, sicut in primum auctorem.
Nevertheless the demons who are sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which they are sent, for they punish from hatred or envy, whereas they are sent by God on account of His justice.
Et tamen Daemones ad puniendum missi, alia intentione puniunt, quam mittantur, nam ipsi puniunt ex odio vel invidia, mittuntur autem a Deo propter eius iustitiam.
In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained principally through the grace of God, secondarily through the guardianship of the angels.
Ad hoc quod non sit inaequalis pugnae conditio, fit ex parte hominis recompensatio, principaliter quidem per auxilium divinae gratiae, secundario autem per custodiam Angelorum.
The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men. But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect.
Infirmitati humanae sufficeret ad exercitium impugnatio quae est a carne et mundo, sed malitiae Daemonum non sufficit, quae utroque utitur ad hominum impugnationem. Sed tamen ex divina ordinatione hoc provenit in gloriam electorum.
Two things may be considered in the assault of the demons--the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault itself is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor to hinder man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance of Divine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the angels of God in their various offices minister to man's salvation.
Circa impugnationem Daemonum duo est considerare, scilicet ipsam impugnationem, et impugnationis ordinem. Impugnatio quidem ipsa ex Daemonum malitia procedit, qui propter invidiam profectum hominum impedire nituntur; et propter superbiam divinae potestatis similitudinem usurpant, deputando sibi ministros determinatos ad hominum impugnationem, sicut et Angeli Deo ministrant in determinatis officiis ad hominum salutem.
But the ordering of the assault is from God, Who knows how to make orderly use of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in regard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering thereof are to be referred to God as their first author.
Sed ordo impugnationis ipsius est a Deo, qui ordinate novit malis uti, ad bona ea ordinando. Sed ex parte Angelorum, tam ipsa custodia quam ordo custodiae reducitur ad Deum, sicut ad primum auctorem.
"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.
Thursday, August 13, 2009
Wednesday, August 12, 2009
Q113 A8: Whether there can be strife or discord among the angels?
Yes. One angel can be said to resist another because the Divine judgments in regard to various kingdoms and various men are executed by the angels.
Unus Angelus alteri resistere dicitur quia divina iudicia circa diversa regna et diversos homines, per Angelos exercentur.
Now in their actions, the angels are ruled by the Divine decree. But it happens at times in various kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits, so that one of them is subject to or placed over another. As to what is the ordering of Divine wisdom on such matters, the angels cannot know it unless God reveal it to them: and so they need to consult Divine wisdom thereupon.
In suis autem actionibus Angeli secundum divinam sententiam regulantur. Contingit autem quandoque quod in diversis regnis, vel in diversis hominibus, contraria merita vel demerita inveniuntur, ut unus alteri subdatur aut praesit. Quid autem super hoc ordo divinae sapientiae habeat, cognoscere non possunt nisi Deo revelante, unde necesse habent super his sapientiam Dei consulere.
Wherefore inasmuch as they consult the Divine will concerning various contrary and opposing merits, they are said to resist one another: not that their wills are in opposition, since they are all of one mind as to the fulfillment of the Divine decree; but that the things about which they seek knowledge are in opposition.
Sic igitur inquantum de contrariis meritis et sibi repugnantibus, divinam consulunt voluntatem, resistere sibi invicem dicuntur, non quia sint eorum contrariae voluntates, cum in hoc omnes concordent, quod Dei sententia impleatur; sed quia ea de quibus consulunt, sunt repugnantia.
The raising of this question is occasioned by this passage of Daniel:
Ista quaestio movetur occasione horum verborum Danielis:
It is written (Daniel 10:13): "The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days."
Dicitur Dan. X, ex persona Gabrielis, "princeps regni Persarum restitit mihi viginti et uno diebus."
Jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the kingdom of the Persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of the people of Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his prayers being offered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may have been caused by some prince of the demons having led the Jewish captives in Persia into sin; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of the prayer which Daniel put up for that same people.
Quae quidem Hieronymus exponit, dicens principem regni Persarum esse Angelum qui se opposuit liberationi populi Israelitici, pro quo Daniel orabat, Gabriele preces eius Deo praesentante. Haec autem resistentia potuit fieri, quia princeps aliquis Daemonum Iudaeos in Persidem ductos ad peccatum induxerat, per quod impedimentum praestabatur orationi Danielis, pro eodem populo deprecantis.
But according to Gregory (Moral. xvii), the prince of the kingdom of Persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship of that kingdom.
Sed secundum Gregorium, XVII Moral., princeps regni Persarum bonus Angelus fuit, custodiae regni illius deputatus.
Therefore one good angel resists the others; and thus there is strife among them.
Ergo unus bonus Angelus resistit alii, et sic inter eos est pugna.
Unus Angelus alteri resistere dicitur quia divina iudicia circa diversa regna et diversos homines, per Angelos exercentur.
Now in their actions, the angels are ruled by the Divine decree. But it happens at times in various kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits, so that one of them is subject to or placed over another. As to what is the ordering of Divine wisdom on such matters, the angels cannot know it unless God reveal it to them: and so they need to consult Divine wisdom thereupon.
In suis autem actionibus Angeli secundum divinam sententiam regulantur. Contingit autem quandoque quod in diversis regnis, vel in diversis hominibus, contraria merita vel demerita inveniuntur, ut unus alteri subdatur aut praesit. Quid autem super hoc ordo divinae sapientiae habeat, cognoscere non possunt nisi Deo revelante, unde necesse habent super his sapientiam Dei consulere.
Wherefore inasmuch as they consult the Divine will concerning various contrary and opposing merits, they are said to resist one another: not that their wills are in opposition, since they are all of one mind as to the fulfillment of the Divine decree; but that the things about which they seek knowledge are in opposition.
Sic igitur inquantum de contrariis meritis et sibi repugnantibus, divinam consulunt voluntatem, resistere sibi invicem dicuntur, non quia sint eorum contrariae voluntates, cum in hoc omnes concordent, quod Dei sententia impleatur; sed quia ea de quibus consulunt, sunt repugnantia.
The raising of this question is occasioned by this passage of Daniel:
Ista quaestio movetur occasione horum verborum Danielis:
It is written (Daniel 10:13): "The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days."
Dicitur Dan. X, ex persona Gabrielis, "princeps regni Persarum restitit mihi viginti et uno diebus."
Jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the kingdom of the Persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of the people of Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his prayers being offered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may have been caused by some prince of the demons having led the Jewish captives in Persia into sin; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of the prayer which Daniel put up for that same people.
Quae quidem Hieronymus exponit, dicens principem regni Persarum esse Angelum qui se opposuit liberationi populi Israelitici, pro quo Daniel orabat, Gabriele preces eius Deo praesentante. Haec autem resistentia potuit fieri, quia princeps aliquis Daemonum Iudaeos in Persidem ductos ad peccatum induxerat, per quod impedimentum praestabatur orationi Danielis, pro eodem populo deprecantis.
But according to Gregory (Moral. xvii), the prince of the kingdom of Persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship of that kingdom.
Sed secundum Gregorium, XVII Moral., princeps regni Persarum bonus Angelus fuit, custodiae regni illius deputatus.
Therefore one good angel resists the others; and thus there is strife among them.
Ergo unus bonus Angelus resistit alii, et sic inter eos est pugna.
Q113 A7: Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard?
No. Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the pains inflicted on men, because, simply speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the blessed.
Angeli non dolent neque de peccatis, neque de poenis hominum, quia, simpliciter loquendo, nihil fit in mundo contra voluntatem beatorum.
For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a particular time, having considered all the circumstances; although universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo into the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened danger of his life, he wills it. Wherefore this is voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage.
Ut enim philosophus dicit in III Ethic. illud dicitur simpliciter voluntarium, quod aliquis vult in particulari, secundum quod agitur, consideratis scilicet omnibus quae circumstant, quamvis in universali consideratum non esset voluntarium, sicut nauta non vult proiectionem mercium in mare, absolute et universaliter considerando, sed imminente periculo salutis hoc vult. Unde magis est hoc voluntarium quam involuntarium, ut ibidem dicitur.
Therefore universally and absolutely speaking the angels do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine justice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin.
Sic igitur Angeli peccata et poenas hominum, universaliter et absolute loquendo, non volunt, volunt tamen quod circa hoc ordo divinae iustitiae servetur, secundum quem quidam poenis subduntur, et peccare permittuntur.
Angeli non dolent neque de peccatis, neque de poenis hominum, quia, simpliciter loquendo, nihil fit in mundo contra voluntatem beatorum.
For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a particular time, having considered all the circumstances; although universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo into the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened danger of his life, he wills it. Wherefore this is voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage.
Ut enim philosophus dicit in III Ethic. illud dicitur simpliciter voluntarium, quod aliquis vult in particulari, secundum quod agitur, consideratis scilicet omnibus quae circumstant, quamvis in universali consideratum non esset voluntarium, sicut nauta non vult proiectionem mercium in mare, absolute et universaliter considerando, sed imminente periculo salutis hoc vult. Unde magis est hoc voluntarium quam involuntarium, ut ibidem dicitur.
Therefore universally and absolutely speaking the angels do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine justice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin.
Sic igitur Angeli peccata et poenas hominum, universaliter et absolute loquendo, non volunt, volunt tamen quod circa hoc ordo divinae iustitiae servetur, secundum quem quidam poenis subduntur, et peccare permittuntur.
Monday, August 10, 2009
Q113 A6: Whether the angel guardian ever forsakes a man?
No. The angel guardian never forsakes a man entirely, but sometimes he leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him from being subject to some trouble, or even from falling into sin, according to the ordering of Divine judgments, because neither man, nor anything at all, is entirely withdrawn from the providence of God, for inasmuch as a thing participates being, so far is it subject to the providence that extends over all being.
Angelus custos nunquam totaliter dimittit hominem, sed ad aliquid interdum eum dimittit; prout scilicet non impedit quin subdatur alicui tribulationi, vel etiam quin cadat in peccatum, secundum ordinem divinorum iudiciorum, quia nec homo, nec res aliqua, totaliter divinae providentiae subtrahitur, inquantum enim aliquid participat de esse, intantum subditur universali providentiae entium.
God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering of His providence, but only inasmuch as He allows man to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault.
Sed intantum Deus, secundum ordinem suae providentiae, dicitur hominem derelinquere, inquantum permittit hominem pati aliquem defectum vel poenae vel culpae.
Angelus custos nunquam totaliter dimittit hominem, sed ad aliquid interdum eum dimittit; prout scilicet non impedit quin subdatur alicui tribulationi, vel etiam quin cadat in peccatum, secundum ordinem divinorum iudiciorum, quia nec homo, nec res aliqua, totaliter divinae providentiae subtrahitur, inquantum enim aliquid participat de esse, intantum subditur universali providentiae entium.
God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering of His providence, but only inasmuch as He allows man to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault.
Sed intantum Deus, secundum ordinem suae providentiae, dicitur hominem derelinquere, inquantum permittit hominem pati aliquem defectum vel poenae vel culpae.
Sunday, August 09, 2009
Q113 A5: Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth?
Yes. From the very moment of his birth man has an angel guardian appointed to him, because those benefits which are conferred by God on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism (such as receiving the Eucharist, and the like), but those which are conferred by God on man as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he receives that nature; among the latter benefits we must count the guardianship of angels.
Statim a nativitate habet homo Angelum ad sui custodiam deputatum quia beneficia quae dantur homini divinitus ex eo quod est Christianus, incipiunt a tempore Baptismi (sicut perceptio Eucharistiae, et alia huiusmodi), sed ea quae providentur homini a Deo, inquantum habet naturam rationalem, ex tunc ei exhibentur, ex quo nascendo talem naturam accipit; et tale beneficium est custodia Angelorum.
As long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree of probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes separate from the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it.
Puer quandiu est in materno utero, non totaliter est a matre separatus, sed per quandam colligationem est quodammodo adhuc aliquid eius, sicut et fructus pendens in arbore, est aliquid arboris. Et ideo probabiliter dici potest quod Angelus qui est in custodia matris, custodiat prolem in matris utero existentem. Sed in nativitate, quando separatur a matre, Angelus ei ad custodiam deputatur, ut Hieronymus dicit.
Statim a nativitate habet homo Angelum ad sui custodiam deputatum quia beneficia quae dantur homini divinitus ex eo quod est Christianus, incipiunt a tempore Baptismi (sicut perceptio Eucharistiae, et alia huiusmodi), sed ea quae providentur homini a Deo, inquantum habet naturam rationalem, ex tunc ei exhibentur, ex quo nascendo talem naturam accipit; et tale beneficium est custodia Angelorum.
As long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree of probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes separate from the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it.
Puer quandiu est in materno utero, non totaliter est a matre separatus, sed per quandam colligationem est quodammodo adhuc aliquid eius, sicut et fructus pendens in arbore, est aliquid arboris. Et ideo probabiliter dici potest quod Angelus qui est in custodia matris, custodiat prolem in matris utero existentem. Sed in nativitate, quando separatur a matre, Angelus ei ad custodiam deputatur, ut Hieronymus dicit.
Saturday, August 08, 2009
Q113 A4: Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men?
Yes. Each soul has an angel appointed to guard it because, as guardians are appointed for men who have to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is assigned to each man as long as he is a wayfarer.
Unaquaeque anima ad sui custodiam habet Angelum deputatum quia sicut hominibus per viam non tutam ambulantibus dantur custodes, ita et cuilibet homini, quandiu viator est, custos Angelus deputatur.
Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even Anti-christ, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason; so neither are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to the whole human race--namely the guardianship of the angels. And although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt both themselves and others. For even the demons are held off by the good angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. In like manner Antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish.
Sicut praesciti et infideles, et etiam Antichristus, non privantur interiori auxilio naturalis rationis; ita etiam non privantur exteriori auxilio toti naturae humanae divinitus concesso, scilicet custodia Angelorum. Per quam etsi non iuventur quantum ad hoc quod vitam aeternam bonis operibus mereantur, iuvantur tamen quantum ad hoc, quod ab aliquibus malis retrahuntur, quibus et sibi ipsis et aliis nocere possunt. Nam et ipsi Daemones arcentur per bonos Angelos, ne noceant quantum volunt. Et similiter Antichristus non tantum nocebit, quantum vellet.
On the text, "Their angels in heaven," etc. (Matthew 8:10), Jerome says: "Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth."
Hieronymus, exponens illud Matth. XVIII, "Angeli eorum in caelis," dicit, "magna est dignitas animarum, ut unaquaeque habeat, ab ortu nativitatis, in custodiam sui Angelum delegatum."
Unaquaeque anima ad sui custodiam habet Angelum deputatum quia sicut hominibus per viam non tutam ambulantibus dantur custodes, ita et cuilibet homini, quandiu viator est, custos Angelus deputatur.
Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even Anti-christ, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason; so neither are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to the whole human race--namely the guardianship of the angels. And although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt both themselves and others. For even the demons are held off by the good angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. In like manner Antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish.
Sicut praesciti et infideles, et etiam Antichristus, non privantur interiori auxilio naturalis rationis; ita etiam non privantur exteriori auxilio toti naturae humanae divinitus concesso, scilicet custodia Angelorum. Per quam etsi non iuventur quantum ad hoc quod vitam aeternam bonis operibus mereantur, iuvantur tamen quantum ad hoc, quod ab aliquibus malis retrahuntur, quibus et sibi ipsis et aliis nocere possunt. Nam et ipsi Daemones arcentur per bonos Angelos, ne noceant quantum volunt. Et similiter Antichristus non tantum nocebit, quantum vellet.
On the text, "Their angels in heaven," etc. (Matthew 8:10), Jerome says: "Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth."
Hieronymus, exponens illud Matth. XVIII, "Angeli eorum in caelis," dicit, "magna est dignitas animarum, ut unaquaeque habeat, ab ortu nativitatis, in custodiam sui Angelum delegatum."
Friday, August 07, 2009
Q113 A3: Whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels?
Yes. To each man an angel is appointed to guard him, and such guardianship belongs to the lowest order of the angels (whose place it is, according to Gregory, to announce the "lesser things"), because it seems to be the least of the angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one man.
Singulis hominibus singuli Angeli ad custodiam deputantur, et talis custodia pertinet ad infimum ordinem Angelorum (quorum, secundum Gregorium, est minima nuntiare), quia hoc videtur esse minimum in officiis Angelorum, procurare ea quae ad unius hominis tantum salutem pertinent.
The other kind of guardianship is universal, multiplied according to the different orders. For the more universal an agent is, the higher it is.
Alia vero est custodia universalis. Et haec multiplicatur secundum diversos ordines, nam quanto agens fuerit universalius, tanto est superius.
Thus the guardianship of the human race belongs to the order of "Principalities," or perhaps to the "Archangels," whom we call the angel princes. Hence, Michael, whom we call an archangel, is also styled "one of the princes" (Daniel 10:13). Moreover all corporeal creatures are guarded by the "Virtues"; and likewise the demons by the "Powers," and the good spirits by the "Principalities," according to Gregory's opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.).
Sic igitur custodia humanae multitudinis pertinet ad ordinem principatuum, vel forte ad Archangelos, qui dicuntur principes Angeli, unde et Michael, quem Archangelum dicimus, unus de principibus dicitur Dan. X. Ulterius autem super omnes naturas corporeas habent custodiam virtutes. Et ulterius etiam super Daemones habent custodiam potestates. Et ulterius etiam super bonos spiritus habent custodiam principatus, secundum Gregorium.
Singulis hominibus singuli Angeli ad custodiam deputantur, et talis custodia pertinet ad infimum ordinem Angelorum (quorum, secundum Gregorium, est minima nuntiare), quia hoc videtur esse minimum in officiis Angelorum, procurare ea quae ad unius hominis tantum salutem pertinent.
The other kind of guardianship is universal, multiplied according to the different orders. For the more universal an agent is, the higher it is.
Alia vero est custodia universalis. Et haec multiplicatur secundum diversos ordines, nam quanto agens fuerit universalius, tanto est superius.
Thus the guardianship of the human race belongs to the order of "Principalities," or perhaps to the "Archangels," whom we call the angel princes. Hence, Michael, whom we call an archangel, is also styled "one of the princes" (Daniel 10:13). Moreover all corporeal creatures are guarded by the "Virtues"; and likewise the demons by the "Powers," and the good spirits by the "Principalities," according to Gregory's opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.).
Sic igitur custodia humanae multitudinis pertinet ad ordinem principatuum, vel forte ad Archangelos, qui dicuntur principes Angeli, unde et Michael, quem Archangelum dicimus, unus de principibus dicitur Dan. X. Ulterius autem super omnes naturas corporeas habent custodiam virtutes. Et ulterius etiam super Daemones habent custodiam potestates. Et ulterius etiam super bonos spiritus habent custodiam principatus, secundum Gregorium.
Q113 A2: Whether each man is guarded by an angel?
Yes. Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him because men are not only incorruptible in the common species, but also in the proper forms of each individual, which are the rational souls, which cannot be said of other corruptible things.
Singulis hominibus singuli Angeli ad custodiam deputantur quia homines non solum sunt incorruptibiles quantum ad communem speciem, sed etiam quantum ad proprias formas singulorum, quae sunt animae rationales, quod de aliis rebus corruptibilibus dici non potest.
Although men are equal in nature, still inequality exists among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the greater, and others to the lesser things, according to Sirach 33:11-12: "With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified their ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and some of them hath He cursed and brought low."
Quamvis homines natura sint pares, tamen inaequalitas in eis invenitur, secundum quod ex divina providentia quidam ordinantur ad maius, et quidam ad minus; secundum illud quod dicitur Eccli. XXXIII, "in multitudine disciplinae domini separavit eos, ex ipsis benedixit et exaltavit, ex ipsis maledixit et humiliavit."
Singulis hominibus singuli Angeli ad custodiam deputantur quia homines non solum sunt incorruptibiles quantum ad communem speciem, sed etiam quantum ad proprias formas singulorum, quae sunt animae rationales, quod de aliis rebus corruptibilibus dici non potest.
Although men are equal in nature, still inequality exists among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the greater, and others to the lesser things, according to Sirach 33:11-12: "With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified their ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and some of them hath He cursed and brought low."
Quamvis homines natura sint pares, tamen inaequalitas in eis invenitur, secundum quod ex divina providentia quidam ordinantur ad maius, et quidam ad minus; secundum illud quod dicitur Eccli. XXXIII, "in multitudine disciplinae domini separavit eos, ex ipsis benedixit et exaltavit, ex ipsis maledixit et humiliavit."
Wednesday, August 05, 2009
Q113 A1: Whether men are guarded by the angels?
Yes. It was necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men, in order to regulate them and move them to good, because as regards things to be done human cognition and affection can vary and fail from good in many ways.
Necessarium fuit quod hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputarentur, per quos regularentur et moverentur ad bonum, quia in rebus agendis cognitio et affectus hominis multipliciter variari et deficere possunt a bono.
Two things are required for a good action; first, that the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the habit of moral virtue. Secondly, that reason should discover the proper ways to make perfect the good of virtue; this the Philosopher (Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence.
Ad bene operandum duo requiruntur. Primo quidem, quod affectus inclinetur ad bonum, quod quidem fit in nobis per habitum virtutis moralis. Secundo autem, quod ratio inveniat congruas vias ad perficiendum bonum virtutis, quod quidem philosophus attribuit prudentiae.
As regards the first, God guards man immediately by infusing into him grace and virtues; as regards the second, God guards man as his universal instructor, Whose precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated (Q111, A1).
Quantum ergo ad primum, Deus immediate custodit hominem, infundendo ei gratiam et virtutes. Quantum autem ad secundum, Deus custodit hominem sicut universalis instructor, cuius instructio ad hominem provenit mediantibus Angelis, ut supra habitum est.
As men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the instigation of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish is not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside the ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as likewise that miracles occur outside the order of nature.
Sicut homines a naturali instinctu boni discedunt propter passionem peccati; ita etiam discedunt ab instigatione bonorum Angelorum, quae fit invisibiliter per hoc quod homines illuminant ad bene agendum. Unde quod homines pereunt, non est imputandum negligentiae Angelorum, sed malitiae hominum. Quod autem aliquando, praeter legem communem, hominibus visibiliter apparent, ex speciali Dei gratia est, sicut etiam quod praeter ordinem naturae miracula fiunt.
By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in affection towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul. Likewise universal natural cognition of the law, which by nature belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be deficient in many ways. Hence it is written (Wisdom 9:14): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels.
Per liberum arbitrium potest homo aliqualiter malum vitare, sed non sufficienter, quia infirmatur circa affectum boni, propter multiplices animae passiones. Similiter etiam universalis cognitio naturalis legis, quae homini naturaliter adest, aliqualiter dirigit hominem ad bonum, sed non sufficienter, quia in applicando universalia principia iuris ad particularia opera, contingit hominem multipliciter deficere. Unde dicitur Sap. IX, "cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae." Et ideo necessaria fuit homini custodia Angelorum.
Necessarium fuit quod hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputarentur, per quos regularentur et moverentur ad bonum, quia in rebus agendis cognitio et affectus hominis multipliciter variari et deficere possunt a bono.
Two things are required for a good action; first, that the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the habit of moral virtue. Secondly, that reason should discover the proper ways to make perfect the good of virtue; this the Philosopher (Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence.
Ad bene operandum duo requiruntur. Primo quidem, quod affectus inclinetur ad bonum, quod quidem fit in nobis per habitum virtutis moralis. Secundo autem, quod ratio inveniat congruas vias ad perficiendum bonum virtutis, quod quidem philosophus attribuit prudentiae.
As regards the first, God guards man immediately by infusing into him grace and virtues; as regards the second, God guards man as his universal instructor, Whose precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated (Q111, A1).
Quantum ergo ad primum, Deus immediate custodit hominem, infundendo ei gratiam et virtutes. Quantum autem ad secundum, Deus custodit hominem sicut universalis instructor, cuius instructio ad hominem provenit mediantibus Angelis, ut supra habitum est.
As men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the instigation of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish is not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside the ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as likewise that miracles occur outside the order of nature.
Sicut homines a naturali instinctu boni discedunt propter passionem peccati; ita etiam discedunt ab instigatione bonorum Angelorum, quae fit invisibiliter per hoc quod homines illuminant ad bene agendum. Unde quod homines pereunt, non est imputandum negligentiae Angelorum, sed malitiae hominum. Quod autem aliquando, praeter legem communem, hominibus visibiliter apparent, ex speciali Dei gratia est, sicut etiam quod praeter ordinem naturae miracula fiunt.
By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in affection towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul. Likewise universal natural cognition of the law, which by nature belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be deficient in many ways. Hence it is written (Wisdom 9:14): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels.
Per liberum arbitrium potest homo aliqualiter malum vitare, sed non sufficienter, quia infirmatur circa affectum boni, propter multiplices animae passiones. Similiter etiam universalis cognitio naturalis legis, quae homini naturaliter adest, aliqualiter dirigit hominem ad bonum, sed non sufficienter, quia in applicando universalia principia iuris ad particularia opera, contingit hominem multipliciter deficere. Unde dicitur Sap. IX, "cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae." Et ideo necessaria fuit homini custodia Angelorum.
Q113: The guardianship of the good angels
- Are men guarded by the angels?
- Is each man assigned a single guardian angel?
- Does the guardianship belong only to the lowest order of angels?
- Is it fitting for each man to have an angel guardian?
- When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin?
- Do the angel guardians always watch over men?
- Does the angel grieve over the loss of the one guarded?
- Does rivalry exist among the angels as regards their guardianship?
Tuesday, August 04, 2009
Q112 A4: Whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent?
No. The dominations are not sent to minister because to be sent to external ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine command in respect of any corporeal creature, which is part of the execution of the Divine ministry.
Dominationes in ministerium non mittuntur quia mitti ad exterius ministerium proprie convenit Angelo, secundum quod ex divino imperio operatur circa aliquam creaturam corporalem, quod quidem pertinet ad executionem divini ministerii.
Now the angelic properties are manifested by their names, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry whose names signify some kind of administration. But the name "dominations" does not signify any such administration, but only disposition and command in administering.
Proprietates autem Angelorum ex eorum nominibus manifestantur, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Et ideo Angeli illorum ordinum ad exterius ministerium mittuntur, ex quorum nominibus aliqua executio datur intelligi. In nomine autem dominationum non importatur aliqua executio, sed sola dispositio et imperium de exequendis.
On the other hand, the names of the inferior orders imply administration, for the "Angels" and "Archangels" are so called from "announcing"; the "Virtues" and "Powers" are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that the "Prince," according to what Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), "be first among the workers." Hence it belongs to these five orders to be sent to external ministry, not to the four superior orders.
Sed in nominibus inferiorum ordinum intelligitur aliqua executio, nam "Angeli" et "Archangeli" denominantur a denuntiando; "virtutes" et "potestates" dicuntur per respectum ad aliquem actum; "principis" etiam est, ut Gregorius dicit, inter alios operantes priorem existere. Unde ad hos quinque ordines pertinet in exterius ministerium mitti, non autem ad quatuor superiores.
The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to be done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others are to do.
Dominationes computantur quidem inter Angelos ministrantes, non sicut exequentes ministerium, sed sicut disponentes et mandantes quid per alios fieri debeat. Sicut architectores in artificiis nihil manu operantur, sed solum disponunt et praecipiunt quid alii debeant operari.
Two accounts may be given in assigning the number of the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those who minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he takes the words (Daniel 7:10) "thousands of thousands ministered to Him," not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean "thousands out of thousands"; thus the number of those who minister is indefinite, and signifies excess; while the number of assistants is finite as in the words added, "and ten thousand times a hundred thousand assisted Him."
De numero assistentium et ministrantium duplex ratio haberi potest. Gregorius enim dicit plures esse ministrantes quam assistentes. Intelligit enim quod dicitur, millia millium ministrabant ei, non esse dictum multiplicative, sed partitive; ac si diceretur, millia de numero millium. Et sic ministrantium numerus ponitur indefinitus, ad significandum excessum; assistentium vero finitus, cum subditur, et decies millies centena millia assistebant ei.
This explanation rests on the account of the Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first principle, the smaller they are in number; as the nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. This opinion is verified as regards the number of orders, as six administer and three assist.
Et hoc procedit secundum rationem Platonicorum, qui dicebant quod quanto aliqua sunt uni primo principio propinquiora, tanto sunt minoris multitudinis, sicut quanto numerus est propinquior unitati, tanto est multitudine minor. Et haec opinio salvatur quantum ad numerum ordinum, dum sex ministrant, et tres assistunt.
Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of angels surpasses all the multitude of material things; so that, as the superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable degree, so the superior incorporeal natures surpass all corporeal natures in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and more multiplied by God. Hence, as the assistants are superior to the ministers there will be more assistants than ministers.
Sed Dionysius ponit, XIV cap. Cael. Hier., quod multitudo Angelorum transcendit omnem materialem multitudinem; ut scilicet, sicut corpora superiora transcendunt corpora inferiora magnitudine quasi in immensum, ita superiores naturae incorporeae transcendunt multitudine omnes naturas corporeas; quia quod est melius, est magis a Deo intentum et multiplicatum. Et secundum hoc, cum assistentes sint superiores ministrantibus, plures erunt assistentes quam ministrantes.
In this way, the words "thousands of thousands" are taken by way of multiplication, to signify "a thousand times a thousand." And because ten times a hundred is a thousand, if it were said "ten times a hundred thousand" it would mean that there are as many assistants as ministers: but since it is written "ten thousand times a hundred thousand," we are given to understand that the assistants are much more numerous than the ministers.
Unde secundum hoc, millia millium legitur multiplicativae, ac si diceretur, millies millia. Et quia decies centum sunt mille, si diceretur, decies centena millia, daretur intelligi quod tot essent assistentes, quot ministrantes, sed quia dicitur, decies millies centena millia, multo plures dicuntur esse assistentes quam ministrantes.
Nor is this said to signify that this is the precise number of angels, but rather that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all material multitude. This is signified by the multiplication together of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a hundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage.
Nec tamen hoc pro tanto dicitur, quia tantus solum sit Angelorum numerus, sed multo maior, quia omnem materialem multitudinem excedit. Quod significatur per multiplicationem maximorum numerorum supra seipsos, scilicet denarii, centenarii et millenarii; ut Dionysius ibidem dicit.
Dominationes in ministerium non mittuntur quia mitti ad exterius ministerium proprie convenit Angelo, secundum quod ex divino imperio operatur circa aliquam creaturam corporalem, quod quidem pertinet ad executionem divini ministerii.
Now the angelic properties are manifested by their names, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry whose names signify some kind of administration. But the name "dominations" does not signify any such administration, but only disposition and command in administering.
Proprietates autem Angelorum ex eorum nominibus manifestantur, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Et ideo Angeli illorum ordinum ad exterius ministerium mittuntur, ex quorum nominibus aliqua executio datur intelligi. In nomine autem dominationum non importatur aliqua executio, sed sola dispositio et imperium de exequendis.
On the other hand, the names of the inferior orders imply administration, for the "Angels" and "Archangels" are so called from "announcing"; the "Virtues" and "Powers" are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that the "Prince," according to what Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), "be first among the workers." Hence it belongs to these five orders to be sent to external ministry, not to the four superior orders.
Sed in nominibus inferiorum ordinum intelligitur aliqua executio, nam "Angeli" et "Archangeli" denominantur a denuntiando; "virtutes" et "potestates" dicuntur per respectum ad aliquem actum; "principis" etiam est, ut Gregorius dicit, inter alios operantes priorem existere. Unde ad hos quinque ordines pertinet in exterius ministerium mitti, non autem ad quatuor superiores.
The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to be done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others are to do.
Dominationes computantur quidem inter Angelos ministrantes, non sicut exequentes ministerium, sed sicut disponentes et mandantes quid per alios fieri debeat. Sicut architectores in artificiis nihil manu operantur, sed solum disponunt et praecipiunt quid alii debeant operari.
Two accounts may be given in assigning the number of the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those who minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he takes the words (Daniel 7:10) "thousands of thousands ministered to Him," not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean "thousands out of thousands"; thus the number of those who minister is indefinite, and signifies excess; while the number of assistants is finite as in the words added, "and ten thousand times a hundred thousand assisted Him."
De numero assistentium et ministrantium duplex ratio haberi potest. Gregorius enim dicit plures esse ministrantes quam assistentes. Intelligit enim quod dicitur, millia millium ministrabant ei, non esse dictum multiplicative, sed partitive; ac si diceretur, millia de numero millium. Et sic ministrantium numerus ponitur indefinitus, ad significandum excessum; assistentium vero finitus, cum subditur, et decies millies centena millia assistebant ei.
This explanation rests on the account of the Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first principle, the smaller they are in number; as the nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. This opinion is verified as regards the number of orders, as six administer and three assist.
Et hoc procedit secundum rationem Platonicorum, qui dicebant quod quanto aliqua sunt uni primo principio propinquiora, tanto sunt minoris multitudinis, sicut quanto numerus est propinquior unitati, tanto est multitudine minor. Et haec opinio salvatur quantum ad numerum ordinum, dum sex ministrant, et tres assistunt.
Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of angels surpasses all the multitude of material things; so that, as the superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable degree, so the superior incorporeal natures surpass all corporeal natures in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and more multiplied by God. Hence, as the assistants are superior to the ministers there will be more assistants than ministers.
Sed Dionysius ponit, XIV cap. Cael. Hier., quod multitudo Angelorum transcendit omnem materialem multitudinem; ut scilicet, sicut corpora superiora transcendunt corpora inferiora magnitudine quasi in immensum, ita superiores naturae incorporeae transcendunt multitudine omnes naturas corporeas; quia quod est melius, est magis a Deo intentum et multiplicatum. Et secundum hoc, cum assistentes sint superiores ministrantibus, plures erunt assistentes quam ministrantes.
In this way, the words "thousands of thousands" are taken by way of multiplication, to signify "a thousand times a thousand." And because ten times a hundred is a thousand, if it were said "ten times a hundred thousand" it would mean that there are as many assistants as ministers: but since it is written "ten thousand times a hundred thousand," we are given to understand that the assistants are much more numerous than the ministers.
Unde secundum hoc, millia millium legitur multiplicativae, ac si diceretur, millies millia. Et quia decies centum sunt mille, si diceretur, decies centena millia, daretur intelligi quod tot essent assistentes, quot ministrantes, sed quia dicitur, decies millies centena millia, multo plures dicuntur esse assistentes quam ministrantes.
Nor is this said to signify that this is the precise number of angels, but rather that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all material multitude. This is signified by the multiplication together of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a hundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage.
Nec tamen hoc pro tanto dicitur, quia tantus solum sit Angelorum numerus, sed multo maior, quia omnem materialem multitudinem excedit. Quod significatur per multiplicationem maximorum numerorum supra seipsos, scilicet denarii, centenarii et millenarii; ut Dionysius ibidem dicit.
Monday, August 03, 2009
Q112 A3: Whether all the angels who are sent, assist?
No. Only the superior angels belonging to the highest hierarchy are said to assist, whose special prerogative it is to be enlightened immediately by God, because not all the angels can perceive the secrets of the Divine mysteries in the clearness itself of the Divine Essence, but only the superior angels who announce them to the inferior.
Soli superiores, qui sunt primae hierarchiae, assistere dicuntur, cuius proprium dicit esse Dionysius immediate a Deo illuminari, quia non omnes Angeli secreta divinorum mysteriorum in ipsa claritate divinae essentiae percipere possunt, sed soli superiores, per quos inferioribus denuntiantur.
All the angels gaze upon the Divine Essence immediately, in regard to which all, even those who minister, are said to assist. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "those who are sent on the external ministry of our salvation can always assist and see the face of the Father."
Omnes Angeli divinam essentiam immediate vident, et quantum ad hoc, omnes etiam qui ministrant, assistere dicuntur. Unde Gregorius dicit in II Moral., quod "semper assistere, aut videre faciem patris possunt, qui ad ministerium exterius mittuntur pro nostra salute."
All the assistants see some things immediately in the glory of the Divine Essence; and so it may be said that it is the prerogative of the whole of the highest hierarchy to be immediately enlightened by God; while the higher ones among them see more than is seen by the inferior; some of whom enlighten others: as also among those who assist the king, one knows more of the king's secrets than another.
Omnes assistentes aliqua immediate vident in claritate divinae essentiae; et ideo totius primae hierarchiae proprium esse dicitur immediate illuminari a Deo. Sed superiores eorum plura percipiunt quam inferiores, de quibus illuminant alios, sicut etiam inter eos qui assistunt regi, plura scit de secretis regis unus quam alius.
Soli superiores, qui sunt primae hierarchiae, assistere dicuntur, cuius proprium dicit esse Dionysius immediate a Deo illuminari, quia non omnes Angeli secreta divinorum mysteriorum in ipsa claritate divinae essentiae percipere possunt, sed soli superiores, per quos inferioribus denuntiantur.
All the angels gaze upon the Divine Essence immediately, in regard to which all, even those who minister, are said to assist. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "those who are sent on the external ministry of our salvation can always assist and see the face of the Father."
Omnes Angeli divinam essentiam immediate vident, et quantum ad hoc, omnes etiam qui ministrant, assistere dicuntur. Unde Gregorius dicit in II Moral., quod "semper assistere, aut videre faciem patris possunt, qui ad ministerium exterius mittuntur pro nostra salute."
All the assistants see some things immediately in the glory of the Divine Essence; and so it may be said that it is the prerogative of the whole of the highest hierarchy to be immediately enlightened by God; while the higher ones among them see more than is seen by the inferior; some of whom enlighten others: as also among those who assist the king, one knows more of the king's secrets than another.
Omnes assistentes aliqua immediate vident in claritate divinae essentiae; et ideo totius primae hierarchiae proprium esse dicitur immediate illuminari a Deo. Sed superiores eorum plura percipiunt quam inferiores, de quibus illuminant alios, sicut etiam inter eos qui assistunt regi, plura scit de secretis regis unus quam alius.
Sunday, August 02, 2009
Q112 A2: Whether all the angels are sent in ministry?
No. Some have said that according to the general law the superior angels are not sent, but only the inferior, yet that sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent, because God can immediately reveal things to men without the help of the angels, and the superior angels without the inferior, as regards corporeal things, for the sake of a higher order, that is, according as it is suitable for the manifestation of grace.
Quidam dixerunt quod, secundum communem legem, superiores non mittuntur, sed inferiores tantum, sed ex aliqua dispensatione divina, interdum etiam superiores mittuntur, quia Deus immediate hominibus aliqua revelare posset, non mediantibus Angelis, et superiores Angeli, non mediantibus inferioribus, in rebus corporalibus aliquando ex divina dispensatione receditur, propter altiorem ordinem, secundum scilicet quod expedit ad gratiae manifestationem.
According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet's lips [Isaiah 6:6-7] was one of the inferior order; but was called a "Seraph," that is, "kindling " in an equivocal sense, because he came to "kindle" the lips of the prophet. It may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the ministry of the inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim is described as purifying by fire the prophet's lips, not as if he did so immediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his power; as the Pope is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means of someone else.
Secundum Dionysium, quod ille Angelus qui missus est ad purgandum labia prophetae, fuit de inferioribus Angelis; sed dictus est "Seraphim", idest "incendens", aequivoce, propter hoc quod venerat ad "incendendum" labia prophetae. Vel dicendum quod superiores Angeli communicant propria dona, a quibus denominantur, mediantibus inferioribus Angelis. Sic igitur unus de Seraphim dictus est purgasse incendio labia prophetae, non quia hoc ipse immediate fecerit, sed quia inferior Angelus virtute eius hoc fecit. Sicut Papa dicitur absolvere aliquem, etiam si per alium officium absolutionis impendat.
Quidam dixerunt quod, secundum communem legem, superiores non mittuntur, sed inferiores tantum, sed ex aliqua dispensatione divina, interdum etiam superiores mittuntur, quia Deus immediate hominibus aliqua revelare posset, non mediantibus Angelis, et superiores Angeli, non mediantibus inferioribus, in rebus corporalibus aliquando ex divina dispensatione receditur, propter altiorem ordinem, secundum scilicet quod expedit ad gratiae manifestationem.
According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet's lips [Isaiah 6:6-7] was one of the inferior order; but was called a "Seraph," that is, "kindling " in an equivocal sense, because he came to "kindle" the lips of the prophet. It may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the ministry of the inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim is described as purifying by fire the prophet's lips, not as if he did so immediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his power; as the Pope is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means of someone else.
Secundum Dionysium, quod ille Angelus qui missus est ad purgandum labia prophetae, fuit de inferioribus Angelis; sed dictus est "Seraphim", idest "incendens", aequivoce, propter hoc quod venerat ad "incendendum" labia prophetae. Vel dicendum quod superiores Angeli communicant propria dona, a quibus denominantur, mediantibus inferioribus Angelis. Sic igitur unus de Seraphim dictus est purgasse incendio labia prophetae, non quia hoc ipse immediate fecerit, sed quia inferior Angelus virtute eius hoc fecit. Sicut Papa dicitur absolvere aliquem, etiam si per alium officium absolutionis impendat.
Saturday, August 01, 2009
Q112 A1: Whether the angels are sent on works of ministry?
Yes. Some angels are sent in ministry by God because whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by his power, and in that way begins to be there afresh.
Aliqui Angeli in ministerium mittuntur a Deo quia cum aliquid est fiendum per aliquem Angelum circa aliquam creaturam corpoream, de novo applicatur Angelus illi corpori sua virtute, et sic Angelus de novo incipit ibi esse.
An angel's power, as a particular agent, does not reach to the whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such a way as not to reach another; and so he is "here" in such a manner as not to be "there."
Virtus autem Angeli, cum sit particulare agens, non attingit totum universum; sed sic attingit unum, quod non attingit aliud. Et ideo ita est hic, quod non alibi.
Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God as from its first principle, at Whose nod and by Whose authority the angels work; and [the angelic action] is reduced to God as to its last end.
Sed actio quam Angelus missus exercet, procedit a Deo sicut a primo principio, cuius nutu et auctoritate Angeli operantur; et in Deum reducitur sicut in ultimum finem.
Aliqui Angeli in ministerium mittuntur a Deo quia cum aliquid est fiendum per aliquem Angelum circa aliquam creaturam corpoream, de novo applicatur Angelus illi corpori sua virtute, et sic Angelus de novo incipit ibi esse.
An angel's power, as a particular agent, does not reach to the whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such a way as not to reach another; and so he is "here" in such a manner as not to be "there."
Virtus autem Angeli, cum sit particulare agens, non attingit totum universum; sed sic attingit unum, quod non attingit aliud. Et ideo ita est hic, quod non alibi.
Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God as from its first principle, at Whose nod and by Whose authority the angels work; and [the angelic action] is reduced to God as to its last end.
Sed actio quam Angelus missus exercet, procedit a Deo sicut a primo principio, cuius nutu et auctoritate Angeli operantur; et in Deum reducitur sicut in ultimum finem.
Friday, July 31, 2009
Q111 A4: Whether an angel can change the human senses?
Yes. An angel, by his natural power, can work a change in the senses, because an angel can offer the senses a sensible object from without, formed by nature, or by the angel himself, as when he assumes a body, as we have said above (Q51, A2). Likewise he can move the spirits and humors from within, as above remarked (Q111, A3), whereby the senses are changed in various ways.
Angelus potest immutare sensum hominis sua naturali virtute, quia potest Angelus opponere exterius sensui sensibile aliquod, vel a natura formatum, vel aliquod de novo formando, sicut facit dum corpus assumit, ut supra dictum est. Similiter etiam potest interius commovere spiritus et humores, ut supra dictum est, ex quibus sensus diversimode immutentur.
Angelus potest immutare sensum hominis sua naturali virtute, quia potest Angelus opponere exterius sensui sensibile aliquod, vel a natura formatum, vel aliquod de novo formando, sicut facit dum corpus assumit, ut supra dictum est. Similiter etiam potest interius commovere spiritus et humores, ut supra dictum est, ex quibus sensus diversimode immutentur.
Thursday, July 30, 2009
Q111 A3: Whether an angel can change man's imagination?
Yes. An angel can move the imagination because corporeal nature obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be caused by the local movement of bodies is subject to the natural power of the angels. Now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused in us by the local movement of animal spirits and humors.
Angelus potest imaginationem movere quia natura corporalis obedit Angelo ad motum localem. Illa ergo quae ex motu locali aliquorum corporum possunt causari, subsunt virtuti naturali Angelorum. Manifestum est autem quod apparitiones imaginariae causantur interdum in nobis ex locali mutatione corporalium spirituum et humorum.
So, as this happens by a natural disturbance of the humors, and sometimes also by the will of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so also the same may be done by the power of a good or a bad angel, sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without such alienation.
Sicut igitur hoc fit per naturalem commotionem humorum, et quandoque etiam per voluntatem hominis, qui voluntarie imaginatur quod prius senserat, ita etiam hoc potest fieri virtute Angeli boni vel mali, quandoque quidem cum alienatione a corporeis sensibus, quandoque autem absque tali alienatione.
The first principle of the imagination is from the sense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by the senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot imagine color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions preserved within.
Primum principium phantasiae est a sensu secundum actum, non enim possumus imaginari quae nullo modo sensimus, vel secundum totum vel secundum partem; sicut caecus natus non potest imaginari colorem. Sed aliquando imaginatio informatur, ut actus phantastici motus consurgat, ab impressionibus interius conservatis.
An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these images signify; and then there is not deception. But sometimes by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear in the imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by the defect in the intellect to whom such things appear. Thus neither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to the people in parables, which He did not explain to them.
Angelus causans aliquam imaginariam visionem, quandoque quidem simul intellectum illuminat, ut cognoscat quid per huiusmodi similitudines significetur, et tunc nulla est deceptio. Quandoque vero per operationem Angeli solummodo similitudines rerum apparent in imaginatione, nec tamen tunc causatur deceptio ab Angelo, sed ex defectu intellectus eius cui talia apparent. Sicut nec Christus fuit causa deceptionis in hoc quod multa turbis in parabolis proposuit, quae non exposuit eis.
Angelus potest imaginationem movere quia natura corporalis obedit Angelo ad motum localem. Illa ergo quae ex motu locali aliquorum corporum possunt causari, subsunt virtuti naturali Angelorum. Manifestum est autem quod apparitiones imaginariae causantur interdum in nobis ex locali mutatione corporalium spirituum et humorum.
So, as this happens by a natural disturbance of the humors, and sometimes also by the will of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so also the same may be done by the power of a good or a bad angel, sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without such alienation.
Sicut igitur hoc fit per naturalem commotionem humorum, et quandoque etiam per voluntatem hominis, qui voluntarie imaginatur quod prius senserat, ita etiam hoc potest fieri virtute Angeli boni vel mali, quandoque quidem cum alienatione a corporeis sensibus, quandoque autem absque tali alienatione.
The first principle of the imagination is from the sense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by the senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot imagine color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions preserved within.
Primum principium phantasiae est a sensu secundum actum, non enim possumus imaginari quae nullo modo sensimus, vel secundum totum vel secundum partem; sicut caecus natus non potest imaginari colorem. Sed aliquando imaginatio informatur, ut actus phantastici motus consurgat, ab impressionibus interius conservatis.
An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these images signify; and then there is not deception. But sometimes by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear in the imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by the defect in the intellect to whom such things appear. Thus neither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to the people in parables, which He did not explain to them.
Angelus causans aliquam imaginariam visionem, quandoque quidem simul intellectum illuminat, ut cognoscat quid per huiusmodi similitudines significetur, et tunc nulla est deceptio. Quandoque vero per operationem Angeli solummodo similitudines rerum apparent in imaginatione, nec tamen tunc causatur deceptio ab Angelo, sed ex defectu intellectus eius cui talia apparent. Sicut nec Christus fuit causa deceptionis in hoc quod multa turbis in parabolis proposuit, quae non exposuit eis.
Wednesday, July 29, 2009
Q111 A2: Whether the angels can change the will of man?
No. Since the movement of the will is nothing but the inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination to the intellectual nature.
Et sic cum motus voluntatis non sit aliud quam inclinatio voluntatis in rem volitam, solius Dei est sic immutare voluntatem, qui dat naturae intellectuali virtutem talis inclinationis.
For as the natural inclination is from God alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from God alone, Who causes the will.
Sicut enim inclinatio naturalis non est nisi a Deo qui dat naturam; ita inclinatio voluntaria non est nisi a Deo, qui causat voluntatem.
The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of the things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions. Damascene calls this kindling "a putting in" because such a work is accomplished within.
Daemones non possunt immittere cogitationes, interius eas causando, cum usus cogitativae virtutis subiaceat voluntati. Dicitur tamen Diabolus incensor cogitationum, inquantum incitat ad cogitandum, vel ad appetendum cogitata, per modum persuadentis, vel passionem concitantis. Et hoc ipsum incendere Damascenus vocat immittere, quia talis operatio interius fit.
But good thoughts are attributed to a higher principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry of the angels.
Sed bonae cogitationes attribuuntur altiori principio, scilicet Deo; licet Angelorum ministerio procurentur.
Et sic cum motus voluntatis non sit aliud quam inclinatio voluntatis in rem volitam, solius Dei est sic immutare voluntatem, qui dat naturae intellectuali virtutem talis inclinationis.
For as the natural inclination is from God alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from God alone, Who causes the will.
Sicut enim inclinatio naturalis non est nisi a Deo qui dat naturam; ita inclinatio voluntaria non est nisi a Deo, qui causat voluntatem.
The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of the things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions. Damascene calls this kindling "a putting in" because such a work is accomplished within.
Daemones non possunt immittere cogitationes, interius eas causando, cum usus cogitativae virtutis subiaceat voluntati. Dicitur tamen Diabolus incensor cogitationum, inquantum incitat ad cogitandum, vel ad appetendum cogitata, per modum persuadentis, vel passionem concitantis. Et hoc ipsum incendere Damascenus vocat immittere, quia talis operatio interius fit.
But good thoughts are attributed to a higher principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry of the angels.
Sed bonae cogitationes attribuuntur altiori principio, scilicet Deo; licet Angelorum ministerio procurentur.
Tuesday, July 28, 2009
Q111 A1: Whether an angel can enlighten man?
Yes. Men are enlightened by the angels because natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be strengthened by an angel.
Homines illuminantur per Angelos quia ratio naturalis, quae est immediate a Deo, potest per Angelum confortari.
Again, the more the human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more perfect knowledge of God.
Et similiter ex speciebus a creaturis acceptis, tanto altior elicitur intelligibilis veritas, quanto intellectus humanus fuerit fortior. Et sic per Angelum adiuvatur homo, ut ex creaturis perfectius in divinam cognitionem deveniat.
The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms, as above explained (Q84, A7).
Sed intellectus humanus non potest ipsam intelligibilem veritatem nudam capere, quia connaturale est ei ut intelligat per conversionem ad phantasmata, ut supra dictum est.
So the angels propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things, according to what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), that, "It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded by the variety of the sacred veils."
Et ideo intelligibilem veritatem proponunt Angeli hominibus sub similitudinibus sensibilium; secundum illud quod dicit Dionysius, I cap. Cael. Hier., quod "impossibile est aliter nobis lucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum."
Homines illuminantur per Angelos quia ratio naturalis, quae est immediate a Deo, potest per Angelum confortari.
Again, the more the human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more perfect knowledge of God.
Et similiter ex speciebus a creaturis acceptis, tanto altior elicitur intelligibilis veritas, quanto intellectus humanus fuerit fortior. Et sic per Angelum adiuvatur homo, ut ex creaturis perfectius in divinam cognitionem deveniat.
The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms, as above explained (Q84, A7).
Sed intellectus humanus non potest ipsam intelligibilem veritatem nudam capere, quia connaturale est ei ut intelligat per conversionem ad phantasmata, ut supra dictum est.
So the angels propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things, according to what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), that, "It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded by the variety of the sacred veils."
Et ideo intelligibilem veritatem proponunt Angeli hominibus sub similitudinibus sensibilium; secundum illud quod dicit Dionysius, I cap. Cael. Hier., quod "impossibile est aliter nobis lucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum."
Monday, July 27, 2009
Q110 A4: Whether angels can work miracles?
No. God alone can work miracles because for a miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole created nature; but God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or any other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of created nature; and thus it is not a miracle.
Solus Deus miracula facere possit quia aliquid dicitur esse miraculum, quod fit praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae; hoc autem non potest facere nisi Deus, quia quidquid facit Angelus, vel quaecumque alia creatura, propria virtute, hoc fit secundum ordinem naturae creatae; et sic non est miraculum.
Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement.
Spirituales potestates possunt facere ea quae visibiliter fiunt in hoc mundo, adhibendo corporalia semina per motum localem.
A miracle properly so called is when something is done outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for the formal aspect of a miracle if something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards, as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature.
Miraculum proprie dicitur, cum aliquid fit praeter ordinem naturae. Sed non sufficit ad rationem miraculi si aliquid fiat praeter ordinem naturae alicuius particularis; quia sic, cum aliquis proiicit lapidem sursum, miraculum faceret, cum hoc sit praeter ordinem naturae lapidis.
Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those things which are done outside the order of the whole created nature. But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows that when anything is done outside the order of created nature by a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves.
Miracula simpliciter loquendo, dicuntur, ut dictum est, cum aliqua fiunt praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae. Sed quia non omnis virtus naturae creatae est nota nobis, ideo cum aliquid fit praeter ordinem naturae creatae nobis notae, per virtutem creatam nobis ignotam, est miraculum quoad nos.
So when the demons do anything of their own natural power, these things are called "miracles" not in an absolute sense, but in reference to ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the demons; and these are said to be done by "private contracts," inasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be compared to the power of a private person in a city. Hence when a magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it were by private contract.
Sic igitur cum Daemones aliquid faciunt sua virtute naturali, miracula dicuntur non simpliciter, sed quoad nos. Et hoc modo magi per Daemones miracula faciunt. Et dicuntur fieri per privatos contractus, quia quaelibet virtus creaturae in universo se habet ut virtus alicuius privatae personae in civitate; unde cum magus aliquid facit per pactum initum cum Daemone, hoc fit quasi per quendam privatum contractum.
On the other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians, so far as they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to work miracles by "public justice": but bad Christians by the "signs of public justice," as by invoking the name of Christ, or by making use of other sacred signs.
Sed iustitia divina est in toto universo sicut lex publica in civitate. Et ideo boni Christiani, inquantum per iustitiam divinam miracula faciunt, dicuntur facere miracula per publicam iustitiam. Mali autem Christiani per signa publicae iustitiae, sicut invocando nomen Christi, vel exhibendo aliqua sacramenta.
Solus Deus miracula facere possit quia aliquid dicitur esse miraculum, quod fit praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae; hoc autem non potest facere nisi Deus, quia quidquid facit Angelus, vel quaecumque alia creatura, propria virtute, hoc fit secundum ordinem naturae creatae; et sic non est miraculum.
Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement.
Spirituales potestates possunt facere ea quae visibiliter fiunt in hoc mundo, adhibendo corporalia semina per motum localem.
A miracle properly so called is when something is done outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for the formal aspect of a miracle if something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards, as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature.
Miraculum proprie dicitur, cum aliquid fit praeter ordinem naturae. Sed non sufficit ad rationem miraculi si aliquid fiat praeter ordinem naturae alicuius particularis; quia sic, cum aliquis proiicit lapidem sursum, miraculum faceret, cum hoc sit praeter ordinem naturae lapidis.
Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those things which are done outside the order of the whole created nature. But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows that when anything is done outside the order of created nature by a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves.
Miracula simpliciter loquendo, dicuntur, ut dictum est, cum aliqua fiunt praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae. Sed quia non omnis virtus naturae creatae est nota nobis, ideo cum aliquid fit praeter ordinem naturae creatae nobis notae, per virtutem creatam nobis ignotam, est miraculum quoad nos.
So when the demons do anything of their own natural power, these things are called "miracles" not in an absolute sense, but in reference to ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the demons; and these are said to be done by "private contracts," inasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be compared to the power of a private person in a city. Hence when a magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it were by private contract.
Sic igitur cum Daemones aliquid faciunt sua virtute naturali, miracula dicuntur non simpliciter, sed quoad nos. Et hoc modo magi per Daemones miracula faciunt. Et dicuntur fieri per privatos contractus, quia quaelibet virtus creaturae in universo se habet ut virtus alicuius privatae personae in civitate; unde cum magus aliquid facit per pactum initum cum Daemone, hoc fit quasi per quendam privatum contractum.
On the other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians, so far as they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to work miracles by "public justice": but bad Christians by the "signs of public justice," as by invoking the name of Christ, or by making use of other sacred signs.
Sed iustitia divina est in toto universo sicut lex publica in civitate. Et ideo boni Christiani, inquantum per iustitiam divinam miracula faciunt, dicuntur facere miracula per publicam iustitiam. Mali autem Christiani per signa publicae iustitiae, sicut invocando nomen Christi, vel exhibendo aliqua sacramenta.
Sunday, July 26, 2009
Q110 A3: Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion?
Yes. The corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place because what is moved locally is not as such in potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only to something extrinsic: that is, to place.
Natura corporalis nata est moveri immediate a natura spirituali secundum locum quia mobile secundum locum non est in potentia ad aliquid intrinsecum, inquantum huiusmodi, sed solum ad aliquid extrinsecum: scilicet, ad locum.
The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move other things. But an angel's power is not limited to any body; hence it can move locally bodies not joined to it.
Angeli habent virtutem minus contractam quam animae. Unde virtus motiva animae contrahitur ad corpus unitum, quod per eam vivificatur, quo mediante alia potest movere. Sed virtus Angeli non est contracta ad aliquod corpus. Unde potest corpora non coniuncta localiter movere.
Natura corporalis nata est moveri immediate a natura spirituali secundum locum quia mobile secundum locum non est in potentia ad aliquid intrinsecum, inquantum huiusmodi, sed solum ad aliquid extrinsecum: scilicet, ad locum.
The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move other things. But an angel's power is not limited to any body; hence it can move locally bodies not joined to it.
Angeli habent virtutem minus contractam quam animae. Unde virtus motiva animae contrahitur ad corpus unitum, quod per eam vivificatur, quo mediante alia potest movere. Sed virtus Angeli non est contracta ad aliquod corpus. Unde potest corpora non coniuncta localiter movere.
Saturday, July 25, 2009
Q110 A2: Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel?
No. Every informing of matter is either immediately from God, or from some corporeal agent, but not immediately from an angel, because whatever makes natural things, has a likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as when fire begets fire, or because the whole "composite" as to both matter and form is within its power, and this belongs to God alone.
Omnis informatio materiae vel est a Deo immediate, vel ab aliquo agente corporali, non autem immediate ab Angelo, quia id quod facit res naturales, habet similitudinem cum composito, vel quia est compositum, sicut ignis generat ignem, vel quia totum compositum, et quantum ad materiam et quantum ad formam, est in virtute ipsius, quod est proprium Dei.
As the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what is made, properly speaking, is the "composite": for this properly speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to be is nothing but the way to existence.
Sicut philosophus probat in VII Metaphys., hoc quod proprie fit, est compositum, hoc enim proprie est quasi subsistens. Forma autem non dicitur ens quasi ipsa sit, sed sicut quo aliquid est, et sic per consequens nec forma proprie fit; eius enim est fieri, cuius est esse, cum fieri nihil aliud sit quam via in esse. Manifestum est autem quod factum est simile facienti, quia omne agens agit sibi simile.
Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the command of reason.
Anima nostra unitur corpori ut forma; et sic non est mirum, si formaliter transmutatur ex conceptione ipsius; praesertim cum motus sensitivi appetitus, qui fit cum quadam transmutatione corporali, subdatur imperio rationis.
Omnis informatio materiae vel est a Deo immediate, vel ab aliquo agente corporali, non autem immediate ab Angelo, quia id quod facit res naturales, habet similitudinem cum composito, vel quia est compositum, sicut ignis generat ignem, vel quia totum compositum, et quantum ad materiam et quantum ad formam, est in virtute ipsius, quod est proprium Dei.
As the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what is made, properly speaking, is the "composite": for this properly speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to be is nothing but the way to existence.
Sicut philosophus probat in VII Metaphys., hoc quod proprie fit, est compositum, hoc enim proprie est quasi subsistens. Forma autem non dicitur ens quasi ipsa sit, sed sicut quo aliquid est, et sic per consequens nec forma proprie fit; eius enim est fieri, cuius est esse, cum fieri nihil aliud sit quam via in esse. Manifestum est autem quod factum est simile facienti, quia omne agens agit sibi simile.
Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the command of reason.
Anima nostra unitur corpori ut forma; et sic non est mirum, si formaliter transmutatur ex conceptione ipsius; praesertim cum motus sensitivi appetitus, qui fit cum quadam transmutatione corporali, subdatur imperio rationis.
Friday, July 24, 2009
Q110 A1: Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?
Yes. As the inferior angels, who have the less universal forms, are ruled by the superior, so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels, because it is manifest that the power of any individual body is more particular than the power of any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form individualized by matter, and determined to the "here and now", whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible.
Sicut inferiores Angeli, qui habent formas minus universales, reguntur per superiores, ita omnia corporalia reguntur per Angelos, quia manifestum est quod virtus cuiuslibet corporis est magis particularis quam virtus spiritualis substantiae; nam omnis forma corporalis est forma individuata per materiam, et determinata ad "hic et nunc", formae autem immateriales sunt absolutae et intelligibiles.
Aristotle laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps human souls. And this was because he did not consider that any operations were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed.
Aristoteles posuit quod corpora caelestia moventur a substantiis spiritualibus; quarum numerum conatus fuit assignare secundum numerum motuum qui apparent in corporibus caelestibus. Sed non posuit quod essent aliquae substantiae spirituales quae haberent immediatam praesidentiam supra inferiora corpora, nisi forte animas humanas. Et hoc ideo, quia non consideravit aliquas operationes in inferioribus corporibus exerceri nisi naturales, ad quas sufficiebat motus corporum caelestium.
But because we assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural corporeal actions, for which the movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient, therefore in our opinion we must assert that the angels possess an immediate presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies.
Sed quia nos ponimus multa in corporibus inferioribus fieri praeter naturales actiones corporum, ad quae non sufficiunt virtutes caelestium corporum, ideo secundum nos, necesse est ponere quod Angeli habeant immediatam praesidentiam non solum supra caelestia corpora, sed etiam supra corpora inferiora.
Sicut inferiores Angeli, qui habent formas minus universales, reguntur per superiores, ita omnia corporalia reguntur per Angelos, quia manifestum est quod virtus cuiuslibet corporis est magis particularis quam virtus spiritualis substantiae; nam omnis forma corporalis est forma individuata per materiam, et determinata ad "hic et nunc", formae autem immateriales sunt absolutae et intelligibiles.
Aristotle laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps human souls. And this was because he did not consider that any operations were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed.
Aristoteles posuit quod corpora caelestia moventur a substantiis spiritualibus; quarum numerum conatus fuit assignare secundum numerum motuum qui apparent in corporibus caelestibus. Sed non posuit quod essent aliquae substantiae spirituales quae haberent immediatam praesidentiam supra inferiora corpora, nisi forte animas humanas. Et hoc ideo, quia non consideravit aliquas operationes in inferioribus corporibus exerceri nisi naturales, ad quas sufficiebat motus corporum caelestium.
But because we assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural corporeal actions, for which the movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient, therefore in our opinion we must assert that the angels possess an immediate presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies.
Sed quia nos ponimus multa in corporibus inferioribus fieri praeter naturales actiones corporum, ad quae non sufficiunt virtutes caelestium corporum, ideo secundum nos, necesse est ponere quod Angeli habeant immediatam praesidentiam non solum supra caelestia corpora, sed etiam supra corpora inferiora.
Thursday, July 23, 2009
Q109 A4: Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels?
Yes. The good angels have precedence over the bad, and these are ruled by them, because those creatures, which are more perfect and nearer to God, have the power to act on others.
Boni Angeli super malos praelationem habent, et per eos reguntur, quia illae creaturae super alias influentiam habent, quae sunt perfectiores et Deo propinquiores.
The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.
Sancti Angeli sunt ministri divinae sapientiae. Unde sicut divina sapientia permittit aliqua mala fieri per malos Angelos vel homines, propter bona quae ex eis elicit; ita et boni Angeli non totaliter cohibent malos a nocendo.
Boni Angeli super malos praelationem habent, et per eos reguntur, quia illae creaturae super alias influentiam habent, quae sunt perfectiores et Deo propinquiores.
The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.
Sancti Angeli sunt ministri divinae sapientiae. Unde sicut divina sapientia permittit aliqua mala fieri per malos Angelos vel homines, propter bona quae ex eis elicit; ita et boni Angeli non totaliter cohibent malos a nocendo.
Wednesday, July 22, 2009
Q109 A3: Whether there is enlightenment in the demons?
No. There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among the demons, because enlightenment properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to God, Who enlightens every intellect.
In Daemonibus non potest esse illuminatio proprie, quia illuminatio proprie est manifestatio veritatis, secundum quod habet ordinem ad Deum, qui illuminat omnem intellectum.
Another kind of manifestation of the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to another. Now the demon's perversity does not lead one to order another to God, but rather to lead away from the Divine order; and so one demon does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental concept to another by way of speech.
Alia autem manifestatio veritatis potest esse locutio, sicut cum unus Angelus alteri suum conceptum manifestat. Perversitas autem Daemonum hoc habet, quod unus alium non intendit ordinare ad Deum, sed magis ab ordine divino abducere. Et ideo unus Daemon alium non illuminat; sed unus alii suum conceptum per modum locutionis intimare potest.
According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or in the demons, because, as above explained (Q55, A2; Q58, A2; Q79, A2), they know from the first all that belongs to their natural knowledge. So the greater fullness of natural light in the superior demons is not able to achieve the formal aspect of enlightenment.
Secundum ea quae ad naturalem cognitionem pertinent, non est necessaria manifestatio veritatis neque in Angelis neque in Daemonibus, quia, sicut supra dictum est, statim a principio suae conditionis omnia cognoverunt quae ad naturalem cognitionem pertinent. Et ideo maior plenitudo naturalis luminis quae est in superioribus Daemonibus, non potest esse ratio illuminationis.
In Daemonibus non potest esse illuminatio proprie, quia illuminatio proprie est manifestatio veritatis, secundum quod habet ordinem ad Deum, qui illuminat omnem intellectum.
Another kind of manifestation of the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to another. Now the demon's perversity does not lead one to order another to God, but rather to lead away from the Divine order; and so one demon does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental concept to another by way of speech.
Alia autem manifestatio veritatis potest esse locutio, sicut cum unus Angelus alteri suum conceptum manifestat. Perversitas autem Daemonum hoc habet, quod unus alium non intendit ordinare ad Deum, sed magis ab ordine divino abducere. Et ideo unus Daemon alium non illuminat; sed unus alii suum conceptum per modum locutionis intimare potest.
According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or in the demons, because, as above explained (Q55, A2; Q58, A2; Q79, A2), they know from the first all that belongs to their natural knowledge. So the greater fullness of natural light in the superior demons is not able to achieve the formal aspect of enlightenment.
Secundum ea quae ad naturalem cognitionem pertinent, non est necessaria manifestatio veritatis neque in Angelis neque in Daemonibus, quia, sicut supra dictum est, statim a principio suae conditionis omnia cognoverunt quae ad naturalem cognitionem pertinent. Et ideo maior plenitudo naturalis luminis quae est in superioribus Daemonibus, non potest esse ratio illuminationis.
Tuesday, July 21, 2009
Q109 A2: Whether among the demons there is precedence?
Yes. The demons are by natural order subject to others and hence their actions are subject to the action of those above them (and this is what the formal aspect is of precedence--that the action of the subject should be under the action of the one presiding), because the very natural disposition of the demons requires that there should be authority among them.
Daemonum quidam naturali ordine sub aliis constituuntur; unde et actiones eorum sub actionibus superiorum sunt (et hoc est quod rationem praelationis facit, ut scilicet actio subditi subdatur actioni praelati), quia ipsa naturalis dispositio Daemonum requirit quod sit in eis praelatio.
The concord of the demons, whereby some obey others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common wickedness whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness.
Concordia Daemonum, qua quidam aliis obediunt, non est ex amicitia quam inter se habeant; sed ex communi nequitia, qua homines odiunt, et Dei iustitiae repugnant. Est enim proprium hominum impiorum, ut eis se adiungant et subiiciant, ad propriam nequitiam exequendam, quos potiores viribus vident.
That the inferior are subject to the superior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their detriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to unhappiness, it follows that to preside in evil is to be more unhappy.
Quod autem superioribus inferiores subdantur, non est ad bonum superiorum, sed magis ad malum eorum; quia cum mala facere maxime ad miseriam pertineat, praeesse in malis est esse magis miserum.
The demons are not equal in nature, and so among them there exists a natural precedence: which is not the case with men, who are naturally equal.
Daemones non sunt aequales secundum naturam, unde in eis est naturalis praelatio: quod in hominibus non contingit, qui natura sunt pares.
Daemonum quidam naturali ordine sub aliis constituuntur; unde et actiones eorum sub actionibus superiorum sunt (et hoc est quod rationem praelationis facit, ut scilicet actio subditi subdatur actioni praelati), quia ipsa naturalis dispositio Daemonum requirit quod sit in eis praelatio.
The concord of the demons, whereby some obey others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common wickedness whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness.
Concordia Daemonum, qua quidam aliis obediunt, non est ex amicitia quam inter se habeant; sed ex communi nequitia, qua homines odiunt, et Dei iustitiae repugnant. Est enim proprium hominum impiorum, ut eis se adiungant et subiiciant, ad propriam nequitiam exequendam, quos potiores viribus vident.
That the inferior are subject to the superior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their detriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to unhappiness, it follows that to preside in evil is to be more unhappy.
Quod autem superioribus inferiores subdantur, non est ad bonum superiorum, sed magis ad malum eorum; quia cum mala facere maxime ad miseriam pertineat, praeesse in malis est esse magis miserum.
The demons are not equal in nature, and so among them there exists a natural precedence: which is not the case with men, who are naturally equal.
Daemones non sunt aequales secundum naturam, unde in eis est naturalis praelatio: quod in hominibus non contingit, qui natura sunt pares.
Monday, July 20, 2009
Q109 A1: Whether there are orders among the demons?
Yes. In the bad angels there are orders because order in the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature and according to that of grace.
In malis Angelis sunt aliqui ordines quia ordo angelicus consideratur et secundum gradum naturae, et secundum gradum gratiae.
Now grace has a twofold state, the imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of consummae glory.
Gratia vero habet duplicem statum, scilicet imperfectum, qui est status merendi; et perfectum, qui est status gloriae consummatae.
If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic orders, and never were.
Si ergo considerentur ordines angelici quantum ad perfectionem gloriae, sic Daemones neque sunt in ordinibus angelicis, neque unquam fuerunt.
But if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in that view the demons were at the time in the orders of angels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above (Q62, A3), that all the angels were created in grace.
Si autem considerentur quantum ad id quod est gratiae imperfectae, sic Daemones fuerunt quidem aliquando in ordinibus Angelorum, sed ab eis ceciderunt; secundum illud quod supra posuimus, omnes Angelos in gratia creatos fuisse.
But if we consider them in the light of nature, in that view they are still in those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Si autem considerentur quantum ad id quod est naturae, sic adhuc sunt in ordinibus, quia data naturalia non amiserunt, ut Dionysius dicit.
In malis Angelis sunt aliqui ordines quia ordo angelicus consideratur et secundum gradum naturae, et secundum gradum gratiae.
Now grace has a twofold state, the imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of consummae glory.
Gratia vero habet duplicem statum, scilicet imperfectum, qui est status merendi; et perfectum, qui est status gloriae consummatae.
If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic orders, and never were.
Si ergo considerentur ordines angelici quantum ad perfectionem gloriae, sic Daemones neque sunt in ordinibus angelicis, neque unquam fuerunt.
But if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in that view the demons were at the time in the orders of angels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above (Q62, A3), that all the angels were created in grace.
Si autem considerentur quantum ad id quod est gratiae imperfectae, sic Daemones fuerunt quidem aliquando in ordinibus Angelorum, sed ab eis ceciderunt; secundum illud quod supra posuimus, omnes Angelos in gratia creatos fuisse.
But if we consider them in the light of nature, in that view they are still in those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Si autem considerentur quantum ad id quod est naturae, sic adhuc sunt in ordinibus, quia data naturalia non amiserunt, ut Dionysius dicit.
Sunday, July 19, 2009
Q108 A8: Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?
Yes. Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction will always remain. In view of this distinction, some asserted that men can in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this is erroneous, contradicting as it does the promise of Christ saying that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven (Luke 20:36). For whatever belongs to nature is the material part of an order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which depends on the liberality of God, and not on the order of nature. Therefore by the gift of grace men can merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this implies that men are taken up into the orders of the angels. Some, however, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic orders, but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other will constitute their own order, as it were, corresponding to the whole society of the angels. But this is against what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), that "there will not be two societies of men and angels, but only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to God alone."
Si ergo considerentur Angelorum ordines solum quantum ad gradum naturae, sic homines nullo modo assumi possunt ad ordines Angelorum, quia semper remanebit naturarum distinctio. Quam quidam considerantes, posuerunt quod nullo modo homines transferri possunt ad aequalitatem Angelorum. Quod est erroneum, repugnat enim promissioni Christi, dicentis, Lucae XX, quod filii resurrectionis erunt aequales Angelis in caelis. Illud enim quod est ex parte naturae, se habet ut materiale in ratione ordinis, completivum vero est quod est ex dono gratiae, quae dependet ex liberalitate Dei, non ex ordine naturae. Et ideo per donum gratiae homines mereri possunt tantam gloriam, ut Angelis aequentur secundum singulos Angelorum gradus. Quod est homines ad ordines Angelorum assumi. Quidam tamen dicunt quod ad ordines Angelorum non assumuntur omnes qui salvantur, sed soli virgines vel perfecti; alii vero suum ordinem constituent, quasi condivisum toti societati Angelorum. Sed hoc est contra Augustinum, qui dicit XII de Civ. Dei, quod "non erunt duae societates hominum et Angelorum, sed una, quia omnium beatitudo est adhaerere uni Deo."
Si ergo considerentur Angelorum ordines solum quantum ad gradum naturae, sic homines nullo modo assumi possunt ad ordines Angelorum, quia semper remanebit naturarum distinctio. Quam quidam considerantes, posuerunt quod nullo modo homines transferri possunt ad aequalitatem Angelorum. Quod est erroneum, repugnat enim promissioni Christi, dicentis, Lucae XX, quod filii resurrectionis erunt aequales Angelis in caelis. Illud enim quod est ex parte naturae, se habet ut materiale in ratione ordinis, completivum vero est quod est ex dono gratiae, quae dependet ex liberalitate Dei, non ex ordine naturae. Et ideo per donum gratiae homines mereri possunt tantam gloriam, ut Angelis aequentur secundum singulos Angelorum gradus. Quod est homines ad ordines Angelorum assumi. Quidam tamen dicunt quod ad ordines Angelorum non assumuntur omnes qui salvantur, sed soli virgines vel perfecti; alii vero suum ordinem constituent, quasi condivisum toti societati Angelorum. Sed hoc est contra Augustinum, qui dicit XII de Civ. Dei, quod "non erunt duae societates hominum et Angelorum, sed una, quia omnium beatitudo est adhaerere uni Deo."
Q108 A7: Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?
Yes. The angels will ever remain in their orders because although after the Day of Judgment men will not be led any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those who are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry.
Angeli semper in suis ordinibus remanebunt quia etsi post diem iudicii homines non sint ulterius ad salutem adducendi per ministerium Angelorum; tamen illi qui iam salutem erunt consecuti, aliquam illustrationem habebunt per Angelorum officia.
Since the inferior angels know the formal aspects of the Divine works by the light of the superior angels, their cognition depends on the light of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the preserving of the cognition possessed. So, although after the Judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the cognition of some things, still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior angels.
Cum inferiores Angeli rationes divinorum operum cognoscant per lumen superiorum Angelorum, dependet eorum cognitio ex lumine superiorum, non solum quantum ad novam acquisitionem scientiae, sed etiam quantum ad cognitionis conservationem. Licet ergo post iudicium non proficiant inferiores Angeli in cognitione aliquarum rerum, non tamen propter hoc excluditur quin a superioribus illuminentur.
Angeli semper in suis ordinibus remanebunt quia etsi post diem iudicii homines non sint ulterius ad salutem adducendi per ministerium Angelorum; tamen illi qui iam salutem erunt consecuti, aliquam illustrationem habebunt per Angelorum officia.
Since the inferior angels know the formal aspects of the Divine works by the light of the superior angels, their cognition depends on the light of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the preserving of the cognition possessed. So, although after the Judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the cognition of some things, still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior angels.
Cum inferiores Angeli rationes divinorum operum cognoscant per lumen superiorum Angelorum, dependet eorum cognitio ex lumine superiorum, non solum quantum ad novam acquisitionem scientiae, sed etiam quantum ad cognitionis conservationem. Licet ergo post iudicium non proficiant inferiores Angeli in cognitione aliquarum rerum, non tamen propter hoc excluditur quin a superioribus illuminentur.
Q108 A6: Whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned?
Yes. The highest hierarchy contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the universal causes; and third in their application to particular effects: because God is the end not only of the angelic ministrations, but also of the whole creation, it belongs to the first hierarchy to consider the end; to the middle one belongs the universal disposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs the application of this disposition to the effect, which is the carrying out of the work; for it is clear that these three things exist in every kind of operation.
Prima hierarchia accipit rationes rerum in ipso Deo; secunda vero in causis universalibus; tertia vero secundum determinationem ad speciales effectus: Et quia Deus est finis non solum angelicorum ministeriorum, sed etiam totius creaturae, ad primam hierarchiam pertinet consideratio finis; ad mediam vero dispositio universalis de agendis; ad ultimam autem applicatio dispositionis ad effectum, quae est operis executio; haec enim tria manifestum est in qualibet operatione inveniri.
Prima hierarchia accipit rationes rerum in ipso Deo; secunda vero in causis universalibus; tertia vero secundum determinationem ad speciales effectus: Et quia Deus est finis non solum angelicorum ministeriorum, sed etiam totius creaturae, ad primam hierarchiam pertinet consideratio finis; ad mediam vero dispositio universalis de agendis; ad ultimam autem applicatio dispositionis ad effectum, quae est operis executio; haec enim tria manifestum est in qualibet operatione inveniri.
Thursday, July 16, 2009
Q108 A5: Whether the orders of the angels are properly named?
Yes. In the names of the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of each order expresses its property, because we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are all more excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels.
In nominatione angelicorum ordinum, considerare oportet quod "propria nomina singulorum ordinum proprietates eorum designant", quia considerandum est in ordinibus Angelorum, quod omnes spirituales perfectiones sunt omnibus Angelis communes et quod omnes abundantius existunt in superioribus quam in inferioribus.
Further, as in these perfections there are grades, the superior perfection belongs to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by participation; and conversely the inferior perfection belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by way of excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the superior perfection.
Sed cum in ipsis etiam perfectionibus sit quidam gradus, superior perfectio attribuitur superiori ordini per proprietatem, inferiori vero per participationem, e converso autem inferior attribuitur inferiori per proprietatem, superiori autem per excessum. Et ita superior ordo a superiori perfectione nominatur.
The name "Seraphim" is found in Isaiah 6:2; the name "Cherubim" in Ezekiel 1 (Cf. 10:15-20); "Thrones" in Colossians 1:16; "Dominations," "Virtues," "Powers," and "Principalities" are mentioned in Ephesians 1:21; the name "Archangels" in the canonical epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name "Angels" is found in many places of Scripture.
Nomen enim Seraphim ponitur Isaiae VI; nomen Cherubim Ezech. I; nomen thronorum, Coloss. I; dominationes autem et virtutes et potestates et principatus ponuntur Ephes. I; nomen autem Archangeli ponitur in canonica Iudae, nomina autem Angelorum in pluribus Scripturae locis.
In nominatione angelicorum ordinum, considerare oportet quod "propria nomina singulorum ordinum proprietates eorum designant", quia considerandum est in ordinibus Angelorum, quod omnes spirituales perfectiones sunt omnibus Angelis communes et quod omnes abundantius existunt in superioribus quam in inferioribus.
Further, as in these perfections there are grades, the superior perfection belongs to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by participation; and conversely the inferior perfection belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by way of excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the superior perfection.
Sed cum in ipsis etiam perfectionibus sit quidam gradus, superior perfectio attribuitur superiori ordini per proprietatem, inferiori vero per participationem, e converso autem inferior attribuitur inferiori per proprietatem, superiori autem per excessum. Et ita superior ordo a superiori perfectione nominatur.
The name "Seraphim" is found in Isaiah 6:2; the name "Cherubim" in Ezekiel 1 (Cf. 10:15-20); "Thrones" in Colossians 1:16; "Dominations," "Virtues," "Powers," and "Principalities" are mentioned in Ephesians 1:21; the name "Archangels" in the canonical epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name "Angels" is found in many places of Scripture.
Nomen enim Seraphim ponitur Isaiae VI; nomen Cherubim Ezech. I; nomen thronorum, Coloss. I; dominationes autem et virtutes et potestates et principatus ponuntur Ephes. I; nomen autem Archangeli ponitur in canonica Iudae, nomina autem Angelorum in pluribus Scripturae locis.
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
Q108 A4: Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders comes from the angelic nature?
Yes. The distinction of orders among the angels is not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature, because the end of the angels may be considered in two ways.
Distinctio ordinum in Angelis est non solum secundum dona gratuita, sed etiam secundum dona naturalia, quia finis autem Angelorum potest accipi dupliciter.
First, according to the faculty of nature, so that they may know and love God by natural knowledge and love; and according to their relation to this end the orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts.
Uno modo, secundum facultatem suae naturae, ut scilicet cognoscant et ament Deum naturali cognitione et amore. Et secundum respectum ad hunc finem, distinguuntur ordines Angelorum secundum naturalia dona.
Secondly, the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above their natural powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which end they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the gifts of grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts according to the capacity of their natural gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained (Q62, A6). Hence among men the orders are distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts.
Alio modo potest accipi finis angelicae multitudinis supra naturalem facultatem eorum, qui consistit in visione divinae essentiae, et in immobili fruitione bonitatis ipsius; ad quem finem pertingere non possunt nisi per gratiam. Unde secundum respectum ad hunc finem, ordines distinguuntur in Angelis completive quidem secundum dona gratuita, dispositive autem secundum dona naturalia, quia Angelis data sunt dona gratuita secundum capacitatem naturalium, quod non est in hominibus, ut supra dictum est. Unde in hominibus distinguuntur ordines secundum dona gratuita tantum, et non secundum naturam.
Distinctio ordinum in Angelis est non solum secundum dona gratuita, sed etiam secundum dona naturalia, quia finis autem Angelorum potest accipi dupliciter.
First, according to the faculty of nature, so that they may know and love God by natural knowledge and love; and according to their relation to this end the orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts.
Uno modo, secundum facultatem suae naturae, ut scilicet cognoscant et ament Deum naturali cognitione et amore. Et secundum respectum ad hunc finem, distinguuntur ordines Angelorum secundum naturalia dona.
Secondly, the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above their natural powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which end they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the gifts of grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts according to the capacity of their natural gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained (Q62, A6). Hence among men the orders are distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts.
Alio modo potest accipi finis angelicae multitudinis supra naturalem facultatem eorum, qui consistit in visione divinae essentiae, et in immobili fruitione bonitatis ipsius; ad quem finem pertingere non possunt nisi per gratiam. Unde secundum respectum ad hunc finem, ordines distinguuntur in Angelis completive quidem secundum dona gratuita, dispositive autem secundum dona naturalia, quia Angelis data sunt dona gratuita secundum capacitatem naturalium, quod non est in hominibus, ut supra dictum est. Unde in hominibus distinguuntur ordines secundum dona gratuita tantum, et non secundum naturam.
Q108 A3: Whether there are many angels in one order?
Yes. We can only distinguish the angelic offices and orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order, because our knowledge of the angels is imperfect.
Non possumus distinguere officia et ordines Angelorum, nisi in communi, secundum quem modum, multi Angeli sub uno ordine continentur, quia nos imperfecte Angelos cognoscimus, et eorum officia.
But if we knew the offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly, we should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order among things, and much more so than any star, though this be hidden from us.
Si autem perfecte cognosceremus officia Angelorum, et eorum distinctiones, perfecte sciremus quod quilibet Angelus habet suum proprium officium et suum proprium ordinem in rebus, multo magis quam quaelibet stella, etsi nos lateat.
All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but absolutely speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those who are first, middle, and last.
Omnes Angeli unius ordinis sunt aliquo modo aequales, quantum ad communem similitudinem secundum quam constituuntur in uno ordine, sed simpliciter non sunt aequales. Unde Dionysius dicit, X cap. Cael. Hier., quod in uno et eodem ordine Angelorum, est accipere primos, medios et ultimos.
Non possumus distinguere officia et ordines Angelorum, nisi in communi, secundum quem modum, multi Angeli sub uno ordine continentur, quia nos imperfecte Angelos cognoscimus, et eorum officia.
But if we knew the offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly, we should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order among things, and much more so than any star, though this be hidden from us.
Si autem perfecte cognosceremus officia Angelorum, et eorum distinctiones, perfecte sciremus quod quilibet Angelus habet suum proprium officium et suum proprium ordinem in rebus, multo magis quam quaelibet stella, etsi nos lateat.
All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but absolutely speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those who are first, middle, and last.
Omnes Angeli unius ordinis sunt aliquo modo aequales, quantum ad communem similitudinem secundum quam constituuntur in uno ordine, sed simpliciter non sunt aequales. Unde Dionysius dicit, X cap. Cael. Hier., quod in uno et eodem ordine Angelorum, est accipere primos, medios et ultimos.
Monday, July 13, 2009
Q108 A2: Whether there are several orders in one hierarchy?
Yes. The formal aspect of a hierarchy requires diversity of orders because one hierarchy is one principality; that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the rule of a prince. Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but confused, if there were not in it different orders.
Ipsa ratio hierarchiae requirit ordinum diversitatem quia una hierarchia est unus principatus; idest una multitudo ordinata uno modo sub principis gubernatione. Non autem esset multitudo ordinata, sed confusa, si in multitudine diversi ordines non essent.
We find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to their actions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to three: namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base. And so in every hierarchy Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi).
In qualibet hierarchia angelica ordines distinguuntur secundum diversos actus et officia, et omnis ista diversitas ad tria reducitur: scilicet ad summum, medium et infimum. Et propter hoc in qualibet hierarchia Dionysius ponit tres ordines.
Ipsa ratio hierarchiae requirit ordinum diversitatem quia una hierarchia est unus principatus; idest una multitudo ordinata uno modo sub principis gubernatione. Non autem esset multitudo ordinata, sed confusa, si in multitudine diversi ordines non essent.
We find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to their actions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to three: namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base. And so in every hierarchy Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi).
In qualibet hierarchia angelica ordines distinguuntur secundum diversos actus et officia, et omnis ista diversitas ad tria reducitur: scilicet ad summum, medium et infimum. Et propter hoc in qualibet hierarchia Dionysius ponit tres ordines.
Sunday, July 12, 2009
Q108 A1: Whether all the angels are of one hierarchy?
No. Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distinguishes three hierarchies of angels because the superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the inferior angels.
Dionysius, VI cap. Cael. Hier., distinguit tres hierarchias Angelorum quia superiores Angeli habent universaliorem cognitionem veritatis quam inferiores.
This sort of universal cognitive reception has three grades among the angels. For the formal aspects of things, concerning which the angels are enlightened, can be considered in a threefold manner.
Huiusmodi autem universalis acceptio cognitionis secundum tres gradus in Angelis distingui potest. Possunt enim rationes rerum, de quibus Angeli illuminantur, considerari tripliciter.
First as proceeding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of knowledge belongs to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with God, and, "as it were, placed in the vestibule of God," as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii).
Primo quidem, secundum quod procedunt a primo principio universali, quod est Deus, et iste modus convenit primae hierarchiae, quae immediate ad Deum extenditur, et "quasi in vestibulis Dei collocatur", ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier.
Secondly, inasmuch as these formal aspects depend on the universal created causes, which in some way are already multiplied; and this mode [of cognitive reception] belongs to the second hierarchy.
Secundo vero, prout huiusmodi rationes dependent ab universalibus causis creatis, quae iam aliquo modo multiplicantur, et hic modus convenit secundae hierarchiae.
Thirdly, inasmuch as these formal aspects are applied to individual things and depending on their proper causes; and this mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy.
Tertio autem modo, secundum quod huiusmodi rationes applicantur singulis rebus, et prout dependent a propriis causis, et hic modus convenit infimae hierarchiae.
Dionysius, VI cap. Cael. Hier., distinguit tres hierarchias Angelorum quia superiores Angeli habent universaliorem cognitionem veritatis quam inferiores.
This sort of universal cognitive reception has three grades among the angels. For the formal aspects of things, concerning which the angels are enlightened, can be considered in a threefold manner.
Huiusmodi autem universalis acceptio cognitionis secundum tres gradus in Angelis distingui potest. Possunt enim rationes rerum, de quibus Angeli illuminantur, considerari tripliciter.
First as proceeding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of knowledge belongs to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with God, and, "as it were, placed in the vestibule of God," as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii).
Primo quidem, secundum quod procedunt a primo principio universali, quod est Deus, et iste modus convenit primae hierarchiae, quae immediate ad Deum extenditur, et "quasi in vestibulis Dei collocatur", ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier.
Secondly, inasmuch as these formal aspects depend on the universal created causes, which in some way are already multiplied; and this mode [of cognitive reception] belongs to the second hierarchy.
Secundo vero, prout huiusmodi rationes dependent ab universalibus causis creatis, quae iam aliquo modo multiplicantur, et hic modus convenit secundae hierarchiae.
Thirdly, inasmuch as these formal aspects are applied to individual things and depending on their proper causes; and this mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy.
Tertio autem modo, secundum quod huiusmodi rationes applicantur singulis rebus, et prout dependent a propriis causis, et hic modus convenit infimae hierarchiae.
Q108: The angelic degrees of hierarchies and orders
- Do all the angels belong to one hierarchy?
- In one hierarchy, is there only one order?
- In one order, are there many angels?
- Is the distinction of hierarchies and orders natural?
- The names and properties of each order
- The comparison of the orders to one another
- Will the orders outlast the Day of Judgment?
- Are men taken up into the angelic orders?
Saturday, July 11, 2009
Q107 A5: Whether all the angels know what one speaks to another?
No. One man can speak to another alone; much more can this be the case among the angels, because the mental concept of one angel can be perceived by another, when the angel who possesses the concept, refers it by his will to another.
Unus homo potest alteri soli loqui; multo igitur magis hoc in Angelis esse potest, quia conceptus mentis unius Angeli percipi potest ab altero, per hoc quod ille cuius est conceptus, sua voluntate ordinat ipsum ad alterum.
Unus homo potest alteri soli loqui; multo igitur magis hoc in Angelis esse potest, quia conceptus mentis unius Angeli percipi potest ab altero, per hoc quod ille cuius est conceptus, sua voluntate ordinat ipsum ad alterum.
Friday, July 10, 2009
Q107 A4: Whether local distance influences the angelic speech?
No. In the angelic speech local distance is no impediment because as regards whatever is abstracted from "here and now," neither difference of time, nor local distance, has any influence whatever.
In locutione Angeli nullum impedimentum facit distantia loci quia in eo quod est omnino abstractum a loco et tempore, nihil operatur, neque temporis diversitas, neque loci distantia.
In locutione Angeli nullum impedimentum facit distantia loci quia in eo quod est omnino abstractum a loco et tempore, nihil operatur, neque temporis diversitas, neque loci distantia.
Thursday, July 09, 2009
Q107 A3: Whether an angel speaks to God?
Yes. An angel speaks to God because the angel speaks by ordering his mental concept to something else.
Loquitur Angelus Deo quia locutio Angeli est per hoc, quod conceptus mentis ordinatur ad alterum.
Speech is not always for the purpose of making something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the disciples ask instruction from the master.
Locutio non semper est ad manifestandum alteri; sed quandoque ad hoc ordinatur finaliter, ut loquenti aliquid manifestetur; sicut cum discipulus quaerit aliquid a magistro.
The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of praising and admiring Him and His works. But they speak to Him by consulting Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.
Locutione qua Angeli loquuntur Deo laudantes ipsum et admirantes, semper Angeli Deo loquuntur. Sed locutione qua eius sapientiam consulunt super agendis, tunc ei loquuntur, quando aliquod novum per eos agendum occurrit, super quo desiderant illuminari.
Loquitur Angelus Deo quia locutio Angeli est per hoc, quod conceptus mentis ordinatur ad alterum.
Speech is not always for the purpose of making something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the disciples ask instruction from the master.
Locutio non semper est ad manifestandum alteri; sed quandoque ad hoc ordinatur finaliter, ut loquenti aliquid manifestetur; sicut cum discipulus quaerit aliquid a magistro.
The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of praising and admiring Him and His works. But they speak to Him by consulting Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.
Locutione qua Angeli loquuntur Deo laudantes ipsum et admirantes, semper Angeli Deo loquuntur. Sed locutione qua eius sapientiam consulunt super agendis, tunc ei loquuntur, quando aliquod novum per eos agendum occurrit, super quo desiderant illuminari.
Wednesday, July 08, 2009
Q107 A2: Whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior?
Yes. The inferior angels can speak to the superior because the manifestation of what belongs to the will, is conveyed to others by the one who wills.
Angeli inferiores superioribus loqui possunt quia manifestatio eorum quae ad voluntatem pertinent, per ipsum volentem deducitur ad alios quoscumque.
Angeli inferiores superioribus loqui possunt quia manifestatio eorum quae ad voluntatem pertinent, per ipsum volentem deducitur ad alios quoscumque.
Tuesday, July 07, 2009
Q107 A1: Whether one angel speaks to another?
Yes. The angels speak in a certain way because as sense is aroused by the sensible sign, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power.
In Angelis est aliqua locutio quia sicut per signum sensibile excitatur sensus, ita per aliquam virtutem intelligibilem potest excitari mens Angeli ad attendendum.
By the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the angel himself, the concept of the mind of one angel is made known to another. In this way one angel speaks to another. For to speak to another only means to make known the mental concept to another.
Ex hoc vero quod conceptus mentis angelicae ordinatur ad manifestandum alteri, per voluntatem ipsius Angeli, conceptus mentis unius Angeli innotescit alteri. Et sic loquitur unus Angelus alteri. Nihil est enim aliud loqui ad alterum, quam conceptum mentis alteri manifestare.
When the mind turns itself to the actual consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is called "the interior word."
Quando autem mens convertit se ad actu considerandum quod habet in habitu, loquitur aliquis sibi ipsi, nam ipse conceptus mentis "interius verbum" vocatur.
External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit an angel, but only interior speech belongs to him; and this includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also its being ordered to another's knowledge by the will.
Locutio exterior, quae fit per vocem, est nobis necessaria propter obstaculum corporis. Unde non convenit Angelo, sed sola locutio interior; ad quam pertinet non solum quod loquatur sibi interius concipiendo, sed etiam quod ordinet per voluntatem ad alterius manifestationem.
Gregory says (Moral. ii): "It is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech."
Dicit Gregorius II Moral., "dignum est ut mens nostra, qualitatem corporeae locutionis excedens, ad sublimes atque incognitos modos locutionis intimae suspendatur."
In Angelis est aliqua locutio quia sicut per signum sensibile excitatur sensus, ita per aliquam virtutem intelligibilem potest excitari mens Angeli ad attendendum.
By the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the angel himself, the concept of the mind of one angel is made known to another. In this way one angel speaks to another. For to speak to another only means to make known the mental concept to another.
Ex hoc vero quod conceptus mentis angelicae ordinatur ad manifestandum alteri, per voluntatem ipsius Angeli, conceptus mentis unius Angeli innotescit alteri. Et sic loquitur unus Angelus alteri. Nihil est enim aliud loqui ad alterum, quam conceptum mentis alteri manifestare.
When the mind turns itself to the actual consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is called "the interior word."
Quando autem mens convertit se ad actu considerandum quod habet in habitu, loquitur aliquis sibi ipsi, nam ipse conceptus mentis "interius verbum" vocatur.
External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit an angel, but only interior speech belongs to him; and this includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also its being ordered to another's knowledge by the will.
Locutio exterior, quae fit per vocem, est nobis necessaria propter obstaculum corporis. Unde non convenit Angelo, sed sola locutio interior; ad quam pertinet non solum quod loquatur sibi interius concipiendo, sed etiam quod ordinet per voluntatem ad alterius manifestationem.
Gregory says (Moral. ii): "It is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech."
Dicit Gregorius II Moral., "dignum est ut mens nostra, qualitatem corporeae locutionis excedens, ad sublimes atque incognitos modos locutionis intimae suspendatur."
Monday, July 06, 2009
Q106 A4: Whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he himself knows?
Yes. Every creature participates in the Divine goodness, so as to diffuse the good it possesses to others, because it is of the formal aspect of good that it communicates itself to others.
Omnes creaturae ex divina bonitate participant ut bonum quod habent, in alia diffundant, nam de ratione boni est quod se aliis communicet.
Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior as by the superior angels. And therefore the superior ever remain in a higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge. Just as the master understands one and the same thing more fully than the pupil who learns from him.
Non tamen recipitur ab inferioribus ita excellenter sicut est in superioribus. Et ideo superiores semper remanent in altiori ordine, et perfectiorem scientiam habentes. Sicut unam et eandem rem plenius intelligit magister, quam discipulus qui ab eo addiscit.
Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is always something for the superior angels to make known to the inferior.
Usque ad diem iudicii, semper nova aliqua supremis Angelis revelantur divinitus de his quae pertinent ad dispositionem mundi, et praecipue ad salutem electorum. Unde semper remanet unde superiores Angeli inferiores illuminent.
The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge.
Superiorum Angelorum scientia dicitur esse universalior, quantum ad eminentiorem modum intelligendi.
Omnes creaturae ex divina bonitate participant ut bonum quod habent, in alia diffundant, nam de ratione boni est quod se aliis communicet.
Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior as by the superior angels. And therefore the superior ever remain in a higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge. Just as the master understands one and the same thing more fully than the pupil who learns from him.
Non tamen recipitur ab inferioribus ita excellenter sicut est in superioribus. Et ideo superiores semper remanent in altiori ordine, et perfectiorem scientiam habentes. Sicut unam et eandem rem plenius intelligit magister, quam discipulus qui ab eo addiscit.
Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is always something for the superior angels to make known to the inferior.
Usque ad diem iudicii, semper nova aliqua supremis Angelis revelantur divinitus de his quae pertinent ad dispositionem mundi, et praecipue ad salutem electorum. Unde semper remanet unde superiores Angeli inferiores illuminent.
The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge.
Superiorum Angelorum scientia dicitur esse universalior, quantum ad eminentiorem modum intelligendi.
Sunday, July 05, 2009
Q106 A3: Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?
No. The inferior angels never enlighten the superior, but are always enlightened by them, because one order is under another, as cause is under cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to order.
Inferiores Angeli nunquam illuminant superiores, sed semper ab eis illuminantur, quia, sicut supra dictum est, ordo continetur sub ordine, sicut causa continetur sub causa. Unde sicut ordinatur causa ad causam, ita ordo ad ordinem.
God may work something miraculously outside the order of corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the order that belongs to spiritual substances, in no way belongs to the ordering of men to God, since the angelic operations are not made known to us, as are the operations of sensible bodies.
Praeter ordinem naturae corporalis, aliquid Deus miraculose operetur, ad ordinandum homines in eius cognitionem. Sed praetermissio ordinis qui debetur spiritualibus substantiis, in nullo pertinet ad ordinationem hominum in Deum, cum operationes Angelorum non sint nobis manifestae, sicut operationes visibilium corporum.
Thus the order which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God, so that the inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not conversely.
Et ideo ordo qui convenit spiritualibus substantiis, nunquam a Deo praetermittitur, quin semper inferiora moveantur per superiora, et non e converso.
Dionysius says that "this is the Divine unalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior" (Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v).
Dionysius dicit "hanc legem esse divinitatis immobiliter firmatam, ut inferiora reducantur in Deum per superiora."
Inferiores Angeli nunquam illuminant superiores, sed semper ab eis illuminantur, quia, sicut supra dictum est, ordo continetur sub ordine, sicut causa continetur sub causa. Unde sicut ordinatur causa ad causam, ita ordo ad ordinem.
God may work something miraculously outside the order of corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the order that belongs to spiritual substances, in no way belongs to the ordering of men to God, since the angelic operations are not made known to us, as are the operations of sensible bodies.
Praeter ordinem naturae corporalis, aliquid Deus miraculose operetur, ad ordinandum homines in eius cognitionem. Sed praetermissio ordinis qui debetur spiritualibus substantiis, in nullo pertinet ad ordinationem hominum in Deum, cum operationes Angelorum non sint nobis manifestae, sicut operationes visibilium corporum.
Thus the order which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God, so that the inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not conversely.
Et ideo ordo qui convenit spiritualibus substantiis, nunquam a Deo praetermittitur, quin semper inferiora moveantur per superiora, et non e converso.
Dionysius says that "this is the Divine unalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior" (Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v).
Dionysius dicit "hanc legem esse divinitatis immobiliter firmatam, ut inferiora reducantur in Deum per superiora."
Saturday, July 04, 2009
Q106 A2: Whether one angel moves another angel's will?
No. An angel cannot move another angel's will because on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by God.
Unus Angelus voluntatem alterius movere non potest quia ex parte vero ipsius potentiae, voluntas nullo modo potest moveri nisi a Deo.
For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination, Who bestowed on the creature the power to will.
Operatio enim voluntatis est inclinatio quaedam volentis in volitum. Hanc autem inclinationem solus ille immutare potest, qui virtutem volendi creaturae contulit.
Unus Angelus voluntatem alterius movere non potest quia ex parte vero ipsius potentiae, voluntas nullo modo potest moveri nisi a Deo.
For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination, Who bestowed on the creature the power to will.
Operatio enim voluntatis est inclinatio quaedam volentis in volitum. Hanc autem inclinationem solus ille immutare potest, qui virtutem volendi creaturae contulit.
Q106 A1: Whether one angel enlightens another?
Yes. One angel enlightens another because a superior angel knows more about the formal aspects of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and concerning these the former enlightens the latter; and as to this Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels "are enlightened by the formal aspects of existing things."
Unus Angelus illuminat alium quia superior Angelus plura in Deo de rationibus divinorum operum cognoscit quam inferior; et de his eum illuminat. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod "Angeli existentium illuminantur rationibus."
For the superior angel receives the knowledge of truth by a kind of universal conception, to receive which the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner. Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth which he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge.
Superior enim Angelus notitiam veritatis accipit in universali quadam conceptione, ad quam capiendam inferioris Angeli intellectus non esset sufficiens, sed est ei connaturale ut magis particulariter veritatem accipiat. Superior ergo Angelus veritatem quam universaliter concipit, quodammodo distinguit, ut ab inferiori capi possit; et sic eam cognoscendam illi proponit.
Thus it is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into many points the knowledge which he possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): "Every intellectual substance with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its inferiors upwards by analogy."
Sicut etiam apud nos, doctores, quod in summa capiunt, multipliciter distinguunt, providentes capacitati aliorum. Et hoc est quod Dionysius dicit, XV cap. Cael. Hier., "unaquaeque substantia intellectualis datam sibi a diviniore uniformem intelligentiam, provida virtute dividit et multiplicat, ad inferioris sursum ductricem analogiam."
An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace, and of glory.
Unus Angelus non illuminat alium tradendo ei lumen naturae vel gratiae vel gloriae; sed confortando lumen naturale ipsius, et manifestando ei veritatem de his quae pertinent ad statum naturae, gratiae et gloriae.
Unus Angelus illuminat alium quia superior Angelus plura in Deo de rationibus divinorum operum cognoscit quam inferior; et de his eum illuminat. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod "Angeli existentium illuminantur rationibus."
For the superior angel receives the knowledge of truth by a kind of universal conception, to receive which the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner. Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth which he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge.
Superior enim Angelus notitiam veritatis accipit in universali quadam conceptione, ad quam capiendam inferioris Angeli intellectus non esset sufficiens, sed est ei connaturale ut magis particulariter veritatem accipiat. Superior ergo Angelus veritatem quam universaliter concipit, quodammodo distinguit, ut ab inferiori capi possit; et sic eam cognoscendam illi proponit.
Thus it is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into many points the knowledge which he possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): "Every intellectual substance with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its inferiors upwards by analogy."
Sicut etiam apud nos, doctores, quod in summa capiunt, multipliciter distinguunt, providentes capacitati aliorum. Et hoc est quod Dionysius dicit, XV cap. Cael. Hier., "unaquaeque substantia intellectualis datam sibi a diviniore uniformem intelligentiam, provida virtute dividit et multiplicat, ad inferioris sursum ductricem analogiam."
An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace, and of glory.
Unus Angelus non illuminat alium tradendo ei lumen naturae vel gratiae vel gloriae; sed confortando lumen naturale ipsius, et manifestando ei veritatem de his quae pertinent ad statum naturae, gratiae et gloriae.
Thursday, July 02, 2009
Q105 A8: Whether one miracle is greater than another?
Yes. The more the power of nature is surpassed, the greater the miracle, because a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpasses.
Secundum quod magis excedit facultatem naturae, secundum hoc maius miraculum dicitur, quia dicitur aliquid miraculum per comparationem ad facultatem naturae, quam excedit.
Secundum quod magis excedit facultatem naturae, secundum hoc maius miraculum dicitur, quia dicitur aliquid miraculum per comparationem ad facultatem naturae, quam excedit.
Wednesday, July 01, 2009
Q105 A7: Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous?
Yes. Those things which God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles, because a miracle is so called as being full of wonder, as having a cause absolutely hidden from all; and this cause is God.
Illa quae a Deo fiunt praeter causas nobis notas, miracula dicuntur, quia miraculum dicitur quasi admiratione plenum, quod scilicet habet causam simpliciter et omnibus occultam; haec autem est Deus.
Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do not belong to that order.
Creatio, et iustificatio impii, etsi a solo Deo fiant, non tamen, proprie loquendo, miracula dicuntur. Quia non sunt nata fieri per alias causas, et ita non contingunt praeter ordinem naturae, cum haec ad ordinem naturae non pertineant.
A miracle is said to go beyond the hope "of nature," not above the hope "of grace," which hope comes from faith, whereby we believe in the future resurrection.
Supra spem etiam naturae miraculum esse dicitur, non supra spem gratiae, quae est ex fide, per quam credimus resurrectionem futuram.
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "Where God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle."
Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod "cum Deus aliquid facit contra cognitum nobis cursum solitumque naturae, magnalia, vel mirabilia nominantur."
Illa quae a Deo fiunt praeter causas nobis notas, miracula dicuntur, quia miraculum dicitur quasi admiratione plenum, quod scilicet habet causam simpliciter et omnibus occultam; haec autem est Deus.
Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do not belong to that order.
Creatio, et iustificatio impii, etsi a solo Deo fiant, non tamen, proprie loquendo, miracula dicuntur. Quia non sunt nata fieri per alias causas, et ita non contingunt praeter ordinem naturae, cum haec ad ordinem naturae non pertineant.
A miracle is said to go beyond the hope "of nature," not above the hope "of grace," which hope comes from faith, whereby we believe in the future resurrection.
Supra spem etiam naturae miraculum esse dicitur, non supra spem gratiae, quae est ex fide, per quam credimus resurrectionem futuram.
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "Where God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle."
Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod "cum Deus aliquid facit contra cognitum nobis cursum solitumque naturae, magnalia, vel mirabilia nominantur."
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