Tuesday, May 19, 2009

Q94 A4: Whether man in his first state could be deceived?

No. As long as the state of innocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to assent to falsehood as if it were truth, because as some perfections, such as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members of the first man, though no evil could be therein, so there could be in his intellect the absence of some knowledge, but no false opinion.

Non poterat esse quod, innocentia manente, intellectus hominis alicui falso acquiesceret quasi vero, quia sicut membris corporis primi hominis erat quidem carentia perfectionis alicuius, puta claritatis, non tamen aliquod malum inesse poterat; ita in intellectu poterat esse carentia notitiae alicuius, nulla tamen poterat ibi esse existimatio falsi.

Were anything presented to the imagination or sense of the first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he would not have been deceived, because by its formal aspect he would have judged the truth.

Si aliquid repraesentatum fuisset sensui vel phantasiae primi hominis aliter quam sit in rerum natura, non tamen deciperetur, quia per rationem veritatem diiudicaret.

It is clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true (Q85, A6); and hence it is never deceived of itself; but whatever deception occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the imagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natural power of judgment is free we are not deceived by such images, but only when it is not free, as is the case in sleep. Therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state was incompatible with deception of the intellect.

Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod intellectus circa proprium obiectum semper verus est. Unde ex seipso nunquam decipitur, sed omnis deceptio accidit in intellectu ex aliquo inferiori, puta phantasia vel aliquo huiusmodi. Unde videmus quod, quando naturale iudicatorium non est ligatum, non decipimur per huiusmodi apparitiones, sed solum quando ligatur, ut patet in dormientibus. Unde manifestum est quod rectitudo primi status non compatiebatur aliquam deceptionem circa intellectum.

Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "To regard what is true as false, is not natural to man as created; but is a punishment of man condemned."

Augustinus dicit, "approbare vera pro falsis, non est natura instituti hominis, sed poena damnati."

If anyone had said something untrue as regards future contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in the primitive state would not have believed it was so: but he might have believed that such a thing was possible; which would not have been to entertain a false opinion.

Alicui dicenti falsum de contingentibus futuris vel cogitationibus cordium, homo in statu innocentiae non credidisset ita esse, sed credidisset quod hoc esset possibile, et hoc non esset existimare falsum.

It might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge did not extend.

Vel potest dici quod divinitus ei subventum fuisset, ne deciperetur in his quorum scientiam non habebat.

If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted, though he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that man had already sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to the Divine aid.

Nec est instantia, quam quidam afferunt, quod in tentatione non fuit ei subventum ne deciperetur, licet tunc maxime indigeret. Quia iam praecesserat peccatum in animo, et ad divinum auxilium recursum non habuit.

Though the woman was deceived before she sinned in deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman could not have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already acquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption of self-conceit."

Illa seductio mulieris, etsi praecesserit peccatum operis, subsecuta tamen est peccatum internae elationis. Dicit enim Augustinus, XI super Gen. ad Litt., quod "mulier verbis serpentis non crederet, nisi iam inesset menti eius amor propriae potestatis, et quaedam de se superba praesumptio."