No. That the soul of the first man fell short of the knowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact that the body was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural object fell short of the excellence of separate substances. We, in our present state, fall short on account of both these reasons.
Hoc quod anima primi hominis deficiebat ab intellectu substantiarum separatarum, non erat ex aggravatione corporis; sed ex hoc quod obiectum ei connaturale erat deficiens ab excellentia substantiarum separatarum. Nos autem deficimus propter utrumque.
Man's soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern the body.
Anima enim hominis in statu innocentiae erat corpori perficiendo et gubernando accommodata.
Since the soul is adapted to perfect and govern the body, as regards animal life, it is fitting that it should have that mode of understanding which is by turning to phantasms. Wherefore this mode of understanding was becoming to the soul of the first man also.
Anima est accommodata ad corporis gubernationem et perfectionem secundum animalem vitam, competit animae nostrae talis modus intelligendi, qui est per conversionem ad phantasmata. Unde et hic modus intelligendi etiam animae primi hominis competebat.
Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees of movement in the soul, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The first is by the soul "passing from exterior things to concentrate its powers on itself"; the second is by the soul ascending "so as to be associated with the united superior powers," namely the angels; the third is when the soul is "led on" yet further "to the supreme good," that is, to God.
Secundum autem hunc modum intelligendi, motus quidam invenitur in anima, ut Dionysius dicit IV cap. de Div. Nom., secundum tres gradus. Quorum primus est, secundum quod a rebus exterioribus congregatur anima ad seipsam; secundus autem est, prout anima ascendit ad hoc quod uniatur virtutibus superioribus unitis, scilicet Angelis; tertius autem gradus est, secundum quod ulterius manuducitur ad bonum quod est supra omnia, scilicet Deum.
In virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to itself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. This is because the intellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external things, as we have said above (Q87, A3): and so by the knowledge thereof, our intellectual operation can be known perfectly, as an act through its object. And through the intellectual operation itself, the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power through its proper act.
Secundum igitur primum processum animae, qui est a rebus exterioribus ad seipsam, perficitur animae cognitio. Quia scilicet intellectualis operatio animae naturalem ordinem habet ad ea quae sunt extra, ut supra dictum est, et ita per eorum cognitionem perfecte cognosci potest nostra intellectualis operatio, sicut actus per obiectum. Et per ipsam intellectualem operationem perfecte potest cognosci humanus intellectus, sicut potentia per proprium actum.
But in the second movement we do not find perfect knowledge. Because, since the angel does not understand by turning to phantasms, but by a far more excellent process, as we have said above (Q55, A2); the above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the soul knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of an angel.
Sed in secundo processu non invenitur perfecta cognitio. Quia, cum Angelus non intelligat per conversionem ad phantasmata, sed longe eminentiori modo, ut supra dictum est; praedictus modus cognoscendi, quo anima cognoscit seipsam, non sufficienter ducit in Angeli cognitionem.
Much less does the third movement lead to perfect knowledge: for even the angels themselves, by the fact that they know themselves, are not able to arrive at the knowledge of the Divine Substance, by reason of its surpassing excellence.
Multo autem minus tertius processus ad perfectam notitiam terminatur, quia etiam ipsi Angeli, per hoc quod cognoscunt seipsos, non possunt pertingere ad cognitionem divinae substantiae propter eius excessum.
Therefore the soul of the first man could not see the angels in their essence. Nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the angels than we possess, because his knowledge of intelligible things within him was more certain and fixed than our knowledge. And it was on account of this excellence of knowledge that Gregory says that "he enjoyed the company of the angelic spirits."
Sic igitur anima primi hominis non poterat videre Angelos per essentiam. Sed tamen excellentiorem modum cognitionis habebat de eis, quam nos habeamus, quia eius cognitio erat magis certa et fixa circa interiora intelligibilia, quam cognitio nostra. Et propter tantam eminentiam dicit Gregorius quod "intererat Angelorum spiritibus".
For Gregory says (Dialog. iv, 1): "In paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God; and by purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the good angels."
Dicit enim Gregorius, in IV Dialog., "in Paradiso quippe assueverat homo verbis Dei perfrui, beatorum Angelorum spiritibus cordis munditia et celsitudine visionis interesse."