Yes. The soul must be in the whole body, and in each part thereof, because act is in that which it actuates.
Actus autem est in eo cuius est actus. Unde oportet animam esse in toto corpore, et in qualibet eius parte.
Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely the intellect and the will, whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the body. Other powers are common to the soul and body; wherefore each of these powers need not be wherever the soul is, but only in that part of the body, which is adapted to the operation of such a power.
Potentiarum animae quaedam sunt in ea secundum quod excedit totam corporis capacitatem, scilicet intellectus et voluntas, unde huiusmodi potentiae in nulla parte corporis esse dicuntur. Aliae vero potentiae sunt communes animae et corpori; unde talium potentiarum non oportet quod quaelibet sit in quocumque est anima, sed solum in illa parte corporis quae est proportionata ad talis potentiae operationem.
An animal is that which is composed of a soul and a whole body, which is the soul's primary and proportionate perfectible. Thus the soul is not in a part.
Animal est quod componitur ex anima et corpore toto, quod est primum et proportionatum eius perfectibile. Sic autem anima non est in parte. Unde non oportet quod pars animalis sit animal.
Now the substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part of the whole. For since a whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which does not give existence to each of the parts of the body, is a form consisting in composition and order, such as the form of a house, and such a form is accidental.
Substantialis autem forma non solum est perfectio totius, sed cuiuslibet partis. Cum enim totum consistat ex partibus, forma totius quae non dat esse singulis partibus corporis, est forma quae est compositio et ordo, sicut forma domus, et talis forma est accidentalis.
But the soul is a substantial form; and therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of the whole, but also of each part.
Anima vero est forma substantialis, unde oportet quod sit forma et actus non solum totius, sed cuiuslibet partis.
That it is entire in each part thereof, may be concluded from this, that since a whole is that which is divided into parts, there are three kinds of totality, corresponding to three kinds of division. (1) There is a whole which is divided into parts of quantity, as a whole line, or a whole body.
Et quod tota sit in qualibet parte eius, hinc considerari potest, quia, cum totum sit quod dividitur in partes, secundum triplicem divisionem est triplex totalitas. Est enim quoddam totum quod dividitur in partes quantitativas, sicut tota linea vel totum corpus.
The first kind of totality does not apply to forms, except perhaps accidentally; and then only to those forms, which have an indifferent relationship to a quantitative whole and its parts.
Primus autem totalitatis modus non convenit formis, nisi forte per accidens; et illis solis formis, quae habent indifferentem habitudinem ad totum quantitativum et partes eius.
But a form which requires variety in the parts, such as a soul, and specially the soul of perfect animals, is not equally related to the whole and the parts: hence it is not divided accidentally when the whole is divided.
Sed forma quae requirit diversitatem in partibus, sicut est anima, et praecipue animalium perfectorum, non aequaliter se habet ad totum et partes: unde non dividitur per accidens per divisionem quantitatis.
(2) There is also a whole which is divided into logical and essential parts: as a thing defined is divided into the parts of a definition, and a composite into matter and form.
Est etiam quoddam totum quod dividitur in partes rationis et essentiae: sicut definitum in partes definitionis, et compositum resolvitur in materiam et formam.
(3) There is, further, a third kind of whole which is potential, divided into virtual parts.
Tertium autem totum est potentiale, quod dividitur in partes virtutis.
So therefore quantitative totality cannot be attributed to the soul, either essentially or accidentally. But the second kind of totality, which depends on logical and essential perfection, properly and essentially belongs to forms; and likewise the virtual totality, because a form is the principle of operation.
Sic ergo totalitas quantitativa non potest attribui animae nec per se nec per accidens. Sed totalitas secunda, quae attenditur secundum rationis et essentiae perfectionem, proprie et per se convenit formis. Similiter autem et totalitas virtutis, quia forma est operationis principium.
Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen: it is enough to say that the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power.
Sed quia anima totalitatem quantitativam non habet, nec per se nec per accidens, ut dictum est: sufficit dicere quod anima tota est in qualibet parte corporis secundum totalitatem perfectionis et essentiae, non autem secundum totalitatem virtutis.
For it is not in each part of the body, with regard to each of its powers; but with regard to sight, it is in the eye; and with regard to hearing, it is in the ear; and so forth.
Quia non secundum quamlibet suam potentiam est in qualibet parte corporis; sed secundum visum in oculo, secundum auditum in aure, et sic de aliis.
We must observe, however, that since the soul requires variety of parts, its relation to the whole is not the same as its relation to the parts: for to the whole it is compared primarily and essentially, as to its proper and proportionate perfectible; but to the parts, secondarily, inasmuch as they are ordained to the whole.
Tamen attendendum est quod, quia anima requirit diversitatem in partibus, non eodem modo comparatur ad totum et ad partes: sed ad totum quidem primo et per se, sicut ad proprium et proportionatum perfectibile; ad partes autem per posterius, secundum quod habent ordinem ad totum.
The soul is the act of an organic body, as of its primary and proportionate perfectible.
Anima est actus corporis organici, sicut primi et proportionati perfectibilis.
Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), that "in each body the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part is entire."
Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin., quod "anima in quocumque corpore et in toto est tota, et in qualibet eius parte tota est."