1a 2ae q12: Intention

1. Is intention an act of intellect or of the will?
2. Is it only of the last end?
3. Can one intend two things at the same time?
4. Is intention of the end the same act as volition of the means?
5. Is intention within the competency of irrational animals?

1a 2ae q11 a4: Whether enjoyment is only of the end possessed? No.

Frui potest esse etiam finis non habiti quia perfecta est fruitio finis iam habiti realiter, sed imperfecta est etiam finis non habiti realiter, sed in intentione tantum.

It is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not possessed because perfect enjoyment is of the end already possessed, but imperfect enjoyment is also of the end possessed not really, but only in intention.

Quies voluntatis dupliciter impeditur: uno modo, ex parte obiecti, quia scilicet non est ultimus finis, sed ad aliud ordinatur; alio modo, ex parte appetentis finem qui nondum adipiscitur finem.

The will is hindered in two ways from being at rest: first, on the part of the object, by reason of its not being the last end, but ordained to something else; secondly, on the part of the one who desires the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession of it.

Obiectum autem est quod dat speciem actui, sed ab agente dependet modus agendi, ut sit perfectus vel imperfectus, secundum conditionem agentis.

Now it is the object that gives the specifies to an act, but on the agent depends the manner of acting, so that [the act] may be perfect or imperfect, according to the actual circumstances of the agent.

Et ideo eius quod non est ultimus finis, fruitio est impropria, quasi deficiens a specie fruitionis. Finis autem ultimi non habiti, est fruitio propria quidem, sed imperfecta, propter imperfectum modum habendi ultimum finem.

Therefore enjoyment of anything but the last end is enjoyment improperly speaking, as falling short of the formal nature of enjoyment. But enjoyment of the last end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly speaking, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect way in which it is possessed.

"Frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei propter seipsam", ut Augustinus dicit.

"To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4).

1a 2ae q11 a3: Whether enjoyment is only of the last end? Yes.

Solius ultimi finis est fruitio quia non quiescit simpliciter nisi in ultimo: quia quandiu aliquid expectatur, motus voluntatis remanet in suspenso, licet iam ad aliquid pervenerit.

Enjoyment is of the last end alone because rest is not absolute save in the possession of the last end: for as long as something is looked for, the movement of the will remains in suspense, although it has reached something.

Augustinus, in X de Trin., dicit quod "fruimur cognitis in quibus voluntas delectata conquiescit".

Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10) that "we enjoy what we know, when the delighted will is at rest therein".

Deus igitur est ultimus finis, sicut res quae ultimo quaeritur: fruitio autem sicut adeptio huius ultimi finis. Sicut igitur non est alius finis Deus, et fruitio Dei; ita eadem ratio fruitionis est qua fruimur Deo, et qua fruimur divina fruitione.

Accordingly God is the last end, as that which is ultimately sought for: while the enjoyment is as the attainment of this last end. And so, just as God is not one end, and the enjoyment of God, another; so it is the same formal aspect of enjoyment whereby we enjoy God, and whereby we enjoy our enjoyment of God.

Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., "non fruitur si quis id quod in facultatem voluntatis assumit, propter aliud appetit".

Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "A man does not enjoy that which he desires for the sake of something else."

1a 2ae q11 a2: Whether to enjoy belongs to the rational creature alone? No.

Rationali naturae convenit fruitio secundum rationem perfectam; brutis autem animalibus secundum rationem imperfectam; aliis autem creaturis nullo modo; quia appetitus sensitivus consequitur aliquam cognitionem.

Enjoyment belongs to the rational nature under a perfect formal aspect; to irrational animals, under an imperfect aspect; to other creatures, not at all; because the sensitive appetite follows some knowledge.

Frui non est actus potentiae pervenientis ad finem sicut exequentis, sed potentiae imperantis executionem; dictum est enim quod est appetitivae potentiae.

To enjoy is not the act of the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that commands the achievement; for it has been said to belong to the appetitive power.

Sed cognitio finis est duplex: perfecta, et imperfecta. Perfecta quidem, qua non solum cognoscitur id quod est finis et bonum, sed universalis ratio finis et boni, et talis cognitio est solius rationalis naturae.

Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that known which is the end and the good, but also the universal formal aspect of the end and the good, and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone.

Imperfecta autem cognitio est qua cognoscitur particulariter finis et bonum, et talis cognitio est in brutis animalibus. Quorum etiam virtutes appetitivae non sunt imperantes libere, sed secundum naturalem instinctum ad ea quae apprehenduntur, moventur.

On the other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the good are known in the particular. Such knowledge is in irrational animals, whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are moved according to a natural "Umwelt" to whatever they apprehend.

1a 2ae q11 a1: Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power? Yes.

Frui est actus appetitivae potentiae quia finis et bonum est obiectum appetitivae potentiae.

To enjoy is an act of the appetitive power because the end and the good is the object of the appetitive power.

Fruitio pertinere videtur ad amorem vel delectationem quam aliquis habet de ultimo expectato, quod est finis.

Hence fruition seems to have relation to love, or to the delight which one has in realizing the longed-for term, which is the end.

Perfectio et finis cuiuslibet potentiae, inquantum est quoddam bonum, pertinet ad appetitivam. Propter quod appetitiva potentia movet alias ad suos fines, et ipsa consequitur finem, quando quaelibet aliarum pertingit ad finem.

The perfection and end of each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive power. Wherefore the appetitive power moves the other powers to their ends, and itself realizes the end, when each of them reaches the end.

Nihil prohibet unum et idem, secundum diversas rationes, ad diversas potentias pertinere. Ipsa igitur visio Dei, inquantum est visio, est actus intellectus, inquantum autem est bonum et finis, est voluntatis obiectum. Et hoc modo est eius fruitio. Et sic hunc finem intellectus consequitur tanquam potentia agens, voluntas autem tanquam potentia movens ad finem, et fruens fine iam adepto.

Nothing hinders one and the same thing from belonging, under different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly the vision of God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good and an end, is the object of the will. And as such is the fruition thereof: so that the intellect attains this end, as the executive power, but the will as the motive power, moving (the powers) towards the end and enjoying the end attained.

1a 2ae q11: Enjoyment which is an act of the will

1. Is enjoyment an act of the appetitive power?
2. Does it belong to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals?
3. Is enjoyment only of the last end?
4. Is it only of the end possessed?

1a 2ae q10 a4: Whether the will is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God? No.

Deus non ex necessitate movet voluntatem hominis quia voluntas est activum principium non determinatum ad unum, sed indifferenter se habens ad multa.

God does not of necessity move man's will because the will is an active principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things.

Sic Deus ipsam movet, quod non ex necessitate ad unum determinat, sed remanet motus eius contingens et non necessarius, nisi in his ad quae naturaliter movetur.

God so moves it that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.

Magis repugnaret divinae motioni, si voluntas ex necessitate moveretur, quod suae naturae non competit, quam si moveretur libere, prout competit suae naturae.

It would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature, than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.

Sicut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., ad providentiam divinam non pertinet naturam rerum corrumpere, sed servare. Unde omnia movet secundum eorum conditione: ita quod ex causis necessariis, per motionem divinam, consequuntur effectus ex necessitate; ex causis autem contingentibus, sequuntur effectus contingenter.

As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "it belongs to Divine providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things." Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions: so that from necessary causes, through the Divine motion, effects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently.

1a 2ae q10 a3: Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by the lower appetite? No.Iin so far as the reason remains free, and not subject to the passio

Non voluntas hominis ex necessitate movetur ab appetitu inferiori: inquantum ratio manet libera, et passioni non subiecta, intantum voluntatis motus qui manet, non ex necessitate tendit ad hoc ad quod passio inclinat, quia potest voluntas non velle concupiscere, aut concupiscentiae non consentire, et sic non ex necessitate sequitur concupiscentiae motum.

Man's will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite: insofar as the reason remains free, and not subject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it, because it is in the power of the will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence, and thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.

Passio appetitus sensitivi movet voluntatem, ex ea parte qua voluntas movetur ab obiecto: inquantum scilicet homo aliqualiter dispositus per passionem, iudicat aliquid esse conveniens et bonum quod extra passionem existens non iudicaret.

The passion of the sensitive appetite moves the will, insofar as the will is moved by its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such and such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, which he would not judge thus were it not for the passion.

Voluntas non solum movetur a bono universali apprehenso per rationem, sed etiam a bono apprehenso per sensum. Et ideo potest moveri ad aliquod particulare bonum absque passione appetitus sensitivi. Multa enim volumus et operamur absque passione, per solam electionem, ut maxime patet in his in quibus ratio renititur passioni.

The will is moved not only by the universal good apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense. And it can be moved to some particular good independently of a passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things without passion, and through choice alone, as is most evident in those cases wherein reason resists passion.

1a 2ae q10 a2: Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its object? No.

Voluntas non ex necessitate movetur ad alterum oppositorum, quia voluntas est potentia rationalis, est enim in ratione, et potentiae rationales sunt ad opposita.

The will is not moved, of necessity, to either of the opposites, because the will is a rational power, since it is in the reason, and the rational powers are directed to opposites.

Finis ultimus ex necessitate movet voluntatem, quia est bonum perfectum. Et similiter illa quae ordinantur ad hunc finem, sine quibus finis haberi non potest, sicut esse et vivere et huiusmodi. Alia vero, sine quibus finis haberi potest, non ex necessitate vult qui vult finem.

The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is the perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that end, and without which the end cannot be attained, such as "to be" and "to live," and the like. But other things without which the end can be gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end.

Voluntas movetur dupliciter, uno modo, quantum ad exercitium actus; alio modo, quantum ad specificationem actus, quae est ex obiecto.

The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived from the object.

Primo ergo modo, voluntas a nullo obiecto ex necessitate movetur, potest enim aliquis de quocumque obiecto non cogitare, et per consequens neque actu velle illud. Sed quantum ad secundum motionis modum, voluntas ab aliquo obiecto ex necessitate movetur, ab aliquo autem non. In motu enim cuiuslibet potentiae a suo obiecto, consideranda est ratio per quam obiectum movet potentiam.

As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man's power not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second manner of motion, the will is moved by one object necessarily, by another not. For in the movement of a power by its object, we must consider under what aspect the object moves the power.

Visibile enim movet visum sub ratione coloris actu visibilis. Unde si color proponatur visui, ex necessitate movet visum, nisi aliquis visum avertat, quod pertinet ad exercitium actus. Si autem proponeretur aliquid visui quod non omnibus modis esset color in actu, sed secundum aliquid esset tale, secundum autem aliquid non tale, non ex necessitate visus tale obiectum videret, posset enim intendere in ipsum ex ea parte qua non est coloratum in actu, et sic ipsum non videret.

For the visible moves the sight, under the aspect of color actually visible. Wherefore if color be offered to the sight, it moves the sight necessarily: unless one turns one's eyes away; which belongs to the exercise of the act. But if the sight were confronted with something not in all respects colored actually, but only so in some respects, and in other respects not, the sight would not of necessity see such an object: for it might look at that part of the object which is not actually colored, and thus it would not see it.

Sicut autem coloratum in actu est obiectum visus, ita bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Unde si proponatur aliquod obiectum voluntati quod sit universaliter bonum et secundum omnem considerationem, ex necessitate voluntas in illud tendet, si aliquid velit, non enim poterit velle oppositum.

Now just as the actually colored is the object of sight, so is good the object of the will. Wherefore if the will be offered an object which is good universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will the opposite.

Si autem proponatur sibi aliquod obiectum quod non secundum quamlibet considerationem sit bonum, non ex necessitate voluntas feretur in illud. Et quia defectus cuiuscumque boni habet rationem non boni, ideo illud solum bonum quod est perfectum et cui nihil deficit, est tale bonum quod voluntas non potest non velle, quod est beatitudo.

If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever, is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and lacking in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it: and this is Happiness.

Alia autem quaelibet particularia bona, inquantum deficiunt ab aliquo bono, possunt accipi ut non bona, et secundum hanc considerationem, possunt repudiari vel approbari a voluntate, quae potest in idem ferri secundum diversas considerationes.

Whereas any other particular goods, in so far as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will, which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.

1a 2ae q10 a1: Whether the will is moved to anything naturally? Yes.

Principium motuum voluntariorum est bonum in communi, in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit, sicut etiam quaelibet potentia in suum obiectum (et etiam ipse finis ultimus, qui hoc modo se habet in appetibilibus, sicut prima principia demonstrationum in intelligibilibus, et universaliter omnia illa quae conveniunt volenti secundum suam naturam), quia non per voluntatem appetimus solum ea quae pertinent ad potentiam voluntatis, sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas potentias, et ad totum hominem.

The principle of voluntary movements is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as does each power to its object (and again it is the last end, which stands in the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of demonstrations to things intelligible and, speaking generally, it is all those things which belong to the willer according to his nature), because it is not only things pertaining to the will that the will desires, but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire man.

Unde naturaliter homo vult non solum obiectum voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae conveniunt aliis potentiis, ut cognitionem veri, quae convenit intellectui; et esse et vivere et alia huiusmodi, quae respiciunt consistentiam naturalem; quae omnia comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quadam particularia bona.

Wherefore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to the other powers; such as the knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect; and to be and to live and other like things which regard the natural well-being; all of which are included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.

Cum igitur voluntas sit quaedam vis immaterialis sicut et intellectus, respondet sibi naturaliter aliquod unum commune, scilicet bonum, sicut etiam intellectui aliquod unum commune, scilicet verum, vel ens, vel quod quid est. Sub bono autem communi multa particularia bona continentur, ad quorum nullum voluntas determinatur.

Since, therefore, the will is an immaterial power like the intellect, some one general thing corresponds to it naturally, which is the good; just as to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which is the true, or being, or "what a thing is." And under good in general are included many particular goods, to none of which is the will determined.

Sicut Boetius dicit in libro de duabus naturis, et philosophus in V Metaphys., natura dicitur multipliciter. Quandoque enim dicitur principium intrinsecum in rebus mobilibus. Et talis natura est vel materia, vel forma materialis, ut patet ex II Physic. Alio modo dicitur natura quaelibet substantia, vel etiam quodlibet ens. Et secundum hoc, illud dicitur esse naturale rei, quod convenit ei secundum suam substantiam. Et hoc est quod per se inest rei. In omnibus autem, ea quae non per se insunt, reducuntur in aliquid quod per se inest, sicut in principium. Et ideo necesse est quod, hoc modo accipiendo naturam, semper principium in his quae conveniunt rei, sit naturale. Et hoc manifeste apparet in intellectu, nam principia intellectualis cognitionis sunt naturaliter nota. Similiter etiam principium motuum voluntariorum oportet esse aliquid naturaliter volitum.

As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.) and the Philosopher also (Metaph. v, 4) the word "nature" is used in a manifold sense. For sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things. In this sense nature is either matter or the material form, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. In another sense nature stands for any substance, or even for any being. And in this sense, that is said to be natural to a thing which befits it in respect of its substance. And this is that which of itself is in a thing. Now all things that do not of themselves belong to the thing in which they are, are reduced to something which belongs of itself to that thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing, be a natural principle. This is evident in regard to the intellect: for the principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like manner the principle of voluntary movements must be something naturally willed.

In rebus naturalibus id quod est naturale quasi consequens formam tantum, semper actu inest, sicut calidum igni. Quod autem est naturale sicut consequens materiam, non semper actu inest, sed quandoque secundum potentiam tantum. Nam forma est actus, materia vero potentia.

In the case of natural things, that which is natural, as a result of the form only, is always in them actually, as heat is in fire. But that which is natural as a result of matter, is not always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality: because form is act, whereas matter is potentiality.

Et similiter non oportet quod voluntas, quae de potentia in actum reducitur dum aliquid vult, semper actu velit, sed solum quando est in aliqua dispositione determinata. Voluntas autem Dei, quae est actus purus, semper est in actu volendi.

And in like manner it is not necessary that the will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills something), should always be in the act of volition; but only when it is in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will, which is pure act, is always in the act of volition.

1a 2ae q10: The manner in which the will is moved

1. Is the will moved to anything naturally?
2. Is it moved of necessity by its object?
3. Is it moved of necessity by the lower appetite?
4. Is it moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?

1a 2ae q9 a6: Whether the will is moved by God alone, as exterior principle? Yes.

Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis motor, ad universale obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum, quia sine hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle.

God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good, because without this universal motion, man cannot will anything.

Sed homo per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud, quod est vere bonum vel apparens bonum. Sed tamen interdum specialiter Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum, quod est bonum, sicut in his quos movet per gratiam, ut infra dicetur.

But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later on (q109, a2).

Sic ergo hominem, voluntatem habentem, contingit moveri ab aliquo qui non est causa eius, sed quod motus voluntarius eius sit ab aliquo principio extrinseco quod non est causa voluntatis, est impossibile.

Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something that is not his cause; but that his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle that is not the cause of his will, is impossible.

Voluntatis autem causa nihil aliud esse potest quam Deus. Et hoc patet dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex hoc quod voluntas est potentia animae rationalis, quae a solo Deo causatur per creationem, ut in primo dictum est. Secundo vero ex hoc patet, quod voluntas habet ordinem ad universale bonum.

Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was stated in Ia, q90, a2. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good.

Unde nihil aliud potest esse voluntatis causa, nisi ipse Deus, qui est universale bonum. Omne autem aliud bonum per participationem dicitur, et est quoddam particulare bonum, particularis autem causa non dat inclinationem universalem. Unde nec materia prima, quae est in potentia ad omnes formas, potest causari ab aliquo particulari agente.

Wherefore nothing else can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal good: while every other good is good by participation, and is some particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination. Hence neither can primary matter, which is potentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent.

1a 2ae q9 a5: Whether the will is moved by a heavenly body? No.

Impossibile est quod corpus caeleste imprimat directe in intellectum aut voluntatem quia res incorporeae et immateriales sunt formalioris et universalioris virtutis quam quaecumque res corporales.

It is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect or will because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more formal and more universal than any corporeal things whatever.

Voluntas enim, ut dicitur in III de anima, est in ratione. Ratio autem est potentia animae non alligata organo corporali. Unde relinquitur quod voluntas sit potentia omnino immaterialis et incorporea.

For the "will," as stated in De Anima iii, 9, "is in the reason." Now the reason is a power of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the reverse.

Et propter hoc Aristoteles, in libro de anima, opinionem dicentium quod talis est voluntas in hominibus, "qualem in diem ducit pater deorum virorumque" (scilicet Iupiter, per quem totum caelum intelligunt), attribuit eis qui ponebant intellectum non differre a sensu. Omnes enim vires sensitivae, cum sint actus organorum corporalium, per accidens moveri possunt a caelestibus corporibus, motis scilicet corporibus quorum sunt actus.

For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) ascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from sense, the theory that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods bring on" [Odyssey xviii. 135 (referring to Jupiter, by whom they understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally, by the heavenly bodies, i.e. through those bodies being moved, whose acts they are.

Appetitus intellectivus quodammodo movetur ab appetitu sensitivo; indirecte redundat motus caelestium corporum in voluntatem, inquantum scilicet per passiones appetitus sensitivi voluntatem moveri contingit.

The intellectual appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite; the movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will, insofar as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the sensitive appetite.

Motus corporales humani reducuntur in motum caelestis corporis sicut in causam:

• inquantum ipsa dispositio organorum congrua ad motum, est aliqualiter ex impressione caelestium corporum;
  
• et inquantum etiam appetitus sensitivus commovetur ex impressione caelestium corporum;
  
• et ulterius inquantum corpora exteriora moventur secundum motum caelestium corporum, ex quorum occursu voluntas incipit aliquid velle vel non velle.

Sicut adveniente frigore incipit aliquis velle facere ignem. Sed ista motio voluntatis est ex parte obiecti exterius praesentati, non ex parte interioris instinctus.

The movements of the human body are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body:

• insofar as the disposition suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to the influence of heavenly bodies;
  
• also, insofar as the sensitive appetite is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies;
  
• and again, insofar as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to will or not to will something.

For instance, when our body is chilled, we begin to wish to make a fire. But this movement of the will is on the part of the object offered from without: not on the part of an inward instigation.

Appetitus sensitivus est actus organi corporalis. Unde nihil prohibet ex impressione corporum caelestium aliquos esse habiles ad irascendum vel concupiscendum, vel aliquam huiusmodi passionem, sicut et ex complexione naturali. Plures autem hominum sequuntur passiones, quibus soli sapientes resistunt. Et ideo ut in pluribus verificantur ea quae praenuntiantur de actibus hominum secundum considerationem caelestium corporum. Sed tamen, ut Ptolomaeus dicit in Centiloquio, "sapiens dominatur astris".

The sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ. Wherefore there is no reason why man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence, or some like passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by reason of his natural complexion. But the majority of men are led by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the majority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the observation of heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says (Centiloquium v), "the wise man governs the stars".

1a 2ae q9 a4: Whether the will is moved by an exterior principle? Yes.

Voluntas potest ab aliquo exteriori moveri quia indiget moveri ab alio sicut a primo movente.

The will can be moved by something exterior because it needs to be moved by another as first mover.

De ratione voluntarii est quod principium eius sit intra, sed non oportet quod hoc principium intrinsecum sit primum principium non motum ab alio. Unde motus voluntarius etsi habeat principium proximum intrinsecum, tamen principium primum est ab extra.

The formal aspect of the voluntary act is that its principle be within the agent, but it is not necessary that this inward principle be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its first principle is from without.

Omne enim quod quandoque est agens in actu et quandoque in potentia, indiget moveri ab aliquo movente. Manifestum est autem quod voluntas incipit velle aliquid, cum hoc prius non vellet. Necesse est ergo quod ab aliquo moveatur ad volendum.

For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something to will it.

Hoc autem non est procedere in infinitum. Unde necesse est ponere quod in primum motum voluntatis voluntas prodeat ex instinctu alicuius exterioris moventis, ut Aristoteles concludit in quodam capitulo Ethicae Eudemicae.

But this process could not go on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics (vii, 14).

1a 2ae q9 a3: Whether the will moves itself? Yes.

Voluntas per hoc quod vult finem, movet seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem, quia inquantum actu vult finem, reducit se de potentia in actum respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem, ut scilicet actu ea velit.

The will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means, because inasmuch as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect of the means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.

Potentia voluntatis semper actu est sibi praesens, sed actus voluntatis, quo vult finem aliquem, non semper est in ipsa voluntate. Per hunc autem movet seipsam.

The power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself.

Voluntas movetur ab intellectu, et a seipsa. Sed ab intellectu quidem movetur secundum rationem obiecti, a seipsa vero, quantum ad exercitium actus, secundum rationem finis.

The will is moved by the intellect, and also by itself. By the intellect it is moved by the formal aspect of the object; whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, by the formal aspect of the end.

Sicut supra dictum est, ad voluntatem pertinet movere alias potentias ex ratione finis, qui est voluntatis obiectum. Sed sicut dictum est, hoc modo se habet finis in appetibilibus, sicut principium in intelligibilibus.

As stated above (q9 a1), it belongs to the will to move the other powers, by the formal aspect of the end which is the will's object. Now, as stated above (q8 a2), the end is in things appetible, what the principle is in things intelligible.

Manifestum est autem quod intellectus per hoc quod cognoscit principium, reducit seipsum de potentia in actum, quantum ad cognitionem conclusionum, et hoc modo movet seipsum. Et similiter voluntas per hoc quod vult finem, movet seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem.

But it is evident that the intellect, through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions, and thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.

1a 2ae q9 a2: Whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite? Yes.

Appetitus sensitivus movet voluntatem quia secundum passionem appetitus sensitivi, immutatur homo ad aliquam dispositionem; unde secundum quod homo est in passione aliqua, videtur sibi aliquid conveniens, quod non videtur extra passionem existenti.

The sensitive appetite moves the will because according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition; wherefore according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected.

Id quod apprehenditur sub ratione boni et convenientis, movet voluntatem per modum obiecti. Quod autem aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus contingit: scilicet ex conditione eius quod proponitur, et eius cui proponitur. Conveniens enim secundum relationem dicitur, unde ex utroque extremorum dependet.

That which is apprehended under the formal aspect of good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing appear to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it depends on both extremes.

Et inde est quod gustus diversimode dispositus, non eodem modo accipit aliquid ut conveniens et ut non conveniens. Unde, ut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., "qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei."

And hence it is that taste, according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as a man is, such does the end seem to him."

Sicut philosophus dicit in I Polit., ratio, in qua est voluntas, movet suo imperio irascibilem et concupiscibilem, non quidem despotico principatu, sicut movetur servus a domino; sed principatu regali seu politico, sicut liberi homines reguntur a gubernante, qui tamen possunt contra movere. Unde et irascibilis et concupiscibilis possunt in contrarium movere ad voluntatem. Et sic nihil prohibet voluntatem aliquando ab eis moveri.

As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as a slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic sovereignty," as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times.

Dicitur Iac. I, "unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus."

It is written (James 1:14): "Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured."

1a 2ae q9 a1: Whether the will is moved by the intellect? Yes.

Intellectus movet voluntatem, sicut praesentans ei obiectum suum, quia primum principium formale est ens et verum universale, quod est obiectum intellectus.

The intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it, because the first formal principle is universal "being" and "truth," which is the object of the intellect.

Voluntas movet intellectum quantum ad exercitium actus, quia et ipsum verum, quod est perfectio intellectus, continetur sub universali bono ut quoddam bonum particulare. Sed quantum ad determinationem actus, quae est ex parte obiecti, intellectus movet voluntatem, quia et ipsum bonum apprehenditur secundum quandam specialem rationem comprehensam sub universali ratione veri.

The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal aspect of the true.

Sicut imaginatio formae sine aestimatione convenientis vel nocivi, non movet appetitum sensitivum; ita nec apprehensio veri sine ratione boni et appetibilis. Unde intellectus speculativus non movet, sed intellectus practicus, ut dicitur in III de anima.

Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive appetite; so neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).

Dupliciter autem aliqua vis animae invenitur esse in potentia ad diversa, uno modo, quantum ad agere et non agere; alio modo, quantum ad agere hoc vel illud. Sicut visus quandoque videt actu, et quandoque non videt; et quandoque videt album, et quandoque videt nigrum. Indiget igitur movente quantum ad duo, scilicet quantum ad exercitium vel usum actus; et quantum ad determinationem actus. Quorum primum est ex parte subiecti, quod quandoque invenitur agens, quandoque non agens, aliud autem est ex parte obiecti, secundum quod specificatur actus.

A power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects, viz. as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.

Bonum autem in communi, quod habet rationem finis, est obiectum voluntatis. Et ideo ex hac parte voluntas movet alias potentias animae ad suos actus, utimur enim aliis potentiis cum volumus. Nam fines et perfectiones omnium aliarum potentiarum comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona, semper autem ars vel potentia ad quam pertinet finis universalis, movet ad agendum artem vel potentiam ad quam pertinet finis particularis sub illo universali comprehensus; sicut dux exercitus, qui intendit bonum commune, scilicet ordinem totius exercitus, movet suo imperio aliquem ex tribunis, qui intendit ordinem unius aciei.

Good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will. For the end and perfection of every other power, is included under the object of the will as some particular good: and always the art or power to which the universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good--i.e. the order of the whole army--by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the order of one company.

Sed obiectum movet, determinando actum, ad modum principii formalis, a quo in rebus naturalibus actio specificatur.

On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are specified.

1a 2ae q9: That which moves the will

1. Is the will moved by the intellect?
2. Is it moved by the sensitive appetite?
3. Does the will move itself?
4. Is it moved by an extrinsic principle?
5. Is it moved by a heavenly body?
6. Is the will moved by God alone as by an extrinsic principle?

1a 2ae q8 a3: Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means? No.

Non eodem actu voluntas fertur in utrumque quia diversae species boni sunt finis, et id quod est ad finem, quod dicitur utile, et actus diversificantur secundum obiecta.

The will is not moved to both by the same act because the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a useful good, and acts are diversified according to their objects.

Sic ergo voluntas in ipsum finem dupliciter fertur, uno modo, absolute secundum se; alio modo, sicut in rationem volendi ea quae sunt ad finem.

Accordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, to the end absolutely and in itself; secondly, as the formal aspect for willing the means.

Manifestum est ergo quod unus et idem motus voluntatis est quo fertur in finem, secundum quod est ratio volendi ea quae sunt ad finem, et in ipsa quae sunt ad finem. Sed alius actus est quod fertur in ipsum finem absolute.

Hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and the same movement, to the end, as the formal aspect for willing the means; and to the means themselves. But it is another act whereby the will is moved to the end absolutely.

Et quandoque praecedit tempore, sicut cum aliquis primo vult sanitatem, et postea, deliberans quomodo possit sanari, vult conducere medicum ut sanetur.

And sometimes this act precedes the other in time; for example when a man first wills to have health, and afterwards deliberating by what means to be healed, wills to send for the doctor to heal him.

1a 2ae q8 a2: Whether volition is of the end only? No, it is also of the means.

Si voluntas est finis, ipsa etiam est eorum quae sunt ad finem, quia ratio boni, quod est obiectum potentiae voluntatis, invenitur non solum in fine, sed etiam in his quae sunt ad finem.

If volition is of the end, it is also of the means, because the aspect of good, which is the object of the power of the will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means.

Voluntas quandoque dicitur ipsa potentia qua volumus; quandoque autem ipse voluntatis actus. Si ergo loquamur de voluntate secundum quod nominat potentiam, sic se extendit et ad finem, et ad ea quae sunt ad finem.

The word "voluntas" sometimes designates the power of the will, sometimes its act. Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to the end and to the means.

Ad ea enim se extendit unaquaeque potentia, in quibus inveniri potest quocumque modo ratio sui obiecti, sicut visus se extendit ad omnia quaecumque participant quocumque modo colorem.

For every power extends to those things in which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any way whatever: thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever that are in any way colored.

Si autem loquamur de voluntate secundum quod nominat proprie actum, sic, proprie loquendo, est finis tantum. Omnis enim actus denominatus a potentia, nominat simplicem actum illius potentiae, sicut intelligere nominat simplicem actum intellectus.

If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus "to understand" designates the simple act of the understanding.

Ea vero quae sunt ad finem, non sunt bona vel volita propter seipsa, sed ex ordine ad finem. Unde voluntas in ea non fertur, nisi quatenus fertur in finem, unde hoc ipsum quod in eis vult, est finis.

On the other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to them, only in so far as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the end.

Sicut et intelligere proprie est eorum quae secundum se cognoscuntur, scilicet principiorum, eorum autem quae cognoscuntur per principia, non dicitur esse intelligentia, nisi inquantum in eis ipsa principia considerantur.

Thus, to understand, is properly directed to things that are known in themselves, i.e. first principles: but we do not speak of understanding with regard to things known through first principles, except in so far as we see the principles in those things.