Beatitudo, quae est summum bonum, non consistit in voluptate, quia omnes appetunt delectationem, sicut et appetunt bonum, et tamen delectationem (quae nihil est aliud quam quietatio appetitus in bono) appetunt ratione boni, et non e converso.
Happiness, which is the supreme good, does not consist in pleasure, because all desire delight in the same way as they desire good, and yet they desire delight (which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good) under the formal aspect of the good and not conversely.
Unde non sequitur quod delectatio sit maximum et per se bonum, sed quod unaquaeque delectatio consequatur aliquod bonum, et quod aliqua delectatio consequatur id quod est per se et maximum bonum.
Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good.
Quia in unaquaque re aliud est quod pertinet ad essentiam eius, aliud est proprium accidens ipsius (sicut in homine aliud est quod est animal rationale mortale, aliud quod est risibile), est igitur considerandum quod omnis delectatio est quoddam proprium accidens quod consequitur beatitudinem, vel aliquam beatitudinis partem, ex hoc enim aliquis delectatur quod habet bonum aliquod sibi conveniens, vel in re, vel in spe, vel saltem in memoria.
Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is distinct from its proper accident (just as in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal), we must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness, since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory.
Bonum autem conveniens, si quidem sit perfectum, est ipsa hominis beatitudo; si autem sit imperfectum, est quaedam beatitudinis participatio, vel propinqua, vel remota, vel saltem apparens. Unde manifestum est quod nec ipsa delectatio, quae consequitur bonum perfectum, est ipsa essentia beatitudinis, sed quoddam consequens ad ipsam sicut per se accidens.
Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good, is precisely man's happiness; and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident.
Vehemens appetitus delectationis sensibilis contingit ex hoc quod operationes sensuum, quia sunt principia nostrae cognitionis, sunt magis perceptibiles. Unde etiam a pluribus delectationes sensibiles appetuntur.
The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.
"Quia delectationes corporales pluribus notae sunt, assumpserunt sibi nomen voluptatum," ut dicitur VII Ethic., cum tamen sint aliae delectationes potiores. In quibus tamen beatitudo principaliter non consistit.
Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13), although other delights excel them; and yet happiness does not consist in them.
Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., "tristes exitus esse voluptatum, quisquis reminisci libidinum suarum volet, intelliget. Quae si beatos efficere possent, nihil causae est quin pecudes quoque beatae esse dicantur."
Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had a sad ending; and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy too."
"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.
Saturday, September 19, 2009
Friday, September 18, 2009
1a 2ae q2 a5: Whether man's happiness consists in any bodily good? No.
Beatitudo hominis non consistit in bonis corporis quia impossibile est quod ultimus finis rationis et voluntatis humanae sit conservatio humani esse, quia manifestum est quod homo ordinatur ad aliquid sicut ad finem: non enim homo est summum bonum.
Man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body because the last end of human reason and will cannot be the preservation of the act of human existence, for it is evident that man is ordained to something as to his end: since man is not the supreme good.
Esse enim hominis consistit in anima et corpore, et quamvis esse corporis dependeat ab anima, esse tamen humanae animae non dependet a corpore, ut supra ostensum es.
For the act of human existence consists in soul and body, and although the act of existence of the body depends on the soul, yet the act of existence of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above (I, 75, 2).
Unde omnia bona corporis ordinantur ad bona animae, sicut ad finem. Unde impossibile est quod in bonis corporis beatitudo consistat, quae est ultimus hominis finis.
Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is man's last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.
Man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body because the last end of human reason and will cannot be the preservation of the act of human existence, for it is evident that man is ordained to something as to his end: since man is not the supreme good.
Esse enim hominis consistit in anima et corpore, et quamvis esse corporis dependeat ab anima, esse tamen humanae animae non dependet a corpore, ut supra ostensum es.
For the act of human existence consists in soul and body, and although the act of existence of the body depends on the soul, yet the act of existence of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above (I, 75, 2).
Unde omnia bona corporis ordinantur ad bona animae, sicut ad finem. Unde impossibile est quod in bonis corporis beatitudo consistat, quae est ultimus hominis finis.
Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is man's last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.
Thursday, September 17, 2009
1a 2ae q2 a4: Whether man's happiness consists in power? No.
Impossibile est beatitudinem in potestate consistere: primo quidem, quia potestas habet rationem principii (ut patet in V Metaphys), beatitudo autem habet rationem ultimi finis; secundo, quia potestas se habet ad bonum et ad malum, beatitudo autem est proprium et perfectum hominis bonum.
It is impossible for happiness to consist in power: first, because power has the formal aspect of principle (as is stated in Metaph. v, 12), whereas happiness has the formal aspect of last end; secondly, because power has relation to good and to evil, whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good.
Unde magis posset consistere beatitudo aliqua in bono usu potestatis, qui est per virtutem, quam in ipsa potestate.
Wherefore some happiness might consist instead in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather than in power itself.
Divina potestas est sua bonitas, unde uti sua potestate non potest nisi bene. Sed hoc in hominibus non invenitur. Unde non sufficit ad beatitudinem hominis quod assimiletur Deo quantum ad potestatem, nisi etiam assimiletur ei quantum ad bonitatem.
God's power is His goodness, hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it is not enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he become like Him in goodness also.
Praemissa autem quatuor bona magis sunt a causis exterioribus, et ut plurimum a fortuna, unde et bona fortunae dicuntur. Unde patet quod in praemissis nullo modo beatitudo consistit.
Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune, for which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing.
It is impossible for happiness to consist in power: first, because power has the formal aspect of principle (as is stated in Metaph. v, 12), whereas happiness has the formal aspect of last end; secondly, because power has relation to good and to evil, whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good.
Unde magis posset consistere beatitudo aliqua in bono usu potestatis, qui est per virtutem, quam in ipsa potestate.
Wherefore some happiness might consist instead in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather than in power itself.
Divina potestas est sua bonitas, unde uti sua potestate non potest nisi bene. Sed hoc in hominibus non invenitur. Unde non sufficit ad beatitudinem hominis quod assimiletur Deo quantum ad potestatem, nisi etiam assimiletur ei quantum ad bonitatem.
God's power is His goodness, hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it is not enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he become like Him in goodness also.
Praemissa autem quatuor bona magis sunt a causis exterioribus, et ut plurimum a fortuna, unde et bona fortunae dicuntur. Unde patet quod in praemissis nullo modo beatitudo consistit.
Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune, for which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing.
Wednesday, September 16, 2009
1a 2ae q2 a3: Whether man's happiness consists in fame or glory? No.
Beatitudo hominis non consistit in fama seu gloria quia perfectio humani boni, quae beatitudo dicitur, non potest causari a notitia humana, sed magis notitia humana de beatitudine alicuius procedit et quodammodo causatur ab ipsa humana beatitudine, vel inchoata vel perfecta.
Man's happiness does not consist in fame or glory because the perfection of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human knowledge, but rather human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect.
Bonum alicuius hominis quod per famam vel gloriam est in cognitione multorum, si cognitio quidem vera sit, oportet quod derivetur a bono existente in ipso homine, et sic praesupponit beatitudinem perfectam vel inchoatam.
A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived from good existing in the man himself, and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness.
Si autem cognitio falsa sit, non concordat rei, et sic bonum non invenitur in eo cuius fama celebris habetur. Unde patet quod fama nullo modo potest facere hominem beatum.
But if the knowledge be false, it does not harmonize with the thing, and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that fame can nowise make man happy.
Res autem cognita aliter comparatur ad cognitionem humanam, et aliter ad cognitionem divinam, humana enim cognitio a rebus cognitis causatur, sed divina cognitio est causa rerum cognitarum.
Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's knowledge, for human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God's knowledge is the cause of the things known.
Sed bonum hominis dependet, sicut ex causa, ex cognitione Dei. Et ideo ex gloria quae est apud Deum, dependet beatitudo hominis sicut ex causa sua.
Man's good depends on God's knowledge as its cause, and therefore man's beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God.
Est etiam aliud considerandum, quod humana notitia saepe fallitur, et praecipue in singularibus contingentibus, cuiusmodi sunt actus humani. Et ideo frequenter humana gloria fallax est. Sed quia Deus falli non potest, eius gloria semper vera est.
We must observe that human knowledge often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true.
Fama non habet stabilitatem, immo falso rumore de facili perditur. Et si stabilis aliquando perseveret, hoc est per accidens. Sed beatitudo habet per se stabilitatem, et semper.
Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But happiness endures of itself, and for ever.
Man's happiness does not consist in fame or glory because the perfection of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human knowledge, but rather human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect.
Bonum alicuius hominis quod per famam vel gloriam est in cognitione multorum, si cognitio quidem vera sit, oportet quod derivetur a bono existente in ipso homine, et sic praesupponit beatitudinem perfectam vel inchoatam.
A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived from good existing in the man himself, and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness.
Si autem cognitio falsa sit, non concordat rei, et sic bonum non invenitur in eo cuius fama celebris habetur. Unde patet quod fama nullo modo potest facere hominem beatum.
But if the knowledge be false, it does not harmonize with the thing, and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that fame can nowise make man happy.
Res autem cognita aliter comparatur ad cognitionem humanam, et aliter ad cognitionem divinam, humana enim cognitio a rebus cognitis causatur, sed divina cognitio est causa rerum cognitarum.
Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's knowledge, for human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God's knowledge is the cause of the things known.
Sed bonum hominis dependet, sicut ex causa, ex cognitione Dei. Et ideo ex gloria quae est apud Deum, dependet beatitudo hominis sicut ex causa sua.
Man's good depends on God's knowledge as its cause, and therefore man's beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God.
Est etiam aliud considerandum, quod humana notitia saepe fallitur, et praecipue in singularibus contingentibus, cuiusmodi sunt actus humani. Et ideo frequenter humana gloria fallax est. Sed quia Deus falli non potest, eius gloria semper vera est.
We must observe that human knowledge often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true.
Fama non habet stabilitatem, immo falso rumore de facili perditur. Et si stabilis aliquando perseveret, hoc est per accidens. Sed beatitudo habet per se stabilitatem, et semper.
Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But happiness endures of itself, and for ever.
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
1a 2ae q2 a2: Whether man's happiness consists in honors? No.
In honore beatitudo non consistit quia verum praemium virtutis est ipsa beatitudo, propter quam virtuosi operantur; si autem propter honorem operarentur, iam non esset virtus, sed magis ambitio.
Happiness does not consist in honor because virtue's true reward is happiness itself, for which the virtuous work; whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be virtue, but instead ambition.
Sicut philosophus dicit, honor non est praemium virtutis propter quod virtuosi operantur, sed accipiunt honorem ab hominibus loco praemii, "quasi a non habentibus aliquid maius ad dandum".
As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work, but they receive honor from men instead of a reward, "as from those who have nothing greater to offer."
Honor enim exhibetur alicui propter aliquam eius excellentiam; et ita est signum et testimonium quoddam illius excellentiae quae est in honorato. Excellentia autem hominis maxime attenditur secundum beatitudinem, quae est hominis bonum perfectum, et secundum partes eius, idest secundum illa bona quibus aliquid beatitudinis participatur. Et ideo honor potest quidem consequi beatitudinem, sed principaliter in eo beatitudo consistere non potest.
For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion especially to his happiness, which is man's perfect good, and to its parts, i.e. to those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally consist therein.
Beatitudo est in beato. Honor autem non est in eo qui honoratur, sed magis in honorante, qui reverentiam exhibet honorato, ut philosophus dicit in I Ethic.
Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5).
Happiness does not consist in honor because virtue's true reward is happiness itself, for which the virtuous work; whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be virtue, but instead ambition.
Sicut philosophus dicit, honor non est praemium virtutis propter quod virtuosi operantur, sed accipiunt honorem ab hominibus loco praemii, "quasi a non habentibus aliquid maius ad dandum".
As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work, but they receive honor from men instead of a reward, "as from those who have nothing greater to offer."
Honor enim exhibetur alicui propter aliquam eius excellentiam; et ita est signum et testimonium quoddam illius excellentiae quae est in honorato. Excellentia autem hominis maxime attenditur secundum beatitudinem, quae est hominis bonum perfectum, et secundum partes eius, idest secundum illa bona quibus aliquid beatitudinis participatur. Et ideo honor potest quidem consequi beatitudinem, sed principaliter in eo beatitudo consistere non potest.
For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion especially to his happiness, which is man's perfect good, and to its parts, i.e. to those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally consist therein.
Beatitudo est in beato. Honor autem non est in eo qui honoratur, sed magis in honorante, qui reverentiam exhibet honorato, ut philosophus dicit in I Ethic.
Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5).
Monday, September 14, 2009
1a 2ae q2 a1: Whether man's happiness consists in wealth? No.
In divitiis beatitudo non consistit quia quaeruntur propter aliud, scilicet ad sustentandam naturam hominis; et ideo non possunt esse ultimus finis hominis, sed magis ordinantur ad hominem sicut ad finem.
Man's happiness does not consist in wealth because it is sought for the sake of something else, viz., as a support of human nature; consequently it cannot be man's last end, rather is it ordained to man as to its end.
Appetitus naturalium divitiarum non est infinitus, quia secundum certam mensuram naturae sufficiunt. Sed appetitus divitiarum artificialium est infinitus, quia deservit concupiscentiae inordinatae, quae non modificatur, ut patet per philosophum in I Polit.
The desire for natural riches is not infinite, because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear (Polit. i, 3).
Omnia corporalia obediunt pecuniae, quantum ad multitudinem stultorum, qui sola corporalia bona cognoscunt, quae pecunia acquiri possunt. Iudicium autem de bonis humanis non debet sumi a stultis, sed a sapientibus; sicut et iudicium de saporibus ab his qui habent gustum bene dispositum.
All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise; just as it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable.
Man's happiness does not consist in wealth because it is sought for the sake of something else, viz., as a support of human nature; consequently it cannot be man's last end, rather is it ordained to man as to its end.
Appetitus naturalium divitiarum non est infinitus, quia secundum certam mensuram naturae sufficiunt. Sed appetitus divitiarum artificialium est infinitus, quia deservit concupiscentiae inordinatae, quae non modificatur, ut patet per philosophum in I Polit.
The desire for natural riches is not infinite, because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear (Polit. i, 3).
Omnia corporalia obediunt pecuniae, quantum ad multitudinem stultorum, qui sola corporalia bona cognoscunt, quae pecunia acquiri possunt. Iudicium autem de bonis humanis non debet sumi a stultis, sed a sapientibus; sicut et iudicium de saporibus ab his qui habent gustum bene dispositum.
All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise; just as it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable.
Sunday, September 13, 2009
1a 2ae q1 a8: Whether other creatures concur in that last end? No.
In ultimo fine hominis alia conveniunt quia beatitudo nominat adeptionem ultimi finis.
Other things do not concur in man's last end because happiness means the acquisition of the last end.
Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam rem quae est finis, sic in ultimo fine hominis omnia alia conveniunt, quia Deus est ultimus finis hominis et omnium aliarum rerum.
If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the end, thus all other things concur in man's last end, since God is the last end of man and of all other things.
Si autem loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad consecutionem finis, sic in hoc fine hominis non communicant creaturae irrationales. Nam homo et aliae rationales creaturae consequuntur ultimum finem cognoscendo et amando Deum, quod non competit aliis creaturis, quae adipiscuntur ultimum finem inquantum participant aliquam similitudinem Dei, secundum quod sunt, vel vivunt, vel etiam cognoscunt.
If, however, we speak of man's last end, as of the acquisition of the end, then irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving God; this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in so far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know.
"Sed non cadit in animalia rationis expertia ut beata sint", sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.
"Happiness is not possible for animals bereft of reason," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5).
Other things do not concur in man's last end because happiness means the acquisition of the last end.
Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam rem quae est finis, sic in ultimo fine hominis omnia alia conveniunt, quia Deus est ultimus finis hominis et omnium aliarum rerum.
If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the end, thus all other things concur in man's last end, since God is the last end of man and of all other things.
Si autem loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad consecutionem finis, sic in hoc fine hominis non communicant creaturae irrationales. Nam homo et aliae rationales creaturae consequuntur ultimum finem cognoscendo et amando Deum, quod non competit aliis creaturis, quae adipiscuntur ultimum finem inquantum participant aliquam similitudinem Dei, secundum quod sunt, vel vivunt, vel etiam cognoscunt.
If, however, we speak of man's last end, as of the acquisition of the end, then irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving God; this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in so far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know.
"Sed non cadit in animalia rationis expertia ut beata sint", sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.
"Happiness is not possible for animals bereft of reason," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5).
Saturday, September 12, 2009
1a 2ae q1 a7: Whether all men have the same last end? Yes.
Quantum ad rationem ultimi finis, omnes conveniunt in appetitu finis ultimi, quia omnes appetunt suam perfectionem adimpleri, quae est ratio ultimi finis.
As to the formal aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end, because all desire the fulfillment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfillment which is the formal aspect of the last end.
Sed quantum ad id in quo ista ratio invenitur, non omnes homines conveniunt in ultimo fine: nam quidam appetunt divitias tanquam consummatum bonum; quidam autem voluptatem; quidam vero quodcumque aliud. Sicut et omni gustui delectabile est dulce, sed quibusdam maxime delectabilis est dulcedo vini; quibusdam dulcedo mellis; aut alicuius talium.
But as to the thing in which this formal aspect is realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else. So too for every taste the sweet is pleasant, but to some the sweetness of wine is most pleasant; to others, the sweetness of honey; or of something similar.
Diversa studia vivendi contingunt in hominibus propter diversas res in quibus quaeritur ratio summi boni.
Various pursuits in life are found among humans on account of the various things in which men seek to find [perfection, i.e.,] the formal aspect of their last end.
Illud tamen dulce oportet esse simpliciter melius delectabile, in quo maxime delectatur qui habet optimum gustum. Et similiter illud bonum oportet esse completissimum, quod tanquam ultimum finem appetit habens affectum bene dispositum.
Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in which he who has the best taste takes the most pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with well disposed affections desires for his last end.
Illi qui peccant, avertuntur ab eo in quo vere invenitur ratio ultimi finis, non autem ab ipsa ultimi finis intentione, quam quaerunt falso in aliis rebus.
Those who sin turn from that in which the formal aspect of their last end really consists, but they do not turn away from the very intention of the last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things.
Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., quod omnes homines conveniunt in appetendo ultimum finem, qui est beatitudo.
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness.
As to the formal aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end, because all desire the fulfillment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfillment which is the formal aspect of the last end.
Sed quantum ad id in quo ista ratio invenitur, non omnes homines conveniunt in ultimo fine: nam quidam appetunt divitias tanquam consummatum bonum; quidam autem voluptatem; quidam vero quodcumque aliud. Sicut et omni gustui delectabile est dulce, sed quibusdam maxime delectabilis est dulcedo vini; quibusdam dulcedo mellis; aut alicuius talium.
But as to the thing in which this formal aspect is realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else. So too for every taste the sweet is pleasant, but to some the sweetness of wine is most pleasant; to others, the sweetness of honey; or of something similar.
Diversa studia vivendi contingunt in hominibus propter diversas res in quibus quaeritur ratio summi boni.
Various pursuits in life are found among humans on account of the various things in which men seek to find [perfection, i.e.,] the formal aspect of their last end.
Illud tamen dulce oportet esse simpliciter melius delectabile, in quo maxime delectatur qui habet optimum gustum. Et similiter illud bonum oportet esse completissimum, quod tanquam ultimum finem appetit habens affectum bene dispositum.
Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in which he who has the best taste takes the most pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with well disposed affections desires for his last end.
Illi qui peccant, avertuntur ab eo in quo vere invenitur ratio ultimi finis, non autem ab ipsa ultimi finis intentione, quam quaerunt falso in aliis rebus.
Those who sin turn from that in which the formal aspect of their last end really consists, but they do not turn away from the very intention of the last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things.
Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., quod omnes homines conveniunt in appetendo ultimum finem, qui est beatitudo.
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness.
Friday, September 11, 2009
1a 2ae q1 a6: Whether man wills all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end? Yes.
Necesse est quod omnia quae homo appetit, appetat propter ultimum finem, quia quidquid homo appetit, appetit sub ratione boni.
Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end, because whatever man desires, he desires it under the formal aspect of good.
Quod quidem si non appetitur ut bonum perfectum, quod est ultimus finis, necesse est ut appetatur ut tendens in bonum perfectum, quia semper inchoatio alicuius ordinatur ad consummationem ipsius; sicut patet tam in his quae fiunt a natura, quam in his quae fiunt ab arte. Et ideo omnis inchoatio perfectionis ordinatur in perfectionem consummatam, quae est per ultimum finem.
And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the beginning of anything is always ordained to its completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art. Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved through the last end.
Secundo, quia ultimus finis hoc modo se habet in movendo appetitum, sicut se habet in aliis motionibus primum movens. Manifestum est autem quod causae secundae moventes non movent nisi secundum quod moventur a primo movente. Unde secunda appetibilia non movent appetitum nisi in ordine ad primum appetibile, quod est ultimus finis.
Secondly, because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements. Now it is clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the last end.
Non oportet ut semper aliquis cogitet de ultimo fine, quandocumque aliquid appetit vel operatur, sed virtus primae intentionis, quae est respectu ultimi finis, manet in quolibet appetitu cuiuscumque rei, etiam si de ultimo fine actu non cogitetur. Sicut non oportet quod qui vadit per viam, in quolibet passu cogitet de fine.
One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or does something, but the power of the first intention, which is in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed to any object whatever, even though one's thoughts be not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every step.
Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, "illud est finis boni nostri, propter quod amantur cetera, illud autem propter seipsum".
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the end of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we love it for its own sake."
Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end, because whatever man desires, he desires it under the formal aspect of good.
Quod quidem si non appetitur ut bonum perfectum, quod est ultimus finis, necesse est ut appetatur ut tendens in bonum perfectum, quia semper inchoatio alicuius ordinatur ad consummationem ipsius; sicut patet tam in his quae fiunt a natura, quam in his quae fiunt ab arte. Et ideo omnis inchoatio perfectionis ordinatur in perfectionem consummatam, quae est per ultimum finem.
And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the beginning of anything is always ordained to its completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art. Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved through the last end.
Secundo, quia ultimus finis hoc modo se habet in movendo appetitum, sicut se habet in aliis motionibus primum movens. Manifestum est autem quod causae secundae moventes non movent nisi secundum quod moventur a primo movente. Unde secunda appetibilia non movent appetitum nisi in ordine ad primum appetibile, quod est ultimus finis.
Secondly, because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements. Now it is clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the last end.
Non oportet ut semper aliquis cogitet de ultimo fine, quandocumque aliquid appetit vel operatur, sed virtus primae intentionis, quae est respectu ultimi finis, manet in quolibet appetitu cuiuscumque rei, etiam si de ultimo fine actu non cogitetur. Sicut non oportet quod qui vadit per viam, in quolibet passu cogitet de fine.
One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or does something, but the power of the first intention, which is in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed to any object whatever, even though one's thoughts be not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every step.
Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, "illud est finis boni nostri, propter quod amantur cetera, illud autem propter seipsum".
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the end of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we love it for its own sake."
Thursday, September 10, 2009
1a 2ae q1 a5: Whether one man can have several last ends? No.
Impossibile est quod voluntas unius hominis simul se habeat ad diversa, sicut ad ultimos fines, quia potestas voluntatis non habet ut faciat opposita esse simul (quod contingeret, si tenderet in plura disparata sicut in ultimos fines).
It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to diverse things, as last ends, because the power of the will does not extend to making opposites exist at the same time (which would be the case were it to tend to several diverse objects as last ends).
Etsi plura accipi possint quae ad invicem oppositionem non habeant, tamen bono perfecto opponitur quod sit aliquid de perfectione rei extra ipsum.
Although it is possible to find several things which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's perfect good, that anything besides be required for that thing's perfection.
Cum unumquodque appetat suam perfectionem, illud appetit aliquis ut ultimum finem, quod appetit, ut bonum perfectum et completivum sui ipsius. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, "finem boni nunc dicimus, non quod consumatur ut non sit, sed quod perficiatur ut plenum sit".
Since everything desires its own perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which he desires as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "In speaking of the end of good we mean now, not that it passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be complete."
Oportet igitur quod ultimus finis ita impleat totum hominis appetitum, quod nihil extra ipsum appetendum relinquatur. Quod esse non potest, si aliquid extraneum ad ipsius perfectionem requiratur. Unde non potest esse quod in duo sic tendat appetitus, ac si utrumque sit bonum perfectum ipsius.
It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to desire. Which is not possible, if something else be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good.
Sicut omnium hominum est naturaliter unus finis ultimus, ita huius hominis voluntas in uno ultimo fine statuatur.
Just as of all men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end.
Sicut in processu rationis, principium est id quod naturaliter cognoscitur, ita in processu rationalis appetitus, qui est voluntas, oportet esse principium id quod naturaliter desideratur. Hoc autem oportet esse unum, quia natura non tendit nisi ad unum. Principium autem in processu rationalis appetitus est ultimus finis. Unde oportet id in quod tendit voluntas sub ratione ultimi finis, esse unum.
Just as in the process of reasoning, the principle is that which is naturally known, so in the process of the rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that which is naturally desired. Now this must needs be one: since nature tends to one thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational appetite is the last end. Therefore that to which the will tends, under the formal aspect of its last end, is one.
It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to diverse things, as last ends, because the power of the will does not extend to making opposites exist at the same time (which would be the case were it to tend to several diverse objects as last ends).
Etsi plura accipi possint quae ad invicem oppositionem non habeant, tamen bono perfecto opponitur quod sit aliquid de perfectione rei extra ipsum.
Although it is possible to find several things which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's perfect good, that anything besides be required for that thing's perfection.
Cum unumquodque appetat suam perfectionem, illud appetit aliquis ut ultimum finem, quod appetit, ut bonum perfectum et completivum sui ipsius. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, "finem boni nunc dicimus, non quod consumatur ut non sit, sed quod perficiatur ut plenum sit".
Since everything desires its own perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which he desires as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "In speaking of the end of good we mean now, not that it passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be complete."
Oportet igitur quod ultimus finis ita impleat totum hominis appetitum, quod nihil extra ipsum appetendum relinquatur. Quod esse non potest, si aliquid extraneum ad ipsius perfectionem requiratur. Unde non potest esse quod in duo sic tendat appetitus, ac si utrumque sit bonum perfectum ipsius.
It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to desire. Which is not possible, if something else be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good.
Sicut omnium hominum est naturaliter unus finis ultimus, ita huius hominis voluntas in uno ultimo fine statuatur.
Just as of all men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end.
Sicut in processu rationis, principium est id quod naturaliter cognoscitur, ita in processu rationalis appetitus, qui est voluntas, oportet esse principium id quod naturaliter desideratur. Hoc autem oportet esse unum, quia natura non tendit nisi ad unum. Principium autem in processu rationalis appetitus est ultimus finis. Unde oportet id in quod tendit voluntas sub ratione ultimi finis, esse unum.
Just as in the process of reasoning, the principle is that which is naturally known, so in the process of the rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that which is naturally desired. Now this must needs be one: since nature tends to one thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational appetite is the last end. Therefore that to which the will tends, under the formal aspect of its last end, is one.
Wednesday, September 09, 2009
1a 2ae q1 a4: Whether there is one last end of human life? Yes.
In finibus humanae voluntatis non proceditur in infinitum, et est aliquis ultimus finis humanae voluntatis, quia contra rationem finis est quod procedatur in infinitum.
There is not an infinite series of ends of the human will, and there is one last end of the human will, because it is contrary to the formal aspect of an end to proceed indefinitely.
Ea vero quae non habent ordinem per se, sed per accidens sibi invicem coniunguntur, nihil prohibet infinitatem habere; causae enim per accidens indeterminatae sunt. Et hoc etiam modo contingit esse infinitatem per accidens in finibus, et in his quae sunt ad finem.
On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; for accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the end.
Sed quia primum bonum habet diffusionem secundum intellectum, cuius est secundum aliquam certam formam profluere in causata; aliquis certus modus adhibetur bonorum effluxui a primo bono, a quo omnia alia bona participant virtutem diffusivam. Et ideo diffusio bonorum non procedit in infinitum, sed, sicut dicitur Sap. XI, Deus omnia disposuit in numero, pondere et mensura.
But, since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper to flow forth into its effects according to a certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from the First Good from Which all other goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely but, as it is written (Wisdom 11:21), God disposes all things "in number, weight and measure."
In omnibus enim quae per se habent ordinem ad invicem, oportet quod, remoto primo, removeantur ea quae sunt ad primum.
For in whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of necessity be removed also.
In finibus autem invenitur duplex ordo, scilicet ordo intentionis, et ordo executionis, et in utroque ordine oportet esse aliquid primum. Id enim quod est primum in ordine intentionis est quasi principium movens appetitum, unde, subtracto principio, appetitus a nullo moveretur. Id autem quod est principium in executione, est unde incipit operatio; unde, isto principio subtracto, nullus inciperet aliquid operari.
Now there is to be observed a twofold order in ends--the order of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders there must be something first. For that which is first in the order of intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite; consequently, if you remove this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is that wherein operation has its beginning; and if this principle be taken away, no one will begin to work.
Principium autem intentionis est ultimus finis, principium autem executionis est primum eorum quae sunt ad finem.
Now the principle in the intention is the last end; while the principle in execution is the first of the things which are ordained to the end.
Sic ergo ex neutra parte possibile est in infinitum procedere, quia si non esset ultimus finis, nihil appeteretur, nec aliqua actio terminaretur, nec etiam quiesceret intentio agentis; si autem non esset primum in his quae sunt ad finem, nullus inciperet aliquid operari, nec terminaretur consilium, sed in infinitum procederet.
Consequently, on neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any action have its term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there is no first thing among those that are ordained to the end, none would begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would continue indefinitely.
Unde philosophus probat, in VIII Physic., quod non est possibile in causis moventibus procedere in infinitum, quia iam non esset primum movens, quo subtracto alia movere non possunt, cum non moveant nisi per hoc quod moventur a primo movente.
Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement, because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first mover.
There is not an infinite series of ends of the human will, and there is one last end of the human will, because it is contrary to the formal aspect of an end to proceed indefinitely.
Ea vero quae non habent ordinem per se, sed per accidens sibi invicem coniunguntur, nihil prohibet infinitatem habere; causae enim per accidens indeterminatae sunt. Et hoc etiam modo contingit esse infinitatem per accidens in finibus, et in his quae sunt ad finem.
On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; for accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the end.
Sed quia primum bonum habet diffusionem secundum intellectum, cuius est secundum aliquam certam formam profluere in causata; aliquis certus modus adhibetur bonorum effluxui a primo bono, a quo omnia alia bona participant virtutem diffusivam. Et ideo diffusio bonorum non procedit in infinitum, sed, sicut dicitur Sap. XI, Deus omnia disposuit in numero, pondere et mensura.
But, since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper to flow forth into its effects according to a certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from the First Good from Which all other goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely but, as it is written (Wisdom 11:21), God disposes all things "in number, weight and measure."
In omnibus enim quae per se habent ordinem ad invicem, oportet quod, remoto primo, removeantur ea quae sunt ad primum.
For in whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of necessity be removed also.
In finibus autem invenitur duplex ordo, scilicet ordo intentionis, et ordo executionis, et in utroque ordine oportet esse aliquid primum. Id enim quod est primum in ordine intentionis est quasi principium movens appetitum, unde, subtracto principio, appetitus a nullo moveretur. Id autem quod est principium in executione, est unde incipit operatio; unde, isto principio subtracto, nullus inciperet aliquid operari.
Now there is to be observed a twofold order in ends--the order of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders there must be something first. For that which is first in the order of intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite; consequently, if you remove this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is that wherein operation has its beginning; and if this principle be taken away, no one will begin to work.
Principium autem intentionis est ultimus finis, principium autem executionis est primum eorum quae sunt ad finem.
Now the principle in the intention is the last end; while the principle in execution is the first of the things which are ordained to the end.
Sic ergo ex neutra parte possibile est in infinitum procedere, quia si non esset ultimus finis, nihil appeteretur, nec aliqua actio terminaretur, nec etiam quiesceret intentio agentis; si autem non esset primum in his quae sunt ad finem, nullus inciperet aliquid operari, nec terminaretur consilium, sed in infinitum procederet.
Consequently, on neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any action have its term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there is no first thing among those that are ordained to the end, none would begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would continue indefinitely.
Unde philosophus probat, in VIII Physic., quod non est possibile in causis moventibus procedere in infinitum, quia iam non esset primum movens, quo subtracto alia movere non possunt, cum non moveant nisi per hoc quod moventur a primo movente.
Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement, because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first mover.
Tuesday, September 08, 2009
1a 2ae q1 a3: Whether human acts are specified by their end? Yes.
Actus humani recipiunt speciem a fine quia finis non est omnino aliquid extrinsecum ab actu, quia comparatur ad actum ut principium vel terminus; et hoc ipsum est de ratione actus, ut scilicet sit ab aliquo, quantum ad actionem, et ut sit ad aliquid, quantum ad passionem.
Human acts are specified by their end because the end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it is just this that is the formal aspect of an act, viz. to proceed from something, considered as action, and to proceed towards something, considered as passion.
Unumquodque sortitur speciem secundum actum, et non secundum potentiam, unde ea quae sunt composita ex materia et forma, constituuntur in suis speciebus per proprias formas. Et hoc etiam considerandum est in motibus propriis. Cum enim motus quodammodo distinguatur per actionem et passionem, utrumque horum ab actu speciem sortitur, actio quidem ab actu qui est principium agendi; passio vero ab actu qui est terminus motus.
Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed of matter and form are established in their respective species by their own forms. And this is also to be observed in proper movements. For since movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these receives its species from an act; action indeed from the act which is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is the terminus of the movement.
Finis secundum quod est prior in intentione, ut dictum est, secundum hoc pertinet ad voluntatem. Et hoc modo dat speciem actui humano sive morali.
The end, insofar as it pre-exists in the intention, pertains to the will, as stated above (q1 ad 1). And it is thus that it gives the species to the human or moral act.
Idem actus numero, secundum quod semel egreditur ab agente, non ordinatur nisi ad unum finem proximum, a quo habet speciem, sed potest ordinari ad plures fines remotos, quorum unus est finis alterius.
One and the same act, insofar as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which it has its species; but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of which one is the end of the other.
Human acts are specified by their end because the end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it is just this that is the formal aspect of an act, viz. to proceed from something, considered as action, and to proceed towards something, considered as passion.
Unumquodque sortitur speciem secundum actum, et non secundum potentiam, unde ea quae sunt composita ex materia et forma, constituuntur in suis speciebus per proprias formas. Et hoc etiam considerandum est in motibus propriis. Cum enim motus quodammodo distinguatur per actionem et passionem, utrumque horum ab actu speciem sortitur, actio quidem ab actu qui est principium agendi; passio vero ab actu qui est terminus motus.
Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed of matter and form are established in their respective species by their own forms. And this is also to be observed in proper movements. For since movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these receives its species from an act; action indeed from the act which is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is the terminus of the movement.
Finis secundum quod est prior in intentione, ut dictum est, secundum hoc pertinet ad voluntatem. Et hoc modo dat speciem actui humano sive morali.
The end, insofar as it pre-exists in the intention, pertains to the will, as stated above (q1 ad 1). And it is thus that it gives the species to the human or moral act.
Idem actus numero, secundum quod semel egreditur ab agente, non ordinatur nisi ad unum finem proximum, a quo habet speciem, sed potest ordinari ad plures fines remotos, quorum unus est finis alterius.
One and the same act, insofar as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which it has its species; but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of which one is the end of the other.
Monday, September 07, 2009
1a 2ae q1 a2: Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end? No.
Omnia quae carent ratione, moveantur in fines particulares ab aliqua voluntate rationali, quae se extendit in bonum universale, scilicet a voluntate divina, quia manifestum est quod particulares causae moventur a causa universali.
All things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some rational will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will, because it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause.
Omnia agentia necesse est agere propter finem. Causarum enim ad invicem ordinatarum, si prima subtrahatur, necesse est alias subtrahi. Prima autem inter omnes causas est causa finalis.
Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause.
Cuius ratio est, quia materia non consequitur formam nisi secundum quod movetur ab agente, nihil enim reducit se de potentia in actum. Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis. Si enim agens non esset determinatum ad aliquem effectum, non magis ageret hoc quam illud, ad hoc ergo quod determinatum effectum producat, necesse est quod determinetur ad aliquid certum, quod habet rationem finis.
The reason of which is that matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the formal aspect of an end.
Haec autem determinatio, sicut in rationali natura fit per "rationalem appetitum", qui dicitur voluntas; ita in aliis fit per inclinationem naturalem, quae dicitur "appetitus naturalis".
And just as this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite."
Obiectum voluntatis est finis et bonum in universali. Unde non potest esse voluntas in his quae carent ratione et intellectu, cum non possint apprehendere universale; sed est in eis appetitus naturalis vel sensitivus, determinatus ad aliquod bonum particulare.
The object of the will is the end and the good in universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate to some particular good.
Philosophus probat in II Physic., quod "non solum intellectus, sed etiam natura agit propter finem".
The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not only mind but also nature acts for an end."
All things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some rational will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will, because it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause.
Omnia agentia necesse est agere propter finem. Causarum enim ad invicem ordinatarum, si prima subtrahatur, necesse est alias subtrahi. Prima autem inter omnes causas est causa finalis.
Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause.
Cuius ratio est, quia materia non consequitur formam nisi secundum quod movetur ab agente, nihil enim reducit se de potentia in actum. Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis. Si enim agens non esset determinatum ad aliquem effectum, non magis ageret hoc quam illud, ad hoc ergo quod determinatum effectum producat, necesse est quod determinetur ad aliquid certum, quod habet rationem finis.
The reason of which is that matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the formal aspect of an end.
Haec autem determinatio, sicut in rationali natura fit per "rationalem appetitum", qui dicitur voluntas; ita in aliis fit per inclinationem naturalem, quae dicitur "appetitus naturalis".
And just as this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite."
Obiectum voluntatis est finis et bonum in universali. Unde non potest esse voluntas in his quae carent ratione et intellectu, cum non possint apprehendere universale; sed est in eis appetitus naturalis vel sensitivus, determinatus ad aliquod bonum particulare.
The object of the will is the end and the good in universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate to some particular good.
Philosophus probat in II Physic., quod "non solum intellectus, sed etiam natura agit propter finem".
The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not only mind but also nature acts for an end."
Sunday, September 06, 2009
1a 2ae q1 a1: Whether it belongs to man to act for an end? Yes.
Homini convenit omnia agere propter finem quia differt homo ab aliis irrationalibus creaturis in hoc, quod est suorum actuum dominus.
It belongs to man to do everything for an end because man differs from irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions.
Unde illae solae actiones vocantur proprie humanae, quarum homo est dominus. Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem—unde et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illae ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt. Si quae autem aliae actiones homini conveniant, possunt dici quidem "hominis" actiones, sed non proprie "humanae", cum non sint hominis inquantum est homo.
Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is master. Now man is master of his actions through his [formally aspectual] reason and will—whence, too, free choice is defined as "the faculty of will and reason". Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of a man", but not properly "human" actions, since they are not proper to man as man.
Manifestum est autem quod omnes actiones quae procedunt ab aliqua potentia, causantur ab ea secundum rationem sui obiecti. Obiectum autem voluntatis est finis et bonum. Unde oportet quod omnes actiones humanae propter finem sint.
Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power, are caused by that power in accordance with the formal aspect of its object. But the object of the will is the end, i.e., the good. Therefore all human actions must be for an end.
Finis, etsi sit postremus in executione, est tamen primus in intentione agentis. Et hoc modo habet rationem causae.
Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is in this way that it has the formal aspect of a cause.
Sed multa homo agit absque deliberatione, de quibus etiam quandoque nihil cogitat; sicut cum aliquis movet pedem vel manum, aliis intentus, vel fricat barbam.
But man does many things without deliberation, sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent on something else.
Huiusmodi actiones non sunt proprie humanae, quia non procedunt ex deliberatione rationis, quae est proprium principium humanorum actuum. Et ideo habent quidem finem imaginatum, non autem per rationem praestitutum.
Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from the deliberation of formal aspect, which is the proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an envisioned end, but not one that is fixed by formal aspect.
It belongs to man to do everything for an end because man differs from irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions.
Unde illae solae actiones vocantur proprie humanae, quarum homo est dominus. Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem—unde et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illae ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt. Si quae autem aliae actiones homini conveniant, possunt dici quidem "hominis" actiones, sed non proprie "humanae", cum non sint hominis inquantum est homo.
Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is master. Now man is master of his actions through his [formally aspectual] reason and will—whence, too, free choice is defined as "the faculty of will and reason". Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of a man", but not properly "human" actions, since they are not proper to man as man.
Manifestum est autem quod omnes actiones quae procedunt ab aliqua potentia, causantur ab ea secundum rationem sui obiecti. Obiectum autem voluntatis est finis et bonum. Unde oportet quod omnes actiones humanae propter finem sint.
Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power, are caused by that power in accordance with the formal aspect of its object. But the object of the will is the end, i.e., the good. Therefore all human actions must be for an end.
Finis, etsi sit postremus in executione, est tamen primus in intentione agentis. Et hoc modo habet rationem causae.
Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is in this way that it has the formal aspect of a cause.
Sed multa homo agit absque deliberatione, de quibus etiam quandoque nihil cogitat; sicut cum aliquis movet pedem vel manum, aliis intentus, vel fricat barbam.
But man does many things without deliberation, sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent on something else.
Huiusmodi actiones non sunt proprie humanae, quia non procedunt ex deliberatione rationis, quae est proprium principium humanorum actuum. Et ideo habent quidem finem imaginatum, non autem per rationem praestitutum.
Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from the deliberation of formal aspect, which is the proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an envisioned end, but not one that is fixed by formal aspect.
1a2ae q1: Man's last end
- Does it belong to man to act for an end?
- Is this proper to the rational nature?
- Are a man's actions specified by their end?
- Is there any last end of human life?
- Can one man have several last ends?
- Does man ordain all to the last end?
- Do all men have the same last end?
- Do all other creatures concur with man in that last end?
1a2ae: First Part of the Second Part (Prima Secundæ Partis)
Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur—secundum quod per imaginem significatur "intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum"—postquam praedictum est de exemplari (scilicet de Deo) et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem, restat ut consideremus de eius imagine (idest de homine), secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.
Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orthod. ii. 12), man is said to be made to God's image—insofar as the image implies an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement—now that we have treated of the exemplar (i.e., God) and of those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will, it remains for us to treat of His image (i.e., man), inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.
Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orthod. ii. 12), man is said to be made to God's image—insofar as the image implies an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement—now that we have treated of the exemplar (i.e., God) and of those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will, it remains for us to treat of His image (i.e., man), inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.
Saturday, September 05, 2009
Q119 A2: Whether the semen is produced from surplus food?
Yes. The semen is produced from the substance of the generator because generation is from the substance of the generator in animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its power to the form of the generator, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the substance.
Semen est de substantia generantis quia generatio est de substantia generantis in animalibus et plantis, inquantum semen habet virtutem ex forma generantis, et inquantum est in potentia ad substantiam ipsius.
The semen is not something separated from what was before the actual whole; rather is it the whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of the generator, to produce the whole body.
Semen non sit decisum ab eo quod erat actu totum; sed magis sit in potentia totum, habens virtutem ad productionem totius corporis, derivatam an anima generantis.
Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into the substance of the members. Therefore the semen is taken from this. In this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power: because what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the generative power.
Hoc autem quod est in potentia ad totum, est illud quod generatur ex alimento, antequam convertatur in substantiam membrorum. Et ideo ex hoc semen accipitur. Et secundum hoc, virtus nutritiva dicitur deservire generativae, quia id quod est conversum per virtutem nutritivam, accipitur a virtute generativa ut semen.
A sign of this, according to the Philosopher, is that animals of great size, which require much food, have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and generated seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason.
Et huius signum ponit philosophus, quod animalia magni corporis, quae indigent multo nutrimento, sunt pauci seminis secundum quantitatem sui corporis, et paucae generationis; et similiter homines pingues sunt pauci seminis, propter eandem causam.
The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener. Animal. i, 18) that "the semen is surplus food."
Philosophus probat multipliciter, in libro de Generat. Animal., "quod semen est superfluum alimenti".
The likeness of the generator to the generated is on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that generates its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a certain power derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father.
Assimilatio generantis ad genitum non fit propter materiam, sed propter formam agentis, quod generat sibi simile. Unde non oportet ad hoc quod aliquis assimiletur avo, quod materia corporalis seminis fuerit in avo; sed quod sit in semine aliqua virtus derivata ab anima avi, mediante patre.
Kinship is not in relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms.
Affinitas non attenditur secundum materiam, sed magis secundum derivationem formae.
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were in Adam "not only by seminal formal aspect, but also in the very substance of the body."
Augustinus dicit, X super Gen. ad Litt., quod nos fuimus in Adam non solum secundum "seminalem rationem, sed etiam secundum corpulentam substantiam".
These words of Augustine are not to be understood as though the immediate seminal formal aspect, or the corporeal substance from which this individual was formed, were actually in Adam: but so that both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal matter, which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance, is originally derived from Adam: and likewise the active seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal formal aspect [in the production] of this man.
Verbum Augustini non est sic intelligendum, quasi in Adam actu fuerit aut seminalis ratio huius hominis propinqua, aut corpulenta eius substantia, sed utrumque fuit in Adam secundum originem. Nam et materia corporalis, quae ministrata est a matre, quam vocat corpulentam substantiam, derivatur originaliter ab Adam, et similiter virtus activa existens in semine patris, quae est huius hominis propinqua ratio seminalis.
But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the "corporeal substance," not according to the seminal formal aspect. Because the matter from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin Mother, was derived from Adam; whereas the active power was not derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal power of a man, but by the operation of the Holy Spirit. For "such a birth was becoming to Him" [Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary, O. P.], WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen.
Sed Christus dicitur fuisse in Adam secundum corpulentam substantiam, sed non secundum seminalem rationem. Quia materia corporis eius, quae ministrata est a matre virgine, derivata est ab Adam, sed virtus activa non est derivata ab Adam, quia corpus eius non est formatum per virtutem virilis seminis, sed operatione spiritus sancti. Talis enim partus decebat eum, qui est super omnia benedictus Deus in saecula. Amen.
Semen est de substantia generantis quia generatio est de substantia generantis in animalibus et plantis, inquantum semen habet virtutem ex forma generantis, et inquantum est in potentia ad substantiam ipsius.
The semen is not something separated from what was before the actual whole; rather is it the whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of the generator, to produce the whole body.
Semen non sit decisum ab eo quod erat actu totum; sed magis sit in potentia totum, habens virtutem ad productionem totius corporis, derivatam an anima generantis.
Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into the substance of the members. Therefore the semen is taken from this. In this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power: because what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the generative power.
Hoc autem quod est in potentia ad totum, est illud quod generatur ex alimento, antequam convertatur in substantiam membrorum. Et ideo ex hoc semen accipitur. Et secundum hoc, virtus nutritiva dicitur deservire generativae, quia id quod est conversum per virtutem nutritivam, accipitur a virtute generativa ut semen.
A sign of this, according to the Philosopher, is that animals of great size, which require much food, have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and generated seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason.
Et huius signum ponit philosophus, quod animalia magni corporis, quae indigent multo nutrimento, sunt pauci seminis secundum quantitatem sui corporis, et paucae generationis; et similiter homines pingues sunt pauci seminis, propter eandem causam.
The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener. Animal. i, 18) that "the semen is surplus food."
Philosophus probat multipliciter, in libro de Generat. Animal., "quod semen est superfluum alimenti".
The likeness of the generator to the generated is on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that generates its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a certain power derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father.
Assimilatio generantis ad genitum non fit propter materiam, sed propter formam agentis, quod generat sibi simile. Unde non oportet ad hoc quod aliquis assimiletur avo, quod materia corporalis seminis fuerit in avo; sed quod sit in semine aliqua virtus derivata ab anima avi, mediante patre.
Kinship is not in relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms.
Affinitas non attenditur secundum materiam, sed magis secundum derivationem formae.
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were in Adam "not only by seminal formal aspect, but also in the very substance of the body."
Augustinus dicit, X super Gen. ad Litt., quod nos fuimus in Adam non solum secundum "seminalem rationem, sed etiam secundum corpulentam substantiam".
These words of Augustine are not to be understood as though the immediate seminal formal aspect, or the corporeal substance from which this individual was formed, were actually in Adam: but so that both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal matter, which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance, is originally derived from Adam: and likewise the active seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal formal aspect [in the production] of this man.
Verbum Augustini non est sic intelligendum, quasi in Adam actu fuerit aut seminalis ratio huius hominis propinqua, aut corpulenta eius substantia, sed utrumque fuit in Adam secundum originem. Nam et materia corporalis, quae ministrata est a matre, quam vocat corpulentam substantiam, derivatur originaliter ab Adam, et similiter virtus activa existens in semine patris, quae est huius hominis propinqua ratio seminalis.
But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the "corporeal substance," not according to the seminal formal aspect. Because the matter from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin Mother, was derived from Adam; whereas the active power was not derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal power of a man, but by the operation of the Holy Spirit. For "such a birth was becoming to Him" [Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary, O. P.], WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen.
Sed Christus dicitur fuisse in Adam secundum corpulentam substantiam, sed non secundum seminalem rationem. Quia materia corporis eius, quae ministrata est a matre virgine, derivata est ab Adam, sed virtus activa non est derivata ab Adam, quia corpus eius non est formatum per virtutem virilis seminis, sed operatione spiritus sancti. Talis enim partus decebat eum, qui est super omnia benedictus Deus in saecula. Amen.
Friday, September 04, 2009
Q119 A1: Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature?
Yes. Food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts.
Alimentum vere convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae, inquantum vere accipit speciem carnis et ossis et huiusmodi partium.
This is what the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh."
Et hoc est quod dicit philosophus in II de anima, quod "alimentum nutrit inquantum est potentia caro."
According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being." Therefore that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature.
Secundum philosophum, II Metaphys., "hoc modo se habet unumquodque ad veritatem, sicut se habet ad esse." Illud ergo pertinet ad veritatem naturae alicuius, quod est de constitutione naturae ipsius.
But nature can be considered in two ways: firstly, in general according to the formal aspect of the species; secondly, as in this individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong to a thing's true nature considered in general, individual signate matter, and the form individualized by that matter, belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body.
Sed natura dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, in communi, secundum rationem speciei; alio modo, secundum quod est in hoc individuo. Ad veritatem igitur naturae alicuius in communi consideratae, pertinet forma et materia eius in communi accepta, ad veritatem autem naturae in hoc particulari consideratae, pertinet materia individualis signata, et forma per huiusmodi materiam individuata. Sicut de veritate humanae naturae in communi, est anima humana et corpus, sed de veritate humanae naturae in Petro et Martino, est haec anima et hoc corpus.
Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this; and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5).
Omnis virtus in corpore passibili per continuam actionem debilitatur, quia huiusmodi agentia etiam patiuntur. Et ideo virtus conversiva in principio quidem tam fortis est, ut possit convertere non solum quod sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, sed etiam ad augmentum. Postea vero non potest convertere nisi quantum sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, et tunc cessat augmentum. Demum nec hoc potest, et tunc fit diminutio. Deinde, deficiente huiusmodi virtute totaliter, animal moritur. Sicut virtus vini convertentis aquam admixtam, paulatim per admixtionem aquae debilitatur, ut tandem totum fiat aquosum, ut philosophus exemplificat in I de Generat.
Alimentum vere convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae, inquantum vere accipit speciem carnis et ossis et huiusmodi partium.
This is what the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh."
Et hoc est quod dicit philosophus in II de anima, quod "alimentum nutrit inquantum est potentia caro."
According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being." Therefore that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature.
Secundum philosophum, II Metaphys., "hoc modo se habet unumquodque ad veritatem, sicut se habet ad esse." Illud ergo pertinet ad veritatem naturae alicuius, quod est de constitutione naturae ipsius.
But nature can be considered in two ways: firstly, in general according to the formal aspect of the species; secondly, as in this individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong to a thing's true nature considered in general, individual signate matter, and the form individualized by that matter, belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body.
Sed natura dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, in communi, secundum rationem speciei; alio modo, secundum quod est in hoc individuo. Ad veritatem igitur naturae alicuius in communi consideratae, pertinet forma et materia eius in communi accepta, ad veritatem autem naturae in hoc particulari consideratae, pertinet materia individualis signata, et forma per huiusmodi materiam individuata. Sicut de veritate humanae naturae in communi, est anima humana et corpus, sed de veritate humanae naturae in Petro et Martino, est haec anima et hoc corpus.
Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this; and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5).
Omnis virtus in corpore passibili per continuam actionem debilitatur, quia huiusmodi agentia etiam patiuntur. Et ideo virtus conversiva in principio quidem tam fortis est, ut possit convertere non solum quod sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, sed etiam ad augmentum. Postea vero non potest convertere nisi quantum sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, et tunc cessat augmentum. Demum nec hoc potest, et tunc fit diminutio. Deinde, deficiente huiusmodi virtute totaliter, animal moritur. Sicut virtus vini convertentis aquam admixtam, paulatim per admixtionem aquae debilitatur, ut tandem totum fiat aquosum, ut philosophus exemplificat in I de Generat.
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