Yes. The more the power of nature is surpassed, the greater the miracle, because a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpasses.
Secundum quod magis excedit facultatem naturae, secundum hoc maius miraculum dicitur, quia dicitur aliquid miraculum per comparationem ad facultatem naturae, quam excedit.
"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.
Thursday, July 02, 2009
Wednesday, July 01, 2009
Q105 A7: Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous?
Yes. Those things which God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles, because a miracle is so called as being full of wonder, as having a cause absolutely hidden from all; and this cause is God.
Illa quae a Deo fiunt praeter causas nobis notas, miracula dicuntur, quia miraculum dicitur quasi admiratione plenum, quod scilicet habet causam simpliciter et omnibus occultam; haec autem est Deus.
Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do not belong to that order.
Creatio, et iustificatio impii, etsi a solo Deo fiant, non tamen, proprie loquendo, miracula dicuntur. Quia non sunt nata fieri per alias causas, et ita non contingunt praeter ordinem naturae, cum haec ad ordinem naturae non pertineant.
A miracle is said to go beyond the hope "of nature," not above the hope "of grace," which hope comes from faith, whereby we believe in the future resurrection.
Supra spem etiam naturae miraculum esse dicitur, non supra spem gratiae, quae est ex fide, per quam credimus resurrectionem futuram.
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "Where God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle."
Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod "cum Deus aliquid facit contra cognitum nobis cursum solitumque naturae, magnalia, vel mirabilia nominantur."
Illa quae a Deo fiunt praeter causas nobis notas, miracula dicuntur, quia miraculum dicitur quasi admiratione plenum, quod scilicet habet causam simpliciter et omnibus occultam; haec autem est Deus.
Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do not belong to that order.
Creatio, et iustificatio impii, etsi a solo Deo fiant, non tamen, proprie loquendo, miracula dicuntur. Quia non sunt nata fieri per alias causas, et ita non contingunt praeter ordinem naturae, cum haec ad ordinem naturae non pertineant.
A miracle is said to go beyond the hope "of nature," not above the hope "of grace," which hope comes from faith, whereby we believe in the future resurrection.
Supra spem etiam naturae miraculum esse dicitur, non supra spem gratiae, quae est ex fide, per quam credimus resurrectionem futuram.
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "Where God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle."
Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod "cum Deus aliquid facit contra cognitum nobis cursum solitumque naturae, magnalia, vel mirabilia nominantur."
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
Q105 A6: Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature?
Yes. God can do something outside this order created by Him, when He chooses (for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them, or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend), because a higher cause is not contained by a cause of a lower order, but conversely.
Deus potest praeter hunc ordinem institutum agere, cum voluerit (puta agendo effectus secundarum causarum sine ipsis, vel producendo aliquos effectus ad quos causae secundae non se extendunt), quia causa superior non continetur sub ordine causae inferioris, sed e converso.
God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He is not changed.
Deus sic rebus certum ordinem indidit, ut tamen sibi reservaret quid ipse aliquando aliter ex causa esset facturus. Unde cum praeter hunc ordinem agit, non mutatur.
Since the order of nature is given to things by God, if He does anything outside this order, it is not against nature. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "That is natural to each thing which is caused by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and order in nature."
Cum igitur naturae ordo sit a Deo rebus inditus, si quid praeter hunc ordinem faciat, non est contra naturam. Unde Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod "id est cuique rei naturale, quod ille fecerit a quo est omnis modus, numerus et ordo naturae."
If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, if He did so, He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness.
Si ergo ordo rerum consideretur prout dependet a prima causa, sic contra rerum ordinem Deus facere non potest, sic enim si faceret, faceret contra suam praescientiam aut voluntatem aut bonitatem.
But if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not subject to the order of secondary causes; but, on the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural necessity, but by the choice of His own will, for He could have created another order of things.
Si vero consideretur rerum ordo prout dependet a qualibet secundarum causarum, sic Deus potest facere praeter ordinem rerum. Quia ordini secundarum causarum ipse non est subiectus; sed talis ordo ei subiicitur, quasi ab eo procedens non per necessitatem naturae, sed per arbitrium voluntatis, potuisset enim et alium ordinem rerum instituere.
So Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God acts against the wonted course of nature; but by no means does He act against the supreme law, because He does not act against Himself."
Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod "Deus contra solitum cursum naturae facit; sed contra summam legem tam nullo modo facit, quam contra seipsum non facit."
Deus potest praeter hunc ordinem institutum agere, cum voluerit (puta agendo effectus secundarum causarum sine ipsis, vel producendo aliquos effectus ad quos causae secundae non se extendunt), quia causa superior non continetur sub ordine causae inferioris, sed e converso.
God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He is not changed.
Deus sic rebus certum ordinem indidit, ut tamen sibi reservaret quid ipse aliquando aliter ex causa esset facturus. Unde cum praeter hunc ordinem agit, non mutatur.
Since the order of nature is given to things by God, if He does anything outside this order, it is not against nature. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "That is natural to each thing which is caused by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and order in nature."
Cum igitur naturae ordo sit a Deo rebus inditus, si quid praeter hunc ordinem faciat, non est contra naturam. Unde Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod "id est cuique rei naturale, quod ille fecerit a quo est omnis modus, numerus et ordo naturae."
If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, if He did so, He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness.
Si ergo ordo rerum consideretur prout dependet a prima causa, sic contra rerum ordinem Deus facere non potest, sic enim si faceret, faceret contra suam praescientiam aut voluntatem aut bonitatem.
But if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not subject to the order of secondary causes; but, on the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural necessity, but by the choice of His own will, for He could have created another order of things.
Si vero consideretur rerum ordo prout dependet a qualibet secundarum causarum, sic Deus potest facere praeter ordinem rerum. Quia ordini secundarum causarum ipse non est subiectus; sed talis ordo ei subiicitur, quasi ab eo procedens non per necessitatem naturae, sed per arbitrium voluntatis, potuisset enim et alium ordinem rerum instituere.
So Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God acts against the wonted course of nature; but by no means does He act against the supreme law, because He does not act against Himself."
Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod "Deus contra solitum cursum naturae facit; sed contra summam legem tam nullo modo facit, quam contra seipsum non facit."
Q105 A5: Whether God works in every agent?
Yes. God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation because God not only gives things their form, but He also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the end of every action.
Intelligendum est Deum operari in rebus, quod tamen ipsae res propriam habeant operationem, quia Deus non solum dat formas rebus, sed etiam conservat eas in esse, et applicat eas ad agendum, et est finis omnium actionum.
God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous.
Deus sufficienter operatur in rebus ad modum primi agentis, nec propter hoc superfluit operatio secundorum agentium.
In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes, matter is not a principle of action, but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art.
Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum sint causarum quatuor genera, materia quidem non est principium actionis, sed se habet ut subiectum recipiens actionis effectum. Finis vero et agens et forma se habent ut actionis principium, sed ordine quodam. Nam primo quidem, principium actionis est finis, qui movet agentem; secundo vero, agens; tertio autem, forma eius quod ab agente applicatur ad agendum (quamvis et ipsum agens per formam suam agat); ut patet in artificialibus.
Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three things.
Sic igitur secundum haec tria Deus in quolibet operante operatur.
It is written (Isaiah 26:12): "Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in us."
Dicitur Isaiae XXVI, omnia opera nostra operatus es in nobis, domine.
Intelligendum est Deum operari in rebus, quod tamen ipsae res propriam habeant operationem, quia Deus non solum dat formas rebus, sed etiam conservat eas in esse, et applicat eas ad agendum, et est finis omnium actionum.
God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous.
Deus sufficienter operatur in rebus ad modum primi agentis, nec propter hoc superfluit operatio secundorum agentium.
In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes, matter is not a principle of action, but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art.
Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum sint causarum quatuor genera, materia quidem non est principium actionis, sed se habet ut subiectum recipiens actionis effectum. Finis vero et agens et forma se habent ut actionis principium, sed ordine quodam. Nam primo quidem, principium actionis est finis, qui movet agentem; secundo vero, agens; tertio autem, forma eius quod ab agente applicatur ad agendum (quamvis et ipsum agens per formam suam agat); ut patet in artificialibus.
Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three things.
Sic igitur secundum haec tria Deus in quolibet operante operatur.
It is written (Isaiah 26:12): "Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in us."
Dicitur Isaiae XXVI, omnia opera nostra operatus es in nobis, domine.
Sunday, June 28, 2009
Q105 A4: Whether God can move the created will?
Yes. The will can be moved by good as its object, but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously, because nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at least equals the passive power of the thing movable.
Potest autem voluntas moveri sicut ab obiecto, a quocumque bono, non tamen sufficienter et efficaciter nisi a Deo, quia non sufficienter aliquid potest movere aliquod mobile, nisi virtus activa moventis excedat, vel saltem adaequet, virtutem passivam mobilis.
God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural inclination.
Deus, movendo voluntatem, non cogit ipsam, quia dat ei eius propriam inclinationem.
To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another.
Moveri voluntarie est moveri ex se, idest a principio intrinseco, sed illud principium intrinsecum potest esse ab alio principio extrinseco. Et sic moveri ex se non repugnat ei quod movetur ab alio.
If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated, it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.
Si voluntas ita moveretur ab alio quod ex se nullatenus moveretur, opera voluntatis non imputarentur ad meritum vel demeritum. Sed quia per hoc quod movetur ab alio, non excluditur quin moveatur ex se, ut dictum est, ideo per consequens non tollitur ratio meriti vel demeriti.
Now the passive power of the will extends to the universal good: for its object is universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal being. But every created good is some particular good; God alone is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills [the capacity of] the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object.
Virtus autem passiva voluntatis se extendit ad bonum in universali: est enim eius obiectum bonum universale, sicut et intellectus obiectum est ens universale. Quodlibet autem bonum creatum est quoddam particulare bonum; solus autem Deus est bonum universale. Unde ipse solus implet voluntatem, et sufficienter eam movet ut obiectum.
In like manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but a kind of inclination towards the object of the will, which is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate, just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects to the common weal.
Similiter autem et virtus volendi a solo Deo causatur. Velle enim nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam in obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum universale. Inclinare autem in bonum universale est primi moventis, cui proportionatur ultimus finis, sicut in rebus humanis dirigere ad bonum commune est eius qui praeest multitudini.
Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God to move the will, but especially in the second way, by an interior inclination of the will.
Unde utroque modo proprium est Dei movere voluntatem, sed maxime secundo modo, interius eam inclinando.
It is written (Philippians 2:13): "It is God who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish."
Dicitur ad Philipp. II, "Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere."
Potest autem voluntas moveri sicut ab obiecto, a quocumque bono, non tamen sufficienter et efficaciter nisi a Deo, quia non sufficienter aliquid potest movere aliquod mobile, nisi virtus activa moventis excedat, vel saltem adaequet, virtutem passivam mobilis.
God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural inclination.
Deus, movendo voluntatem, non cogit ipsam, quia dat ei eius propriam inclinationem.
To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another.
Moveri voluntarie est moveri ex se, idest a principio intrinseco, sed illud principium intrinsecum potest esse ab alio principio extrinseco. Et sic moveri ex se non repugnat ei quod movetur ab alio.
If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated, it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.
Si voluntas ita moveretur ab alio quod ex se nullatenus moveretur, opera voluntatis non imputarentur ad meritum vel demeritum. Sed quia per hoc quod movetur ab alio, non excluditur quin moveatur ex se, ut dictum est, ideo per consequens non tollitur ratio meriti vel demeriti.
Now the passive power of the will extends to the universal good: for its object is universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal being. But every created good is some particular good; God alone is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills [the capacity of] the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object.
Virtus autem passiva voluntatis se extendit ad bonum in universali: est enim eius obiectum bonum universale, sicut et intellectus obiectum est ens universale. Quodlibet autem bonum creatum est quoddam particulare bonum; solus autem Deus est bonum universale. Unde ipse solus implet voluntatem, et sufficienter eam movet ut obiectum.
In like manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but a kind of inclination towards the object of the will, which is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate, just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects to the common weal.
Similiter autem et virtus volendi a solo Deo causatur. Velle enim nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam in obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum universale. Inclinare autem in bonum universale est primi moventis, cui proportionatur ultimus finis, sicut in rebus humanis dirigere ad bonum commune est eius qui praeest multitudini.
Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God to move the will, but especially in the second way, by an interior inclination of the will.
Unde utroque modo proprium est Dei movere voluntatem, sed maxime secundo modo, interius eam inclinando.
It is written (Philippians 2:13): "It is God who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish."
Dicitur ad Philipp. II, "Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere."
Saturday, June 27, 2009
Q105 A3: Whether God moves the created intellect immediately?
Yes. God moves the created intellect, because He gives it the power to understand (whether natural, or superadded) and because He impresses intelligible species on it: and maintains and preserves both power and species in be-ing.
Deus movet intellectum creatum, inquantum dat ei virtutem ad intelligendum (vel naturalem vel superadditam) et inquantum imprimit ei species intelligibiles: et utrumque tenet et conservat in esse.
The intellectual operation is indeed performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the one who understands.
Operatio intellectualis est quidem ab intellectu in quo est, sicut a causa secunda; sed a Deo sicut a causa prima. Ab ipso enim datur intelligenti quod intelligere possit.
The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.
Lumen intellectuale, simul cum similitudine rei intellectae, est sufficiens principium intelligendi; secundarium tamen, et a primo principio dependens.
The intelligible object moves our human intellect, inasmuch as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as we have seen above (Q12, A2; Q56, A3). Hence He moves the created intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained (Q12, A4).
Intelligibile movet intellectum nostrum, inquantum quodammodo imprimit ei suam similitudinem, per quam intelligi potest. Sed similitudines quas Deus imprimit intellectui creato, non sufficiunt ad ipsum Deum intelligendum per essentiam, ut supra habitum est. Unde movet intellectum creatum, cum tamen non sit ei intelligibilis, ut dictum est.
As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement of the intellect.
Sicut in motibus corporalibus movens dicitur quod dat formam quae est principium motus, ita dicitur movere intellectum, quod causat formam quae est principium intellectualis operationis, quae dicitur motus intellectus.
Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being: one which is the intellectual power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality; while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands. So a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding, or impresses on him the likeness of the thing understood.
Operationis autem intellectus est duplex principium in intelligente: unum scilicet quod est ipsa virtus intellectualis, quod quidem principium est etiam in intelligente in potentia; aliud autem est principium intelligendi in actu, scilicet similitudo rei intellectae in intelligente. Dicitur ergo aliquid movere intellectum, sive det intelligenti virtutem ad intelligendum, sive imprimat ei similitudinem rei intellectae.
Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the first immaterial being; and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality, it follows that He is the first understanding being. Therefore since the first in each order is the cause of all that follows, we must conclude that from Him proceeds all power of understanding.
Utroque autem modo Deus movet intellectum creatum. Ipse enim est primum ens immateriale. Et quia intellectualitas consequitur immaterialitatem, sequitur quod ipse sit primum intelligens. Unde cum primum in quolibet ordine sit causa eorum quae consequuntur, sequitur quod ab ipso sit omnis virtus intelligendi.
In like manner, since He is the first being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their first cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in Him, after the mode of His own Essence. For as the intelligible formal aspects of all things exist first of all in God, and are derived from Him by other intellects, in order that these may actually understand, so also are they derived by creatures that they may subsist.
Similiter cum ipse sit primum ens, et omnia entia praeexistant in ipso sicut in prima causa, oportet quod sint in eo intelligibiliter secundum modum eius. Sicut enim omnes rationes rerum intelligibiles primo existunt in Deo, et ab derivantur in alios intellectus, ut actu intelligant, sic etiam derivantur in creaturas ut subsistant.
Deus movet intellectum creatum, inquantum dat ei virtutem ad intelligendum (vel naturalem vel superadditam) et inquantum imprimit ei species intelligibiles: et utrumque tenet et conservat in esse.
The intellectual operation is indeed performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the one who understands.
Operatio intellectualis est quidem ab intellectu in quo est, sicut a causa secunda; sed a Deo sicut a causa prima. Ab ipso enim datur intelligenti quod intelligere possit.
The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.
Lumen intellectuale, simul cum similitudine rei intellectae, est sufficiens principium intelligendi; secundarium tamen, et a primo principio dependens.
The intelligible object moves our human intellect, inasmuch as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as we have seen above (Q12, A2; Q56, A3). Hence He moves the created intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained (Q12, A4).
Intelligibile movet intellectum nostrum, inquantum quodammodo imprimit ei suam similitudinem, per quam intelligi potest. Sed similitudines quas Deus imprimit intellectui creato, non sufficiunt ad ipsum Deum intelligendum per essentiam, ut supra habitum est. Unde movet intellectum creatum, cum tamen non sit ei intelligibilis, ut dictum est.
As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement of the intellect.
Sicut in motibus corporalibus movens dicitur quod dat formam quae est principium motus, ita dicitur movere intellectum, quod causat formam quae est principium intellectualis operationis, quae dicitur motus intellectus.
Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being: one which is the intellectual power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality; while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands. So a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding, or impresses on him the likeness of the thing understood.
Operationis autem intellectus est duplex principium in intelligente: unum scilicet quod est ipsa virtus intellectualis, quod quidem principium est etiam in intelligente in potentia; aliud autem est principium intelligendi in actu, scilicet similitudo rei intellectae in intelligente. Dicitur ergo aliquid movere intellectum, sive det intelligenti virtutem ad intelligendum, sive imprimat ei similitudinem rei intellectae.
Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the first immaterial being; and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality, it follows that He is the first understanding being. Therefore since the first in each order is the cause of all that follows, we must conclude that from Him proceeds all power of understanding.
Utroque autem modo Deus movet intellectum creatum. Ipse enim est primum ens immateriale. Et quia intellectualitas consequitur immaterialitatem, sequitur quod ipse sit primum intelligens. Unde cum primum in quolibet ordine sit causa eorum quae consequuntur, sequitur quod ab ipso sit omnis virtus intelligendi.
In like manner, since He is the first being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their first cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in Him, after the mode of His own Essence. For as the intelligible formal aspects of all things exist first of all in God, and are derived from Him by other intellects, in order that these may actually understand, so also are they derived by creatures that they may subsist.
Similiter cum ipse sit primum ens, et omnia entia praeexistant in ipso sicut in prima causa, oportet quod sint in eo intelligibiliter secundum modum eius. Sicut enim omnes rationes rerum intelligibiles primo existunt in Deo, et ab derivantur in alios intellectus, ut actu intelligant, sic etiam derivantur in creaturas ut subsistant.
Friday, June 26, 2009
Q105 A2: Whether God can move a body immediately?
Yes. God can move any body whatever, in respect of any movement whatever, because God can imprint form immediately in matter.
Deus possit, secundum quemcumque motum, corpus quodcumque movere, quia Deus possit immediate formam materiae imprimere.
There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural power of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the words, "There is no contact with God"; that is, so that God Himself be touched.
Duplex est tactus, scilicet corporalis, sicut duo corpora se tangunt; et virtualis, sicut dicitur quod contristans tangit contristatum. Secundum igitur primum contactum, Deus, cum sit incorporeus, nec tangit nec tangitur. Secundum autem virtualem contactum, tangit quidem movendo creaturas, sed non tangitur, quia nullius creaturae virtus naturalis potest ad ipsum pertingere. Et sic intellexit Dionysius quod non est tactus Dei, ut scilicet tangatur.
God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness.
Movet Deus sicut desideratum et intellectum. Sed non oportet quod semper moveat sicut desideratum et intellectum ab eo quod movetur; sed sicut desideratum et notum a seipso; quia omnia operatur propter suam bonitatem.
Deus possit, secundum quemcumque motum, corpus quodcumque movere, quia Deus possit immediate formam materiae imprimere.
There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural power of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the words, "There is no contact with God"; that is, so that God Himself be touched.
Duplex est tactus, scilicet corporalis, sicut duo corpora se tangunt; et virtualis, sicut dicitur quod contristans tangit contristatum. Secundum igitur primum contactum, Deus, cum sit incorporeus, nec tangit nec tangitur. Secundum autem virtualem contactum, tangit quidem movendo creaturas, sed non tangitur, quia nullius creaturae virtus naturalis potest ad ipsum pertingere. Et sic intellexit Dionysius quod non est tactus Dei, ut scilicet tangatur.
God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness.
Movet Deus sicut desideratum et intellectum. Sed non oportet quod semper moveat sicut desideratum et intellectum ab eo quod movetur; sed sicut desideratum et notum a seipso; quia omnia operatur propter suam bonitatem.
Thursday, June 25, 2009
Q105 A1: Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form?
Yes. God can move matter immediately to form, because a being in passive potentiality can be led into act by the active power which contains that potentiality under its power.
Deus immediate potest movere materiam ad formam, quia ens in potentia passiva reduci potest in actum, a potentia activa quae eam sub sua potestate continet.
Therefore, since matter is contained under the Divine power, as brought forth by God, it can be led into act by the Divine power. And this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form, for a form is nothing else but the act of matter.
Cum igitur materia contineatur sub potestate divina, utpote a Deo producta, potest reduci in actum per divinam potentiam. Et hoc est moveri materiam ad formam, quia forma nihil aliud est quam actus materiae.
If a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by way of a virtual containment, or it is likened to the composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing like itself, so also can God. But no other form not existing in matter can do this, because matter is not contained by the power of any other separate substance. Hence angels and demons operate on these visible things, not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds.
Unde compositum quod generatur, similatur Deo secundum virtualem continentiam, sicut similatur composito generanti per similitudinem speciei. Unde sicut compositum generans potest movere materiam ad formam generando compositum sibi simile, ita et Deus. Non autem aliqua alia forma non in materia existens, quia materia non continetur in virtute alterius substantiae separatae. Et ideo Daemones et Angeli operantur circa haec visibilia, non quidem imprimendo formas, sed adhibendo corporalia semina.
Since God acts by His will and intellect, which knows the particular formal aspects and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that form on matter.
Quia Deus agit per voluntatem et intellectum, qui cognoscit rationes proprias omnium formarum, et non solum universales, inde est quod potest determinate hanc vel illam formam materiae imprimere.
The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; wherefore, since God ordains other causes to determinate effects, He can also bring forth determinate effects by Himself [without any other cause].
Hoc ipsum quod causae secundae ordinantur ad determinatos effectus est illis a Deo. Unde Deus, quia alias causas ordinat ad determinatos effectus, potest etiam determinatos effectus producere per seipsum.
It is written (Genesis 2:7): "God formed man of the slime of the earth."
Dicitur Gen. II, "formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae."
Deus immediate potest movere materiam ad formam, quia ens in potentia passiva reduci potest in actum, a potentia activa quae eam sub sua potestate continet.
Therefore, since matter is contained under the Divine power, as brought forth by God, it can be led into act by the Divine power. And this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form, for a form is nothing else but the act of matter.
Cum igitur materia contineatur sub potestate divina, utpote a Deo producta, potest reduci in actum per divinam potentiam. Et hoc est moveri materiam ad formam, quia forma nihil aliud est quam actus materiae.
If a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by way of a virtual containment, or it is likened to the composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing like itself, so also can God. But no other form not existing in matter can do this, because matter is not contained by the power of any other separate substance. Hence angels and demons operate on these visible things, not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds.
Unde compositum quod generatur, similatur Deo secundum virtualem continentiam, sicut similatur composito generanti per similitudinem speciei. Unde sicut compositum generans potest movere materiam ad formam generando compositum sibi simile, ita et Deus. Non autem aliqua alia forma non in materia existens, quia materia non continetur in virtute alterius substantiae separatae. Et ideo Daemones et Angeli operantur circa haec visibilia, non quidem imprimendo formas, sed adhibendo corporalia semina.
Since God acts by His will and intellect, which knows the particular formal aspects and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that form on matter.
Quia Deus agit per voluntatem et intellectum, qui cognoscit rationes proprias omnium formarum, et non solum universales, inde est quod potest determinate hanc vel illam formam materiae imprimere.
The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; wherefore, since God ordains other causes to determinate effects, He can also bring forth determinate effects by Himself [without any other cause].
Hoc ipsum quod causae secundae ordinantur ad determinatos effectus est illis a Deo. Unde Deus, quia alias causas ordinat ad determinatos effectus, potest etiam determinatos effectus producere per seipsum.
It is written (Genesis 2:7): "God formed man of the slime of the earth."
Dicitur Gen. II, "formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae."
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
Q104 A4: Whether anything is annihilated?
No. Nothing at all will be annihilated because the divine power and goodness of God are manifested more by the preservation of things in be-ing.
Simpliciter dicendum est quod nihil omnino in nihilum redigetur quia magis per hoc divina potentia et bonitas ostendatur, quod res in esse conservat.
This fact that things are brought into be-ing, after they have not been, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them. But that they should be reduced to nothing would hinder this sort of manifestation, since the power of God is conspicuously shown in this fact that He preserves all things in be-ing, according to the Apostle: "Upholding all things by the word of His power" (Hebrews 1:3).
Hoc quod res in esse productae sunt, postquam non fuerunt, declarat potentiam producentis. Sed quod in nihilum redigerentur, huiusmodi manifestationem impediret, cum Dei potentia in hoc maxime ostendatur, quod res in esse conservat, secundum illud apostoli Heb. I, "portans omnia verbo virtutis suae".
The natures of creatures show this fact that none of them is annihilated: for, either they are immaterial, and therefore there is in them no potentiality to non-be-ing; or they are material, and thus in all events they remain at least in matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the existing subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation of grace.
Creaturarum autem naturae hoc demonstrant, ut nulla earum in nihilum redigatur: quia vel sunt immateriales, et sic in eis non est potentia ad non esse; vel sunt materiales, et sic saltem remanent semper secundum materiam, quae incorruptibilis est, utpote subiectum existens generationis et corruptionis. Redigere etiam aliquid in nihilum, non pertinet ad gratiae manifestationem.
A creature's potentiality to be-ing a being is receptive only; but the active potentiality belongs to God Himself, from Whom there is the in-flow of the be-ing of a being. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the Divine power.
Potentia creaturae ad essendum est receptiva tantum; sed potentia activa est ipsius Dei, a quo est influxus essendi. Unde quod res in infinitum durent, sequitur infinitatem divinae virtutis.
Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a being"; for it is called a being, because by it something is.
Formae et accidentia non sunt entia completa, cum non subsistant: sed quodlibet eorum est aliquid "entis", sic enim ens dicitur, quia eo aliquid est.
Yet so far as the way in which they are is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to nothingness: not that any part of them survives, but they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of the subject.
Et tamen eo modo quo sunt, non omnino in nihilum rediguntur: non quia aliqua pars eorum remaneat, sed remanent in potentia materiae vel subiecti.
It is written (Ecclesiastes 3:14): "I have learned that all the works that God hath made continue for ever."
Dicitur Eccle. III. "Didici quod omnia opera quae fecit Deus, perseverant in aeternum."
Simpliciter dicendum est quod nihil omnino in nihilum redigetur quia magis per hoc divina potentia et bonitas ostendatur, quod res in esse conservat.
This fact that things are brought into be-ing, after they have not been, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them. But that they should be reduced to nothing would hinder this sort of manifestation, since the power of God is conspicuously shown in this fact that He preserves all things in be-ing, according to the Apostle: "Upholding all things by the word of His power" (Hebrews 1:3).
Hoc quod res in esse productae sunt, postquam non fuerunt, declarat potentiam producentis. Sed quod in nihilum redigerentur, huiusmodi manifestationem impediret, cum Dei potentia in hoc maxime ostendatur, quod res in esse conservat, secundum illud apostoli Heb. I, "portans omnia verbo virtutis suae".
The natures of creatures show this fact that none of them is annihilated: for, either they are immaterial, and therefore there is in them no potentiality to non-be-ing; or they are material, and thus in all events they remain at least in matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the existing subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation of grace.
Creaturarum autem naturae hoc demonstrant, ut nulla earum in nihilum redigatur: quia vel sunt immateriales, et sic in eis non est potentia ad non esse; vel sunt materiales, et sic saltem remanent semper secundum materiam, quae incorruptibilis est, utpote subiectum existens generationis et corruptionis. Redigere etiam aliquid in nihilum, non pertinet ad gratiae manifestationem.
A creature's potentiality to be-ing a being is receptive only; but the active potentiality belongs to God Himself, from Whom there is the in-flow of the be-ing of a being. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the Divine power.
Potentia creaturae ad essendum est receptiva tantum; sed potentia activa est ipsius Dei, a quo est influxus essendi. Unde quod res in infinitum durent, sequitur infinitatem divinae virtutis.
Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a being"; for it is called a being, because by it something is.
Formae et accidentia non sunt entia completa, cum non subsistant: sed quodlibet eorum est aliquid "entis", sic enim ens dicitur, quia eo aliquid est.
Yet so far as the way in which they are is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to nothingness: not that any part of them survives, but they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of the subject.
Et tamen eo modo quo sunt, non omnino in nihilum rediguntur: non quia aliqua pars eorum remaneat, sed remanent in potentia materiae vel subiecti.
It is written (Ecclesiastes 3:14): "I have learned that all the works that God hath made continue for ever."
Dicitur Eccle. III. "Didici quod omnia opera quae fecit Deus, perseverant in aeternum."
Tuesday, June 23, 2009
Q104 A3: Whether God can annihilate anything?
Yes. God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on created things, but [exercises causality] through His free will.
Bonitas Dei est causa rerum, non quasi ex necessitate naturae, quia divina bonitas non dependet ex rebus creatis, sed per liberam voluntatem.
Wherefore, as without prejudice to His goodness, He might not have brought forth things into be-ing, so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in be-ing.
Unde sicut potuit sine praeiudicio bonitatis suae, res non producere in esse; ita absque detrimento suae bonitatis, potest res in esse non conservare.
If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply any action on God's part, but a mere cessation of His action.
Si Deus rem aliquam redigeret in nihilum, hoc non esset per aliquam actionem, sed per hoc quod ab agendo cessaret.
Non-be-ing has no direct causality, for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it is a being; and being, strictly speaking, is the cause of be-ing a being. Therefore God is not able to be the cause of a thing to tend to non-be-ing: but a creature has this tendency of itself, inasmuch as it is [brought forth] from nothing. But indirectly God is able to be the cause which annihilates things: i.e., by withdrawing His action from things.
Non esse non habet causam per se, quia nihil potest esse causa nisi inquantum est ens; ens autem, per se loquendo, est causa essendi. Sic igitur Deus non potest esse causa tendendi in non esse: sed hoc habet creatura ex seipsa, inquantum est de nihilo. Sed per accidens Deus potest esse causa quod res in nihilum redigantur: subtrahendo scilicet suam actionem a rebus.
It is written (Jeremiah 10:24): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing."
Dicitur Ierem. X, "corripe me, domine, verumtamen in iudicio, et non in furore tuo, ne forte ad nihilum redigas me."
Bonitas Dei est causa rerum, non quasi ex necessitate naturae, quia divina bonitas non dependet ex rebus creatis, sed per liberam voluntatem.
Wherefore, as without prejudice to His goodness, He might not have brought forth things into be-ing, so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in be-ing.
Unde sicut potuit sine praeiudicio bonitatis suae, res non producere in esse; ita absque detrimento suae bonitatis, potest res in esse non conservare.
If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply any action on God's part, but a mere cessation of His action.
Si Deus rem aliquam redigeret in nihilum, hoc non esset per aliquam actionem, sed per hoc quod ab agendo cessaret.
Non-be-ing has no direct causality, for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it is a being; and being, strictly speaking, is the cause of be-ing a being. Therefore God is not able to be the cause of a thing to tend to non-be-ing: but a creature has this tendency of itself, inasmuch as it is [brought forth] from nothing. But indirectly God is able to be the cause which annihilates things: i.e., by withdrawing His action from things.
Non esse non habet causam per se, quia nihil potest esse causa nisi inquantum est ens; ens autem, per se loquendo, est causa essendi. Sic igitur Deus non potest esse causa tendendi in non esse: sed hoc habet creatura ex seipsa, inquantum est de nihilo. Sed per accidens Deus potest esse causa quod res in nihilum redigantur: subtrahendo scilicet suam actionem a rebus.
It is written (Jeremiah 10:24): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing."
Dicitur Ierem. X, "corripe me, domine, verumtamen in iudicio, et non in furore tuo, ne forte ad nihilum redigas me."
Monday, June 22, 2009
Q104 A2: Whether God preserves every creature immediately?
No. God gives be-ing by means of certain intermediate causes because a thing is kept the same by that which gives it be-ing.
Deus dat esse rebus mediantibus aliquibus causis mediis quia per idem conservatur res, per quod habet esse.
An effect depends on a creature as to its be-ing. For when we have a series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the principal cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way.
Invenitur etiam quod ab aliqua creatura dependet aliquis effectus secundum suum esse. Cum enim sunt multae causae ordinatae, necesse est quod effectus dependeat primo quidem et principaliter a causa prima, secundario vero ab omnibus causis mediis. Et ideo principaliter quidem prima causa est effectus conservativa, secundario vero omnes mediae causae.
No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue of some change: for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition.
Nulla creatura potest esse causa alterius, quantum ad hoc quod acquirat novam formam vel dispositionem, nisi per modum alicuius mutationis: quia semper agit praesupposito aliquo subiecto. Sed postquam formam vel dispositionem induxit in effectu, absque alia immutatione effectus, huiusmodi formam vel dispositionem conservat.
God created all things immediately, but in the creation itself of things He established an order among things, so that some depend on others, by which they are preserved in be-ing; however, He remains the principal cause of their preservation.
Deus immediate omnia creavit, sed in ipsa rerum creatione ordinem in rebus instituit, ut quaedam ab aliis dependerent, per quas secundario conservarentur in esse; praesupposita tamen principali conservatione, quae est ab ipso.
Deus dat esse rebus mediantibus aliquibus causis mediis quia per idem conservatur res, per quod habet esse.
An effect depends on a creature as to its be-ing. For when we have a series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the principal cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way.
Invenitur etiam quod ab aliqua creatura dependet aliquis effectus secundum suum esse. Cum enim sunt multae causae ordinatae, necesse est quod effectus dependeat primo quidem et principaliter a causa prima, secundario vero ab omnibus causis mediis. Et ideo principaliter quidem prima causa est effectus conservativa, secundario vero omnes mediae causae.
No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue of some change: for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition.
Nulla creatura potest esse causa alterius, quantum ad hoc quod acquirat novam formam vel dispositionem, nisi per modum alicuius mutationis: quia semper agit praesupposito aliquo subiecto. Sed postquam formam vel dispositionem induxit in effectu, absque alia immutatione effectus, huiusmodi formam vel dispositionem conservat.
God created all things immediately, but in the creation itself of things He established an order among things, so that some depend on others, by which they are preserved in be-ing; however, He remains the principal cause of their preservation.
Deus immediate omnia creavit, sed in ipsa rerum creatione ordinem in rebus instituit, ut quaedam ab aliis dependerent, per quas secundario conservarentur in esse; praesupposita tamen principali conservatione, quae est ab ipso.
Sunday, June 21, 2009
Q104 A1: Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God?
Yes. Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by God because God alone is being through His own essence, since His essence is His be-ing; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its be-ing.
Et secundum fidem et secundum rationem, quod creaturae conservantur in esse a Deo, quia solus Deus est ens per essentiam suam, quia eius essentia est suum esse; omnis autem creatura est ens participative, non quod sua essentia sit eius esse.
God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in be-ing after the cessation of the Divine operation; as neither can He grant it not to have received its be-ing from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by God, insofar as the be-ing of an effect depends on the cause of its be-ing a being.
Deus non potest communicare alicui creaturae ut conservetur in esse, sua operatione cessante; sicut non potest ei communicare quod non sit causa esse illius. Intantum enim indiget creatura conservari a Deo, inquantum esse effectus dependet a causa essendi.
The preservation of things by God is not through some new action, but through a continuation of that action whereby He gives be-ing: which action is without either motion or time.
Conservatio rerum a Deo non est per aliquam novam actionem, sed per continuationem actionis qua dat esse: quae quidem actio est sine motu et tempore.
Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): "If the power of God were somehow withdrawn from His creatures who are to be ruled, their form would at once cease, and every nature would collapse."
Et ideo, ut Augustinus dicit IV super Gen. ad Litt., "virtus Dei ab eis quae creata sunt regendis si cessaret aliquando, simul et illorum cessaret species, omnisque natura concideret."
Et secundum fidem et secundum rationem, quod creaturae conservantur in esse a Deo, quia solus Deus est ens per essentiam suam, quia eius essentia est suum esse; omnis autem creatura est ens participative, non quod sua essentia sit eius esse.
God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in be-ing after the cessation of the Divine operation; as neither can He grant it not to have received its be-ing from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by God, insofar as the be-ing of an effect depends on the cause of its be-ing a being.
Deus non potest communicare alicui creaturae ut conservetur in esse, sua operatione cessante; sicut non potest ei communicare quod non sit causa esse illius. Intantum enim indiget creatura conservari a Deo, inquantum esse effectus dependet a causa essendi.
The preservation of things by God is not through some new action, but through a continuation of that action whereby He gives be-ing: which action is without either motion or time.
Conservatio rerum a Deo non est per aliquam novam actionem, sed per continuationem actionis qua dat esse: quae quidem actio est sine motu et tempore.
Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): "If the power of God were somehow withdrawn from His creatures who are to be ruled, their form would at once cease, and every nature would collapse."
Et ideo, ut Augustinus dicit IV super Gen. ad Litt., "virtus Dei ab eis quae creata sunt regendis si cessaret aliquando, simul et illorum cessaret species, omnisque natura concideret."
Saturday, June 20, 2009
Q103 A8: Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?
No. Nothing can resist the order of the Divine government because every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover.
Nihil contranititur ordini divinae gubernationis quia omnis inclinatio alicuius rei, vel naturalis vel voluntaria, nihil est aliud quam quaedam impressio a primo movente.
From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause: but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things.
Ex hoc quod una res alteri contrapugnat, ostenditur quod aliquid reniti potest ordini qui est ex aliqua causa particulari: non autem ordini qui dependet a causa universali totius.
Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly," as is said (Wisdom 8) of Divine wisdom.
Dicit Boetius, in III de Consol., "non est aliquid quod summo huic bono vel velit vel possit obsistere. Est igitur summum bonum quod regit cuncta fortiter, suaviterque disponit"; ut dicitur Sap. VIII, de divina sapientia.
Nihil contranititur ordini divinae gubernationis quia omnis inclinatio alicuius rei, vel naturalis vel voluntaria, nihil est aliud quam quaedam impressio a primo movente.
From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause: but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things.
Ex hoc quod una res alteri contrapugnat, ostenditur quod aliquid reniti potest ordini qui est ex aliqua causa particulari: non autem ordini qui dependet a causa universali totius.
Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly," as is said (Wisdom 8) of Divine wisdom.
Dicit Boetius, in III de Consol., "non est aliquid quod summo huic bono vel velit vel possit obsistere. Est igitur summum bonum quod regit cuncta fortiter, suaviterque disponit"; ut dicitur Sap. VIII, de divina sapientia.
Friday, June 19, 2009
Q103 A7: Whether anything can happen outside the order of the Divine government?
No. It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause, because no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding cause, which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause.
Praeter ordinem alicuius particularis causae, aliquis effectus evenire potest, non autem praeter ordinem causae universalis, quia praeter ordinem particularis causae nihil provenit, nisi ex aliqua alia causa impediente, quam quidem causam necesse est reducere in primam causam universalem.
Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; but not as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government.
Aliqui effectus contingentes, per comparationem ad proximas causas, quae in suis effectibus deficere possunt; non propter hoc quod aliquid fieri possit extra totum ordinem gubernationis divinae. Quia hoc ipsum quod aliquid contingit praeter ordinem causae proximae, est ex aliqua causa subiecta gubernationi divinae.
Therefore as God is the first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all be-ing in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of the Divine government.
Cum igitur Deus sit prima causa universalis, non unius generis tantum, sed universaliter totius entis, impossibile est quod aliquid contingat praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis.
There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above (Q48, A3). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.
Nihil invenitur in mundo quod sit totaliter malum, quia malum semper fundatur in bono, ut supra ostensum est. Et ideo res aliqua dicitur mala, per hoc quod exit ab ordine alicuius particularis boni. Si autem totaliter exiret ab ordine gubernationis divinae, totaliter nihil esset.
Things are said to be fortuitous, as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance," as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
Aliqua dicuntur esse casualia in rebus, per ordinem ad causas particulares, extra quarum ordinem fiunt. Sed quantum ad divinam providentiam pertinet, "nihil fit casu in mundo," ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.
Praeter ordinem alicuius particularis causae, aliquis effectus evenire potest, non autem praeter ordinem causae universalis, quia praeter ordinem particularis causae nihil provenit, nisi ex aliqua alia causa impediente, quam quidem causam necesse est reducere in primam causam universalem.
Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; but not as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government.
Aliqui effectus contingentes, per comparationem ad proximas causas, quae in suis effectibus deficere possunt; non propter hoc quod aliquid fieri possit extra totum ordinem gubernationis divinae. Quia hoc ipsum quod aliquid contingit praeter ordinem causae proximae, est ex aliqua causa subiecta gubernationi divinae.
Therefore as God is the first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all be-ing in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of the Divine government.
Cum igitur Deus sit prima causa universalis, non unius generis tantum, sed universaliter totius entis, impossibile est quod aliquid contingat praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis.
There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above (Q48, A3). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.
Nihil invenitur in mundo quod sit totaliter malum, quia malum semper fundatur in bono, ut supra ostensum est. Et ideo res aliqua dicitur mala, per hoc quod exit ab ordine alicuius particularis boni. Si autem totaliter exiret ab ordine gubernationis divinae, totaliter nihil esset.
Things are said to be fortuitous, as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance," as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
Aliqua dicuntur esse casualia in rebus, per ordinem ad causas particulares, extra quarum ordinem fiunt. Sed quantum ad divinam providentiam pertinet, "nihil fit casu in mundo," ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.
Thursday, June 18, 2009
Q103 A6: Whether all things are immediately governed by God?
No. As to the formal aspect of government, God governs all things immediately, whereas in its execution, He governs some things by means of others, because as God is the very essence of goodness, so everything must be attributed to God in its highest degree of goodness, but it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself.
Quantum igitur ad rationem gubernationis pertinet, Deus immediate omnia gubernat, quantum autem pertinet ad executionem gubernationis, Deus gubernat quaedam mediantibus aliis cum Deus sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, unumquodque attribuendum est Deo secundum sui optimum, sed, quia maior perfectio est quod aliquid in se sit bonum, et etiam sit aliis causa bonitatis, quam si esset solummodo in se bonum.
If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality, wherefore all that is effected by many would not be accomplished by one.
Si solus Deus gubernaret, subtraheretur perfectio causalis a rebus. Unde non totum fieret per unum, quod fit per multa.
Therefore God so governs things that He makes some of them to be causes of others in government: like a teacher, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching others.
Et ideo sic Deus gubernat res, ut quasdam aliarum in gubernando causas instituat: sicut si aliquis magister discipulos suos non solum scientes faceret, sed etiam aliorum doctores.
Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts: The first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to certain spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions.
Gregorius enim Nyssenus reprehendit opinionem Platonis, qui divisit providentiam in tria: primam quidem primi Dei, qui providet rebus caelestibus, et universalibus omnibus; secundam vero providentiam esse dixit secundorum deorum, qui caelum circumeunt, scilicet respectu eorum quae sunt in generatione et corruptione; tertiam vero providentiam dixit quorundam Daemonum, qui sunt custodes circa terram humanarum actionum.
Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the formal aspect of government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the formal aspect of government, into three parts.
Opinio Platonis reprehenditur, quia etiam quantum ad rationem gubernationis, posuit Deum non immediate omnia gubernare. Quod patet per hoc, quod divisit in tria providentiam, quae est ratio gubernationis.
Quantum igitur ad rationem gubernationis pertinet, Deus immediate omnia gubernat, quantum autem pertinet ad executionem gubernationis, Deus gubernat quaedam mediantibus aliis cum Deus sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, unumquodque attribuendum est Deo secundum sui optimum, sed, quia maior perfectio est quod aliquid in se sit bonum, et etiam sit aliis causa bonitatis, quam si esset solummodo in se bonum.
If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality, wherefore all that is effected by many would not be accomplished by one.
Si solus Deus gubernaret, subtraheretur perfectio causalis a rebus. Unde non totum fieret per unum, quod fit per multa.
Therefore God so governs things that He makes some of them to be causes of others in government: like a teacher, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching others.
Et ideo sic Deus gubernat res, ut quasdam aliarum in gubernando causas instituat: sicut si aliquis magister discipulos suos non solum scientes faceret, sed etiam aliorum doctores.
Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts: The first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to certain spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions.
Gregorius enim Nyssenus reprehendit opinionem Platonis, qui divisit providentiam in tria: primam quidem primi Dei, qui providet rebus caelestibus, et universalibus omnibus; secundam vero providentiam esse dixit secundorum deorum, qui caelum circumeunt, scilicet respectu eorum quae sunt in generatione et corruptione; tertiam vero providentiam dixit quorundam Daemonum, qui sunt custodes circa terram humanarum actionum.
Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the formal aspect of government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the formal aspect of government, into three parts.
Opinio Platonis reprehenditur, quia etiam quantum ad rationem gubernationis, posuit Deum non immediate omnia gubernare. Quod patet per hoc, quod divisit in tria providentiam, quae est ratio gubernationis.
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Q103 A5: Whether all things are subject to the Divine government?
Yes. According to the same formal aspect is God the ruler of things as He is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection; and this belongs to government.
Secundum eandem rationem competit Deo esse gubernatorem rerum, et causam earum, quia eiusdem est rem producere, et ei perfectionem dare, quod ad gubernantem pertinet.
As there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government.
Sicut nihil potest esse quod non sit a Deo creatum, ita nihil potest esse quod eius gubernationi non subdatur.
As there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, so it is impossible for anything to escape from the Divine government.
Cum nihil esse possit quod non ordinetur in divinam bonitatem sicut in finem, impossibile est quod aliquod entium subtrahatur gubernationi divinae.
The very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes the formal aspect of chance.
Et hoc ipsum quod aliquid casuale invenitur in huiusmodi rebus, demonstrat ea alicuius gubernationi esse subiecta. Nisi enim huiusmodi corruptibilia ab aliquo superiori gubernarentur, nihil intenderent, maxime quae non cognoscunt, et sic non eveniret in eis aliquid praeter intentionem, quod facit rationem casus.
The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it requires to be governed by God.
Creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam per intellectum et voluntatem, quorum utrumque indiget regi et perfici ab intellectu et voluntate Dei. Et ideo supra gubernationem qua creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam tanquam domina sui actus, indiget gubernari a Deo.
Secundum eandem rationem competit Deo esse gubernatorem rerum, et causam earum, quia eiusdem est rem producere, et ei perfectionem dare, quod ad gubernantem pertinet.
As there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government.
Sicut nihil potest esse quod non sit a Deo creatum, ita nihil potest esse quod eius gubernationi non subdatur.
As there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, so it is impossible for anything to escape from the Divine government.
Cum nihil esse possit quod non ordinetur in divinam bonitatem sicut in finem, impossibile est quod aliquod entium subtrahatur gubernationi divinae.
The very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes the formal aspect of chance.
Et hoc ipsum quod aliquid casuale invenitur in huiusmodi rebus, demonstrat ea alicuius gubernationi esse subiecta. Nisi enim huiusmodi corruptibilia ab aliquo superiori gubernarentur, nihil intenderent, maxime quae non cognoscunt, et sic non eveniret in eis aliquid praeter intentionem, quod facit rationem casus.
The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it requires to be governed by God.
Creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam per intellectum et voluntatem, quorum utrumque indiget regi et perfici ab intellectu et voluntate Dei. Et ideo supra gubernationem qua creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam tanquam domina sui actus, indiget gubernari a Deo.
Q103 A4: Whether the effect of government is one?
No. There are two effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness, and the moving of things to good, because the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the participation and similarity of which all things tend.
Duo sunt effectus gubernationis, scilicet conservatio rerum in bono, et motio earum ad bonum, quia finis gubernationis mundi est bonum essentiale, ad cuius participationem et assimilationem omnia tendunt.
For the creature is assimilated to God in two things: first, with regard to this, that God is good, and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly, with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others, and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to be good.
Creatura enim assimilatur Deo quantum ad duo: scilicet quantum ad id, quod Deus bonus est, inquantum creatura est bona; et quantum ad hoc, quod Deus est aliis causa bonitatis, inquantum una creatura movet aliam ad bonitatem.
Duo sunt effectus gubernationis, scilicet conservatio rerum in bono, et motio earum ad bonum, quia finis gubernationis mundi est bonum essentiale, ad cuius participationem et assimilationem omnia tendunt.
For the creature is assimilated to God in two things: first, with regard to this, that God is good, and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly, with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others, and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to be good.
Creatura enim assimilatur Deo quantum ad duo: scilicet quantum ad id, quod Deus bonus est, inquantum creatura est bona; et quantum ad hoc, quod Deus est aliis causa bonitatis, inquantum una creatura movet aliam ad bonitatem.
Monday, June 15, 2009
Q103 A3: Whether the world is governed by one?
Yes. The world is governed by one because the government of the world must be the best kind of government; but the best government is the government by one.
Mundus gubernatur ab uno quia necesse est quod mundi gubernatio sit optima; optima autem gubernatio est quae fit per unum.
The reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the formal aspect of goodness, as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they desire unity, without which they would cease to exist.
Cuius ratio est, quia gubernatio nihil aliud est quam directio gubernatorum ad finem, qui est aliquod bonum. Unitas autem pertinet ad rationem bonitatis, ut Boetius probat, in III de Consol., per hoc quod, sicut omnia desiderant bonum, ita desiderant unitatem, sine qua esse non possunt.
For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as far as they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one.
Nam unumquodque intantum est, inquantum unum est, unde videmus quod res repugnant suae divisioni quantum possunt, et quod dissolutio uniuscuiusque rei provenit ex defectu illius rei. Et ideo id ad quod tendit intentio multitudinem gubernantis, est unitas sive pax. Unitatis autem causa per se est unum.
For it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord, except so far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several things united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the government of the world, being the best form of government, must be by one.
Manifestum est enim quod plures multa unire et concordare non possunt, nisi ipsi aliquo modo uniantur. Illud autem quod est per se unum, potest convenientius et melius esse causa unitatis, quam multi uniti. Unde multitudo melius gubernatur per unum quam per plures. Relinquitur ergo quod gubernatio mundi, quae est optima, sit ab uno gubernante.
This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10): "Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler."
Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in XII Metaphys., "entia nolunt disponi male, nec bonum pluralitas principatuum, unus ergo princeps".
Mundus gubernatur ab uno quia necesse est quod mundi gubernatio sit optima; optima autem gubernatio est quae fit per unum.
The reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the formal aspect of goodness, as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they desire unity, without which they would cease to exist.
Cuius ratio est, quia gubernatio nihil aliud est quam directio gubernatorum ad finem, qui est aliquod bonum. Unitas autem pertinet ad rationem bonitatis, ut Boetius probat, in III de Consol., per hoc quod, sicut omnia desiderant bonum, ita desiderant unitatem, sine qua esse non possunt.
For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as far as they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one.
Nam unumquodque intantum est, inquantum unum est, unde videmus quod res repugnant suae divisioni quantum possunt, et quod dissolutio uniuscuiusque rei provenit ex defectu illius rei. Et ideo id ad quod tendit intentio multitudinem gubernantis, est unitas sive pax. Unitatis autem causa per se est unum.
For it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord, except so far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several things united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the government of the world, being the best form of government, must be by one.
Manifestum est enim quod plures multa unire et concordare non possunt, nisi ipsi aliquo modo uniantur. Illud autem quod est per se unum, potest convenientius et melius esse causa unitatis, quam multi uniti. Unde multitudo melius gubernatur per unum quam per plures. Relinquitur ergo quod gubernatio mundi, quae est optima, sit ab uno gubernante.
This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10): "Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler."
Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in XII Metaphys., "entia nolunt disponi male, nec bonum pluralitas principatuum, unus ergo princeps".
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