1a 2ae q61 a1: Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues? Yes.

Convenienter inter virtutes morales ponuntur illae quae dicuntur principales, seu cardinales, quia perfectum est principalius imperfecto. Et ideo virtutes quae continent rectitudinem appetitus, dicuntur principales.

Those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral virtues because the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues.

Huiusmodi autem sunt virtutes morales; et inter intellectuales, sola prudentia, quae etiam quodammodo moralis est, secundum materiam, ut ex supradictis patet.

Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly shown above (q57 a4).

Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, exponens illud, "beati pauperes spiritu, scimus virtutes esse quatuor cardinales, scilicet temperantiam, iustitiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem". Hae autem sunt virtutes morales. Ergo virtutes morales sunt cardinales.

Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the poor in spirit" (Luke 6:20) says: "We know that there are four cardinal virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude." But these are moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues.

1a 2ae q61: The cardinal virtues

1. Should the moral virtues be called cardinal or principal virtues?
2. Their number
3. Which are they?
4. Do they differ from one another?
5. Are they fittingly divided into social, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?

1a 2ae q60 a5: Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions? Yes.

Secundum Aristotelem, sunt decem virtutes morales circa passiones, scilicet fortitudo, temperantia, liberalitas, magnificentia, magnanimitas, philotimia, mansuetudo, amicitia, veritas et eutrapelia. Et distinguuntur secundum diversas materias vel secundum diversas passiones; vel secundum diversa obiecta. Si igitur addatur iustitia, quae est circa operationes, erunt omnes undecim, quia omnia obiecta eiusdem operationis secundum speciem, eandem habitudinem habent ad rationem; non autem omnia obiecta eiusdem passionis secundum speciem, quia operationes non repugnant rationi, sicut passiones.

According to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, "philotimia," gentleness, friendship, truthfulness, and "eutrapelia," all of which differ in respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we add "justice," which is about operations, there will be eleven in all, because all objects of the same specific operation have the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do.

Perfectio virtutis ex ratione dependet, perfectio autem passionis, ex ipso appetitu sensitivo. Unde oportet quod virtutes diversificentur secundum ordinem ad rationem, passiones autem, secundum ordinem ad appetitum.

The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite. Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the passions according to their relation to the appetite.

Obiecta igitur passionum, secundum quod diversimode comparantur ad appetitum sensitivum, causant diversas passionum species, secundum vero quod comparantur ad rationem, causant diversas species virtutum.

Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason, they cause the different species of virtues.

1a 2ae q60 a4: Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions? Yes.

Non potest dici quod circa omnes passiones sit una sola virtus moralis, sunt enim quaedam passiones ad diversas potentias pertinentes; aliae namque pertinent ad irascibilem, aliae ad concupiscibilem.

It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue about all the passions, because some passions are not in the same power as other passions, since some belong to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty.

Nec tamen oportet quod omnis diversitas passionum sufficiat ad virtutes morales diversificandas.

On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues.

1a 2ae q60 a3: Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations? No.

Omnes virtutes morales quae sunt circa operationes, conveniunt in quadam generali ratione iustitiae, quae attenditur secundum debitum ad alterum, distinguuntur autem secundum diversas speciales rationes, quia in operationibus exterioribus ordo rationis instituitur sicut dictum est, non secundum proportionem ad affectionem hominis, sed secundum ipsam convenientiam rei in seipsa.

All the moral virtues that are about operations fit with one general, formal aspect of justice, which is in respect of something due to another, but they differ in respect of various specific formal aspects, because in external operations, the order of formal aspect is established, as we have stated (q60 a2), not according as how man is affected towards such operations, but according to the fittingness itself of the thing itself.

Secundum quam convenientiam accipitur ratio debiti, ex quo constituitur ratio iustitiae; ad iustitiam enim pertinere videtur ut quis debitum reddat. Unde omnes huiusmodi virtutes quae sunt circa operationes, habent aliquo modo rationem iustitiae.

From that fittingness we derive the formal aspect of something due, which is the formal aspect of justice; for it seems to pertain to justice that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the formal aspect of justice.

Sed debitum non est unius rationis in omnibus, aliter enim debetur aliquid aequali, aliter superiori, aliter minori; et aliter ex pacto, vel ex promisso, vel ex beneficio suscepto.

But the thing due is not of the same formal aspect in all these virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, in another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred.

Et secundum has diversas rationes debiti, sumuntur diversae virtutes: puta religio est per quam redditur debitum Deo; pietas est per quam redditur debitum parentibus vel patriae; gratia est per quam redditur debitum benefactoribus; et sic de aliis.

And corresponding to these various [specific] formal aspects of debt there are various virtues: e.g. "Religion", whereby we pay our debt to God; "Piety", whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; "Gratitude", whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth.