Virtutes morales sint diversae secundum speciem, et non una tantum, quia appetibilia secundum motionem rationis constituuntur in diversis speciebus, secundum quod diversimode se habent ad rationem.
Moral virtues are of various species and are not one only, because objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong to various species, according to their various relations to reason.
Manifestum est autem quod in moralibus ratio est sicut imperans et movens, vis autem appetitiva est sicut imperata et mota. Non autem appetitus recipit impressionem rationis quasi univoce, quia non fit rationale per essentiam, sed per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic.
Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say, because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation (Ethic. i, 13).
Sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales sunt habitus quidam appetitivae partis. Habitus autem specie differunt secundum speciales differentias obiectorum, ut supra dictum est. Species autem obiecti appetibilis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, attenditur secundum formam specificam, quae est ab agente.
As stated above (q58 aa1-3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as stated above (q54 a2). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent.
Obiectum rationis est verum. Est autem eadem ratio veri, in omnibus moralibus, quae sunt contingentia agibilia. Unde est una sola virtus in eis dirigens, scilicet prudentia.
The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence.
Obiectum autem appetitivae virtutis est bonum appetibile. Cuius est diversa ratio, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rationem dirigentem.
On the other hand, the object of the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in formal aspect according to its various relations to reason, the directing formal aspect.
Moralia non habent speciem a fine ultimo sed a finibus proximis, qui quidem, etsi infiniti sint numero, non tamen infiniti sunt specie.
Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends, and these, although they be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.