Virtus est in potentia animae quia perfectio est in eo cuius est perfectio.
Virtue is in a power of the soul because perfection is in that which it perfects.
Omnis operatio est ab anima per aliquam potentiam.
All operation proceeds from the soul through a power.
Disponit ad optimum: optimum autem est finis, qui vel est operatio rei, vel aliquid consecutum per operationem a potentia egredientem.
Virtue disposes to that which is best: for the best is the end, which is either a thing's operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing's power.
Unde virtus humana est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto.
Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue.
"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.
Tuesday, December 28, 2010
Monday, December 13, 2010
1a 2ae q56: The subject of virtue
- Is the subject of virtue a power of the soul?
- Can one virtue be in several powers?
- Can the intellect be the subject of virtue?
- Can the irascible and concupiscible faculties be the subject of virtue?
- Can the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of virtue?
- Can the will be the subject of virtue?
Sunday, December 12, 2010
1a 2ae q55 a4: Whether virtue is suitably defined? Yes.
"Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur," quia contra est auctoritas Augustini, ex cuius verbis praedicta definitio colligitur, et praecipue in II de libero arbitrio.
"Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us," because we have the authority of Augustine from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, 19.
Ista definitio perfecte complectitur totam rationem virtutis. Perfecta enim ratio uniuscuiusque rei colligitur ex omnibus causis eius. Comprehendit autem praedicta definitio omnes causas virtutis.
This definition comprises perfectly the whole aspect of virtue, because the perfect aspect of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue.
Causa namque formalis virtutis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, accipitur ex eius genere et differentia, cum dicitur qualitas bona, genus enim virtutis qualitas est, differentia autem bonum. Esset tamen convenientior definitio, si loco qualitatis habitus poneretur, qui est genus propinquum.
For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as "a good quality": for "quality" is the genus of virtue, and the difference, "good." But the definition would be more suitable if for "quality" we substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus.
Virtus autem non habet materiam ex qua, sicut nec alia accidentia, sed habet materiam circa quam; et materiam in qua, scilicet subiectum. Materia autem circa quam est obiectum virtutis; quod non potuit in praedicta definitione poni, eo quod per obiectum determinatur virtus ad speciem; hic autem assignatur definitio virtutis in communi. Unde ponitur subiectum loco causae materialis, cum dicitur quod est bona qualitas mentis.
Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter "about which" it is concerned, and matter "in which" it exits, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality "of the mind."
Finis autem virtutis, cum sit habitus operativus, est ipsa operatio. Sed notandum quod habituum operativorum aliqui sunt semper ad malum, sicut habitus vitiosi; aliqui vero quandoque ad bonum, et quandoque ad malum: sicut opinio se habet ad verum et ad falsum; virtus autem est habitus semper se habens ad bonum. Et ideo, ut discernatur virtus ab his quae semper se habent ad malum, dicitur, qua recte vivitur, ut autem discernatur ab his quae se habent quandoque ad bonum, quandoque ad malum, dicitur, qua nullus male utitur.
The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to evil, as vicious habits; others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil: for instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to the untrue, whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good. And so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live righteously", and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, "of which no one makes bad use."
Causa autem efficiens virtutis infusae, de qua definitio datur, Deus est. Propter quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae quidem particula si auferatur, reliquum definitionis erit commune omnibus virtutibus, et acquisitis et infusis.
Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the words "which God works in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or infused.
Id quod primo cadit in intellectu, est ens, unde unicuique apprehenso a nobis attribuimus quod sit ens; et per consequens quod sit unum et bonum, quae convertuntur cum ente.
That which is first seized by the intellect is be-ing: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as be-ing, and consequently as one, and as good, which are convertible with being.
Unde dicimus quod essentia est ens et una et bona; et quod unitas est ens et una et bona; et similiter de bonitate.
Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that oneness is being and one and good: and likewise goodness.
Non autem hoc habet locum in specialibus formis, sicut est albedo et sanitas, non enim omne quod apprehendimus, sub ratione albi et sani apprehendimus. Sed tamen considerandum quod sicut accidentia et formae non subsistentes dicuntur entia, non quia ipsa habeant esse, sed quia eis aliquid est; ita etiam dicuntur bona vel una, non quidem aliqua alia bonitate vel unitate, sed quia eis est aliquid bonum vel unum. Sic igitur et virtus dicitur bona, quia ea aliquid est bonum.
But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the aspect of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had be-ing, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something is good.
Bonum quod ponitur in definitione virtutis, non est bonum commune, quod convertitur cum ente, et est in plus quam qualitas, sed est bonum rationis, secundum quod Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., "quod bonum animae est secundum rationem esse".
Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by formal aspect, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of the soul is to be in accord with formal aspect".
Virtus non potest esse in irrationali parte animae, nisi inquantum participat rationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Et ideo ratio, sive mens, est proprium subiectum virtutis humanae.
Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except insofar as this participates in formal aspect (Ethic. i, 13). And therefore formal aspect, i.e., the mind, is the proper subject of virtue.
Virtus infusa causatur in nobis a Deo sine nobis agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus. Et sic est intelligendum quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae vero per nos aguntur, Deus in nobis causat non sine nobis agentibus, ipse enim operatur in omni voluntate et natura.
Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words, "which God works in us without us." As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.
"Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us," because we have the authority of Augustine from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, 19.
Ista definitio perfecte complectitur totam rationem virtutis. Perfecta enim ratio uniuscuiusque rei colligitur ex omnibus causis eius. Comprehendit autem praedicta definitio omnes causas virtutis.
This definition comprises perfectly the whole aspect of virtue, because the perfect aspect of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue.
Causa namque formalis virtutis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, accipitur ex eius genere et differentia, cum dicitur qualitas bona, genus enim virtutis qualitas est, differentia autem bonum. Esset tamen convenientior definitio, si loco qualitatis habitus poneretur, qui est genus propinquum.
For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as "a good quality": for "quality" is the genus of virtue, and the difference, "good." But the definition would be more suitable if for "quality" we substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus.
Virtus autem non habet materiam ex qua, sicut nec alia accidentia, sed habet materiam circa quam; et materiam in qua, scilicet subiectum. Materia autem circa quam est obiectum virtutis; quod non potuit in praedicta definitione poni, eo quod per obiectum determinatur virtus ad speciem; hic autem assignatur definitio virtutis in communi. Unde ponitur subiectum loco causae materialis, cum dicitur quod est bona qualitas mentis.
Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter "about which" it is concerned, and matter "in which" it exits, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality "of the mind."
Finis autem virtutis, cum sit habitus operativus, est ipsa operatio. Sed notandum quod habituum operativorum aliqui sunt semper ad malum, sicut habitus vitiosi; aliqui vero quandoque ad bonum, et quandoque ad malum: sicut opinio se habet ad verum et ad falsum; virtus autem est habitus semper se habens ad bonum. Et ideo, ut discernatur virtus ab his quae semper se habent ad malum, dicitur, qua recte vivitur, ut autem discernatur ab his quae se habent quandoque ad bonum, quandoque ad malum, dicitur, qua nullus male utitur.
The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to evil, as vicious habits; others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil: for instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to the untrue, whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good. And so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live righteously", and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, "of which no one makes bad use."
Causa autem efficiens virtutis infusae, de qua definitio datur, Deus est. Propter quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae quidem particula si auferatur, reliquum definitionis erit commune omnibus virtutibus, et acquisitis et infusis.
Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the words "which God works in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or infused.
Id quod primo cadit in intellectu, est ens, unde unicuique apprehenso a nobis attribuimus quod sit ens; et per consequens quod sit unum et bonum, quae convertuntur cum ente.
That which is first seized by the intellect is be-ing: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as be-ing, and consequently as one, and as good, which are convertible with being.
Unde dicimus quod essentia est ens et una et bona; et quod unitas est ens et una et bona; et similiter de bonitate.
Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that oneness is being and one and good: and likewise goodness.
Non autem hoc habet locum in specialibus formis, sicut est albedo et sanitas, non enim omne quod apprehendimus, sub ratione albi et sani apprehendimus. Sed tamen considerandum quod sicut accidentia et formae non subsistentes dicuntur entia, non quia ipsa habeant esse, sed quia eis aliquid est; ita etiam dicuntur bona vel una, non quidem aliqua alia bonitate vel unitate, sed quia eis est aliquid bonum vel unum. Sic igitur et virtus dicitur bona, quia ea aliquid est bonum.
But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the aspect of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had be-ing, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something is good.
Bonum quod ponitur in definitione virtutis, non est bonum commune, quod convertitur cum ente, et est in plus quam qualitas, sed est bonum rationis, secundum quod Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., "quod bonum animae est secundum rationem esse".
Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by formal aspect, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of the soul is to be in accord with formal aspect".
Virtus non potest esse in irrationali parte animae, nisi inquantum participat rationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Et ideo ratio, sive mens, est proprium subiectum virtutis humanae.
Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except insofar as this participates in formal aspect (Ethic. i, 13). And therefore formal aspect, i.e., the mind, is the proper subject of virtue.
Virtus infusa causatur in nobis a Deo sine nobis agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus. Et sic est intelligendum quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae vero per nos aguntur, Deus in nobis causat non sine nobis agentibus, ipse enim operatur in omni voluntate et natura.
Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words, "which God works in us without us." As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.
Saturday, December 11, 2010
1a 2ae q55 a3: Whether human virtue is a good habit? Yes.
Virtus humana, quae est habitus operativus, est bonus habitus, et boni operativus, quia virtus importat perfectionem potentiae, unde virtus cuiuslibet rei determinatur ad ultimum in quod res potest.
Human virtue, which is an operative habit, is a good habit, productive of good works, because virtue implies a perfection of power, wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the telos of its power.
Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., "nemo autem dubitaverit quod virtus animam facit optimam".
Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul be at its best".
Et philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod "virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit".
And the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work likewise good".
Human virtue, which is an operative habit, is a good habit, productive of good works, because virtue implies a perfection of power, wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the telos of its power.
Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., "nemo autem dubitaverit quod virtus animam facit optimam".
Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul be at its best".
Et philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod "virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit".
And the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work likewise good".
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