1a 2ae q55 a2: Whether human virtue is an operative habit? Yes.

De ratione virtutis humanae est quod sit habitus operativus quia virtus humana, de qua loquimur, non potest pertinere ad corpus; sed pertinet tantum ad id quod est proprium animae. Unde virtus humana non importat ordinem ad esse, sed magis ad agere.

It is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit because human virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act.

Potentia ad esse se tenet ex parte materiae, quae est ens in potentia, potentia autem ad agere se tenet ex parte formae, quae est principium agendi, eo quod unumquodque agit inquantum est actu.

Power in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is potential being, whereas power in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since everything acts insofar as it is in act.

Modus actionis sequitur dispositionem agentis, unumquodque enim quale est, talia operatur. Et ideo, cum virtus sit principium aliqualis operationis, oportet quod in operante praeexistat secundum virtutem aliqua conformis dispositio. Facit autem virtus operationem ordinatam. Et ideo ipsa virtus est quaedam dispositio ordinata in anima, secundum scilicet quod potentiae animae ordinantur aliqualiter ad invicem, et ad id quod est extra.

Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, insofar as, to wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, and to that which is outside.

Virtus quae est ad esse, non est propria hominis, sed solum virtus quae est ad opera rationis, quae sunt propria hominis.

Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man, but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which are proper to man.

Cum Dei substantia sit eius actio, summa assimilatio hominis ad Deum est secundum aliquam operationem. Unde, sicut supra dictum est, felicitas sive beatitudo, per quam homo maxime Deo conformatur, quae est finis humanae vitae, in operatione consistit.

As God's substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have said above (q3 a2), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in an operation.

1a 2ae q55 a1: Whether human virtue is a habit? Yes.

Virtutes humanae habitus sunt quia potentia dicitur esse perfecta, secundum quod determinatur ad suum actum.

Human virtues are habits because power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act.

Sunt autem quaedam potentiae quae secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad suos actus; sicut potentiae naturales activae. Et ideo huiusmodi potentiae naturales secundum seipsas dicuntur virtutes.

Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues.

Potentiae autem rationales, quae sunt propriae hominis, non sunt determinatae ad unum, sed se habent indeterminate ad multa, determinantur autem ad actus per habitus.

But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts by means of habits.

Quandoque virtus dicitur id ad quod est virtus, scilicet vel obiectum virtutis, vel actus eius, sicut fides dicitur quandoque id quod creditur, quandoque vero ipsum credere, quandoque autem ipse habitus quo creditur.

Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act: for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe.

1a 2ae q55: The virtues, as to their essence

1. Is human virtue a habit?
2. Is it an operative habit?
3. Is it a good habit?
4. The definition of virtue

1a 2ae q54 a4: Whether one habit is made up of many habits? No.

Si consideremus habitum secundum ea ad quae se extendit, sic inveniemus in eo quandam multiplicitatem, sed quia illa multiplicitas est ordinata ad aliquid unum, ad quod principaliter respicit habitus, inde est quod habitus est qualitas simplex, non constituta ex pluribus habitibus, etiam si ad multa se extendat, quia non unus habitus se extendit ad multa, nisi in ordine ad unum, ex quo habet unitatem.

If we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall find a certain multiplicity therein; but since this multiplicity is directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it is that a habit is a simple quality, not composed from several habits, even though it extend to many things, because a habit does not extend to many things save in relation to one, whence it derives its unity.

Ille qui in aliqua scientia acquirit per demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis unius, habet quidem habitum, sed imperfecte. Cum vero acquirit per aliquam demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis alterius, non aggeneratur in eo alius habitus; sed habitus qui prius inerat fit perfectior, utpote ad plura se extendens; eo quod conclusiones et demonstrationes unius scientiae ordinatae sunt, et una derivatur ex alia.

In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration, scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfectly. And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in him: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, inasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the conclusions and demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one flows from another.

1a 2ae q54 a3: Whether habits are divided into good and bad? Yes.

Distinguuntur specie habitus bonus et malus, quia habitus bonus dicitur qui disponit ad actum convenientem naturae agentis; habitus autem malus dicitur qui disponit ad actum non convenientem naturae.

A good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit because a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature.

Sicut actus virtutum naturae humanae conveniunt, eo quod sunt secundum rationem, actus vero vitiorum, cum sint contra rationem, a natura humana discordant.

Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they are against reason.

Et sic manifestum est quod secundum differentiam boni et mali, habitus specie distinguuntur.

Hence it is clear that habits are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and bad.

1a 2ae q54 a2: Whether habits are distinguished by their objects? Yes.

Habitus distinguuntur secundum diversa obiecta quia habitus importat ordinem ad aliquid; omnia autem quae dicuntur secundum ordinem ad aliquid, distinguuntur secundum distinctionem eorum ad quae dicuntur.

Habits also are distinguished according to the diversity of objects because habits imply order to something; and all things that imply order to something, are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained.

In distinctione potentiarum, vel etiam habituum, non est considerandum ipsum obiectum materialiter, sed ratio obiecti differens specie, vel etiam genere.

In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which may differ in species or even in genus.

1a 2ae q54 a1: Whether many habits can be in one power? Yes.

Contingit unius potentiae esse habitus plures quia subiectum habitus est potentia passiva, ut supra dictum est; potentia enim activa tantum non est alicuius habitus subiectum, ut ex supradictis patet.

There may be several habits in one power because the subject of a habit is a passive power, as stated above (q51 a2); for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was clearly shown above (q51 a2).