Homo non ex necessitate eligit, quia quod possibile est non esse, non necesse est esse.
Man does not choose of necessity, because that which is possible not to be, is not of necessity.
Sententia sive iudicium rationis de rebus agendis est circa contingentia, quae a nobis fieri possunt, in quibus conclusiones non ex necessitate sequuntur ex principiis necessariis absoluta necessitate, sed necessariis solum ex conditione.
The formal aspect of decision or judgment is of what is to be done is about things that are contingent and possible to us. In such matters the conclusions do not follow of necessity from principles that are absolutely necessary, but from such as are so conditionally.
Quod autem possibile sit non eligere vel eligere, huius ratio ex duplici hominis potestate accipi potest. Potest enim homo velle et non velle, agere et non agere, potest etiam velle hoc aut illud, et agere hoc aut illud.
Now this formal aspect why it is possible not to choose, or to choose, may be gathered from a twofold power in man. For man can will and not will, act and not act; again, he can will this or that, and do this or that.
Cuius ratio ex ipsa virtute rationis accipitur. Quidquid enim ratio potest apprehendere ut bonum, in hoc voluntas tendere potest. Potest autem ratio apprehendere ut bonum non solum hoc quod est velle aut agere; sed hoc etiam quod est non velle et non agere.
The formal aspect of this is seated in the very power of aspectual apprehension of form. For the will can tend to whatever aspect is apprehended as good. Now formal aspect can apprehend as good, not only this, viz. "to will" or "to act," but also this, viz. "not to will" or "not to act."
Et rursum in omnibus particularibus bonis potest considerare rationem boni alicuius, et defectum alicuius boni, quod habet rationem mali, et secundum hoc, potest unumquodque huiusmodi bonorum apprehendere ut eligibile, vel fugibile.
Again, in all particular goods, it can consider an aspect of some good, and the lack of some good, which has the aspect of evil, and in this respect, it can apprehend any single one of such goods as to be chosen or to be avoided.
Solum autem perfectum bonum, quod est beatitudo, non potest ratio apprehendere sub ratione mali, aut alicuius defectus. Et ideo ex necessitate beatitudinem homo vult, nec potest velle non esse beatus, aut miser.
The perfect good alone, which is Happiness, is the formal aspect that cannot be apprehended under a formal aspect as an evil, or as lacking in any way. Consequently man wills Happiness of necessity, nor can he will not to be happy, or to be unhappy.
Electio autem, cum non sit de fine, sed de his quae sunt ad finem, ut iam dictum est, non est perfecti boni, quod est beatitudo, sed aliorum particularium bonorum. Et ideo homo non ex necessitate, sed libere eligit.
Now since choice is not of the end, but of the means, as stated above (q13 a3), it is not of the perfect good, which is Happiness, but of other particular goods. Therefore man chooses not of necessity, but freely.
"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.
Sunday, January 31, 2010
Saturday, January 30, 2010
1a 2ae q13 a5: Whether choice is only of possible things? Yes.
Electio non sit nisi possibilium quia ratio eligendi aliquid est ex hoc quod ducit ad finem; per id autem quod est impossibile, non potest aliquis consequi finem.
Choice is only of possible things because the formal aspect under which a thing is to be chosen is that it conduces to an end; but what is impossible cannot conduce to an end.
Cum obiectum voluntatis sit bonum apprehensum, hoc modo iudicandum est de obiecto voluntatis, secundum quod cadit sub apprehensione. Et ideo sicut quandoque voluntas est alicuius quod apprehenditur ut bonum, et tamen non est vere bonum; ita quandoque est electio eius quod apprehenditur ut possibile eligenti, quod tamen non est ei possibile.
Since the object of the will is the apprehended good, we must judge of the object of the will according as it is apprehended. And so, just as sometimes the will tends to something which is apprehended as good, and yet is not really good; so is choice sometimes made of something apprehended as possible to the chooser, and yet impossible to him.
Voluntas media est inter intellectum et exteriorem operationem, nam intellectus proponit voluntati suum obiectum, et ipsa voluntas causat exteriorem actionem. Sic igitur principium motus voluntatis consideratur ex parte intellectus, qui apprehendit aliquid ut bonum in universali, sed terminatio seu perfectio actus voluntatis attenditur secundum ordinem ad operationem, per quam aliquis tendit ad consecutionem rei; nam motus voluntatis est ab anima ad rem.
The will stands between the intellect and the external action: for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and the will causes the external action. Hence the principle of the movement in the will is to be found in the intellect, which apprehends something under the universal aspect of good, but the term or perfection of the will's act is to be observed in its relation to the action, whereby a man tends to the attainment of a thing; for the movement of the will is from the soul to the thing.
Et ideo perfectio actus voluntatis attenditur secundum hoc quod est aliquid bonum alicui ad agendum. Hoc autem est possibile. Et ideo voluntas completa non est nisi de possibili, quod est bonum volenti. Sed voluntas incompleta est de impossibili, quae secundum quosdam "velleitas" dicitur, quia scilicet aliquis vellet illud, si esset possibile. Electio autem nominat actum voluntatis iam determinatum ad id quod est huic agendum. Et ideo nullo modo est nisi possibilium.
Consequently the perfect act of the will is in respect of something that is good for one to do. Now this cannot be something impossible. Wherefore the complete act of the will is only in respect of what is possible and good for him that wills. But the incomplete act of the will is in respect of the impossible; and by some is called "velleity," because, to wit, one would will [vellet] such a thing, were it possible. But choice is an act of the will, fixed on something to be done by the chooser. And therefore it is by no means of anything but what is possible.
Choice is only of possible things because the formal aspect under which a thing is to be chosen is that it conduces to an end; but what is impossible cannot conduce to an end.
Cum obiectum voluntatis sit bonum apprehensum, hoc modo iudicandum est de obiecto voluntatis, secundum quod cadit sub apprehensione. Et ideo sicut quandoque voluntas est alicuius quod apprehenditur ut bonum, et tamen non est vere bonum; ita quandoque est electio eius quod apprehenditur ut possibile eligenti, quod tamen non est ei possibile.
Since the object of the will is the apprehended good, we must judge of the object of the will according as it is apprehended. And so, just as sometimes the will tends to something which is apprehended as good, and yet is not really good; so is choice sometimes made of something apprehended as possible to the chooser, and yet impossible to him.
Voluntas media est inter intellectum et exteriorem operationem, nam intellectus proponit voluntati suum obiectum, et ipsa voluntas causat exteriorem actionem. Sic igitur principium motus voluntatis consideratur ex parte intellectus, qui apprehendit aliquid ut bonum in universali, sed terminatio seu perfectio actus voluntatis attenditur secundum ordinem ad operationem, per quam aliquis tendit ad consecutionem rei; nam motus voluntatis est ab anima ad rem.
The will stands between the intellect and the external action: for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and the will causes the external action. Hence the principle of the movement in the will is to be found in the intellect, which apprehends something under the universal aspect of good, but the term or perfection of the will's act is to be observed in its relation to the action, whereby a man tends to the attainment of a thing; for the movement of the will is from the soul to the thing.
Et ideo perfectio actus voluntatis attenditur secundum hoc quod est aliquid bonum alicui ad agendum. Hoc autem est possibile. Et ideo voluntas completa non est nisi de possibili, quod est bonum volenti. Sed voluntas incompleta est de impossibili, quae secundum quosdam "velleitas" dicitur, quia scilicet aliquis vellet illud, si esset possibile. Electio autem nominat actum voluntatis iam determinatum ad id quod est huic agendum. Et ideo nullo modo est nisi possibilium.
Consequently the perfect act of the will is in respect of something that is good for one to do. Now this cannot be something impossible. Wherefore the complete act of the will is only in respect of what is possible and good for him that wills. But the incomplete act of the will is in respect of the impossible; and by some is called "velleity," because, to wit, one would will [vellet] such a thing, were it possible. But choice is an act of the will, fixed on something to be done by the chooser. And therefore it is by no means of anything but what is possible.
Friday, January 29, 2010
1a 2ae q13 a4: Whether choice is of those things only that are done by us? Yes.
Electio semper est humanorum actuum quia necesse est ut id quod est ad finem: vel sit actio, vel res aliqua (interveniente aliqua actione, per quam facit id quod est ad finem, vel utitur eo).
Choice is always in regard to human acts because the means must needs be: either an action, or a thing (with some action intervening whereby man either makes the thing which is the means, or uses it).
Choice is always in regard to human acts because the means must needs be: either an action, or a thing (with some action intervening whereby man either makes the thing which is the means, or uses it).
Thursday, January 28, 2010
1a 2ae q13 a3: Whether choice is only of the means? Yes.
Voluntas est finis, electio autem eorum quae sunt ad finem, quia finis, inquantum est huiusmodi, non cadit sub electione.
Volition is of the end, but choice of the means, because the end, as such, is not a matter of choice.
Ultimus finis est unus tantum. Unde ubicumque occurrunt plures fines, inter eos potest esse electio, secundum quod ordinantur ad ulteriorem finem.
There is but one last end. Accordingly wherever there are several ends, they can be the subject of choice, in so far as they are ordained to a further end.
Fines proprii virtutum ordinantur ad beatitudinem sicut ad ultimum finem. Et hoc modo potest esse eorum electio.
The proper ends of virtues are ordained to Happiness as to their last end. And thus it is that they can be a matter of choice.
Electio consequitur sententiam vel iudicium, quod est sicut conclusio syllogismi operativi. Unde illud cadit sub electione, quod se habet ut conclusio in syllogismo operabilium. Finis autem in operabilibus se habet ut principium, et non ut conclusio.
Choice results from the decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a practical syllogism. Hence that which is the conclusion of a practical syllogism, is the matter of choice. Now in practical things the end stands in the position of a principle, not of a conclusion.
Sicut in operatione medici, sanitas se habet ut finis; unde hoc non cadit sub electione medici, sed hoc supponit tanquam principium.
Thus in the work of a physician health is the end; wherefore it is not a matter of choice for a physician, but a matter of principle.
Sed sanitas corporis ordinatur ad bonum animae, unde apud eum qui habet curam de animae salute, potest sub electione cadere esse sanum vel esse infirmum; nam apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. XII, "cum enim infirmor, tunc potens sum". Sed ultimus finis nullo modo sub electione cadit.
Now the health of the body is ordained to the good of the soul, consequently with one who has charge of the soul's health, health or sickness may be a matter of choice; for the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 12:10): "For when I am weak, then am I powerful." But the last end is nowise a matter of choice.
Volition is of the end, but choice of the means, because the end, as such, is not a matter of choice.
Ultimus finis est unus tantum. Unde ubicumque occurrunt plures fines, inter eos potest esse electio, secundum quod ordinantur ad ulteriorem finem.
There is but one last end. Accordingly wherever there are several ends, they can be the subject of choice, in so far as they are ordained to a further end.
Fines proprii virtutum ordinantur ad beatitudinem sicut ad ultimum finem. Et hoc modo potest esse eorum electio.
The proper ends of virtues are ordained to Happiness as to their last end. And thus it is that they can be a matter of choice.
Electio consequitur sententiam vel iudicium, quod est sicut conclusio syllogismi operativi. Unde illud cadit sub electione, quod se habet ut conclusio in syllogismo operabilium. Finis autem in operabilibus se habet ut principium, et non ut conclusio.
Choice results from the decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a practical syllogism. Hence that which is the conclusion of a practical syllogism, is the matter of choice. Now in practical things the end stands in the position of a principle, not of a conclusion.
Sicut in operatione medici, sanitas se habet ut finis; unde hoc non cadit sub electione medici, sed hoc supponit tanquam principium.
Thus in the work of a physician health is the end; wherefore it is not a matter of choice for a physician, but a matter of principle.
Sed sanitas corporis ordinatur ad bonum animae, unde apud eum qui habet curam de animae salute, potest sub electione cadere esse sanum vel esse infirmum; nam apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. XII, "cum enim infirmor, tunc potens sum". Sed ultimus finis nullo modo sub electione cadit.
Now the health of the body is ordained to the good of the soul, consequently with one who has charge of the soul's health, health or sickness may be a matter of choice; for the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 12:10): "For when I am weak, then am I powerful." But the last end is nowise a matter of choice.
Wednesday, January 27, 2010
1a 2ae q13 a2: Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals? No.
Brutis animalibus non est electio quia proprie voluntatis est eligere, non autem appetitus sensitivi, qui solus est in brutis animalibus.
Choice is not in irrational animals because choice belongs properly to the will, and not to the sensitive appetite which is all that irrational animals have.
Appetitus sensitivus est determinatus ad unum aliquid particulare secundum ordinem naturae; voluntas autem est quidem, secundum naturae ordinem, determinata ad unum commune, quod est bonum, sed indeterminate se habet respectu particularium bonorum.
The sensitive appetite is determinate to one particular thing, according to the order of nature; whereas the will, although determinate to one thing in general, viz. the good, according to the order of nature, is nevertheless indeterminate in respect of particular goods.
Brutum animal accipit unum prae alio, quia appetitus eius est naturaliter determinatus ad ipsum. Unde statim quando per sensum vel per imaginationem repraesentatur sibi aliquid ad quod naturaliter inclinatur eius appetitus, absque electione in illud solum movetur.
An irrational animal takes one thing in preference to another, because its appetite is naturally determinate to that thing. Wherefore as soon as an animal, whether by its sense or by its imagination, represents to itself something to which its appetite is naturally inclined, it is moved to that alone, without making any choice.
In operibus brutorum animalium apparent quaedam sagacitates, inquantum habent inclinationem naturalem ad quosdam ordinatissimos processus, utpote a summa arte ordinatos. Et propter hoc etiam quaedam animalia dicuntur prudentia vel sagacia, non quod in eis sit aliqua ratio vel electio. Quod ex hoc apparet, quod omnia quae sunt unius naturae, similiter operantur.
In the works of irrational animals we notice certain marks of sagacity, in so far as they have a natural inclination to set about their actions in a most orderly manner through being ordained by the Supreme art. For which reason, too, certain animals are called prudent or sagacious, and not because they reason or exercise any choice about things. This is clear from the fact that all that share in one nature, invariably act in the same way.
Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, quod "pueri et irrationalia voluntarie quidem faciunt, non tamen eligentia".
Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.] says that "children and irrational animals act willingly but not from choice."
Choice is not in irrational animals because choice belongs properly to the will, and not to the sensitive appetite which is all that irrational animals have.
Appetitus sensitivus est determinatus ad unum aliquid particulare secundum ordinem naturae; voluntas autem est quidem, secundum naturae ordinem, determinata ad unum commune, quod est bonum, sed indeterminate se habet respectu particularium bonorum.
The sensitive appetite is determinate to one particular thing, according to the order of nature; whereas the will, although determinate to one thing in general, viz. the good, according to the order of nature, is nevertheless indeterminate in respect of particular goods.
Brutum animal accipit unum prae alio, quia appetitus eius est naturaliter determinatus ad ipsum. Unde statim quando per sensum vel per imaginationem repraesentatur sibi aliquid ad quod naturaliter inclinatur eius appetitus, absque electione in illud solum movetur.
An irrational animal takes one thing in preference to another, because its appetite is naturally determinate to that thing. Wherefore as soon as an animal, whether by its sense or by its imagination, represents to itself something to which its appetite is naturally inclined, it is moved to that alone, without making any choice.
In operibus brutorum animalium apparent quaedam sagacitates, inquantum habent inclinationem naturalem ad quosdam ordinatissimos processus, utpote a summa arte ordinatos. Et propter hoc etiam quaedam animalia dicuntur prudentia vel sagacia, non quod in eis sit aliqua ratio vel electio. Quod ex hoc apparet, quod omnia quae sunt unius naturae, similiter operantur.
In the works of irrational animals we notice certain marks of sagacity, in so far as they have a natural inclination to set about their actions in a most orderly manner through being ordained by the Supreme art. For which reason, too, certain animals are called prudent or sagacious, and not because they reason or exercise any choice about things. This is clear from the fact that all that share in one nature, invariably act in the same way.
Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, quod "pueri et irrationalia voluntarie quidem faciunt, non tamen eligentia".
Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.] says that "children and irrational animals act willingly but not from choice."
Monday, January 25, 2010
1a 2ae q13 a1: Whether choice is an act of will? Yes.
Electio substantialiter non est actus rationis, sed voluntatis, quia perficitur electio in motu quodam animae ad bonum quod eligitur; unde manifeste actus est appetitivae potentiae.
Choice is substantially not an act of the reason but of the will, because choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul towards the good which is chosen; consequently it is evidently an act of the appetitive power.
Ille actus quo voluntas tendit in aliquid quod proponitur ut bonum, ex eo quod per rationem est ordinatum ad finem, materialiter quidem est voluntatis, formaliter autem rationis. In huiusmodi autem substantia actus materialiter se habet ad ordinem qui imponitur a superiori potentia.
That act whereby the will tends to something proposed to it as being good, through being ordained to the end by the reason, is materially an act of the will, but formally an act of the reason. Now in such like matters the substance of the act is as the matter in comparison to the order imposed by the higher power.
Choice is substantially not an act of the reason but of the will, because choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul towards the good which is chosen; consequently it is evidently an act of the appetitive power.
Ille actus quo voluntas tendit in aliquid quod proponitur ut bonum, ex eo quod per rationem est ordinatum ad finem, materialiter quidem est voluntatis, formaliter autem rationis. In huiusmodi autem substantia actus materialiter se habet ad ordinem qui imponitur a superiori potentia.
That act whereby the will tends to something proposed to it as being good, through being ordained to the end by the reason, is materially an act of the will, but formally an act of the reason. Now in such like matters the substance of the act is as the matter in comparison to the order imposed by the higher power.
Sunday, January 24, 2010
1a 2ae q12 a5: Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals? No.
Cum bruta animalia non habeant rationem, videtur quod non intendant finem, quia intendere finem proprie et principaliter est moventis, prout scilicet ordinat motum alicuius (vel sui vel alterius) in finem, quod est rationis tantum.
Since irrational animals do not grasp formal aspect, it seems that they do not intend an end, because to intend properly and principally belongs to the mover, according as he ordains the movement of something (either his own or another's) to an end, which only pertains to formal aspect.
Bruta animalia moventur ad finem, non quasi considerantia quod per motum suum possunt consequi finem (quod est proprie intendentis), sed concupiscentia finem naturali instinctu, moventur ad finem: quasi ab alio mota, sicut et cetera quae moventur naturaliter.
Irrational animals are moved to an end, not as though they thought that they can gain the end by this movement (for this belongs to one that intends), but through desiring the end by natural teleonomy, they are moved to an end: moved, as it were, by another [viz., that which their aestimative capacity must assess as either (+, 0, or -)], just like other things that are moved naturally.
Intendere est in aliud tendere; quod quidem est et moventis et moti. Secundum quidem igitur quod dicitur intendere finem id quod movetur ad finem ab alio: sic natura dicitur intendere finem, quasi mota ad suum finem a Deo, sicut sagitta a sagittante. Et hoc modo etiam bruta animalia intendunt finem, inquantum moventur instinctu naturali ad aliquid.
To intend is to tend to something; and this belongs to the mover and to the moved. According, therefore, as that which is moved to an end by another is said to intend the end: thus nature is said to intend an end, as being moved to its end by God, as the arrow is moved by the archer. And in this way, irrational animals intend an end, inasmuch as they are moved to something by natural teleonomy.
Bruta animalia agunt propter finem: movetur enim animal vel ad cibum quaerendum, vel ad aliquid huiusmodi. Sed fruitio non importat ordinationem alicuius in aliquid, sicut intentio, sed absolutam quietem in fine.
Irrational animals act for an end: for an animal is moved either to seek food, or to do something of the kind. But enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of one thing to another, as intention does, but absolute repose in the end.
Since irrational animals do not grasp formal aspect, it seems that they do not intend an end, because to intend properly and principally belongs to the mover, according as he ordains the movement of something (either his own or another's) to an end, which only pertains to formal aspect.
Bruta animalia moventur ad finem, non quasi considerantia quod per motum suum possunt consequi finem (quod est proprie intendentis), sed concupiscentia finem naturali instinctu, moventur ad finem: quasi ab alio mota, sicut et cetera quae moventur naturaliter.
Irrational animals are moved to an end, not as though they thought that they can gain the end by this movement (for this belongs to one that intends), but through desiring the end by natural teleonomy, they are moved to an end: moved, as it were, by another [viz., that which their aestimative capacity must assess as either (+, 0, or -)], just like other things that are moved naturally.
Intendere est in aliud tendere; quod quidem est et moventis et moti. Secundum quidem igitur quod dicitur intendere finem id quod movetur ad finem ab alio: sic natura dicitur intendere finem, quasi mota ad suum finem a Deo, sicut sagitta a sagittante. Et hoc modo etiam bruta animalia intendunt finem, inquantum moventur instinctu naturali ad aliquid.
To intend is to tend to something; and this belongs to the mover and to the moved. According, therefore, as that which is moved to an end by another is said to intend the end: thus nature is said to intend an end, as being moved to its end by God, as the arrow is moved by the archer. And in this way, irrational animals intend an end, inasmuch as they are moved to something by natural teleonomy.
Bruta animalia agunt propter finem: movetur enim animal vel ad cibum quaerendum, vel ad aliquid huiusmodi. Sed fruitio non importat ordinationem alicuius in aliquid, sicut intentio, sed absolutam quietem in fine.
Irrational animals act for an end: for an animal is moved either to seek food, or to do something of the kind. But enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of one thing to another, as intention does, but absolute repose in the end.
Saturday, January 23, 2010
1a 2ae q12 a4: Whether intention of the end is the same act as the volition of the means? Yes.
In rebus voluntariis, idem motus est intentio finis et voluntas eius quod est ad finem, quia voluntas fertur in id quod est ad finem, propter finem.
In things pertaining to the will, the intention of the end is the same movement as the willing of the means, because the will is moved to the means for the sake of the end.
Finis, inquantum est res quaedam, est aliud voluntatis obiectum quam id quod est ad finem. Sed inquantum est ratio volendi id quod est ad finem, est unum et idem obiectum.
The end, considered as a thing, is other than the object of the will that is the means to that end. But insofar as the end is the formal aspect for willing the means, they are one and the same object.
Cum enim dico, "volo medicinam propter sanitatem," non designo nisi unum motum voluntatis. Cuius ratio est quia finis ratio est volendi ea quae sunt ad finem.
For when I say: "I wish to take medicine for the sake of health," I signify no more than one movement of my will. And the formal aspect of this is that the end is the formal aspect for willing the means.
Idem autem actus cadit super obiectum, et super rationem obiecti; sicut eadem visio est coloris et luminis, ut supra dictum est.
Now the object, and the formal aspect by which it is an object, come under the same act; thus it is the same act of sight that perceives color and light, as stated above (q8 a3 ad 2).
Et est simile de intellectu: quia si absolute principium et conclusionem consideret, diversa est consideratio utriusque; in hoc autem quod conclusioni propter principia assentit, est unus actus intellectus tantum.
And the same applies to the intellect: for if it consider principle and conclusion absolutely, it considers each by a distinct act; but when it assents to the conclusion on account of the principles, there is but one act of the intellect.
Motus qui est unus subiecto, potest ratione differre: secundum principium et finem.
A movement which is one as to the subject, may differ according to the formal aspect: as to its beginning and end.
Sic igitur inquantum motus voluntatis fertur in id quod est ad finem, prout ordinatur ad finem, est electio. Motus autem voluntatis qui fertur in finem, secundum quod acquiritur per ea quae sunt ad finem, vocatur intentio.
Accordingly, in so far as the movement of the will is to the means, as ordained to the end, it is "choice". But the movement of the will to the end, as acquired by the means, it is called "intention".
Cuius signum est quod intentio finis esse potest, etiam nondum determinatis his quae sunt ad finem, quorum est electio.
A sign of this is that we can have intention of the end, without having determined the means, which are the object of choice.
In things pertaining to the will, the intention of the end is the same movement as the willing of the means, because the will is moved to the means for the sake of the end.
Finis, inquantum est res quaedam, est aliud voluntatis obiectum quam id quod est ad finem. Sed inquantum est ratio volendi id quod est ad finem, est unum et idem obiectum.
The end, considered as a thing, is other than the object of the will that is the means to that end. But insofar as the end is the formal aspect for willing the means, they are one and the same object.
Cum enim dico, "volo medicinam propter sanitatem," non designo nisi unum motum voluntatis. Cuius ratio est quia finis ratio est volendi ea quae sunt ad finem.
For when I say: "I wish to take medicine for the sake of health," I signify no more than one movement of my will. And the formal aspect of this is that the end is the formal aspect for willing the means.
Idem autem actus cadit super obiectum, et super rationem obiecti; sicut eadem visio est coloris et luminis, ut supra dictum est.
Now the object, and the formal aspect by which it is an object, come under the same act; thus it is the same act of sight that perceives color and light, as stated above (q8 a3 ad 2).
Et est simile de intellectu: quia si absolute principium et conclusionem consideret, diversa est consideratio utriusque; in hoc autem quod conclusioni propter principia assentit, est unus actus intellectus tantum.
And the same applies to the intellect: for if it consider principle and conclusion absolutely, it considers each by a distinct act; but when it assents to the conclusion on account of the principles, there is but one act of the intellect.
Motus qui est unus subiecto, potest ratione differre: secundum principium et finem.
A movement which is one as to the subject, may differ according to the formal aspect: as to its beginning and end.
Sic igitur inquantum motus voluntatis fertur in id quod est ad finem, prout ordinatur ad finem, est electio. Motus autem voluntatis qui fertur in finem, secundum quod acquiritur per ea quae sunt ad finem, vocatur intentio.
Accordingly, in so far as the movement of the will is to the means, as ordained to the end, it is "choice". But the movement of the will to the end, as acquired by the means, it is called "intention".
Cuius signum est quod intentio finis esse potest, etiam nondum determinatis his quae sunt ad finem, quorum est electio.
A sign of this is that we can have intention of the end, without having determined the means, which are the object of choice.
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
1a 2ae q12 a3: Whether one can intend two things at the same time? Yes.
Homo potest simul multa intendere, quia est intentio non solum finis ultimi, sed etiam finis medii: simul autem intendit aliquis et finem proximum, et ultimum (sicut confectionem medicinae, et sanitatem).
A man can intend several things at the same time, because intention is not only of the last end, but also of an intermediary end: for a man intends at the same time both the proximate and the last end (as the mixing of a medicine and the giving of health).
Ea quae sunt plura secundum rem, possunt accipi ut unus terminus intentionis, prout sunt unum secundum rationem, vel quia aliqua duo concurrunt ad integrandum aliquid unum (sicut ad sanitatem concurrunt calor et frigus commensurata), vel quia aliqua duo sub uno communi continentur, quod potest esse intentum (puta acquisitio vini et vestis continetur sub lucro, sicut sub quodam communi, unde nihil prohibet quin ille qui intendit lucrum, simul haec duo intendat).
Where we have many things in reality, we may take them as one term of intention, insofar as the formal aspect takes them as one: either because two things concur in the integrity of one whole (as a proper measure of heat and cold conduce to health), or because two things are included in one which may be intended (for instance, the acquiring of wine and clothing is included in wealth as in something common to both, wherefore nothing hinders the man who intends to acquire wealth, from intending both the others).
A man can intend several things at the same time, because intention is not only of the last end, but also of an intermediary end: for a man intends at the same time both the proximate and the last end (as the mixing of a medicine and the giving of health).
Ea quae sunt plura secundum rem, possunt accipi ut unus terminus intentionis, prout sunt unum secundum rationem, vel quia aliqua duo concurrunt ad integrandum aliquid unum (sicut ad sanitatem concurrunt calor et frigus commensurata), vel quia aliqua duo sub uno communi continentur, quod potest esse intentum (puta acquisitio vini et vestis continetur sub lucro, sicut sub quodam communi, unde nihil prohibet quin ille qui intendit lucrum, simul haec duo intendat).
Where we have many things in reality, we may take them as one term of intention, insofar as the formal aspect takes them as one: either because two things concur in the integrity of one whole (as a proper measure of heat and cold conduce to health), or because two things are included in one which may be intended (for instance, the acquiring of wine and clothing is included in wealth as in something common to both, wherefore nothing hinders the man who intends to acquire wealth, from intending both the others).
Monday, January 18, 2010
1a 2ae q12 a2: Whether intention is only of the last end? No.
Etsi semper intentio sit finis, non tamen oportet quod semper sit ultimi finis, quia terminus habet rationem ultimi, sed non semper ultimi respectu totius, sed quandoque respectu alicuius partis.
Though intention is always of the end, it need not be always of the last end, because a terminus has the formal aspect of something last, not always in respect of the whole, but sometimes in respect of a part.
Sicut in motu quo itur de a in c per b, c est terminus ultimus, b autem est terminus, sed non ultimus. Et utriusque potest esse intentio.
Thus in the movement from A to C through B, C is the last terminus, while B is a terminus, but not the last. And intention can be both.
Fruitio importat quietem in fine, quod pertinet solum ad ultimum finem. Sed intentio importat motum in finem, non autem quietem.
Enjoyment implies rest in the end; and this belongs to the last end alone. But intention implies movement towards an end, not rest.
Intentio cordis dicitur clamor ad Deum, non quod Deus sit obiectum intentionis semper, sed quia est intentionis cognitor. Vel quia, cum oramus, intentionem nostram ad Deum dirigimus, quae quidem intentio vim clamoris habet.
The intention of the heart is called a cry to God, not that God is always the object of intention, but because He sees our intention. Or because, when we pray, we direct our intention to God, which intention has the force of a cry.
Though intention is always of the end, it need not be always of the last end, because a terminus has the formal aspect of something last, not always in respect of the whole, but sometimes in respect of a part.
Sicut in motu quo itur de a in c per b, c est terminus ultimus, b autem est terminus, sed non ultimus. Et utriusque potest esse intentio.
Thus in the movement from A to C through B, C is the last terminus, while B is a terminus, but not the last. And intention can be both.
Fruitio importat quietem in fine, quod pertinet solum ad ultimum finem. Sed intentio importat motum in finem, non autem quietem.
Enjoyment implies rest in the end; and this belongs to the last end alone. But intention implies movement towards an end, not rest.
Intentio cordis dicitur clamor ad Deum, non quod Deus sit obiectum intentionis semper, sed quia est intentionis cognitor. Vel quia, cum oramus, intentionem nostram ad Deum dirigimus, quae quidem intentio vim clamoris habet.
The intention of the heart is called a cry to God, not that God is always the object of intention, but because He sees our intention. Or because, when we pray, we direct our intention to God, which intention has the force of a cry.
Saturday, January 16, 2010
1a 2ae q12 a1: Whether intention is an act of the intellect? No.
Intentio proprie est actus voluntatis quia voluntas movet omnes alias vires animae ad finem.
Intention, properly speaking, is an act of the will because intention belongs first and principally to that which moves to the end, and the will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end (q9 a1).
Intentio est actus voluntatis respectu finis. Sed voluntas respicit finem tripliciter. Uno modo, absolute, et sic dicitur voluntas, prout absolute volumus vel sanitatem, vel si quid aliud est huiusmodi. Alio modo consideratur finis secundum quod in eo quiescitur, et hoc modo fruitio respicit finem. Tertio modo consideratur finis secundum quod est terminus alicuius quod in ipsum ordinatur, et sic intentio respicit finem. Non enim solum ex hoc intendere dicimur sanitatem, quia volumus eam, sed quia volumus ad eam per aliquid aliud pervenire.
Intention is an act of the will in regard to the end. Now the will stands in a threefold relation to the end. First, absolutely; and thus we have "volition," whereby we will absolutely to have health, and so forth. Secondly, it considers the end, as its place of rest; and thus "enjoyment" regards the end. Thirdly, it considers the end as the term towards which something is ordained; and thus "intention" regards the end. For when we speak of intending to have health, we mean not only that we have it, but that we will have it by means of something else.
Voluntas quidem non ordinat, sed tamen in aliquid tendit secundum ordinem rationis. Unde hoc nomen intentio nominat actum voluntatis, praesupposita ordinatione rationis ordinantis aliquid in finem.
The will does not ordain, but tends to something according to the order of formal aspect. Consequently this word "intention" indicates an act of the will, presupposing the [actual] ordination of the [formal] aspect that orders something to the end.
Augustinus dicit, in XI de Trin., quod "voluntatis intentio copulat corpus visum visui, et similiter speciem in memoria existentem ad aciem animi interius cogitantis".
Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4,8,9) that "the intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the images retained in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul's inner thought."
Intention, properly speaking, is an act of the will because intention belongs first and principally to that which moves to the end, and the will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end (q9 a1).
Intentio est actus voluntatis respectu finis. Sed voluntas respicit finem tripliciter. Uno modo, absolute, et sic dicitur voluntas, prout absolute volumus vel sanitatem, vel si quid aliud est huiusmodi. Alio modo consideratur finis secundum quod in eo quiescitur, et hoc modo fruitio respicit finem. Tertio modo consideratur finis secundum quod est terminus alicuius quod in ipsum ordinatur, et sic intentio respicit finem. Non enim solum ex hoc intendere dicimur sanitatem, quia volumus eam, sed quia volumus ad eam per aliquid aliud pervenire.
Intention is an act of the will in regard to the end. Now the will stands in a threefold relation to the end. First, absolutely; and thus we have "volition," whereby we will absolutely to have health, and so forth. Secondly, it considers the end, as its place of rest; and thus "enjoyment" regards the end. Thirdly, it considers the end as the term towards which something is ordained; and thus "intention" regards the end. For when we speak of intending to have health, we mean not only that we have it, but that we will have it by means of something else.
Voluntas quidem non ordinat, sed tamen in aliquid tendit secundum ordinem rationis. Unde hoc nomen intentio nominat actum voluntatis, praesupposita ordinatione rationis ordinantis aliquid in finem.
The will does not ordain, but tends to something according to the order of formal aspect. Consequently this word "intention" indicates an act of the will, presupposing the [actual] ordination of the [formal] aspect that orders something to the end.
Augustinus dicit, in XI de Trin., quod "voluntatis intentio copulat corpus visum visui, et similiter speciem in memoria existentem ad aciem animi interius cogitantis".
Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4,8,9) that "the intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the images retained in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul's inner thought."
Friday, January 15, 2010
1a 2ae q11 a4: Whether enjoyment is only of the end possessed? No.
Frui potest esse etiam finis non habiti quia perfecta est fruitio finis iam habiti realiter, sed imperfecta est etiam finis non habiti realiter, sed in intentione tantum.
It is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not possessed because perfect enjoyment is of the end already possessed, but imperfect enjoyment is also of the end possessed not really, but only in intention.
Quies voluntatis dupliciter impeditur: uno modo, ex parte obiecti, quia scilicet non est ultimus finis, sed ad aliud ordinatur; alio modo, ex parte appetentis finem qui nondum adipiscitur finem.
The will is hindered in two ways from being at rest: first, on the part of the object, by reason of its not being the last end, but ordained to something else; secondly, on the part of the one who desires the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession of it.
Obiectum autem est quod dat speciem actui, sed ab agente dependet modus agendi, ut sit perfectus vel imperfectus, secundum conditionem agentis.
Now it is the object that gives the specifies to an act, but on the agent depends the manner of acting, so that [the act] may be perfect or imperfect, according to the actual circumstances of the agent.
Et ideo eius quod non est ultimus finis, fruitio est impropria, quasi deficiens a specie fruitionis. Finis autem ultimi non habiti, est fruitio propria quidem, sed imperfecta, propter imperfectum modum habendi ultimum finem.
Therefore enjoyment of anything but the last end is enjoyment improperly speaking, as falling short of the formal nature of enjoyment. But enjoyment of the last end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly speaking, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect way in which it is possessed.
"Frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei propter seipsam", ut Augustinus dicit.
"To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4).
It is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not possessed because perfect enjoyment is of the end already possessed, but imperfect enjoyment is also of the end possessed not really, but only in intention.
Quies voluntatis dupliciter impeditur: uno modo, ex parte obiecti, quia scilicet non est ultimus finis, sed ad aliud ordinatur; alio modo, ex parte appetentis finem qui nondum adipiscitur finem.
The will is hindered in two ways from being at rest: first, on the part of the object, by reason of its not being the last end, but ordained to something else; secondly, on the part of the one who desires the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession of it.
Obiectum autem est quod dat speciem actui, sed ab agente dependet modus agendi, ut sit perfectus vel imperfectus, secundum conditionem agentis.
Now it is the object that gives the specifies to an act, but on the agent depends the manner of acting, so that [the act] may be perfect or imperfect, according to the actual circumstances of the agent.
Et ideo eius quod non est ultimus finis, fruitio est impropria, quasi deficiens a specie fruitionis. Finis autem ultimi non habiti, est fruitio propria quidem, sed imperfecta, propter imperfectum modum habendi ultimum finem.
Therefore enjoyment of anything but the last end is enjoyment improperly speaking, as falling short of the formal nature of enjoyment. But enjoyment of the last end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly speaking, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect way in which it is possessed.
"Frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei propter seipsam", ut Augustinus dicit.
"To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4).
Thursday, January 14, 2010
1a 2ae q11 a3: Whether enjoyment is only of the last end? Yes.
Solius ultimi finis est fruitio quia non quiescit simpliciter nisi in ultimo: quia quandiu aliquid expectatur, motus voluntatis remanet in suspenso, licet iam ad aliquid pervenerit.
Enjoyment is of the last end alone because rest is not absolute save in the possession of the last end: for as long as something is looked for, the movement of the will remains in suspense, although it has reached something.
Augustinus, in X de Trin., dicit quod "fruimur cognitis in quibus voluntas delectata conquiescit".
Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10) that "we enjoy what we know, when the delighted will is at rest therein".
Deus igitur est ultimus finis, sicut res quae ultimo quaeritur: fruitio autem sicut adeptio huius ultimi finis. Sicut igitur non est alius finis Deus, et fruitio Dei; ita eadem ratio fruitionis est qua fruimur Deo, et qua fruimur divina fruitione.
Accordingly God is the last end, as that which is ultimately sought for: while the enjoyment is as the attainment of this last end. And so, just as God is not one end, and the enjoyment of God, another; so it is the same formal aspect of enjoyment whereby we enjoy God, and whereby we enjoy our enjoyment of God.
Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., "non fruitur si quis id quod in facultatem voluntatis assumit, propter aliud appetit".
Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "A man does not enjoy that which he desires for the sake of something else."
Enjoyment is of the last end alone because rest is not absolute save in the possession of the last end: for as long as something is looked for, the movement of the will remains in suspense, although it has reached something.
Augustinus, in X de Trin., dicit quod "fruimur cognitis in quibus voluntas delectata conquiescit".
Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10) that "we enjoy what we know, when the delighted will is at rest therein".
Deus igitur est ultimus finis, sicut res quae ultimo quaeritur: fruitio autem sicut adeptio huius ultimi finis. Sicut igitur non est alius finis Deus, et fruitio Dei; ita eadem ratio fruitionis est qua fruimur Deo, et qua fruimur divina fruitione.
Accordingly God is the last end, as that which is ultimately sought for: while the enjoyment is as the attainment of this last end. And so, just as God is not one end, and the enjoyment of God, another; so it is the same formal aspect of enjoyment whereby we enjoy God, and whereby we enjoy our enjoyment of God.
Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., "non fruitur si quis id quod in facultatem voluntatis assumit, propter aliud appetit".
Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "A man does not enjoy that which he desires for the sake of something else."
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
1a 2ae q11 a2: Whether to enjoy belongs to the rational creature alone? No.
Rationali naturae convenit fruitio secundum rationem perfectam; brutis autem animalibus secundum rationem imperfectam; aliis autem creaturis nullo modo; quia appetitus sensitivus consequitur aliquam cognitionem.
Enjoyment belongs to the rational nature under a perfect formal aspect; to irrational animals, under an imperfect aspect; to other creatures, not at all; because the sensitive appetite follows some knowledge.
Frui non est actus potentiae pervenientis ad finem sicut exequentis, sed potentiae imperantis executionem; dictum est enim quod est appetitivae potentiae.
To enjoy is not the act of the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that commands the achievement; for it has been said to belong to the appetitive power.
Sed cognitio finis est duplex: perfecta, et imperfecta. Perfecta quidem, qua non solum cognoscitur id quod est finis et bonum, sed universalis ratio finis et boni, et talis cognitio est solius rationalis naturae.
Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that known which is the end and the good, but also the universal formal aspect of the end and the good, and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone.
Imperfecta autem cognitio est qua cognoscitur particulariter finis et bonum, et talis cognitio est in brutis animalibus. Quorum etiam virtutes appetitivae non sunt imperantes libere, sed secundum naturalem instinctum ad ea quae apprehenduntur, moventur.
On the other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the good are known in the particular. Such knowledge is in irrational animals, whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are moved according to a natural "Umwelt" to whatever they apprehend.
Enjoyment belongs to the rational nature under a perfect formal aspect; to irrational animals, under an imperfect aspect; to other creatures, not at all; because the sensitive appetite follows some knowledge.
Frui non est actus potentiae pervenientis ad finem sicut exequentis, sed potentiae imperantis executionem; dictum est enim quod est appetitivae potentiae.
To enjoy is not the act of the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that commands the achievement; for it has been said to belong to the appetitive power.
Sed cognitio finis est duplex: perfecta, et imperfecta. Perfecta quidem, qua non solum cognoscitur id quod est finis et bonum, sed universalis ratio finis et boni, et talis cognitio est solius rationalis naturae.
Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that known which is the end and the good, but also the universal formal aspect of the end and the good, and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone.
Imperfecta autem cognitio est qua cognoscitur particulariter finis et bonum, et talis cognitio est in brutis animalibus. Quorum etiam virtutes appetitivae non sunt imperantes libere, sed secundum naturalem instinctum ad ea quae apprehenduntur, moventur.
On the other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the good are known in the particular. Such knowledge is in irrational animals, whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are moved according to a natural "Umwelt" to whatever they apprehend.
Monday, January 11, 2010
1a 2ae q11 a1: Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power? Yes.
Frui est actus appetitivae potentiae quia finis et bonum est obiectum appetitivae potentiae.
To enjoy is an act of the appetitive power because the end and the good is the object of the appetitive power.
Fruitio pertinere videtur ad amorem vel delectationem quam aliquis habet de ultimo expectato, quod est finis.
Hence fruition seems to have relation to love, or to the delight which one has in realizing the longed-for term, which is the end.
Perfectio et finis cuiuslibet potentiae, inquantum est quoddam bonum, pertinet ad appetitivam. Propter quod appetitiva potentia movet alias ad suos fines, et ipsa consequitur finem, quando quaelibet aliarum pertingit ad finem.
The perfection and end of each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive power. Wherefore the appetitive power moves the other powers to their ends, and itself realizes the end, when each of them reaches the end.
Nihil prohibet unum et idem, secundum diversas rationes, ad diversas potentias pertinere. Ipsa igitur visio Dei, inquantum est visio, est actus intellectus, inquantum autem est bonum et finis, est voluntatis obiectum. Et hoc modo est eius fruitio. Et sic hunc finem intellectus consequitur tanquam potentia agens, voluntas autem tanquam potentia movens ad finem, et fruens fine iam adepto.
Nothing hinders one and the same thing from belonging, under different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly the vision of God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good and an end, is the object of the will. And as such is the fruition thereof: so that the intellect attains this end, as the executive power, but the will as the motive power, moving (the powers) towards the end and enjoying the end attained.
To enjoy is an act of the appetitive power because the end and the good is the object of the appetitive power.
Fruitio pertinere videtur ad amorem vel delectationem quam aliquis habet de ultimo expectato, quod est finis.
Hence fruition seems to have relation to love, or to the delight which one has in realizing the longed-for term, which is the end.
Perfectio et finis cuiuslibet potentiae, inquantum est quoddam bonum, pertinet ad appetitivam. Propter quod appetitiva potentia movet alias ad suos fines, et ipsa consequitur finem, quando quaelibet aliarum pertingit ad finem.
The perfection and end of each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive power. Wherefore the appetitive power moves the other powers to their ends, and itself realizes the end, when each of them reaches the end.
Nihil prohibet unum et idem, secundum diversas rationes, ad diversas potentias pertinere. Ipsa igitur visio Dei, inquantum est visio, est actus intellectus, inquantum autem est bonum et finis, est voluntatis obiectum. Et hoc modo est eius fruitio. Et sic hunc finem intellectus consequitur tanquam potentia agens, voluntas autem tanquam potentia movens ad finem, et fruens fine iam adepto.
Nothing hinders one and the same thing from belonging, under different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly the vision of God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good and an end, is the object of the will. And as such is the fruition thereof: so that the intellect attains this end, as the executive power, but the will as the motive power, moving (the powers) towards the end and enjoying the end attained.
Sunday, January 10, 2010
1a 2ae q10 a4: Whether the will is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God? No.
Deus non ex necessitate movet voluntatem hominis quia voluntas est activum principium non determinatum ad unum, sed indifferenter se habens ad multa.
God does not of necessity move man's will because the will is an active principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things.
Sic Deus ipsam movet, quod non ex necessitate ad unum determinat, sed remanet motus eius contingens et non necessarius, nisi in his ad quae naturaliter movetur.
God so moves it that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.
Magis repugnaret divinae motioni, si voluntas ex necessitate moveretur, quod suae naturae non competit, quam si moveretur libere, prout competit suae naturae.
It would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature, than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.
Sicut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., ad providentiam divinam non pertinet naturam rerum corrumpere, sed servare. Unde omnia movet secundum eorum conditione: ita quod ex causis necessariis, per motionem divinam, consequuntur effectus ex necessitate; ex causis autem contingentibus, sequuntur effectus contingenter.
As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "it belongs to Divine providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things." Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions: so that from necessary causes, through the Divine motion, effects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently.
God does not of necessity move man's will because the will is an active principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things.
Sic Deus ipsam movet, quod non ex necessitate ad unum determinat, sed remanet motus eius contingens et non necessarius, nisi in his ad quae naturaliter movetur.
God so moves it that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.
Magis repugnaret divinae motioni, si voluntas ex necessitate moveretur, quod suae naturae non competit, quam si moveretur libere, prout competit suae naturae.
It would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature, than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.
Sicut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., ad providentiam divinam non pertinet naturam rerum corrumpere, sed servare. Unde omnia movet secundum eorum conditione: ita quod ex causis necessariis, per motionem divinam, consequuntur effectus ex necessitate; ex causis autem contingentibus, sequuntur effectus contingenter.
As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "it belongs to Divine providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things." Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions: so that from necessary causes, through the Divine motion, effects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently.
Saturday, January 09, 2010
1a 2ae q10 a3: Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by the lower appetite? No.Iin so far as the reason remains free, and not subject to the passio
Non voluntas hominis ex necessitate movetur ab appetitu inferiori: inquantum ratio manet libera, et passioni non subiecta, intantum voluntatis motus qui manet, non ex necessitate tendit ad hoc ad quod passio inclinat, quia potest voluntas non velle concupiscere, aut concupiscentiae non consentire, et sic non ex necessitate sequitur concupiscentiae motum.
Man's will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite: insofar as the reason remains free, and not subject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it, because it is in the power of the will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence, and thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.
Passio appetitus sensitivi movet voluntatem, ex ea parte qua voluntas movetur ab obiecto: inquantum scilicet homo aliqualiter dispositus per passionem, iudicat aliquid esse conveniens et bonum quod extra passionem existens non iudicaret.
The passion of the sensitive appetite moves the will, insofar as the will is moved by its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such and such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, which he would not judge thus were it not for the passion.
Voluntas non solum movetur a bono universali apprehenso per rationem, sed etiam a bono apprehenso per sensum. Et ideo potest moveri ad aliquod particulare bonum absque passione appetitus sensitivi. Multa enim volumus et operamur absque passione, per solam electionem, ut maxime patet in his in quibus ratio renititur passioni.
The will is moved not only by the universal good apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense. And it can be moved to some particular good independently of a passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things without passion, and through choice alone, as is most evident in those cases wherein reason resists passion.
Man's will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite: insofar as the reason remains free, and not subject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it, because it is in the power of the will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence, and thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.
Passio appetitus sensitivi movet voluntatem, ex ea parte qua voluntas movetur ab obiecto: inquantum scilicet homo aliqualiter dispositus per passionem, iudicat aliquid esse conveniens et bonum quod extra passionem existens non iudicaret.
The passion of the sensitive appetite moves the will, insofar as the will is moved by its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such and such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, which he would not judge thus were it not for the passion.
Voluntas non solum movetur a bono universali apprehenso per rationem, sed etiam a bono apprehenso per sensum. Et ideo potest moveri ad aliquod particulare bonum absque passione appetitus sensitivi. Multa enim volumus et operamur absque passione, per solam electionem, ut maxime patet in his in quibus ratio renititur passioni.
The will is moved not only by the universal good apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense. And it can be moved to some particular good independently of a passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things without passion, and through choice alone, as is most evident in those cases wherein reason resists passion.
Friday, January 08, 2010
1a 2ae q10 a2: Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its object? No.
Voluntas non ex necessitate movetur ad alterum oppositorum, quia voluntas est potentia rationalis, est enim in ratione, et potentiae rationales sunt ad opposita.
The will is not moved, of necessity, to either of the opposites, because the will is a rational power, since it is in the reason, and the rational powers are directed to opposites.
Finis ultimus ex necessitate movet voluntatem, quia est bonum perfectum. Et similiter illa quae ordinantur ad hunc finem, sine quibus finis haberi non potest, sicut esse et vivere et huiusmodi. Alia vero, sine quibus finis haberi potest, non ex necessitate vult qui vult finem.
The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is the perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that end, and without which the end cannot be attained, such as "to be" and "to live," and the like. But other things without which the end can be gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end.
Voluntas movetur dupliciter, uno modo, quantum ad exercitium actus; alio modo, quantum ad specificationem actus, quae est ex obiecto.
The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived from the object.
Primo ergo modo, voluntas a nullo obiecto ex necessitate movetur, potest enim aliquis de quocumque obiecto non cogitare, et per consequens neque actu velle illud. Sed quantum ad secundum motionis modum, voluntas ab aliquo obiecto ex necessitate movetur, ab aliquo autem non. In motu enim cuiuslibet potentiae a suo obiecto, consideranda est ratio per quam obiectum movet potentiam.
As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man's power not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second manner of motion, the will is moved by one object necessarily, by another not. For in the movement of a power by its object, we must consider under what aspect the object moves the power.
Visibile enim movet visum sub ratione coloris actu visibilis. Unde si color proponatur visui, ex necessitate movet visum, nisi aliquis visum avertat, quod pertinet ad exercitium actus. Si autem proponeretur aliquid visui quod non omnibus modis esset color in actu, sed secundum aliquid esset tale, secundum autem aliquid non tale, non ex necessitate visus tale obiectum videret, posset enim intendere in ipsum ex ea parte qua non est coloratum in actu, et sic ipsum non videret.
For the visible moves the sight, under the aspect of color actually visible. Wherefore if color be offered to the sight, it moves the sight necessarily: unless one turns one's eyes away; which belongs to the exercise of the act. But if the sight were confronted with something not in all respects colored actually, but only so in some respects, and in other respects not, the sight would not of necessity see such an object: for it might look at that part of the object which is not actually colored, and thus it would not see it.
Sicut autem coloratum in actu est obiectum visus, ita bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Unde si proponatur aliquod obiectum voluntati quod sit universaliter bonum et secundum omnem considerationem, ex necessitate voluntas in illud tendet, si aliquid velit, non enim poterit velle oppositum.
Now just as the actually colored is the object of sight, so is good the object of the will. Wherefore if the will be offered an object which is good universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will the opposite.
Si autem proponatur sibi aliquod obiectum quod non secundum quamlibet considerationem sit bonum, non ex necessitate voluntas feretur in illud. Et quia defectus cuiuscumque boni habet rationem non boni, ideo illud solum bonum quod est perfectum et cui nihil deficit, est tale bonum quod voluntas non potest non velle, quod est beatitudo.
If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever, is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and lacking in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it: and this is Happiness.
Alia autem quaelibet particularia bona, inquantum deficiunt ab aliquo bono, possunt accipi ut non bona, et secundum hanc considerationem, possunt repudiari vel approbari a voluntate, quae potest in idem ferri secundum diversas considerationes.
Whereas any other particular goods, in so far as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will, which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.
The will is not moved, of necessity, to either of the opposites, because the will is a rational power, since it is in the reason, and the rational powers are directed to opposites.
Finis ultimus ex necessitate movet voluntatem, quia est bonum perfectum. Et similiter illa quae ordinantur ad hunc finem, sine quibus finis haberi non potest, sicut esse et vivere et huiusmodi. Alia vero, sine quibus finis haberi potest, non ex necessitate vult qui vult finem.
The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is the perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that end, and without which the end cannot be attained, such as "to be" and "to live," and the like. But other things without which the end can be gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end.
Voluntas movetur dupliciter, uno modo, quantum ad exercitium actus; alio modo, quantum ad specificationem actus, quae est ex obiecto.
The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived from the object.
Primo ergo modo, voluntas a nullo obiecto ex necessitate movetur, potest enim aliquis de quocumque obiecto non cogitare, et per consequens neque actu velle illud. Sed quantum ad secundum motionis modum, voluntas ab aliquo obiecto ex necessitate movetur, ab aliquo autem non. In motu enim cuiuslibet potentiae a suo obiecto, consideranda est ratio per quam obiectum movet potentiam.
As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man's power not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second manner of motion, the will is moved by one object necessarily, by another not. For in the movement of a power by its object, we must consider under what aspect the object moves the power.
Visibile enim movet visum sub ratione coloris actu visibilis. Unde si color proponatur visui, ex necessitate movet visum, nisi aliquis visum avertat, quod pertinet ad exercitium actus. Si autem proponeretur aliquid visui quod non omnibus modis esset color in actu, sed secundum aliquid esset tale, secundum autem aliquid non tale, non ex necessitate visus tale obiectum videret, posset enim intendere in ipsum ex ea parte qua non est coloratum in actu, et sic ipsum non videret.
For the visible moves the sight, under the aspect of color actually visible. Wherefore if color be offered to the sight, it moves the sight necessarily: unless one turns one's eyes away; which belongs to the exercise of the act. But if the sight were confronted with something not in all respects colored actually, but only so in some respects, and in other respects not, the sight would not of necessity see such an object: for it might look at that part of the object which is not actually colored, and thus it would not see it.
Sicut autem coloratum in actu est obiectum visus, ita bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Unde si proponatur aliquod obiectum voluntati quod sit universaliter bonum et secundum omnem considerationem, ex necessitate voluntas in illud tendet, si aliquid velit, non enim poterit velle oppositum.
Now just as the actually colored is the object of sight, so is good the object of the will. Wherefore if the will be offered an object which is good universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will the opposite.
Si autem proponatur sibi aliquod obiectum quod non secundum quamlibet considerationem sit bonum, non ex necessitate voluntas feretur in illud. Et quia defectus cuiuscumque boni habet rationem non boni, ideo illud solum bonum quod est perfectum et cui nihil deficit, est tale bonum quod voluntas non potest non velle, quod est beatitudo.
If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever, is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and lacking in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it: and this is Happiness.
Alia autem quaelibet particularia bona, inquantum deficiunt ab aliquo bono, possunt accipi ut non bona, et secundum hanc considerationem, possunt repudiari vel approbari a voluntate, quae potest in idem ferri secundum diversas considerationes.
Whereas any other particular goods, in so far as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will, which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.
Sunday, January 03, 2010
1a 2ae q10 a1: Whether the will is moved to anything naturally? Yes.
Principium motuum voluntariorum est bonum in communi, in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit, sicut etiam quaelibet potentia in suum obiectum (et etiam ipse finis ultimus, qui hoc modo se habet in appetibilibus, sicut prima principia demonstrationum in intelligibilibus, et universaliter omnia illa quae conveniunt volenti secundum suam naturam), quia non per voluntatem appetimus solum ea quae pertinent ad potentiam voluntatis, sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas potentias, et ad totum hominem.
The principle of voluntary movements is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as does each power to its object (and again it is the last end, which stands in the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of demonstrations to things intelligible and, speaking generally, it is all those things which belong to the willer according to his nature), because it is not only things pertaining to the will that the will desires, but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire man.
Unde naturaliter homo vult non solum obiectum voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae conveniunt aliis potentiis, ut cognitionem veri, quae convenit intellectui; et esse et vivere et alia huiusmodi, quae respiciunt consistentiam naturalem; quae omnia comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quadam particularia bona.
Wherefore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to the other powers; such as the knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect; and to be and to live and other like things which regard the natural well-being; all of which are included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.
Cum igitur voluntas sit quaedam vis immaterialis sicut et intellectus, respondet sibi naturaliter aliquod unum commune, scilicet bonum, sicut etiam intellectui aliquod unum commune, scilicet verum, vel ens, vel quod quid est. Sub bono autem communi multa particularia bona continentur, ad quorum nullum voluntas determinatur.
Since, therefore, the will is an immaterial power like the intellect, some one general thing corresponds to it naturally, which is the good; just as to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which is the true, or being, or "what a thing is." And under good in general are included many particular goods, to none of which is the will determined.
Sicut Boetius dicit in libro de duabus naturis, et philosophus in V Metaphys., natura dicitur multipliciter. Quandoque enim dicitur principium intrinsecum in rebus mobilibus. Et talis natura est vel materia, vel forma materialis, ut patet ex II Physic. Alio modo dicitur natura quaelibet substantia, vel etiam quodlibet ens. Et secundum hoc, illud dicitur esse naturale rei, quod convenit ei secundum suam substantiam. Et hoc est quod per se inest rei. In omnibus autem, ea quae non per se insunt, reducuntur in aliquid quod per se inest, sicut in principium. Et ideo necesse est quod, hoc modo accipiendo naturam, semper principium in his quae conveniunt rei, sit naturale. Et hoc manifeste apparet in intellectu, nam principia intellectualis cognitionis sunt naturaliter nota. Similiter etiam principium motuum voluntariorum oportet esse aliquid naturaliter volitum.
As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.) and the Philosopher also (Metaph. v, 4) the word "nature" is used in a manifold sense. For sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things. In this sense nature is either matter or the material form, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. In another sense nature stands for any substance, or even for any being. And in this sense, that is said to be natural to a thing which befits it in respect of its substance. And this is that which of itself is in a thing. Now all things that do not of themselves belong to the thing in which they are, are reduced to something which belongs of itself to that thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing, be a natural principle. This is evident in regard to the intellect: for the principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like manner the principle of voluntary movements must be something naturally willed.
In rebus naturalibus id quod est naturale quasi consequens formam tantum, semper actu inest, sicut calidum igni. Quod autem est naturale sicut consequens materiam, non semper actu inest, sed quandoque secundum potentiam tantum. Nam forma est actus, materia vero potentia.
In the case of natural things, that which is natural, as a result of the form only, is always in them actually, as heat is in fire. But that which is natural as a result of matter, is not always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality: because form is act, whereas matter is potentiality.
Et similiter non oportet quod voluntas, quae de potentia in actum reducitur dum aliquid vult, semper actu velit, sed solum quando est in aliqua dispositione determinata. Voluntas autem Dei, quae est actus purus, semper est in actu volendi.
And in like manner it is not necessary that the will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills something), should always be in the act of volition; but only when it is in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will, which is pure act, is always in the act of volition.
The principle of voluntary movements is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as does each power to its object (and again it is the last end, which stands in the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of demonstrations to things intelligible and, speaking generally, it is all those things which belong to the willer according to his nature), because it is not only things pertaining to the will that the will desires, but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire man.
Unde naturaliter homo vult non solum obiectum voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae conveniunt aliis potentiis, ut cognitionem veri, quae convenit intellectui; et esse et vivere et alia huiusmodi, quae respiciunt consistentiam naturalem; quae omnia comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quadam particularia bona.
Wherefore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to the other powers; such as the knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect; and to be and to live and other like things which regard the natural well-being; all of which are included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.
Cum igitur voluntas sit quaedam vis immaterialis sicut et intellectus, respondet sibi naturaliter aliquod unum commune, scilicet bonum, sicut etiam intellectui aliquod unum commune, scilicet verum, vel ens, vel quod quid est. Sub bono autem communi multa particularia bona continentur, ad quorum nullum voluntas determinatur.
Since, therefore, the will is an immaterial power like the intellect, some one general thing corresponds to it naturally, which is the good; just as to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which is the true, or being, or "what a thing is." And under good in general are included many particular goods, to none of which is the will determined.
Sicut Boetius dicit in libro de duabus naturis, et philosophus in V Metaphys., natura dicitur multipliciter. Quandoque enim dicitur principium intrinsecum in rebus mobilibus. Et talis natura est vel materia, vel forma materialis, ut patet ex II Physic. Alio modo dicitur natura quaelibet substantia, vel etiam quodlibet ens. Et secundum hoc, illud dicitur esse naturale rei, quod convenit ei secundum suam substantiam. Et hoc est quod per se inest rei. In omnibus autem, ea quae non per se insunt, reducuntur in aliquid quod per se inest, sicut in principium. Et ideo necesse est quod, hoc modo accipiendo naturam, semper principium in his quae conveniunt rei, sit naturale. Et hoc manifeste apparet in intellectu, nam principia intellectualis cognitionis sunt naturaliter nota. Similiter etiam principium motuum voluntariorum oportet esse aliquid naturaliter volitum.
As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.) and the Philosopher also (Metaph. v, 4) the word "nature" is used in a manifold sense. For sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things. In this sense nature is either matter or the material form, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. In another sense nature stands for any substance, or even for any being. And in this sense, that is said to be natural to a thing which befits it in respect of its substance. And this is that which of itself is in a thing. Now all things that do not of themselves belong to the thing in which they are, are reduced to something which belongs of itself to that thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing, be a natural principle. This is evident in regard to the intellect: for the principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like manner the principle of voluntary movements must be something naturally willed.
In rebus naturalibus id quod est naturale quasi consequens formam tantum, semper actu inest, sicut calidum igni. Quod autem est naturale sicut consequens materiam, non semper actu inest, sed quandoque secundum potentiam tantum. Nam forma est actus, materia vero potentia.
In the case of natural things, that which is natural, as a result of the form only, is always in them actually, as heat is in fire. But that which is natural as a result of matter, is not always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality: because form is act, whereas matter is potentiality.
Et similiter non oportet quod voluntas, quae de potentia in actum reducitur dum aliquid vult, semper actu velit, sed solum quando est in aliqua dispositione determinata. Voluntas autem Dei, quae est actus purus, semper est in actu volendi.
And in like manner it is not necessary that the will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills something), should always be in the act of volition; but only when it is in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will, which is pure act, is always in the act of volition.
Saturday, January 02, 2010
1a 2ae q9 a6: Whether the will is moved by God alone, as exterior principle? Yes.
Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis motor, ad universale obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum, quia sine hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle.
God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good, because without this universal motion, man cannot will anything.
Sed homo per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud, quod est vere bonum vel apparens bonum. Sed tamen interdum specialiter Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum, quod est bonum, sicut in his quos movet per gratiam, ut infra dicetur.
But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later on (q109, a2).
Sic ergo hominem, voluntatem habentem, contingit moveri ab aliquo qui non est causa eius, sed quod motus voluntarius eius sit ab aliquo principio extrinseco quod non est causa voluntatis, est impossibile.
Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something that is not his cause; but that his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle that is not the cause of his will, is impossible.
Voluntatis autem causa nihil aliud esse potest quam Deus. Et hoc patet dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex hoc quod voluntas est potentia animae rationalis, quae a solo Deo causatur per creationem, ut in primo dictum est. Secundo vero ex hoc patet, quod voluntas habet ordinem ad universale bonum.
Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was stated in Ia, q90, a2. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good.
Unde nihil aliud potest esse voluntatis causa, nisi ipse Deus, qui est universale bonum. Omne autem aliud bonum per participationem dicitur, et est quoddam particulare bonum, particularis autem causa non dat inclinationem universalem. Unde nec materia prima, quae est in potentia ad omnes formas, potest causari ab aliquo particulari agente.
Wherefore nothing else can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal good: while every other good is good by participation, and is some particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination. Hence neither can primary matter, which is potentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent.
God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good, because without this universal motion, man cannot will anything.
Sed homo per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud, quod est vere bonum vel apparens bonum. Sed tamen interdum specialiter Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum, quod est bonum, sicut in his quos movet per gratiam, ut infra dicetur.
But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later on (q109, a2).
Sic ergo hominem, voluntatem habentem, contingit moveri ab aliquo qui non est causa eius, sed quod motus voluntarius eius sit ab aliquo principio extrinseco quod non est causa voluntatis, est impossibile.
Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something that is not his cause; but that his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle that is not the cause of his will, is impossible.
Voluntatis autem causa nihil aliud esse potest quam Deus. Et hoc patet dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex hoc quod voluntas est potentia animae rationalis, quae a solo Deo causatur per creationem, ut in primo dictum est. Secundo vero ex hoc patet, quod voluntas habet ordinem ad universale bonum.
Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was stated in Ia, q90, a2. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good.
Unde nihil aliud potest esse voluntatis causa, nisi ipse Deus, qui est universale bonum. Omne autem aliud bonum per participationem dicitur, et est quoddam particulare bonum, particularis autem causa non dat inclinationem universalem. Unde nec materia prima, quae est in potentia ad omnes formas, potest causari ab aliquo particulari agente.
Wherefore nothing else can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal good: while every other good is good by participation, and is some particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination. Hence neither can primary matter, which is potentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)