Thursday, August 27, 2009

Q116 A4: Whether all things are subject to fate?

No. All things are not subject to fate because whatever is done immediately by God, since it is not subject to secondary causes, neither is it subject to fate.

Omnia non subduntur fato quia sunt quae immediate a Deo fiunt, cum non subdantur secundis causis, non subduntur fato.

As stated above (Q116 A2), fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to secondary causes, is subject also to fate.

Sicut supra dictum est, fatum est ordinatio secundarum causarum ad effectus divinitus provisos. Quaecumque igitur causis secundis subduntur, ea subduntur et fato.

Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate." Such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like.

Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol., quod "quaedam quae sub providentia locata sunt, fati seriem superant": sicut creatio rerum, glorificatio spiritualium substantiarum, et alia huiusmodi.

Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "those things which are nigh to God have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence it is clear that "the further a thing is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate", since so much the more it is bound up with secondary causes.

Boetius dicit, quod "ea quae sunt primae divinitati propinqua, stabiliter fixa, fatalis ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. Ex quo etiam patet quod quanto aliquid longius a prima mente discedit, nexibus fati maioribus implicatur", quia magis subiicitur necessitati secundarum causarum.