Wednesday, May 20, 2009

Q95 A1: Whether the first man was created in grace?

Yes. If the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein, because such a subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature, otherwise it would have remained after sin (since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared [Div. Nom. iv]).

Si deserente gratia soluta est obedientia carnis ad animam, quod per gratiam in anima existentem inferiora ei subdebantur
, quia illa subiectio corporis ad animam, et inferiorum virium ad rationem, non erat naturalis, alioquin post peccatum mansisset (cum etiam in Daemonibus data naturalia post peccatum permanserint, ut Dionysius dicit cap. IV de Div. Nom.)

Though man was created in grace, yet it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added.

Etsi homo fuerit creatus in gratia, non tamen habuit ex creatione naturae quod posset proficere per meritum, sed ex superadditione gratiae.

We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit grace by an act of nature.

Gloriam meremur per actum gratiae, non autem gratiam per actum naturae.

The very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in grace, according to Ecclesiastes 7:30, "God made man right." For this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as Augustine says [Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 16.

Sed quod etiam fuerit conditus in gratia ... videtur requirere ipsa rectitudo primi status, in qua Deus hominem fecit, secundum illud Eccle. VII, "Deus fecit hominem rectum." Erat enim haec rectitudo secundum hoc, quod ratio subdebatur Deo, rationi vero inferiores vires, et animae corpus. Prima autem subiectio erat causa et secundae et tertiae, quandiu enim ratio manebat Deo subiecta, inferiora ei subdebantur, ut Augustinus dicit.

The primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, "as soon as they disobeyed the Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience."

Illa prima subiectio, qua ratio Deo subdebatur, non erat solum secundum naturam, sed secundum supernaturale donum gratiae; non enim potest esse quod effectus sit potior quam causa. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIII de Civ. Dei, quod "posteaquam praecepti facta transgressio est, confestim, gratia deserente divina, de corporum suorum nuditate confusi sunt, senserunt enim motum inobedientis carnis suae, tanquam reciprocam poenam inobedientiae suae."