Q97 A4: Whether in the state of innocence man would have acquired immortality by the tree of life?

Yes. The tree of life in a certain degree was the cause of immortality, but not absolutely, because its effect was to strengthen the force of the species against the weakness resulting from the admixture of extraneous nutriment.

Lignum vitae quodammodo immortalitatem causabat, non autem simpliciter, quia habebat virtutem fortificandi virtutem speciei contra debilitatem provenientem ex admixtione extranei.

Yet it did not absolutely cause immortality; for neither was the soul's intrinsic power of preserving the body due to the tree of life, nor was it of such efficiency as to give the body a disposition to immortality, whereby it might become indissoluble; which is clear from the fact that every bodily power is finite; so the power of the tree of life could not go so far as to give the body the prerogative of living for an infinite time, but only for a definite time.

Non tamen simpliciter immortalitatem causabat. Quia neque virtus quae inerat animae ad conservandum corpus, causabatur ex ligno vitae, neque etiam poterat immortalitatis dispositionem corpori praestare, ut nunquam dissolvi posset. Quod ex hoc patet, quia virtus cuiuscumque corporis est finita. Unde non poterat virtus ligni vitae ad hoc se extendere ut daret corpori virtutem Durandi tempore infinito, sed usque ad determinatum tempus.

For it is manifest that the greater a force is, the more durable is its effect; therefore, since the power of the tree of life was finite, man's life was to be preserved for a definite time by partaking of it once; and when that time had elapsed, man was to be either transferred to a spiritual life, or had need to eat once more of the tree of life.

Manifestum est enim quod, quanto aliqua virtus est maior, tanto imprimit durabiliorem effectum. Unde cum virtus ligni vitae esset finita, semel sumptum praeservabat a corruptione usque ad determinatum tempus; quo finito, vel homo translatus fuisset ad spiritualem vitam, vel indiguisset iterum sumere de ligno vitae.

Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "Man had food to appease his hunger, drink to slake his thirst; and the tree of life to banish the breaking up of old age".

Unde Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod "cibus aderat homini ne esuriret, potus ne sitiret, et lignum vitae ne senectus eum dissolveret".

Q97 A3: Whether in the state of innocence man had need of food?

Yes. In the state of innocence man had an animal life requiring food, but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual life needing no food, because the immortality of the primitive state was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on any intrinsic disposition of the body.

Homo in statu innocentiae habuit vitam animalem cibis indigentem; post resurrectionem vero habebit vitam spiritualem cibis non indigentem, quia immortalitas primi status erat secundum vim quandam supernaturalem in anima residentem; non autem secundum aliquam dispositionem corpori inhaerentem.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that the rational soul is both soul and spirit. It is called a soul by reason of what it possesses in common with other souls--that is, as giving life to the body; whence it is written (Genesis 2:7): "Man was made into a living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body. But the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to itself, and not to other souls, as possessing an intellectual immaterial power.

Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod anima rationalis et anima est et spiritus. Dicitur autem esse anima secundum illud quod est sibi commune et aliis animabus, quod est vitam corpori dare, unde dicitur Gen. II, factus est homo in animam viventem, idest vitam corpori dantem. Sed spiritus dicitur secundum illud quod est proprium sibi et non aliis animabus, quod scilicet habeat virtutem intellectivam immaterialem.

Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the body what belonged to itself as a soul; and so the body was called "animal" [From 'anima', a soul; Cf. 1 Corinthians 15:44 seqq.], through having its life from the soul. Now the first principle of life in these inferior creatures as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) is the vegetative soul: the operations of which are the use of food, generation, and growth. Wherefore such operations befitted man in the state of innocence.

In primo igitur statu anima rationalis communicabat corpori id quod competit ei inquantum est anima, et ideo corpus illud dicebatur animale, inquantum scilicet habebat vitam ab anima. Primum autem principium vitae in istis inferioribus, ut dicitur in libro de anima, est anima vegetabilis, cuius opera sunt alimento uti et generare et augeri. Et ideo haec opera homini in primo statu competebant.

But in the final state, after the resurrection, the soul will, to a certain extent, communicate to the body what properly belongs to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone; impassibility, glory, and power to the good, whose bodies will be called "spiritual." So, after the resurrection, man will not require food; whereas he required it in the state of innocence.

In ultimo vero statu post resurrectionem, anima communicabit quodammodo corpori ea quae sunt sibi propria inquantum est spiritus, immortalitatem quidem, quantum ad omnes; impassibilitatem vero et gloriam et virtutem, quantum ad bonos, quorum corpora spiritualia dicentur. Unde post resurrectionem homines cibis non indigebunt, sed in statu innocentiae eis indigebant.

Some say that in the state of innocence man would not have taken more than necessary food, so that there would have been nothing superfluous; which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as implying that there would have been no faecal matter. Wherefore there was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to be decorous and suitable to the state.

Quidam dicunt quod homo in statu innocentiae non assumpsisset de cibo nisi quantum fuisset ei necessarium, unde non fuisset ibi superfluitatum emissio. Sed hoc irrationabile videtur, quod in cibo assumpto non esset aliqua faeculentia, quae non esset apta ut converteretur in hominis nutrimentum. Unde oportebat superfluitates emitti. Tamen fuisset divinitus provisum ut nulla ex hoc indecentia esset.

Q97 A2: Whether in the state of innocence man would have been passible?

No. Man was impassible, both in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal, because he could curb his passion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin.

Erat impassibilis et secundum animam et secundum corpus, sicut et immortalis, poterat enim passionem prohibere, sicut et mortem, si absque peccato perstitisset.

Man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a hard body: partly by the use of his reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by Divine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful nature could come upon him unawares.

Corpus hominis in statu innocentiae poterat praeservari ne pateretur laesionem ab aliquo duro: partim quidem per propriam rationem, per quam poterat nociva vitare; partim etiam per divinam providentiam, quae sic ipsum tuebatur, ut nihil ei occurreret ex improviso, a quo laederetur.

But "passion" can be taken in a general sense for any kind of change, even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus understanding and sensation are said to be passions. In this second sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and was passive both in soul and body.

Dicitur passio communiter, secundum quamcumque mutationem, etiam si pertineat ad perfectionem naturae; sicut intelligere vel sentire dicitur pati quoddam. Hoc igitur secundo modo, homo in statu innocentiae passibilis erat, et patiebatur, et secundum animam et secundum corpus.

Q97 A1: Whether in the state of innocence man would have been immortal?

Yes. Man was immortal before sin, because a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient cause.

Ante peccatum homo erat immortalis, quia dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex parte causae efficientis.

For man's body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it remained itself subject to God.

Non enim corpus eius erat indissolubile per aliquem immortalitatis vigorem in eo existentem; sed inerat animae vis quaedam supernaturaliter divinitus data, per quam poterat corpus ab omni corruptione praeservare, quandiu ipsa Deo subiecta mansisset.

This power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this was reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature was to be restored into something better, as we shall explain further on (III, Q14, A4, ad 1).

Vis illa praeservandi corpus a corruptione, non erat animae humanae naturalis, sed per donum gratiae. Et quamvis gratiam recuperaverit ad remissionem culpae et meritum gloriae, non tamen ad amissae immortalitatis effectum. Hoc enim reservabatur Christo, per quem naturae defectus in melius reparandus erat, ut infra dicetur.

The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of innocence.

Differt immortalitas gloriae, quae promittitur in praemium, ab immortalitate quae fuit homini collata in statu innocentiae.

It is written (Romans 5:12): "By sin death came into the world."

Dicitur ad Rom. V, quod "per peccatum intravit mors in mundum".

Q97: The preservation of the individual in the primitive state

1. Was man in the state of innocence immortal?
2. Was he impassible?
3. Did he stand in need of food?
4. Would he have obtained immortality by the tree of life?

Q96 A4: Whether in the state of innocence man would have been master over man?

Yes. It was not beneath the dignity of the state of innocence that one man should be subject to another, because a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common good.

Non est contra dignitatem status innocentiae, quod homo homini dominaretur, quia dominatur aliquis alteri ut libero, quando dirigit ipsum ad proprium bonum eius qui dirigitur, vel ad bonum commune.

Mastership has a twofold meaning. First, as opposed to slavery, in which sense a master means one to whom another is subject as a slave. In another sense mastership is referred in a general sense to any kind of subject; and in this sense even he who has the office of governing and directing free men, can be called a master. In the state of innocence man could have been a master of men, not in the former but in the latter sense.

Dominium accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod opponitur servituti, et sic dominus dicitur cui aliquis subditur ut servus. Alio modo accipitur dominium, secundum quod communiter refertur ad subiectum qualitercumque, et sic etiam ille qui habet officium gubernandi et dirigendi liberos, dominus dici potest. Primo ergo modo accepto dominio, in statu innocentiae homo homini non dominaretur, sed secundo modo accepto dominio, in statu innocentiae homo homini dominari potuisset.

Since every man's proper good is desirable to himself, and consequently it is a grievous matter to anyone to yield to another what ought to be one's own, therefore such dominion implies of necessity a pain inflicted on the subject; and consequently in the state of innocence such a mastership could not have existed between man and man.

Quia unicuique est appetibile proprium bonum, et per consequens contristabile est unicuique quod illud bonum quod deberet esse suum, cedat alteri tantum; ideo tale dominium non potest esse sine poena subiectorum. Propter quod, in statu innocentiae non fuisset tale dominium hominis ad hominem.

Man is naturally a social being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless under the presidency of one to look after the common good.

Homo naturaliter est animal sociale, unde homines in statu innocentiae socialiter vixissent. Socialis autem vita multorum esse non posset, nisi aliquis praesideret, qui ad bonum commune intenderet.

Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 14): "Just men command not by the love of domineering, but by the service of counsel", and (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): "The natural order of things requires this; and thus did God make man."

Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod "iusti non dominandi cupiditate imperant, sed officio consulendi; hoc naturalis ordo praescribit, ita Deus hominem condidit."

Q96 A3: Whether men were equal in the state of innocence?

No. In the primitive state, which was most proper and orderly, inequality would have existed, because order chiefly consists in inequality.

In primo statu, qui decentissimus fuisset, disparitas inveniretur, quia ordo maxime videtur in disparitate consistere.

Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper place."

Dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, "ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio."

As regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to righteousness and knowledge.

Secundum animam diversitas fuisset, et quantum ad iustitiam et quantum ad scientiam.

In the primitive state there would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because generation depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age; for some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union have been sterile.

Necesse est dicere aliquam disparitatem in primo statu fuisse, ad minus quantum ad sexum, quia sine diversitate sexus, generatio non fuisset. Similiter etiam quantum ad aetatem, sic enim quidam ex aliis nascebantur; nec illi qui miscebantur, steriles erant.

There might also have been bodily disparity.

Ex parte etiam corporis, poterat esse disparitas.

Q96 A2: Whether man had mastership over all other creatures?

Yes. In the state of innocence man would not have had mastership over all other creatures, because man in a certain sense contains all things, and so according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way he can have mastership over other things.

Homo habuisset dominium super omnes alias creaturas, quia in homine quodammodo sunt omnia, et ideo secundum modum quo dominatur his quae in seipso sunt, secundum hunc modum competit ei dominari aliis.

Now we may consider four things in man: his "reason," which makes him like to the angels'; his "sensitive powers," whereby he is like the animals; his "natural forces," which liken him to the plants; and "the body itself," wherein he is like to inanimate things.

Est autem in homine quatuor considerare, scilicet rationem, secundum quam convenit cum Angelis; vires sensitivas, secundum quas convenit cum animalibus; vires naturales, secundum quas convenit cum plantis; et ipsum corpus, secundum quod convenit cum rebus inanimatis.

Now in man reason has the position of a master and not of a subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over the angels in the primitive state; so when we read "all creatures," we must understand the creatures which are not made to God's image.

Ratio autem in homine habet locum dominantis, et non subiecti dominio. Unde homo Angelis non dominabatur in primo statu, et quod dicitur omni creaturae, intelligitur quae non est ad imaginem Dei.

Over the sensitive powers, as the irascible and concupiscible, which obey reason in some degree, the soul has mastership by commanding. So in the state of innocence man had mastership over the animals by commanding them.

Viribus autem sensitivis, sicut irascibili et concupiscibili, quae aliqualiter obediunt rationi, dominatur anima imperando. Unde et in statu innocentiae animalibus aliis per imperium dominabatur.

But of the natural powers and the body itself man is master not by commanding, but by using them. Thus also in the state of innocence man's mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted not in commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them without hindrance.

Viribus autem naturalibus, et ipsi corpori, homo dominatur non quidem imperando, sed utendo. Et sic etiam homo in statu innocentiae dominabatur plantis et rebus inanimatis, non per imperium vel immutationem, sed absque impedimento utendo eorum auxilio.

Q96 A1: Whether Adam in the state of innocence had mastership over the animals?

Yes. In the state of innocence, before man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him, because for his disobedience to God, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which should be subject to him.

In statu innocentiae, ante inobedientiam praedictam, nihil ei repugnabat quod naturaliter deberet ei esse subiectum, quia inobedientia ad hominem eorum quae ei debent esse subiecta, subsecuta est in poenam eius, eo quod ipse fuit inobediens Deo.

Now all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be proved in three ways.

Omnia autem animalia sunt homini naturaliter subiecta. Quod apparet ex tribus.

It is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be master over animals. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5) that the hunting of wild animals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises a natural right.

Naturaliter homo dominatur animalibus. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in I Politic., quod venatio sylvestrium animalium est iusta et naturalis, quia per eam homo vindicat sibi quod est naturaliter suum.

As man, being made to the image of God, is above other animals, these are rightly subject to his government.

Cum homo sit supra cetera animalia, utpote ad imaginem Dei factus, convenienter eius gubernationi alia animalia subduntur.

Thirdly, this is proved from a property of man and of other animals. For we see in the latter a certain participated prudence of natural instinct, in regard to certain particular acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence as regards all practical matters.

Tertio apparet idem ex proprietate hominis, et aliorum animalium. In aliis enim animalibus invenitur, secundum aestimationem naturalem, quaedam participatio prudentiae ad aliquos particulares actus, in homine autem invenitur universalis prudentia, quae est ratio omnium agibilium.

In the state of innocence man would not have had any bodily need of animals--neither for clothing, since then they were naked and not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of concupiscence--nor for food, since they fed on the trees of paradise--nor to carry him about, his body being strong enough for that purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experimental knowledge of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God led the animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of their respective natures.

Homines in statu innocentiae non indigebant animalibus ad necessitatem corporalem, neque ad tegumentum, quia nudi erant, et non erubescebant, nullo instante inordinatae concupiscentiae motu; neque ad cibum, quia lignis Paradisi vescebantur; neque ad vehiculum, propter corporis robur. Indigebant tamen eis ad experimentalem cognitionem sumendam de naturis eorum. Quod significatum est per hoc, quod Deus ad eum animalia adduxit, ut eis nomina imponeret, quae eorum naturas designant.

All animals by their natural instinct have a certain participation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the fact that cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present state some domestic animals obey him.

Alia animalia habent quandam participationem prudentiae et rationis secundum aestimationem naturalem; ex qua contingit quod grues sequuntur ducem, et apes obediunt regi. Et sic tunc omnia animalia per seipsa homini obedivissent, sicut nunc quaedam domestica ei obediunt.

Q96: The mastership belonging to man in the state of innocence

1. Was man in the state of innocence master over the animals?
2. Was he master over all creatures?
3. In the state of innocence, were all men equal?
4. Would man in that state have been master over men?

Q95 A4: Whether the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are?

No. In the state of innocence man's works were more meritorious than after sin was committed, if we consider the degree of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more copious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature; and in like manner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; because, as man would have had greater virtue, he would have performed greater works.

Efficaciora fuissent hominis opera ad merendum in statu innocentiae quam post peccatum, si attendatur quantitas meriti ex parte gratiae, quae tunc copiosior fuisset, nullo obstaculo in natura humana invento; similiter etiam, si consideretur absoluta quantitas operis; quia, cum homo esset maioris virtutis, maiora opera fecisset.

But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason for merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness; because a small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with difficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily.

Sed si consideretur quantitas proportionalis, maior invenitur ratio meriti post peccatum, propter hominis imbecillitatem, magis enim excedit parvum opus potestatem eius qui cum difficultate operatur illud, quam opus magnum potestatem eius qui sine difficultate operatur.

After sin man requires grace for more things than before sin, but he does not need grace more, inasmuch as man even before sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief reason for the need of grace. But after sin man required grace also for the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness.

Homo post peccatum ad plura indiget gratia quam ante peccatum, sed non magis. Quia homo, etiam ante peccatum, indigebat gratia ad vitam aeternam consequendam, quae est principalis necessitas gratiae. Sed homo post peccatum, super hoc, indiget gratia etiam ad peccati remissionem, et infirmitatis sustentationem.

Q95 A3: Whether Adam had all the virtues?

Yes. In the state of innocence man in a certain sense possessed all the virtues, because such was the rectitude of the primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason.

In statu innocentiae aliqualiter habuit omnes virtutes, quia talis erat rectitudo primi status, quod ratio erat Deo subiecta, inferiores autem vires rationi.

Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in the Treatise on the Virtues (I-II, 63, 2). Wherefore the rectitude of the primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every virtue.

Virtutes autem nihil aliud sunt quam perfectiones quaedam, quibus ratio ordinatur in Deum, et inferiores vires disponuntur secundum regulam rationis; ut magis patebit cum de virtutibus agetur. Unde rectitudo primi status exigebat ut homo aliqualiter omnes virtutes haberet.

The perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of the Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the primitive state, both as to habit and as to act. But any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; for instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin committed; and mercy, which is sorrow for others' unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and unhappiness are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but not as to their acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if there had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness in his neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy it.

Perfectio enim primi status non se extendebat ad hoc, ut videret Deum per essentiam, et ut haberet eum cum fruitione finalis beatitudinis, unde fides et spes esse poterant in primo statu, et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum. Si vero imperfectio quae est de ratione virtutis alicuius, repugnat perfectioni primi status, poterat huiusmodi virtus ibi esse secundum habitum, sed non secundum actum, ut patet de poenitentia, quae est dolor de peccato commisso, et de misericordia, quae est dolor de miseria aliena; perfectioni enim primi status repugnat tam dolor, quam culpa et miseria. Unde huiusmodi virtutes erant in primo homine secundum habitum, sed non secundum actum, erat enim primus homo sic dispositus, ut si peccatum praecessisset, doleret; et similiter si miseriam in alio videret, eam pro posse repelleret.

Q95 A2: Whether passions existed in the soul of the first man?

Yes. In the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason, so that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason, because our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is not entirely subject to reason; hence at times our passions forestall and hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's judgment, accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some extent.

In statu vero innocentiae inferior appetitus erat rationi totaliter subiectus, unde non erant in eo passiones animae, nisi ex rationis iudicio consequentes, quia in nobis appetitus sensualis, in quo sunt passiones, non totaliter subest rationi, unde passiones quandoque sunt in nobis praevenientes iudicium rationis, et impedientes; quandoque vero ex iudicio rationis consequentes, prout sensualis appetitus aliqualiter rationi obedit.

Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in Ethic. iii, 11.

Perfecta virtus moralis non totaliter tollit passiones, sed ordinat eas, "temperati enim est concupiscere sicut oportet, et quae oportet," ut dicitur in III Ethic.

Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that "in our first parents there was undisturbed love of God," and other passions of the soul.

Dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod erat in eis amor imperturbatus in Deum, et quaedam aliae animae passiones.

Q95 A1: Whether the first man was created in grace?

Yes. If the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein, because such a subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature, otherwise it would have remained after sin (since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared [Div. Nom. iv]).

Si deserente gratia soluta est obedientia carnis ad animam, quod per gratiam in anima existentem inferiora ei subdebantur, quia illa subiectio corporis ad animam, et inferiorum virium ad rationem, non erat naturalis, alioquin post peccatum mansisset (cum etiam in Daemonibus data naturalia post peccatum permanserint, ut Dionysius dicit cap. IV de Div. Nom.)

Though man was created in grace, yet it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added.

Etsi homo fuerit creatus in gratia, non tamen habuit ex creatione naturae quod posset proficere per meritum, sed ex superadditione gratiae.

We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit grace by an act of nature.

Gloriam meremur per actum gratiae, non autem gratiam per actum naturae.

The very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in grace, according to Ecclesiastes 7:30, "God made man right." For this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as Augustine says [Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 16.

Sed quod etiam fuerit conditus in gratia ... videtur requirere ipsa rectitudo primi status, in qua Deus hominem fecit, secundum illud Eccle. VII, "Deus fecit hominem rectum." Erat enim haec rectitudo secundum hoc, quod ratio subdebatur Deo, rationi vero inferiores vires, et animae corpus. Prima autem subiectio erat causa et secundae et tertiae, quandiu enim ratio manebat Deo subiecta, inferiora ei subdebantur, ut Augustinus dicit.

The primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, "as soon as they disobeyed the Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience."

Illa prima subiectio, qua ratio Deo subdebatur, non erat solum secundum naturam, sed secundum supernaturale donum gratiae; non enim potest esse quod effectus sit potior quam causa. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIII de Civ. Dei, quod "posteaquam praecepti facta transgressio est, confestim, gratia deserente divina, de corporum suorum nuditate confusi sunt, senserunt enim motum inobedientis carnis suae, tanquam reciprocam poenam inobedientiae suae."

Q95: Things pertaining to the first man's will--namely, grace and righteousness

1. Was the first man created in grace?
2. In the state of innocence, did he have passions of the soul?
3. Did he have all virtues?
4. Would what he did have been as meritorious as now?

Q94 A4: Whether man in his first state could be deceived?

No. As long as the state of innocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to assent to falsehood as if it were truth, because as some perfections, such as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members of the first man, though no evil could be therein, so there could be in his intellect the absence of some knowledge, but no false opinion.

Non poterat esse quod, innocentia manente, intellectus hominis alicui falso acquiesceret quasi vero, quia sicut membris corporis primi hominis erat quidem carentia perfectionis alicuius, puta claritatis, non tamen aliquod malum inesse poterat; ita in intellectu poterat esse carentia notitiae alicuius, nulla tamen poterat ibi esse existimatio falsi.

Were anything presented to the imagination or sense of the first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he would not have been deceived, because by its formal aspect he would have judged the truth.

Si aliquid repraesentatum fuisset sensui vel phantasiae primi hominis aliter quam sit in rerum natura, non tamen deciperetur, quia per rationem veritatem diiudicaret.

It is clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true (Q85, A6); and hence it is never deceived of itself; but whatever deception occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the imagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natural power of judgment is free we are not deceived by such images, but only when it is not free, as is the case in sleep. Therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state was incompatible with deception of the intellect.

Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod intellectus circa proprium obiectum semper verus est. Unde ex seipso nunquam decipitur, sed omnis deceptio accidit in intellectu ex aliquo inferiori, puta phantasia vel aliquo huiusmodi. Unde videmus quod, quando naturale iudicatorium non est ligatum, non decipimur per huiusmodi apparitiones, sed solum quando ligatur, ut patet in dormientibus. Unde manifestum est quod rectitudo primi status non compatiebatur aliquam deceptionem circa intellectum.

Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "To regard what is true as false, is not natural to man as created; but is a punishment of man condemned."

Augustinus dicit, "approbare vera pro falsis, non est natura instituti hominis, sed poena damnati."

If anyone had said something untrue as regards future contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in the primitive state would not have believed it was so: but he might have believed that such a thing was possible; which would not have been to entertain a false opinion.

Alicui dicenti falsum de contingentibus futuris vel cogitationibus cordium, homo in statu innocentiae non credidisset ita esse, sed credidisset quod hoc esset possibile, et hoc non esset existimare falsum.

It might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge did not extend.

Vel potest dici quod divinitus ei subventum fuisset, ne deciperetur in his quorum scientiam non habebat.

If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted, though he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that man had already sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to the Divine aid.

Nec est instantia, quam quidam afferunt, quod in tentatione non fuit ei subventum ne deciperetur, licet tunc maxime indigeret. Quia iam praecesserat peccatum in animo, et ad divinum auxilium recursum non habuit.

Though the woman was deceived before she sinned in deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman could not have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already acquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption of self-conceit."

Illa seductio mulieris, etsi praecesserit peccatum operis, subsecuta tamen est peccatum internae elationis. Dicit enim Augustinus, XI super Gen. ad Litt., quod "mulier verbis serpentis non crederet, nisi iam inesset menti eius amor propriae potestatis, et quaedam de se superba praesumptio."

Q94 A3: Whether the first man knew all things?

Yes. The first man had knowledge of all things by divinely infused species, because to Adam, as being the first man, was due to a degree of perfection which was not due to other men. (Yet his knowledge was not different in its formal aspect from ours; as the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind were not different in their formal aspect from those given by nature.)

Adam debebat aliquid habere perfectionis, inquantum erat primus homo, quod ceteris hominibus non competit, quia primus homo habuit scientiam omnium per species a Deo infusas. (Nec tamen scientia illa fuit alterius rationis a scientia nostra; sicut nec oculi quos caeco nato Christus dedit, fuerunt alterius rationis ab oculis quos natura produxit.)

Adam would have advanced in knowledge of naturally knowable things, not in the number of things known, but in the manner of knowing; because what he knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by experience. But as regards supernaturally known things, he would also have advanced as regards the number of things known, by further revelation; as the angels advance by further enlightenment. (Moreover there is no comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in merit; since one man cannot be a principle of merit to another, although he can be to another a principle of knowledge.)

Adam in scientia naturalium scibilium non profecisset quantum ad numerum scitorum, sed quantum ad modum sciendi, quia quae sciebat intellectualiter, scivisset postmodum per experimentum. Quantum vero ad supernaturalia cognita, profecisset etiam quantum ad numerum, per novas revelationes; sicut et Angeli proficiunt per novas illuminationes. (Nec tamen est simile de profectu meriti, et scientiae, quia unus homo non est alteri principium merendi, sicut est sciendi.)

In the natural order, perfection comes before imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality is made actual only by something actual. And since God created things not only for their own existence, but also that they might be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in their perfect state to be the principles as regards others.

Naturali ordine perfectum praecedit imperfectum, sicut et actus potentiam, quia ea quae sunt in potentia, non reducuntur ad actum nisi per aliquod ens actu. Et quia res primitus a Deo institutae sunt, non solum ut in seipsis essent, sed etiam ut essent aliorum principia; ideo productae sunt in statu perfecto, in quo possent esse principia aliorum.

Now man can be the principle of another man, not only by generation of the body, but also by instruction and government. Hence, as the first man was produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the work of generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others.

Homo autem potest esse principium alterius non solum per generationem corporalem, sed etiam per instructionem et gubernationem. Et ideo, sicut primus homo institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad corpus, ut statim posset generare; ita etiam institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad animam, ut statim posset alios instruere et gubernare.

Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge, and so the first man was established by God in such a manner as to have knowledge of all those things for which man has a natural aptitude. And such are whatever are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles, that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know.

Non potest autem aliquis instruere, nisi habeat scientiam. Et ideo primus homo sic institutus est a Deo, ut haberet omnium scientiam in quibus homo natus est instrui. Et haec sunt omnia illa quae virtualiter existunt in primis principiis per se notis, quaecumque scilicet naturaliter homines cognoscere possunt.

Moreover, in order to direct his own life and that of others, man needs to know not only those things which can be naturally known, but also things surpassing natural knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a supernatural end: just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of faith in order to direct our own lives.

Ad gubernationem autem vitae propriae et aliorum, non solum requiritur cognitio eorum quae naturaliter sciri possunt, sed etiam cognitio eorum quae naturalem cognitionem excedunt; eo quod vita hominis ordinatur ad quendam finem supernaturalem; sicut nobis, ad gubernationem vitae nostrae, necessarium est cognoscere quae fidei sunt.

Wherefore the first man was endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatural truths as was necessary for the direction of human life in that state. But those things which cannot be known by merely human effort, and which are not necessary for the direction of human life, were not known by the first man; such as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some individual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream; and the like.

Unde et de his supernaturalibus tantam cognitionem primus homo accepit, quanta erat necessaria ad gubernationem vitae humanae secundum statum illum. Alia vero, quae nec naturali hominis studio cognosci possunt, nec sunt necessaria ad gubernationem vitae humanae, primus homo non cognovit; sicut sunt cogitationes hominum, futura contingentia, et quaedam singularia, puta quot lapilli iaceant in flumine, et alia huiusmodi.

Q94 A2: Whether Adam in the state of innocence saw the angels through their essence?

No. That the soul of the first man fell short of the knowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact that the body was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural object fell short of the excellence of separate substances. We, in our present state, fall short on account of both these reasons.

Hoc quod anima primi hominis deficiebat ab intellectu substantiarum separatarum, non erat ex aggravatione corporis; sed ex hoc quod obiectum ei connaturale erat deficiens ab excellentia substantiarum separatarum. Nos autem deficimus propter utrumque.

Man's soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern the body.

Anima enim hominis in statu innocentiae erat corpori perficiendo et gubernando accommodata.

Since the soul is adapted to perfect and govern the body, as regards animal life, it is fitting that it should have that mode of understanding which is by turning to phantasms. Wherefore this mode of understanding was becoming to the soul of the first man also.

Anima est accommodata ad corporis gubernationem et perfectionem secundum animalem vitam, competit animae nostrae talis modus intelligendi, qui est per conversionem ad phantasmata. Unde et hic modus intelligendi etiam animae primi hominis competebat.

Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees of movement in the soul, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The first is by the soul "passing from exterior things to concentrate its powers on itself"; the second is by the soul ascending "so as to be associated with the united superior powers," namely the angels; the third is when the soul is "led on" yet further "to the supreme good," that is, to God.

Secundum autem hunc modum intelligendi, motus quidam invenitur in anima, ut Dionysius dicit IV cap. de Div. Nom., secundum tres gradus. Quorum primus est, secundum quod a rebus exterioribus congregatur anima ad seipsam; secundus autem est, prout anima ascendit ad hoc quod uniatur virtutibus superioribus unitis, scilicet Angelis; tertius autem gradus est, secundum quod ulterius manuducitur ad bonum quod est supra omnia, scilicet Deum.

In virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to itself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. This is because the intellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external things, as we have said above (Q87, A3): and so by the knowledge thereof, our intellectual operation can be known perfectly, as an act through its object. And through the intellectual operation itself, the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power through its proper act.

Secundum igitur primum processum animae, qui est a rebus exterioribus ad seipsam, perficitur animae cognitio. Quia scilicet intellectualis operatio animae naturalem ordinem habet ad ea quae sunt extra, ut supra dictum est, et ita per eorum cognitionem perfecte cognosci potest nostra intellectualis operatio, sicut actus per obiectum. Et per ipsam intellectualem operationem perfecte potest cognosci humanus intellectus, sicut potentia per proprium actum.

But in the second movement we do not find perfect knowledge. Because, since the angel does not understand by turning to phantasms, but by a far more excellent process, as we have said above (Q55, A2); the above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the soul knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of an angel.

Sed in secundo processu non invenitur perfecta cognitio. Quia, cum Angelus non intelligat per conversionem ad phantasmata, sed longe eminentiori modo, ut supra dictum est; praedictus modus cognoscendi, quo anima cognoscit seipsam, non sufficienter ducit in Angeli cognitionem.

Much less does the third movement lead to perfect knowledge: for even the angels themselves, by the fact that they know themselves, are not able to arrive at the knowledge of the Divine Substance, by reason of its surpassing excellence.

Multo autem minus tertius processus ad perfectam notitiam terminatur, quia etiam ipsi Angeli, per hoc quod cognoscunt seipsos, non possunt pertingere ad cognitionem divinae substantiae propter eius excessum.

Therefore the soul of the first man could not see the angels in their essence. Nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the angels than we possess, because his knowledge of intelligible things within him was more certain and fixed than our knowledge. And it was on account of this excellence of knowledge that Gregory says that "he enjoyed the company of the angelic spirits."

Sic igitur anima primi hominis non poterat videre Angelos per essentiam. Sed tamen excellentiorem modum cognitionis habebat de eis, quam nos habeamus, quia eius cognitio erat magis certa et fixa circa interiora intelligibilia, quam cognitio nostra. Et propter tantam eminentiam dicit Gregorius quod "intererat Angelorum spiritibus".

For Gregory says (Dialog. iv, 1): "In paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God; and by purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the good angels."

Dicit enim Gregorius, in IV Dialog., "in Paradiso quippe assueverat homo verbis Dei perfrui, beatorum Angelorum spiritibus cordis munditia et celsitudine visionis interesse."

Q94 A1: Whether the first man saw God through His Essence?

No. The first man in the primitive state of his natural life did not see God through His Essence because no one who sees the Essence of God can willingly turn away from God, which means to sin.

Primus homo, in primo statu animalis vitae, Deum per essentiam non vidit, quia nullus videns Deum per essentiam, potest voluntate averti a Deo, quod est peccare.

Man cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude, since naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns unhappiness.

Nullus homo potest per voluntatem a beatitudine averti, naturaliter enim, et ex necessitate, homo vult beatitudinem, et fugit miseriam.

Hence all who see God through His Essence are so firmly established in the love of God, that for eternity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear that he did not see God through His Essence.

Et propter hoc, omnes videntes Deum per essentiam, sic in amore Dei stabiliuntur, quod in aeternum peccare non possunt.

Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowledge than we do now. Thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our knowledge in the present state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see God through His Essence.

Cognoscebat tamen Deum quadam altiori cognitione quam nos cognoscamus, et sic quodammodo eius cognitio media erat inter cognitionem praesentis status, et cognitionem patriae, qua Deus per essentiam videtur.

God is seen in a much more perfect manner through His intelligible effects than through those which are only sensible or corporeal. But in his present state man is impeded as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible creatures, because he is distracted by and occupied with sensible things.

Multo eminentius videtur Deus per intelligibiles effectus, quam per sensibiles et corporeos. A consideratione autem plena et lucida intelligibilium effectuum impeditur homo in statu praesenti, per hoc quod distrahitur a sensibilibus, et circa ea occupatur.

The first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first truth, whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 33) that, "perhaps God used to speak to the first man as He speaks to the angels; by shedding on his mind a ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on him the experience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the Divine Essence." Therefore, through these intelligible effects of God, man knew God then more clearly than we know Him now.

Homo primus non impediebatur per res exteriores a clara et firma contemplatione intelligibilium effectuum, quos ex irradiatione primae veritatis percipiebat, sive naturali cognitione sive gratuita. Unde dicit Augustinus, in XI super Gen. ad Litt., quod "fortassis Deus primis hominibus antea loquebatur, sicut cum Angelis loquitur, ipsa incommutabili veritate illustrans mentes eorum; etsi non tanta participatione divinae essentiae, quantam capiunt Angeli." Sic igitur per huiusmodi intelligibiles effectus Dei, Deum clarius cognoscebat quam modo cognoscamus.

There was no need for the first man to attain to the knowledge of God by demonstration drawn from an effect, such as we need; since he knew God simultaneously in His effects, especially in the intelligible effects, according to His capacity.

Non enim oportebat primum hominem pervenire in Dei cognitionem per demonstrationem sumptam ab aliquo effectu, sicut nobis est necessarium; sed simul in effectibus, praecipue intelligibilibus, suo modo Deum cognoscebat.

Man was happy in paradise, but not with that perfect happiness to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence.

Homo in Paradiso beatus fuit, non illa perfecta beatitudine in quam transferendus erat, quae in divinae essentiae visione consistit.

The Apostle says (1 Corinthians 15:46): "That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural."

Apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XV, quod "non prius quod spirituale est, sed quod animale."

Q94: The state and condition of the first man as regards his intellect

1. Did the first man see the Essence of God?
2. Could he see the separate substances, that is, the angels?
3. Did he possess all knowledge?
4. Could he err or be deceived?

Q93 A9: Whether "likeness" is properly distinguished from "image"?

Yes. "Likeness" is not distinct from "image" in the general formal aspect of "likeness" (for thus it is included in the formal aspect of "image" itself), but is distinct so far as any "likeness" falls short of the formal aspect of "image," or again, as it perfects the "image", because we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation is perfect or imperfect.

Similitudo non distinguitur ab imagine secundum communem rationem similitudinis (sic enim includitur in ratione ipsius imaginis), sed secundum quod aliqua similitudo deficit a ratione imaginis, vel etiam est imaginis perfectiva, quia dicimus enim imaginem alicuius esse similem vel non similem ei cuius est imago, inquantum perfecte vel imperfecte repraesentat ipsum.

Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu. 51) that "the spirit" (namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the image of God. "But the other parts of man," belonging to the soul's inferior faculties, or even to the body, "are in the opinion of some made to God's likeness." In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the likeness of God is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings.

Sic ergo similitudo potest ab imagine distingui dupliciter. Uno modo, prout est praeambula ad ipsam, et in pluribus existens. Et sic similitudo attenditur secundum ea quae sunt communiora proprietatibus naturae intellectualis, secundum quas proprie attenditur imago. Et secundum hoc dicitur in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod spiritus, idest mens, ad imaginem Dei, nullo dubitante, factus est, cetera autem hominis, scilicet quae pertinent ad inferiores partes animae, vel etiam ad ipsum corpus, ad similitudinem facta esse aliqui volunt. Secundum hoc etiam in libro de quantitate animae dicitur quod similitudo Dei attenditur in anima, inquantum est incorruptibilis, nam corruptibile et incorruptibile sunt differentiae entis communis.

The soul's essence belongs to the "image," as representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the intellectual nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to general notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility.

Essentia animae pertinet ad imaginem, prout repraesentat divinam essentiam secundum ea quae sunt propria intellectualis naturae, non autem secundum conditiones consequentes ens in communi, ut est esse simplicem et indissolubilem.

But likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the expression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image implies "an intelligent being, endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man." In the same sense "likeness" is said to belong to "the love of virtue": for there is no virtue without love of virtue.

Alio modo potest considerari similitudo, secundum quod significat imaginis expressionem et perfectionem. Et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit quod "id quod est secundum imaginem, intellectuale significat, et arbitrio liberum per se potestativum, quod autem secundum similitudinem, virtutis, secundum quod homini possibile est inesse, similitudinem." Et ad idem refertur quod similitudo dicitur ad dilectionem virtutis pertinere, non enim est virtus sine dilectione virtutis.

Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural "likeness" exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to us the term "image" from one point of view and from another the term "likeness."

Etiam virtutes quaedam naturaliter insunt animae, ad minus secundum quaedam earum semina, et secundum has posset attendi similitudo naturalis. Quamvis non sit inconveniens ut id quod secundum assignationem unam dicitur imago, secundum aliam dicatur similitudo.

Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of "image"; but love of virtue belongs to "likeness," as virtue itself belongs to likeness.

Dilectio verbi, quod est amata notitia, pertinet ad rationem imaginis, sed dilectio virtutis pertinet ad similitudinem, sicut et virtus.

Q93 A8: Whether the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul only by comparison with God as its object?

Yes. We refer the Divine image in man to the word conceived by the knowledge of God, and to the love derived therefrom, because it is clear that diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love. (For the word conceived in the human mind is not the same in species concerning a rock or concerning a horse, nor is the love [for each the same] in species.)

Attenditur divina imago in homine secundum verbum conceptum de Dei notitia, et amorem exinde derivatum, quia diversitas obiectorum diversificat speciem verbi et amoris. (Non enim idem est specie in corde hominis verbum conceptum de lapide et de equo, nec idem specie amor.)

Thus the image of God is found in the soul according as the soul is referred to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to be referred to God.

Et sic imago Dei attenditur in anima secundum quod fertur, vel nata est ferri in Deum.

Now the mind is referred towards something in two ways: directly and immediately; or indirectly and mediately (as, for instance, when anyone sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be said to be referred towards that man).

Fertur autem in aliquid mens dupliciter: uno modo, directe et immediate; alio modo, indirecte et mediate (sicut cum aliquis, videndo imaginem hominis in speculo, dicitur ferri in ipsum hominem).

So Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 8), the "the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we perceive this, we perceive a trinity; not, indeed, God, but, nevertheless, rightly called the image of God." But this is due to the fact, not that the mind is referred to itself absolutely, but that thereby it can furthermore be referred to God.

Et ideo Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Trin., quod "mens meminit sui, intelligit se, et diligit se; hoc si cernimus, cernimus Trinitatem; nondum quidem Deum, sed iam imaginem Dei." Sed hoc est, non quia fertur mens in seipsam absolute, sed prout per hoc ulterius potest ferri in Deum.

Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 12): "The image of God exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself, loves itself, and understands itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love God by Whom it was made."

Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., quod "non propterea est Dei imago in mente, quia sui meminit, et intelligit et diligit se; sed quia potest etiam meminisse, intelligere et amare Deum, a quo facta est."

The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love as seen above (Q12, A12; Q56, A3; Q60, A5). This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can make use of reason, in which sense we have already said that the image of God abides ever in the soul; "whether this image of God be so obsolete," as it were clouded, "as almost to amount to nothing," as in those who have not the use of reason; "or obscured and disfigured," as in sinners; or "clear and beautiful," as in the just; as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6).

Meritoria Dei cognitio et dilectio non est nisi per gratiam. Est tamen aliqua Dei cognitio et dilectio naturalis, ut supra habitum est. Et hoc etiam ipsum naturale est, quod mens ad intelligendum Deum ratione uti potest, secundum quod imaginem Dei semper diximus permanere in mente, "sive haec imago Dei ita sit obsoleta," quasi obumbrata, "ut pene nulla sit," ut in his qui non habent usum rationis; "sive sit obscura atque deformis," ut in peccatoribus; "sive sit clara et pulchra," ut in iustis, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin.

By the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in God Himself; and such a vision of things temporal will belong to the image of God. This is what Augustine means (De Trin. xiv, 6), when he says that "in that nature to which the mind will blissfully adhere, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable". For in the Uncreated Word are the formal aspects of all creatures.

Secundum visionem gloriae, temporalia videbuntur in ipso Deo; et ideo huiusmodi temporalium visio ad Dei imaginem pertinebit. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., quod "in illa natura cui mens feliciter adhaerebit, immutabile videbit omne quod viderit". Nam et in ipso verbo increato sunt rationes omnium creaturarum.

Q93 A7: Whether the image of God is to be found in the acts of the soul?

Yes. The trinity in the mind, by reason of which man is like to God's image, must be referred to actual vision, because in our soul word "cannot exist without actual thought," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 7).

Trinitas quae est in mente, secundum quam homo est ad imaginem Dei, debet attendi secundum actualem visionem, quia verbum in anima nostra sine actuali cogitatione esse non potest, ut Augustinus dicit XIV de Trin.

Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word, and thence break forth into love.

Et ideo primo et principaliter attenditur imago Trinitatis in mente secundum actus, prout scilicet ex notitia quam habemus, cogitando interius verbum formamus, et ex hoc in amorem prorumpimus.

But, since the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein.

Sed quia principia actuum sunt habitus et potentiae, unumquodque autem virtualiter est in suo principio, secundario, et quasi ex consequenti, imago Trinitatis potest attendi in anima secundum potentias, et praecipue secundum habitus, prout in eis scilicet actus virtualiter existunt.

Thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything. But since it is not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers.

Et sic patet quod anima semper intelligit et amat se, non actualiter, sed habitualiter. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod, percipiendo actum suum, seipsam intelligit quandocumque aliquid intelligit. Sed quia non semper est actu intelligens, ut patet in dormiente, ideo oportet dicere quod actus, etsi non semper maneant in seipsis, manent tamen semper in suis principiis, scilicet potentiis et habitibus.

Wherefore, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 4): "If the rational soul is made to the image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and consider God, then the image of God was in the soul from the beginning of its existence."

Unde Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., "si secundum hoc facta est ad imaginem Dei anima rationalis, quod uti ratione atque intellectu ad intelligendum et conspiciendum Deum potest, ab initio quo esse coepit, fuit in ea Dei imago."

Q93 A6: Whether the image of God is in man as regards the mind only?

Yes. To be to the image of God belongs to the mind only because while in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of "image" as we have explained above (Q93, A1; Q93, A2); whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a "trace."

Esse ergo ad imaginem Dei pertinet solum ad mentem quia, cum in omnibus creaturis sit aliqualis Dei similitudo, in sola creatura rationali invenitur similitudo Dei per modum imaginis, ut supra dictum est, in aliis autem creaturis per modum vestigii.

Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures; wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a "trace," as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts, the rational creature can be likened.

Id autem in quo creatura rationalis excedit alias creaturas, est intellectus sive mens. Unde relinquitur quod nec in ipsa rationali creatura invenitur Dei imago, nisi secundum mentem. In aliis vero partibus, si quas habet rationalis creatura, invenitur similitudo vestigii; sicut et in ceteris rebus quibus secundum partes huiusmodi assimilatur.

We may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in which a "trace," and the way in which an "image," represents anything. An "image" represents something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a "trace" represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called "traces": so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army.

Cuius ratio manifeste cognosci potest, si attendatur modus quo repraesentat vestigium, et quo repraesentat imago. Imago enim repraesentat secundum similitudinem speciei, ut dictum est. Vestigium autem repraesentat per modum effectus qui sic repraesentat suam causam, quod tamen ad speciei similitudinem non pertingit, impressiones enim quae ex motu animalium relinquuntur, dicuntur vestigia; et similiter cinis dicitur vestigium ignis; et desolatio terrae, vestigium hostilis exercitus.

Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained (Q93, A2); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we consider their disposition.

Potest ergo huiusmodi differentia attendi inter creaturas rationales et alias creaturas, et quantum ad hoc quod in creaturis repraesentatur similitudo divinae naturae, et quantum ad hoc quod in eis repraesentatur similitudo Trinitatis increatae. Nam quantum ad similitudinem divinae naturae pertinet, creaturae rationales videntur quodammodo ad repraesentationem speciei pertingere, inquantum imitantur Deum non solum in hoc quod est et vivit, sed etiam in hoc quod intelligit, ut supra dictum est. Aliae vero creaturae non intelligunt; sed apparet in eis quoddam vestigium intellectus producentis, si earum dispositio consideretur.

Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have seen (Q28, A3); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced them.

Similiter, cum increata Trinitas distinguatur secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque, ut supra habitum est; in creatura rationali, in qua invenitur processio verbi secundum intellectum, et processio amoris secundum voluntatem, potest dici imago Trinitatis increatae per quandam repraesentationem speciei. In aliis autem creaturis non invenitur principium verbi, et verbum, et amor; sed apparet in eis quoddam vestigium quod haec inveniantur in causa producente.

For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end; as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by way of an "image" in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by way of a "trace."

Nam hoc ipsum quod creatura habet substantiam modificatam et finitam, demonstrat quod sit a quodam principio; species vero eius demonstrat verbum facientis, sicut forma domus demonstrat conceptionem artificis; ordo vero demonstrat amorem producentis, quo effectus ordinatur ad bonum, sicut usus aedificii demonstrat artificis voluntatem. Sic igitur in homine invenitur Dei similitudo per modum imaginis secundum mentem; sed secundum alias partes eius, per modum vestigii.

We must understand that when Scripture had said, "to the image of God He created him," it added, "male and female He created them," not to imply that the image of God came through the distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction.

Et ideo dicendum est quod Scriptura, postquam dixerat, "ad imaginem Dei creavit illum," addidit, "masculum et feminam creavit eos," non ut imago Dei secundum distinctiones sexuum attendatur, sed quia imago Dei utrique sexui est communis, cum sit secundum mentem, in qua non est distinctio sexuum.

Q93 A5: Whether the image of God is in man according to the Trinity of Persons?

Yes. In man there exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons, because also in God Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons.

Dicendum est in homine esse imaginem Dei et quantum ad naturam divinam, et quantum ad Trinitatem personarum, nam et in ipso Deo in tribus personis una existit natura.

As we have seen (Q40, A2), the distinction of the Divine Persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations of origin. Now the mode of origin is not the same in all things, but in each thing is adapted to the nature thereof; animated things being produced in one way, and inanimate in another; animals in one way, and plants in another.

Sicut supra habitum est, distinctio divinarum personarum non est nisi secundum originem, vel potius secundum relationes originis. Non autem est idem modus originis in omnibus, sed modus originis uniuscuiusque est secundum convenientiam suae naturae, aliter enim producuntur animata, aliter inanimata; aliter animalia, atque aliter plantae.

Wherefore it is manifest that the distinction of the Divine Persons is suitable to the Divine Nature; and therefore to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to the same image by the representation of the Divine Persons: but rather one follows from the other.

Unde manifestum est quod distinctio divinarum personarum est secundum quod divinae naturae convenit. Unde esse ad imaginem Dei secundum imitationem divinae naturae, non excludit hoc quod est esse ad imaginem Dei secundum repraesentationem trium personarum; sed magis unum ad alterum sequitur.

But, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 6), there is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: "We see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas we believe rather than see that God is Trinity."

Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit in XV de Trin., maxima est differentia huius Trinitatis quae est in nobis, ad Trinitatem divinam. Et ideo, ut ipse ibidem dicit, "Trinitatem quae in nobis est, videmus potius quam credimus, Deum vero esse Trinitatem, credimus potius quam videmus."

Q93 A4: Whether the image of God is found in every man?

Yes. The image of God, in its principal signification, namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman, because the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands and loves Himself; wherefore we see that the image of God is in human beings in three ways.

Tam in viro quam in muliere invenitur Dei imago quantum ad id in quo principaliter ratio imaginis consistit, scilicet quantum ad intellectualem naturam, quia imitatur intellectualis natura maxime Deum quantum ad hoc, quod Deus seipsum intelligit et amat; unde imago Dei tripliciter potest considerari in homine.

The first is found in all human beings, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed.

Prima ergo imago invenitur in omnibus hominibus; secunda in iustis tantum; tertia vero solum in beatis.

First, inasmuch as the human possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all humans.

Uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo habet aptitudinem naturalem ad intelligendum et amandum Deum, et haec aptitudo consistit in ipsa natura mentis, quae est communis omnibus hominibus.

Secondly, inasmuch as the human actually and habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace.

Alio modo, secundum quod homo actu vel habitu Deum cognoscit et amat, sed tamen imperfecte, et haec est imago per conformitatem gratiae.

Thirdly, inasmuch as the human knows and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory.

Tertio modo, secundum quod homo Deum actu cognoscit et amat perfecte, et sic attenditur imago secundum similitudinem gloriae.

Q93 A3: Whether the angels are more to the image of God than man is?

Yes. The image of God is more perfect in the angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more perfect, as is clear from what has been said (Q58, A3; Q79, A8).

Imago Dei est magis in Angelis quam sit in hominibus, quia intellectualis natura perfectior est in eis, ut ex supra dictis patet.

We may consider the image of God in man as regards its accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a certain imitation of God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to the whole world.

Potest considerari imago Dei in homine, quantum ad id in quo secundario consideratur, prout scilicet in homine invenitur quaedam Dei imitatio, inquantum scilicet homo est de homine, sicut Deus de Deo; et inquantum anima hominis est tota in toto corpore eius, et iterum tota in qualibet parte ipsius, sicut Deus se habet ad mundum.

In these and the like things the image of God is more perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of themselves belong to the formal aspect of the Divine image in man, unless we presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise even brute animals would be to God's image. Therefore, as in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, but that in some respects man is more like to God.

Et secundum haec et similia, magis invenitur Dei imago in homine quam in Angelo. Sed quantum ad hoc non attenditur per se ratio divinae imaginis in homine, nisi praesupposita prima imitatione, quae est secundum intellectualem naturam; alioquin etiam animalia bruta essent ad imaginem Dei. Et ideo, cum quantum ad intellectualem naturam Angelus sit magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo, simpliciter concedendum est Angelum magis esse ad imaginem Dei; hominem autem secundum quid.

Q93 A2: Whether the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures?

No. Things without intellect are not made to God's image because specific likeness follows the ultimate difference.

Ea quae non habent intellectum, non sunt ad imaginem Dei, quia similitudo speciei attenditur secundum ultimam differentiam.

But some things are like to God first and most commonly because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because they know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51) "approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to Him." It is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's image.

Assimilantur autem aliqua Deo, primo quidem, et maxime communiter, inquantum sunt; secundo vero, inquantum vivunt; tertio vero, inquantum sapiunt vel intelligunt. Quae, ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., "ita sunt Deo similitudine proxima, ut in creaturis nihil sit propinquius." Sic ergo patet quod solae intellectuales creaturae, proprie loquendo, sunt ad imaginem Dei.

Every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using the word "image" in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent, like to the Supreme Wisdom.

Quaelibet creatura est imago rationis exemplaris quam habet in mente divina. Sic autem non loquimur nunc de imagine, sed secundum quod attenditur secundum similitudinem in natura; prout scilicet primo enti assimilantur omnia, inquantum sunt entia; et primae vitae inquantum sunt viventia; et summae sapientiae, inquantum sunt intelligentia.

The universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest good.

Universum est perfectius in bonitate quam intellectualis creatura extensive et diffusive. Sed intensive et collective similitudo divinae perfectionis magis invenitur in intellectuali creatura, quae est capax summi boni.

Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12): "Man's excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of the field."

Dicit Augustinus, VI super Gen. ad Litt., "hoc excellit in homine, quia Deus ad imaginem suam hominem fecit, propter hoc quod dedit ei mentem intellectualem, qua praestat pecoribus."

Q93 A1: Whether the image of God is in man?

Yes. There is in man a likeness to God: not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but imperfect; because it is manifest that in man there is some likeness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy.

In homine dicitur esse imago Dei, non tamen perfecta, sed imperfecta; quia manifestum est quod in homine invenitur aliqua Dei similitudo, quae deducitur a Deo sicut ab exemplari; non tamen est similitudo secundum aequalitatem, quia in infinitum excedit exemplar hoc tale exemplatum.

And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was made "to" God's likeness; for the preposition "to" signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance.

Et hoc significat Scriptura, cum dicit hominem factum ad imaginem Dei; praepositio enim "ad" accessum quendam significat, qui competit rei distanti.

It is written (Genesis 1:26): "Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness."

Dicitur Gen. I, "faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram."

As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where an image exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness, there is not necessarily an image." Hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image; and that an image adds something to the formal aspect of likeness--namely, that it is copied from something else. For an "image" is so called because it is produced as an imitation of something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other egg, because it is not copied from it.

Sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., "ubi est imago, continuo est et similitudo; sed ubi est similitudo, non continuo est imago." Ex quo patet quod similitudo est de ratione imaginis, et quod imago aliquid addit supra rationem similitudinis, scilicet quod sit ex alio expressum, imago enim dicitur ex eo quod agitur ad imitationem alterius. Unde ovum, quantumcumque sit alteri ovo simile et aequale, quia tamen non est expressum ex illo, non dicitur imago eius.

But equality does not belong to the formal aspect of an image; for as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where there is an image there is not necessarily equality," as we see in a person's image reflected in a glass. Yet this is of the formal aspect of a perfect image; for in a perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy.

Aequalitas autem non est de ratione imaginis, quia, ut Augustinus ibidem dicit, "ubi est imago, non continuo est aequalitas"; ut patet in imagine alicuius in speculo relucente. Est tamen de ratione perfectae imaginis, nam in perfecta imagine non deest aliquid imagini, quod insit illi de quo expressa est.

The Apostle says (Colossians 1:15): "Who is the image of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature."

Dicit apostolus, ad Colos. I, "qui est imago Dei invisibilis, primogenitus omnis creaturae."

The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He is said to be the "Image," and never "to the image." But man is said to be both "image" by reason of the likeness; and "to the image" by reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to God cannot be except in an identical nature, the Image of God exists in His first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, who is of the same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as Augustine says explains in De decem Chordis (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De Tempore).

Primogenitus omnis creaturae est imago Dei perfecta, perfecte implens illud cuius imago est, et ideo dicitur imago, et nunquam ad imaginem. Homo vero et propter similitudinem dicitur imago; et propter imperfectionem similitudinis, dicitur ad imaginem. Et quia similitudo perfecta Dei non potest esse nisi in identitate naturae, imago Dei est in filio suo primogenito sicut imago regis in filio sibi connaturali; in homine autem sicut in aliena natura, sicut imago regis in nummo argenteo; ut patet per Augustinum in libro de decem chordis.

As unity means absence of division, a species is said to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one not only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to a certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature is one with God, or like to Him.

Cum unum sit ens indivisum, eo modo dicitur species indifferens, quo una. Unum autem dicitur aliquid non solum numero aut specie aut genere, sed etiam secundum analogiam vel proportionem quandam.

Q93: The end or term of the production of man

1. Is the image of God in man?
2. Is the image of God in irrational creatures?
3. Is the image of God in the angels more than in man?
4. Is the image of God in every man?
5. Is the image of God in man by comparison with the Essence, or with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them?
6. Is the image of God in man, as to his mind only?
7. Is the image of God in man's power or in his habits and acts?
8. Is the image of God in man by comparison with every object?
9. The difference between "image" and "likeness"

Q92 A4: Whether the woman was formed immediately by God?

Yes. God alone could produce either a man from the slime of the earth, or a woman from the rib of man, because God alone, the Author of nature, can produce an effect into existence outside the ordinary course of nature.

Solus Deus potuit vel virum de limo terrae, vel mulierem de costa viri formare, quia solus Deus, qui est naturae institutor, potest praeter naturae ordinem res in esse producere.

The natural generation of every species is from some determinate matter.

Uniuscuiusque speciei generatio naturalis est ex determinata materia.

As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15), we do not know whether the angels were employed by God in the formation of the woman; but it is certain that, as the body of man was not formed by the angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body of the woman formed by them from the man's rib.

Sicut Augustinus dicit IX super Gen. ad Litt., an ministerium Angeli exhibuerint Deo in formatione mulieris, nescimus; certum tamen est quod, sicut corpus viri de limo non fuit formatum per Angelos, ita nec corpus mulieris de costa viri.

The woman's body was produced in its causal aspects among the first created works, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15).

Sed secundum causales rationes corpus mulieris in primis operibus productum fuit, ut Augustinus dicit IX super Gen. ad Litt.

As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 18): "The first creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus; it made it possible for her to be thus made." Therefore the body of the woman did indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in the things first created: not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a potentiality passive in relation to the active potentiality of the Creator.

Sicut Augustinus in eodem libro dicit, "non habuit prima rerum conditio ut femina omnino sic fieret; sed tantum hoc habuit, ut sic fieri posset." Et ideo secundum causales rationes praeexsisit corpus mulieris in primis operibus: non secundum potentiam activam, sed secundum potentiam passivam tantum, in ordine ad potentiam activam creatoris.