Tristitia potest esse cum virtute quia ad virtutem pertinet quod tristetur moderate in quibus tristandum est, sicut etiam philosophus dicit in II Ethic.
Sorrow is compatible with virtue because moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful is a mark of virtue, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6,7).
Et hoc etiam utile est ad fugiendum mala: sicut enim bona propter delectationem promptius quaeruntur, ita mala propter tristitiam fortius fugiuntur.
Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.
Tristitia impedit operationem de qua tristamur, sed adiuvat ad ea promptius exequenda per quae tristitia fugitur.
Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful, but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.
De his quae quocumque modo repugnant virtuti, virtus moderate tristatur.
Virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how.
Tristitia immoderata est animae aegritudo, tristitia autem moderata ad bonam habitudinem animae pertinet, secundum statum praesentis vitae.
Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind, but moderate sorrow, in the present state of life, is the mark of a mind that is in a good state of affairs.
In beatis, in quibus nullum impedimentum sapientiae esse potest, tristitia locum non habet.
There is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom.