Secundum diversa genera scibilium, sunt diversi habitus scientiarum, cum tamen sapientia non sit nisi una, quia sapientia est quaedam scientia, inquantum habet id quod est commune omnibus scientiis (ut scilicet ex principiis conclusiones demonstret), sed quia habet aliquid proprium supra alias scientias, inquantum scilicet de omnibus iudicat, et non solum quantum ad conclusiones, sed etiam quantum ad prima principia, ideo habet rationem perfectioris virtutis quam scientia.
According to the different kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge, whereas there is but one wisdom, because wisdom is a kind of science, insofar as it has that which is common to all the sciences (viz., to demonstrate conclusions from principles), but since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it has the formal aspect of a more perfect virtue than science.
Quando ratio obiecti sub uno actu refertur ad potentiam vel habitum, tunc non distinguuntur habitus vel potentiae penes rationem obiecti et obiectum materiale.
When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object.
Principia vero demonstrationis possunt seorsum considerari, absque hoc quod considerentur conclusiones. Possunt etiam considerari simul cum conclusionibus, prout principia in conclusiones deducuntur. Considerare ergo hoc secundo modo principia, pertinet ad scientiam, quae considerat etiam conclusiones; sed considerare principia secundum seipsa, pertinet ad intellectum.
Yet the principles of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the conclusion being considered at all. Still, they can be considered together with the conclusions, since the conclusions can be deduced from them. Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs to science, which considers the conclusions also; while to consider the principles in themselves, belongs to understanding.
Scientia dependet ab intellectu sicut a principaliori. Et utrumque dependet a sapientia sicut a principalissimo, quae sub se continet et intellectum et scientiam, ut de conclusionibus scientiarum diiudicans, et de principiis earundem.
Science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the conclusions of science, and of the principles on which they are based.
Sapientia considerat altissimas causas, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Unde convenienter iudicat et ordinat de omnibus, quia iudicium perfectum et universale haberi non potest nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas.
Wisdom considers the highest causes, as stated in Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it fittingly judges all things and sets them in order, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not resolvable to the first causes.